1. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION 2. REDUCTION IN ARMAMENTS PRODUCTION TARGETS 3. POPULAR ATTITUDES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000400180006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 19, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
CONFIDENTIAL
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO.
PLACE ACQUIRED
25X1
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This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws. Title 18. U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited
by law.
REPORT NO.
REQUIREMENT NO.
REFERENCES
Poland.
1. Political and Edonomie Information DAT ` DISTR.
2. Reduction in Armaments Production Targets
3. Popular Attitudes NO. OF PAGES
NAVY
(NOTE: Washington disfribufi nkma
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114.28
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111.2
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134
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55M
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DENT] AL
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25X1
19 November 1954
10
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COUNTRY Poland
REPORT NO.
25X1
DATE D1 87R. 3,5 1954
SUBJECT 1. Political and Economic Information NO. OF PAGES 9
2w Reduction'in Armaments Production Targets
3. Popular Attitudes
DATE OF INFORMATION REFERENCES:
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
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Radio Listeninj
1. Glistened to the BBC German-language news broadcasts almost
every evening at home in Breslau until the spring of 194, when
25X1 jamming became so troublesome that he gave up trying to get the
broadcasts regularly. He used to listen to VOA and RFE broadcasts
occasionally, though not as often as to the BBC,.as he was mainly
interested in news, and the BBC transmissions gave him as much
news as he had time to hear. He had no comment to make about in-
dividual programs, beyond the remark that all of the foreign stations
should try to give as much news,as possible bearing on Poland. It
was his impression that jamming of Western broadcasts had increased
very sharply in the spring of 1954. Before that time it had usually
been possible to receive BBC, VOA and RFE.broadcasts without too
much trouble, and to listen to West German, Austrian, and Swiss German-
language cadc:gtts almost without interference. By the summer of 1954,
however, all foreign stations broadcasting in German or Polish were
very strongly jammed, so that people were beginning to give up trying
to follow foreign stations regularly. He.said that reception was
generally best.in..the middle-wave band and suggested that it might be
possible to combat jamming on short-wave by continually moving the
signal from side to side onethe wave band. The listeners who tuned in
on short-wave usually kept their hands on the dials anyway and would
be able to follow the signal easily enough, while the jamming stations
would probably be slower in keeping on the same frequency as the
Western station.
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Comment on Berlin and Geneva Conferences
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2. people in Poland were not very interested in the Berlin
25X1 and Geneva Conferences, as hardly anyone expected that the conferences
wotild"-produce any.results satisfactory to themselves or the ,West
generally. People have long ago given up hoping that the Russians
would ever give up any position they now hold except through defeat
in a world war. People accepted the official view that the settle-
ment of the war in Indochina was a victory for the Communists.
Everyone was convinced that the Communists would renew the fighting
at a later time more favorable to themselves.
Attitudes toward the USSR
3.
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4.
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the present, government in Moscow was as strong as in the time
of STALIN. The organization of the Party guaranteed that there
would always be a dictatorship in the Soviet Union. It didn't
matter who was dictator, as the Communist system itself would
survive regardless of who was at the top. No one man could hope
to challenge the system, as was shown by the elimination of BERIA.
Source agreed that there might be rivalries. among the Communist
leaders, but doubted if they would affect the Soviet Union's
power position in the world. He did not know that - KHRUSHCHEV had
replaced MALENKOV as Party Secretary. He felt that people in the
West placed far too much hope in the possibility that domestic.
discord might cripple the power of the USSR.
people in Poland generally, were greatly oppressed by
a sense o the enormous power and strength of the USSR. People
took it for granted that the Soviet Union was now so strong -- had
so many jet planes, tanks, trained and loyal soldiers, and so on --
that it could scarcely be completely defeated in a war. The best
which could be hoped for was that the West might be able, by a
pincer attack from the Black and Baltic seas, to out off the
Russians to the West and be strong enough to prevent them from
occupying the territories
25X1 wne es were particularly peas a outcome
if the main battle were Joined along the.present frontiers in the
West. In that case, everyone assumed that the Russians would
deport the Polish and other Satellite peoples to Siberia and then
proceeed to defeat the Western armies unhindered by uprisings in
their rear. Soviet peace propaganda had no influence on public
opinion. There was such hostility to the Russians, that nothing the
Russians said was believed. no matter how logical it might sound.
Opinions on China and Guatemala
5. I Iwhile most people were sure that only a tiny
25X1 percentage of the populations in the European Satellites supported
the Communists, it was generally believed that the Communists
enjoyed substantial mass support in China. Life was so very, very
poor for most people in China that it is assumed they are grateful
even for the little order and organization and economic improvement
that Communism has supposedly brought them.
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6. The upset in Guatemala' did not make a very big impression in Poland,
25X1 as people-had-not thought. that the government
o was completely Communist, y that the Polish
25X1 Government is Communist. .- the Guatemalan Communist
Party's authority had de on a pro-Communist leanings
of President ARBENZ, and that active open anti-Communist parties
still existed. 'Accordingly.. the ouster of the. Communists from
power in Guatemala was not seen as offering any hopeful example of
a form of political action open to the anti-Communist Poles.
Armament Production in Poland
7.
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8.
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the 1954 production plan of the factory in
Jelcz, as finally approved by the Poliah - li
p
a
in March 1954, called for the manufacture of approximately
pproximato
tely
30% less military equipment than in the plan originally worked out
and submitted by the Ministry of Highway and Air Transport at the
end of 1953. The items produced by the plant were special-purpose
trucks -- ambulances, gasoline tank trucks, repair trucks, fire
wagons, and so on. The final version of the plan made certain small
increases in the output of such equipment for the air force, so that
the cuts were all at the expense of the army. Even with these cuts,
however, 1954 output will undoubtedly be far higher than last year's
output, as in 1953 the factory had been reorganized and had done
little actual manufacturing on its own. It-had been occupied mainly
with the assembling of gasoline-tank trucks from chassis imported 25X1
from the USSR and tanks from East :Germany.
ror the Jeloz facto were not bein offset by any-increaseWelse
where. the Jelcz factory was responsible
for at leas 90% of Poland's production of these particular military
items.
Another change in the factory at Jelcz notedi from late 1953
and thereafter, was a new emphasis given to the manufacture of
agricultural machinery and to the production of a variety of consumer
goods -- kitchen utensils and the like -- in short supply in that
part of Poland. Almost all factories in Poland have for years been
required to turn out, as a side line,small amounts of miscellaneous.
useful items which the workers and their families need and which are
hard to find locally. In the past, directives for such side line
production had not been enforced, but at the end of 1953'the authorities
began to act as if they were really interested in this aspect of the
production plan.
10. all of the above changes were made an instructions
25X1 from Moscow. the Russians had ordered the cu'..)asks
because enora us reserves o military equipment had already been set
25X1 aside, because war was not expected in the near future, and becaiAse
25X1 the authorities now felt it was more important to concentrate on
improving the quality of military equipment than to go ahead turning
out still more of the items already on hand in good supply. An
25X1 acquaintance once told him of seeing'' an army filled with hundred of new, unused army trucks in 19 51 warehouse
Elblag, East Prussia, at a time when the Polish army mageuvers in
the area were still being carried out with well-worn Wa'time equip-
25X1 meat. even after the downward revision of the
plan,. r pro action will still be increasing and the Eastern states
will still have an output of military items far in excess of any-
25X1 thing in the West. For this reason, the changes were
more in the nature of an adjustment of plans to a more realistic
assessment of needs and resources available and did not by any means
indicate that the Russians intend in the future to take fewer chances
of war then they have taken in the past.
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Technical Education.in Poland
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the postwar engineers were
as good as the prewar, and that in fact they were astonishingly
good considering how much time they had been required to give to
irrevelant political indoctrination. The only drawback was that
they lacked practice, though this of course was generally made
good on the job. They had little direct access to Western European
or US techniques, but this was only a marginal handicap. When
engineers needed to read Western automotive industry
periodicals they were able to borrow them from the library of the
Highway and Air Trans Transport Ministry in Warsaw These publication
were uncensored
re were three from West Germany, one from France..
and one for the US.
Church-State Relations
12.
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in June 1954 the German Catholic priest in the
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German-speaking village of Dywity, (population from 600-700) near
Olsztyn in East Prussia, was tranferred to Goldap, a village not
far from the Soviet frontier about 100 miles away. No reason was
given for the transfer. all the German priests
in East Prussia, with the possible exception of one or two priests
well-known as collaborating with the Communists, were to be shifted
about in the summer of 1954. He supposed that the move was designed
to weaken the ties between the priests and parishioners, though he
had the general impression otherwise that political pressure on the
church was somewhat less in 1954 than it had been before.
Polish-Russian Technical Collaboration
13. I Iwhen the Jelcz factory first began production of
25X1 Soviet-model military equipment (several years before he began to
work there), the Russians had provided detailed plans and models of
25X1 the equipment to be manufactured, but thereafter Onever heard
of any case in which the Russians had either provided plans of
their own, or asked for plans or designs worked out by the Poles.
Groups of Soviet engineers or officers sometimes visited the plant
to indicate in general terms what they wanted the plant to do, but
the responsibility for carrying out the work was left to the. Poles.
25X1 none of the production of the plant went to the
Soviet Union, though possibly some of it was delivered to the Soviet
25X1 army units in Poland. In 19531 research and development
section received instructions to design a new Polish military
ambulance. A new Soviet-made ambulance was supplied as a model,
but the factory was also given a number of other ambulances, in
eluding a wartime US Dodge, from which design ideas could likewise
be taken.
14.
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In March or April 1954, a large group of Russian experts visited
the factory to inspect the items being
in
1955 the plant's output would go to equip the Rumanian armed forces,
and the Soviet group had come to make certain that the
Te1r:z plant could qualify for this order.
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15.
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Though there was thus little or no close scientific collaboration
between the Poles and the Russians in this industry,
exchanges of technical information and of visits of tec-ncians
between the Poles and the Czechs were fairly common.
a number of Czech engineers had
on several occasions come to Jelcz to give advice on manufacturing
cruited at
end of 1943,: while on a visit to the Ministry,
apolitically reliable technical experts were being re-
very large salaries to go to China. The action was very
secret, and!
Agricultural Developments
18.
25X1 in June 1954 the Polish author itiei apparently began
to take a stronger pro-collectivization line toward the peasants.
25X1 A collective was finally established at the village of K.iezli_ny in
the summer of 1954, although until then the peasants had successful?;Wi
resisted pressure to form s collective there. Many of the priratc
fa-~mers had gone into debt to the state for tools, seed, and so on,
~d it was these debt-ridden peasants who were finally coerced into
_orming a collective. As soon as these few farmers had been so per-
Nuaded to create a nucleus for a collective, the authorities had
relatively smooth sailing in dragging in others who had held back
when all had held together, but who were too timid or frightened
to make individual refusals.
19.
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In March and April 1954, several cases of people
working on farms who had asked for permission to go to work in
factories but who were all refused permission to leave agricultural
work. some people who had formerly worked on farms
or who had had advanced agricultural educations had been required to
go back to agricultural work.
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Relations between Poles and Germans
20.
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relations between Poles and-Germans were better
than they had been for many years . The .Poles still distrusted the
Germans and the old hate between Germans and Poles remained, but now
it had been pushed back into second place by the common hate which
both had for the common enemy, the USSR. most
Poles agreed that Poland would have to give up the so-called Recovered
Territories, and that this.wouldbe acceptable to the great majority
of the Poles so long as Poland would receive back its lands to the
East.- a considerable number of Poles accepted to some
extent the Communist propaganda claims that Nazis were now stronger
in West Germany than at any time since the end of the war, but that
this fact did not make the average Pole dislike the Communist govern-
ment any less. I everyone believed that the Russians,
and not the Germans, had carried out the Katyn Massacre, but that
there was no longer much interest in the question. The Polish public
had been brutalized somewhat and had grown indifferent to facts such
as these.
_Party Developments
21.
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Polish peop oubt whether GOMULKA is even alive. In the Ministry of
Highway and Air Transport it was believed that the replacement of
Hilary MINC as chairman of the State Economic Planning Commission
did not mean that MINC had either lost importance generally or had
given up his control of economic activities. The shift was regarded
as the result of a routine shuffle of jobs among the top members of
his hierarchy.
22. in general the quality of local Party leaders is
25X1 very low. .functionaries below the pro-
vincial level were usually quite unintelligent. Party officials in
25X1 the countryside were incredibly stupid. Many could barely write.
Recently, however, with the greater emphasis on increasing agri-
cultural output, the Party has tended to assign more intelligent
people to agricultural organizations. This, and the increasing avail-
ability of competent, technically-trained people to advise Party
leaders in the countryside has resulted in some improvement in the
quality of Party activities in agriculture.
23. In industry, too, the quality of persons who are, purely Party
functionaries is very low. Intelligent Party members prefer work
25X1 in production, where very high salaries and bonuses can be earned,
to straight Party jobs. In factory at Jeicz, for example,
the director, a Party member, earned from 3,000 to 5,000 zloty or'
more per mouth, while the secretary of the factory's Party organi-
zation was. paid only 1,050 zloty per month. The Party secretary at
the factory when Source.:arrived there in mid-1953 was a former worker
who stole and drank heavily, and who neglected his Party work, Only
,to or 1 of the eligible workers had taken political courses at
Jelcz, though .when the Party was well run, nearly all of the eligible
workers were sent -to political courses regularly. In the fall ?of
1953, the secretary took a factory car and wrecked it against a tree.
The driver who had given him the car was sent to prison for 21 years.
The secretary was removed from his job, given a one-year suspended
sentence, and made head of a small section in the factory administra-
tion office with an increase in salary to about 1,800 zloty per month.
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25X1 A new secretary was brought in from the regional secretariat.
r
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eased the number of workers attending political cours
which had hitherto been run by non-Par y techniciana,
25X1 an n general did the thin s active Party organizers are praised for
doi f
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Indoctrination of Youth
24. Odid not believe that the government was succeeding in con-
25X1 verting the youth of Poland to Communism, butl_ id think that the
25X1 indoctrination had partly succeeded in making the youth less attached
to the old moral values. People had to work so hard and such long
hours that they were unable to take care of their children properly.
The Polish youth was growing accustomed to life under a regime of
force and violence. This did not make young people satisfied with
their present life, but it also did not make them very good human
material for a future better society.
25. The Communist authorities pretended to be very concerned about the
growth of hooliganism among young people, but
25X1 paign against hooliganism was not seriously
meant. the Communists realized that a hooliganized
2p 1 youth offered far better human material for a Communist. organization
of society than would a disciplined youth which honored values of
the older generation. The disorderly behaviour of young people was
no doubt occasionally inconvenient even to the authorities, but the
government could afford to tat a longer view*of the problem. Even-
tually, the young hooligans would either sober down somewhat or would
turn into out-and-out criminals. If the former, the government could
use them to fill the tens of thousands of jobs in the police and
state apparatus, best performed by selfish, cynical, ambitious men.
If the latter, the government would use them as forced labor in
penal camps.
26? the authorities tolerated avid
25X1 encouraged the excesses of the youth as long as the hooliganiatic
outrages were practiced on private persons or private property.
The police looked the other way at the rude, antagonistic behaviour
of young people, when it was not directed at the police or at state
property. Seeing this, the general public likewise tried to ignore
hooliganism as much as possible. Besides, people were afraid to
interfere with the hooligans because there was always the danger
that the leader of the group might be the son of a Party secretary.
27? The regime's efforts to indoctrinate young people via the Union of
Polish Youth (ZMP) had failed badly. The ZMP was very poorly
organized and had very little influence on young people. Except in
the schools, the Party had much less success in organizing young
people's activities than it had with the older generation.- The
degree of success in creating formal organizations for the different
groups in the population was not important, however, as practically
all of the organizations of all age groups were only empty frame-
works for an elaborate make-believe routine which left members and
organizers alike for the most part unconvinced and unconverted.
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Attitude Toward New Course
28.
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to improve somewhat in the next few years. It is apparent to nearly
everyone that much of the initial disorganization and inefficiency
resulting from the hasty nationalization of the economy has already
been overcome. Consequently, it is now generally believed that the
worst point has been reached and passed, and that, if there is no
war, there is bound to be some Improvement In the standard of living.
most Poles now expected the standard of living
29. only about five per cent of the. population
25X1 were convinced supporters of the regime and he did not think that
the regime, as presently organized and administered, would gain any
significant degree of popularity from a modest rise in the living
standard. 'The improvement to date has resulted in a slight increase
in people's hopes for the better life, but did not make them re-
conciled to Communism. In the first place, very few people expected
the improvement to be. permanent. Prices are reduced with great fan-
fare one day and silently increased in one way or another on another
occasion. People's hopes can only be maintained if the improvement
continues without a break. If the improvement stops, the regime
will at once lose any good will it may have gained up to that point.
Source was convinced that the living standard of Poland would, in
the last resort, be determined by the Russians and their international
plans, and would in any case almost certainly never catch up with
the living standard in the West or. even with the best standards
achieved in prewar Poland. Accordingly, he felt that there was
little likelihood that the New Course would succeed in making the
Polish people reconciled to the Communist government.
Forced Labor in Poland
30. About 3,000 of the approximately 4,500 workers ati factory
25X1 in Jelcz were political prisoners. The other 1,500 were free
workers. 'Almost all of them were sentenced to terms of at least
six years. Prisoners serving shorter sentences were not usually
sent to Jelcz, because it was judged uneconomical to spend con-
siderable.time training-them if they were not likely to keep work-
ing at the factory later. The prisoners worked, very hard, and the
authorities were very successful in getting the best work out of
them. Prisoners who made suggestions for improving output or re-
ducing costs were rewarded with reductions in their sentences, and as
a result a. great many ver r useful ideas had been obtained for the
factory's "racjonalizacji' section from this source.
Sabotageand.Resistance Activities
31. There was much talk in the press and public about sabotage, but
25X1 Odid not thick there was any significant deliberate sabotage
in Poland. At least, he never saw any signs of.it in his factory.
The controls on all phases of production.were.so strict that un-
detected sabotage. or intentional neglect of equipment was not
.really possible even if anti-Communist workmen were willing to take
"considerable risks. The only thing remotely approaching sabotage
was a certain indifference to the quality of work done. The. regime
exhorted everyone to pay attention to quality as well as quantity..
in.production, but everyone was under such heavy pressure to increase
output that the worker could not afford to give any time or atten-
tion to quality., which was accordingly generally much neglected.
This indifference to quality of work done so long as minimum stand-
ards were met was perhaps in part motivated by a political"dislike
of the regime, but in the main it was the result of the -eneral
25X1 apathy and Weariness of working people.
there was, in "short, practically no sabotage or passive neglect
of production made purely as an expression of political opposition
to the authorities.
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32. there were 'practically no Underground groups in
25X1 P'oland., but was sure that there were many people who were ready
in time of crisis to organize themselves very quickly into such
groups. He did not think that there were any anti-Co unist parti-
sans :now active in Poland, but until 1950 or 1951 there had. been
25X1
that-time the police were apparently not yet ready to deal with
the partisans, for the transport authorities who asked for police
protection' were advised to route the buses over different roads
temporarily.
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