RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00046R000400010001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 19, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECRET
SUBJECT
Resistance Potential in the USSR
This material contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States within the mean-
ing of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law.
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT
REFERENCES
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
2. Karachaev, page 4, should read Karachayev.
ARMY review completed.
CoMe nti s
19 August 195+
S.
1. Following the procedure of the Board on Geographic Names, it has been
decided to use the local form for place names in the Baltic States,
rather than to transliterate them from the Cyrillic form. Kalvaria,
page 2, would then be given in the Lithuanian form, Kalvarija, not
as Kalvariya.
2. Kozak, pages 3 and 4, may also be rendered as Kazak and refers to the
Cossacks. It is not a misspelling of Kazakh.
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SECRET
COUNTRY
USSR
SUBJECT Resistance Potential in the USSR
DATE OF INFORMATION
PLACE ACQUIRED
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
awn.lovanoe rovential Prior to l953
25X1
DATE DISTR. 10 May 1954
NO. OF PAGES It
1. The Lithuanians were called "bandits" by the Soviet government.
They conducted open war against Soviet armed forces and security
troops. The leaders were highly educated men, including former,
stttesmen, doctors, officers, etc. They had a central headquarters
and operated all over Lithuania. They hoped to force Soviet troops
out of Lithuania and to establish Lithuanian sovereignty.
were mostly Lithuanian peasants and their wives, plus many Lithuan-
ian, ex-German, and ex-Soviet officers and EM
and some Ukrainian
,
peasants.
The "bandits" fought regular battles against Soviet troops. They
had armor, heavy artillery, and plenty of ammunition, mostly
equipment abandoned by the retreating German Army. No "bandits"
were ever captured alive; all of them died in action or committed
suicide.
Lithuanian peasants suspected of feeding the "bandits" and of
knowing their hideouts were ruthlessly tortured
fin ernails pulled out. e
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Lithuanian SSR. Resistance wags still going on, and continued - /_~.)ni
in November 1951. At this time,
Party or government positions, became kolkhaz chairmen; or in any
way helped the USSR in the collectivization of Lithuanian farms.
The "bandits" hid in forests and did not molest Soviet army or
border guard troops personnel, but operated only against "Lithuan-
ians who were betraying Lithuania".
From 1944 until 1951, the Soviet government promised amnesties to
all "bandits" who would accept "kolkhozivation". A few Lithuan-
ians accepted these offers at their face value, and returned to
farming. At first these people were given land, but within a few
months they were all deported to Siberia. In 1949, about 300 such
families from the Kalvaria 54-25, E 23-13w area in the Lithuan-
ian SSR were deported to Si eria, In 1950, about 100 more families
from the same area were sent to Siberia..
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however, the "bandits" bad no armor or heavy artillery. Their 25X1
activities were confined to killing Lithuanians who accepted
Resistance Potential in 1953
7.
tance in Lithuania
s llsale
there was still resis-
in 1952 - 195-1. though on a very
8. All over the USSR there were expressions f passive resistance to
the Soviet regime. examples:
a.' Peasants in kolkhozy neglected their work. They were negli-
gent it tilling the soil, reaping the crops, and handling their
cattle. Despite fines for absenteeism, the foreman (brigadier)
had to hunt up the peasants and force them to work. Many came
three to five hours late.
b. Party meetings were shunned by peasants. Despite the induce-
ment of free movies, very few came to the meetings. Whenever
a meeting was scheduled, the Party officials, the women's
organizer, the kolkhoz chairmen, and the activists (fanatic
Party members) had to round up the population and force them
to attend the political meetings.
a. People emphatically refused to subscribe to bonds sold by the
government, or to buy Party literature.
.d. Factory workers did not complete their prescribed norms.
,~e. The Orthodox churches were always filled.
all priests were selected and screened b the MVD
~Ind fay the anvernment _F
all priests permitted to conduct
services were told by the MVD-Fow and what to preach.
9. government restrictions that the people most opposed were:
a. "Kolkhozivation" -- not only farmers, but the factory workers,
the middle class, and the intelligentsia were opposed to
kolkhozy.
b. Armament -- the lack of consumer goods caused by the industrial
concentration on armament was resented by all the people.
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c . Censorship -- the complete lack of personal freedom, the con-
stant threat of imprisonment, and the severe sentences given
for casual remarks held all the people in a state of terror.
d. Bureaucracy -- the people were opposed to the privileges of
Party officials, who lived a life of luxury at the expense-of
the people. Party chairmen;, organizers, secretaries, etc,,
had sinecures.
e. Ban on private enterprises --- tradesmen wanted to open small
shops, such as tailor shops, shoemaker shops, barber shops,
etc. However, such small business was impossible.
10. The majority of the people in the USSR had some family member in
a jail or forced labor camp, and for this reason they were hostile
to the Soviet government.
11. I 14-U--,. 25X1
ulter. for motive '`J~L' b6BC ,: or one Party, but only for
12. If ive unity or assured of support from outside sources, 25X1
all the inmates of th
fo
e
rced labor camps would
revolt. Many of their relatives would also In the event
of large scale outside support farmers would 25X1
not work in kolkhozy, inductees would not appear for induction,
the army would not put up an effective fight, and 50% of the M
troops would defect or disappear into the woods. Racial minorities
such as the Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Moldavians',
Turkmen, and Kazakhe, would revolt.
13. If assured of large scale outside heln. and if esis Ling nation
conducted a genuine liberation a80$ of the 25X1
people would revolt. However, assisting rs ion followed
.Hitler a example and treated the Russians as a conquered, inferior
race, then the people would back up the government in defense of
Soviet soil.
14.
in the army or MVD
A. A
fo+~rces, the Jews managed to be supply clerks medics adfministra ve.
alerke _ Atn _ n?A ,..e,.... -_L ..
-
ionc nummian s azsllKed the
JeWe, ecause o em were clnesMA,+e _------- -- _-,
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high-ranking arm fobs was exceedir~glnsemelldia dmwassgr?r~i gssm ller
all the tii, A
aen age o Jews in high Part it tae per-
15? In 19+
- 1040
there w
,
ere nearly &4u- 50 ar desertions each ear
5
in the Lithuanian
E
t
-
as
Prussian aea.
.1-6.
ra
9 9 - 1951 about 10 army desertions
eaab year in the Lithuanian - La v an area.
,three desertions of Border Guard Troops-men
Communist.
90% of the Soviet youth were strongly n
17. Since 1920, man ethnic rou s had been resettled in Central Asia
and?Siberia . examples:
a. During the twenties litany KoZaks were deported to Siberia. 25X1 this Kozalrs fought with the White force as gainstwthebRedsafrom h1917 -
1920. 25X1
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b. In 1940 - 1941, all Volga Germans were exiled to Siberia.
c. In 1943 all , natives of the Karachaev Autonomous "Oblast"
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F-the Cana
ere exiled to Siberiaor Central-Asia
In 1944,-ail natives of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic in the
Caucasus, and the Crimean : Tatars of the Crimean Autonomous
Republic were exiled to Siberia or Central Asia
18. In all these deportations, except that of the Kozaks, all members
.19.
of the groups were deported, without exception. The attitude of
the rest of the Soviet citizens towards the relocation policy Was
pity for the victim, and fear of a like fate.
Lithuania and Turkmen
these people detested the Russians and would, without daub,
zealously support and/or ,join:Western forces.
20. The first .Soviet power to be disposed of should be the local
After ' the militia, the district (rayon), area
kray.):.. Party officials. should be disposed of.
tae security forces would not put up much of a fight against
militia, who were brutal, arrogant, and hated.by the population.
and inmates of forced labor camps, would
liquidate militia and Party officials if aided by the West in
sufficient strength, or' if a large Western force was. approaching.
We et rn invaders, but would busy themselves elsewhere and await
the final. outcome . The national minorities, such as Lithuanians
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in tl a caueasus and the Cheehen-Ingush Autonomous ,Re Republic in