SOCIOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000400280009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 22, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States withia..the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person lei prohibited
by law.
25X1
COUNTRY Bulgaria
SUBJECT Sociological and Political Attitudes DATE DISTR.
and Opinions
PLACE ACQUIRED
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
STATE #a 4 ARMY# D{ NAVYJt X AIR# X FBI AEC USIA ART
r
(NOTE: Wadungton distribution indicated by ")r'; Field distribution by "#".)
22. Janua:ry 1955
9
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/25X1
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COUNTRY Bulgaria
SUSA&".
Sociological and Political Attitudes
and Opinions
DATE OF INFORMATION
'PLACE ACQUIRED
DATE DI
STR.
Deo,22,1
954
NO., OF PAGE
S 8
REFERENCES:
THIS .1S;Ut . ALUATEDiNFORMATIC N
Domestic Politi'as
There was gossip that Chervenkov
was viewed with disfavor in Moscow and that he would like to assert
his independence from the Soviets but was too.weak to do anything.
Yugov had been rehabilitated in recent months but neither he nor any
of the party ao=nanded any particular influence among the 25X1
population; Chervenkov probably had the most in-
fluence, thanks to a widespread belief that Dimitrov had been murder-
ed by the Soviets and that Chervenkov, as Dimitrov?a close follower,
was possibly a potential opponent of theTIovietsa Ruben
Levi, who is said to have changed his name to Avranov, had been 25X1
criticized in the 'Communist press.
25X1
the average level of intelligence of
Party members had declined in recent yearso Five years ago, there
were more old ' members who were convinced dbmmunjets and whose member-
skip dated babk.to before.19kk s NQW - the: ?arty~t v+te recruiting stupid
but ambitious ~pe-ople from remote villages g l"t erd v s considerable
didcuesioo.aboutr bringing more member.' of-the intelligentsia into the
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Party but this was still mainly talk. At, the: reee'bt,time the: per?centage
of members secretly opposed to Communism was larger than fives or eight
years ago. As jobs were given more and more to the ambitious%,, selfish,
unprincipled, and opportunistic, in the future, the 25X1
Party would become an even more useful, though possibly less reliable,
tool its the hands of the Soviets than it had been to date.
The Bulgarian public was generally favorable to the emigrants but did
not know much about or take an' interest in the-activities of the
individual emigrants or emigrant groups. The monarchy no longer had
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much importance or much future in the eyes of most Bulgarians.
in the referendum shortly after the 'ar,
many people doted as an anti-Cotmunist 25X1
protest and not because they favored a monarchical system,
4. In the event of a political upset in Bulgaria, all agricultural
collectives and state farms would be swept away at once. There was
practically no.support in any section of the population for collectiviza-
tion in agriculture; however, Socialism might survive in industry.
Youth and Communism
6.
the proportion of convinced Communists among the
youth of twenty was no greater than among older age groups; ,n ant
case it was not more than five or ten percent of the total?
The, Dimitrov Union of National Youth (DSNM) was unpopular among young 25X1
people and was Quite ineffective in converting youth to Communism.
Nevertheless, the constant unchallenged repetition 25X1
of Communist propaganda partially succeeded in making people acquire
some Communist habits ,and ideas without their knowing it
Uooli anism waa a serious roblem but a non-political one ascribe'4
.
it to the lack of adequate recreational facilities for young. people 25X1
In Sofia and, its vicinity, there were only.two or three places where 25X1
young people could dance and enjoy themselves. There were a few
protected and pampered young peoples the children of Party leaders, 25X1
but= did not contributed more than its share to 25X1
the oountrys juvenile delinuents.
Amn,e-ty of Political.-Prisoners
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9. It was widely believed in Bulgaria that during summer 1954 a very large
number of inmates of concentration cam s had been set frees
probab
t ere would-
official announcement of amnesty on the nine September
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10, People were no longer as afraid as they had once been of being
arbitrarily arrested; however, there was as much caution as ever
about speaking openly. It was felt that any opposition to the
regime would be punished assete e3y as ever but that the authorities 25X1.
were now less likely to involve innocent people in such eases.
holiday. It was believed that the amnesty would set free persons
in prison and that the earlier unannounced releases had been con-
fined to inmates of the.labor camps or to persons who had never
been brought to trial; there were no rumors of releases of ordinar
criminals.
The Government's generally milder policy has
not increased public support for the regime because everyone saw
the change as only part of the latest shift in the Moscow line.
Attitudes toward New Economic Course
11.
most Bulgarians agreed that the so-called new
economic course was a.Communiast trick to weaken opposition to the
regime. Because living conditions,, better now than two years ago,
were worse than six years ago, and were far from pre-war living
standards, this trick had not changed Bulgarian public attitudes
toward the regime.. In 1939, prices of cOfrt dities in levas were
about the same as today but wages then were from three to five
times higher. This was the calculation people constantly made
and which convinced them that.many annual price reductions would be
required to raise. standards to.the pre-war level, A lack of 'con-
fidence in the future was also seen in the continued tears that
sooner or later another currency reform would be sprung on the
country.
12. The goals of the Government's industrialization program were approved
and there was a general impression that some progress was being
made toward industrializing the country. Nevertheless, the Govern-
ment claims about the amount of progress were disbelieved; official
statistics were seen as.mainly lies.: The-official line was that
the high level of investments in industry was imposing heavy
sacrifices on the present generation. This was, to some extent,
accepted by the population but nobody thought that the Indus-+:
trialization program was entirely, or even chiefly, responsible for
the catastrophic fall in living standards.
13 .
Communist organizational methods were mainly responsible for Bulgaria's
bad economic situation. There were more planners than workers. If
a factory ad trouble, its politically-appointed director, instead
of trying to cope with the trouble, spent most of his time writing
letters to his superiors to establish a paper record proving that
he was actively seeking a solution to the problem and that he-was
not responsible for the trouble. The multiplication of paper work
effectively protected the inefficient individual and brought the
econo to a. slowdown.
industrialization was not responsible for low living standards
police, soldiers, and bureaucrats, and the basic inefficiency of
the proliferation of unproductive
Communist mismanagement was responsible. How else?
construction of new dame And electriea-1. works, there were usually
two nights or more a week in August 1954 when electric current
failed in different parts of Sofia? The forced loans deducted
from peoples' salaries should have been enough to cover Investments
for industrialization without additional levies through fixing very
high prices for consumer goods.
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14. Soviet exploitation of Bulgaria was also partly responsible for the
country's continued low standard of living. When announcements were
made that the Bulgarian Government was sending help to North Korea,
people assumed that because it would be-uneconomical to send
Bulgarian help all the way to North Korea,..the"aid from Bulgaria
probably went instead to the Soviet Union'.` The latter apparently
sent some help to Korea, but..probably compensated itself for at least
part of this help by insisting on increased contributions from the
satellite countries.
15.
in mid-1953, at the Ministry
Sofia. she 9 p
tanks. Work was :.._ nearly finished on 28 tanks but when these
t
of National Defnse, considerable cuts were made in the Ministr s
funds for financing ' new" construction.
e cut to be 2 of that year's investment
plan. The cuts took the form of cancelling plans for new construc-
t.ion and reducing amounts which could be spent on projects already
under way. Because the 19.53 construction plans were apparently
larger. than the 1952 figures, actual 1953
outlay for construction large as that o the previous year.
The only specific example of a project which was
cut back was one for an oil tank storage farm about 20 km. from
1 53 lan called for construction of about 40 large
25X1
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L because there had. been no cut in the three-year term 25X1
of compulsory military service, there had been no such cut in.wsr
production.
ans.
were completed no work was started on the other 12
ere was no plan to build the remaining 12 tanks the
following year.
Religion in Bulgaria
1T. The subordination of the church to the regime had been of only minor
help in controlling the people. The government really was not so
much interested in getting support-from the church as it controlling
the church so that it would not be able to oppose the regime. The
election of Bulgaria's first Orthodox Patriarch of modern times had
left people indifferent. The.Patriarch was regarded as a Communist
tool, a careerist, who sold himself to the regime. Young people
were afraid to go to church except on major church holidays, when
nearly everyone, believer, and non-believer alike, went to church.
It was relatively safe to go to church in Sofia but a young person
in a small town who went very often would be in considerable danger
his job
i
.
ng
of being expelled from the DSNM;and of possibly los
L1_ 1 w ww1, a.4 AG1 ni+ofZ RT1 T%0
a influence of the church on the population 25X1
le
,
on the young peop
was declining. There seemed to be a general growth of indifference
to organized religion among young people. Fewer and fewer people
had church weddings. A church marriage customarily involved
excessively heavy expenditures on flowers, long dresses, etc., while
the registry office-marriages, which had to be performed first, were
free.
Foreim Affairs and the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
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19. There was no enthusiasm for Pan-Slavism. People were tired of
"Grandfather Ivan", as the USSR was called and would be glad to
have nothing to do with the Soviet Union. The Bulgarian people
were not anti-Soviet but believed the Communists were an oppressive'
minority in the USSR as in Bulgaria; they consequently felt that
the Soviets were, in a sense, fellow victims of Bolshevism. This
latent sympathy for the Soviets did not extend to Soviet citizens
who came to Bulgaria. These people were universally regarded as
ignorant carpetbaggers.
20. People read classical Russian books but were not interested in or
influenced by Soviet literature.
21.
22.
23q
Soviet Citizens. in Bulgaria
24.
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a s x-story apartment building on
Stalin Street, number 62, at the corner,of 'Patri'arch. EftJmj Street,
was reserved for Soviet personnel attached to the Ministry of Defense:
there were 15 flats in the building. The Ministry had a.garage at
Sezdika Street, No. 25, which operated.a motor pool' of about 30 cars
for Soviet citizens working in the Ministry. The drivers were
Bulgarian soldiers. On the basis of the above, the 25X1
total number of Soviet personnel with the Ministry would be between.
20 and
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25X1
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Sidelights on Bulgarian-Rumanian Relations
25X1
25. The tour to East Germany was delayed b
one da
y
y
because o unexplained difficulties in obtaining a Rumanian transit
visa for the group. At the Bulgarian-Rumanian border crossing point,
the two railway coaches in which the'Bulgarian party was travelling
were taken off the train, and held at the border from About 0600
hours until nearly noon. During that time, two trains departed for
Bucharest but the Rumanian customs officials pretended that some
questions about the group passport prevented them from allowing
the group to leave. The Bulgarians on the train were all convinced
that the delay was caused by the failure of the Bulgarians to bribe
the Rumanian officials with money, cigarettes, or liquor. The customs
examination was very superficial and none of the Bulgarians' luggage
was opened. The.Rumanians probably knew that the Bulgarians were
carrying considerable quantities of cigarettes and other contraband
for sale in East Germany and wanted a share of it,
26, One of the group claimed to have heard that the Bulgarian Deputy Prime
Minister, Georgi Traikov, was once held by Rumanian border guards at
a Soviet frontier for six hours and was only released and allowed to
proceed to Bucharest on his way to Bulgaria after he had telephoned
the Rumanian Communist leader, Groza. The Bulgarians ascribed this .~'
incident also to the sane notorious determination of the' Rumanian
officials to extort bribes on every too occasion rather than to
any political consideration. since Bulgaria regained 25X1
part of Dobrudja there is-no an - uman an feeling in Bulgaria. 25X1
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31.
42portunities for Travel Outside Bulgaria:
32, It is now fairly easy for Bulgarians to get permission to travel on
escorted tours to neighboring Satellite countries.
travel to East Germany were stiffer than for other Satellitesehts for
the chance to travel to East Germany rom an announcement
in. the window of the Balkanturist Agency office on Rakovski street
in Sofia. The trip was to include four days in Leipzig and two :Ln
Ea "t'Berlin. Tndivid?sal n",1 {.,aa-a.,..A
leach submitting his identity document, two photos,
aletter from his employer that the visit to Leipzig would help
him directly with his work. Salkanturist itself obtained a classified
letter on each applicant from the cadre section at his place of
employment. About 200 people applied for the approximately 50
available places in the tour. Balkanturist threw out about 50 names
of private persons with no plausible reason and sent the remainder
of the applications to the militia. The latter presumably made an
investigation of the applicants and then selected the .50 ost deserving
or reliable persons. A group passport was made out and given
directly to Balkanturist. The persons chosen had to submit an
additional 12 photos each.
selected were either married or relatively im
orta
ta$
ffi
p
n
o
cials or
Party members. The announcement of who was to go was made only
two days before the tour left.
34. A clerk at Balkanturist mentioned that applications might be accepted
later for escorted tours to the Soviet Union. There was no indication
of when such tours would begin, would go, or how large
they would be, some token tourist travel
of this sort would be allowed in the-near future, otherwise, nothing
would have been said of it at Balkanturist in this very vague way.
Protection _of Classified Information in Bulgarian Ministries
unclassified-
/ .. Vl Bone-yructilon was all
the n s ry of Defense, however, no visitors
were allowed and all documents had to be put away in a file room at
night. Blank sheets of tran6parent tracing paper were stamped secret
and registered in the file room. Torn and otherwise unuseable sheets
had to be returned to the file room where they were checked off the
register even though nothing might have been written on them, Brief
cages were inspected when people left the Ministry and occasionally
employees were searched.
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Prices of Imports from other Satellite Countries-
36.
in the Construction Plannin
Organization of the Ministry of Defense in December 1952,
a pump from Czechoslovakia was invoiced in rubles. The cost
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and multiplying that sum in levas by a coefficient of something
between 2.3 and 2.7. The coefficient was apparently the same for
all products in the same sate or
cost into Bulgarian currency at the official published exchange rate
to the Ministry of Defense was calculated by converting the ruble
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