THE CAPITULATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00039R000100030035-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: October 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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LA OARTA PRROP.'NTR
Diplomatio 1[emoirse of . F. 1(oe,llhaueen
25 July 194 - 2 May 19b5
OIC
or
mrr?n ~r vTtanaio RUsce
BPIL04UF:
The Oapitu].stian
(Beginning Pale I39)
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STAT
STAT
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IAA CARTA P~tD94T! Mssotru Dip1omtic
Ju17 943 Qf 2Ritij- 1945~uNn
EnxTFt) ai viROiNIO RUSM
BPXI,QdUB
Thy Oapiaulitior-
(E.ginning Pagi 439)
For the first tics a oomplst. reconstruction has bun made, bit by
bit, of the oaapluc atohieurq of the German .urrnidrar in Italy. This re-
oonstruotian, which is strictly faithful to trot, and is oarstUlly dpcu-
e.nteA, is the result of lengthy consultations with the participants.
Many difficulties had to be overc to obtain the information necessary
to create s true picture of the moving story of the ersnEa that preceded
the autumn of '41, up to the final surrender, whsa at noon on the 2nd of
11a7 1945, the German forces in Italy coseed fighting.
In this book I have tried to describe the principal events that took
place In Rely during the period of the Osnaaa occupation; events that for
the most part I personally observed. At the time of the surrender I was
no longer in Italy. For the nasona stated in t) preceding chapter I
had been sent on a special mieaion to the Iberi~r- Peninsula. I was not,
therefore, present at the se.tingt that lid to the capitulation.
Later, however, I had the opportunity of talking with the actors
in the tat scene of the dram of the Ads, fraw Nhae I learned the details
of the arrangements of the meetings.
tat us review the preliminary events.
The idea of contacting the Allies was first considered by the Ger-
mane in the autumn of 'W.t. At Bagni de Lucca, w'hsre Ksaeelring had his
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OHO ab that bis.illol!f apprasohad Mnsra1 of Avistion Ritti.r aan Pohl.
It wui a wry ngua l.s1.r. Wolff did not wig to start an srgunt or
to frankly ueassk his thoughts or intier-tiont. T3? point of d.P&rtUZ'e for
sttaokins thA gwebioe- aaa that of tM recent reverses svtiirod by' th~
O.rran Arai~l.
In t1.e.nib.ar of '44, lloit! for the aoond time made lciams his nnbi-
ncnbe to Fi*hni this took place at the Villa Bsis*na, ms's itahn and his
wife had been hobs to Wolff after the baebinK of lhsVi1L Baseitti.
Dn the ID~at u in the West new xr-d *1xaYYs more serious revs rsee
struck the Raioh. The secret wasps that had been promised for so long
? tiro had not ?t appeared. It Kai a1re+,49 rumored that Hitler had lost
his rind. The T*'aan forces in Italy, short of gasolicsi weapons, xuni-
bions, rangy of transport, and without air cover, were coping dth an
Allied advance . The (Nrsane no longer possessed air oia*bst strength and
the snsnp- had control of the air dthout opposition. Dsmor*liI*tt on was
growing among the troop . Eessslring himself, who was noted for his tena-
city and ability in defensive mortars, admitted that it would be difficult
indeed to hold back the British and *uericans Shen these should decide to
take the offensive. If the Mrst- resistance became desperate, it might
possibly prolong the war several seeks and even several nonLhe= but as re-
garde the ti:u-1 ruult it was no longer possible to mores illusions. The
planned attack in the Ard.rmfl would not br able to revere. the positions.
Rahn, * +- * * * agreed With Roltf in judging that thane was no possi-
bility of MrwnY continuing to fight and that it was imperative that every
effort should be sods to stop a last useless sacrifice of huaaa lily. On
the politics/ aids tiles Mbassador saw no possibility of a rupture in the
opposite party while the war lasted.
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a~r~w
3?
N.y.rW-?1eS$ Io deciiimI whc? ruoMd and it was `reed that thq
would it a Fors prapitiow soSSn4.
*$ $$ W~w
In J1suaY7 of 191-5, DRron AarsIIlii aoaanniaf,Id dth t!r Li.ut.nan0
of the 98, Ouido Ziaier, had of the IV Qtlia of the
trupt,$a-t or Uilaa CIA) that he had a ~&n* of oontaat~n6 'e ~r
Americana through 9Rits.r21*nd? The motive is*p.ui.n6 ptrrtlli to U.ks th1~
step a found in tds dasir. to prevent the OeaanI aaoarpliehini their
plaeufl?d d.etruotion of the power plaits gad laotorSe? of northern Italy.
For the yams rsuons Cardinal scltiustear had served as iaLsrs.diar7
between the Italiu- Prrtii~atu ~s'd the Osr~~
In T*brwa7 Parrilli orossid the border into SRl,tssrland and aon-
t&ot.d his lri.nd Prof. Wx Hawn, s Swiss national.
Hue/mu-rm, in additiSon to tM humane motive, was dssiraw of PreaerT-
ing the port of Genoa and the Italian railway eyitwhioh were of parti-
cular interest to the Swiss economy.
Rua*anp undertook to sake all the arrws6smeflL~i an called in
llajor 11aibs1, one ct the heads of the 9wi.se int,elliBeno~ ?e+rtiae, wt? as
a friend of long sbwdin6? He regvssted lp-ibsl to tiw him all possible
t-e1A in a may difficult situation.
llaibal got in touch with qtr. Allyn R. Duller, personal representative
of Roosmlt in 5wit~rl*nd and bud of the 0lria of BLrat,Sgia 3ersiasi
op.ntiing in the territory of the Oonfederaapr.
tulles yaw that the project was worthy of consideration and decided
to give a hearing to Pirrilli.
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In the first meAting of Merloans, Kies, and Italians, laulles did
not appear, but had hiaeelf repreeinted by his ssoratary O ro pan a-s"emits?
Oawrnits asked for the rwel? of the Oed'sane with sh* it would be
poesible to establish contact..
The first names given by Pirrilii did not iieprsse Dulles' aeor+tary?
lls, ho~rerer, evinced more interest when P*ZTIlli mentioned the name of
Dollaane?
Prrrilli had not yet gotten in touch with Dollsann in regard to the
^a0trr, but from his personal knowledge of the man he 1msw DolLnann would
be interested in s e'uQotiabiazi of this kind. Besides, Purrilli was aware
of the fact that Do17.mann had favorably received ? /otter from Captain
vhisetti, whop in the name of cardinal 9ohueter, asked him to do all in
his pacer to prevent the destruction of NorEhsarn Italy.
H* r+f
do hie return from Switzerland, on the let of March, Parrill.l had
a meeting dth Dollawnn in Yi1an in Zimmer 's apartment.
A!"6sr the lose of Rcme, Do1lii+-nn was appointed liaison between
1(seeellrin6 and llclifi although he had loaf sore standing, he was still
of laportanoe ? He was living at Reggio, wku re, in addi4 ion to socompliah-
ing hie liairaan tasks, he had tried to sot as aadiaticr between the wehnnacht
and the partisans, at least in the sector controlled by hia office.
With the greatest a?thusiam Dol]aIIn accepted the proposal of meet-
ing Roosevelt 'a repreeenEatiYe. He, at first, thought that the Americans
were dsairws of meeting the Germane becaus. they had finally realised
that destroying Oeraa?Y msarst opening the door of Europe to Russia.
Aarrilli sanagsd to avoid tM eubjso0; he wanted at all costs to
establish cor~taot between the Amsriosns and the Osxmarjs.
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 11
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5.
11han Wolff was infonr.d by tb11iNa of the opportunity that tied pr*-
eanted itselt, hi Icrpt the bail on the bounds. TM incitation o*. it the
right mna.nt. H. aeked his oolLDoraLors to go as quickly me possible to
9iritserland to Aes what the Americana .nted.
an the Ord of Wrote Arrrilli, DolLann, and Zimmer ?reeented t2sea-
ssl,.s at the 9wi~e border. prrrilli oroserd, giving L}e pryarr.ng,j pase-
woi^d, "Piarluigi". t)olbmann and 21uee~r managed to enter 8wiwa*r'3rnd with
the help or YYaibel, who had given spsodal irretruations to the frontier guard.
An ismOdiate meeting with Dulls and Qaey.rtitx xae idpossibls as,
for the time bming, they weiy not available. F&rrilli hook the i,nibtttys
in presenting Nueiaearm to LheOermsne as a rsprss.ntAti.~rs buying the mnfl-
deno? of I)ulles.
The oosfarnoe between puemarm end Dollmsnn opened on a claeeioal
argument. IblLrann talked of the nsoesmit}r of earl.ng Europe from Holshe-
vien-, expressing surprl,ee that the Allies had not yet thought of uniting
with the Qernians in an anti-Ruaeiani crusade,
Attacking the subject directly, Husa,nn announced to T?ollman that
the Allies were prepared to contend with any deaperate last stand of the
Germane, but that it would not be north while tor ashy to cantinas
fighting because there was no chanee of a ruptures between the Anglo-
Americans and the Ruselane, at any rate 'While militant operation against
the Reich oantinued. Them resained only, one gay open to the ()er~asnsi
that of rhortening the wtr Dy the capitulation of the (Isreian troops in
Thaly opposing tlreMglo-Msrioans.
A surrender of this kind would be hailed as a patriotic gesture
(like that made the 20th of ,1i1y 1941 by the Generals Witsieben, Beck end
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6.
otherl ) and a olswr political move that the0eo1raar-s `Would b' wry wrOTt not
to make.
At this point Do1Lman, ~]ising twit his ~t.'looutor w&nt.d au~
and oif.r~i lift/^; nened to hts feet, indiBna-~t and red in the fsas, UI
inq, "Indeed what do you expect of nN? Thit I should bebray mY ao~-~ry~~~
Hu8,ruc- replied that he did not expect any-thin~ bit that M oon'
.idersd the rrordd '~betrs7a1' and "traitor" were not psrtimnty that the
who v~uld help in s~nc~nB the
Allise r~aogi-'~sed and e???Oted m honest ~n d of
slaughter of warfare, is they had ~~xoYsn in the case of BSdcBlio, V
Orandi, m-~d of Vann+rhsLe. gas
It ?*1 not tillths af0srnoon of the 3rd or march flat the nDOU1~ it
joined by 11r. Ps~-1 ~~, xhO1? files had delegated ass his rePr~
this first nsstln~.
gl,un, having been requested by 1N$fln to sWreea hie opiai~n to the
tlexn-ans who were xeac~Y to aoopAXsbe in brinESing the war to an end and aroid-
tug the useless waste of hwoar- life, said (in 'French), "Tb miteriaZ nd
tns been ao great thsb the Allies
moral dan.Qe caus~d by thle sr in iuraPe
will t-avs need of every men of good will for the rosonetructioxa. AnY O1?r
that he i~ ? man ?r g?O~ X11?"
~fio helps to shortsn the wr Will have proven the ~ri-
At the end of the meeting, Tpllmann noted down euaclnot]3'
cm ideas as folloWs s
ate the ~g~o-
1? No power in the world will be able to sepa
Auerioans front the Russians.
2. arm$ny had lost the war.
3. The Allies would not have dealt with rmPreeentatlvee of Hitler
or at ~ii~slsr.
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'7.
b. In this o aataot being made b.twsen the Allis and Ctd araans,
the disouseione ooulA only dia1 with ths Allied Zone,
5. That the only thin` that rKS left far an honest psraan to do,
ml, in the interest of t1? psrmari people, to help ehortan the
war in every possible nay, ~rhioh, if it were carxy,ed on would
involw th.0srsan nation in an incredible struggle.
The second mestinQ between the de:mans anni the Americana took place
at Zurich. Ih addition to DolLnann and Ziemuier, Wolff and his aids, Wenner,
were prosent.
Th, group way received it the 3w1sa frontier by parri],li, Nuemsnn,
and a representatly. of Major 1b.1.
The illsga], crossings of the gwiee border by t}n ~er&en Army officers,
which was aggravated by the feat that they belonged to the 53, was due
solely to the pereona], initiative of be.
The gMss~~~~t wae not aware of thSe infraction of the3r-i,ee /axe,
this breaph of gwise neutrality.
Huamanr- and Weibel had taken the initiabive at their o~m risk end
peril ' The suaQesatul ending justified their deed and merited the gratitude
of thedorornmenb of the Contede Lion.
During the journey from the frontier to Zurich, yusma retired alone
with Wolff to s first class reaernd coiirtiesnt. There they had a oontar-
snos that /acted not lees than aevsn hauare,
ihue~wnn began his talk with a question that apparently had no retcr-
enos to the subject but whioh served as a baiia for his argument. lie asked
q-o3ft it he, in his position of great rsepontibility had erern had occasion
to disouas problems with leaders of industry, of finance, of science, and
if he had ewrn listened to the brute of ninsnt ~uriete. Wolff replied
that he had not.
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8.
i
"That is a pity", obasrv~sd fNMrann, "beaaus? with our eyes we sus
only + part of our surrounding.. Roaaevslt, for example, in addition to
his regular diplomatic and military intelligence servioee, hue tlr ls*bit
of e~ndiryg his psrsonal friends to foreign countries as obserwirs. Con-
eider pu11?a, for example, who ie not Ambassador in Hips, and doe. not
even belong to thiplo~stic Corp;,, but i., ciia cif Li? 1tlNtIli18 IU+IIy/Td in
Amerioa; he now finds hiueelf in Switzerland as observer and per4onaj ri_
preeentatiye of the President of the United 9taLes. He rsportd treotly
to Roosevelt and is responsible to Rooeewlt only.
Hua~ann spoke at length about Rooe~velt au a man and au a abeteeman,
and presented hip au the pereonifioation of the American psopi. He re
marked that in times of war even dNOOraolee became, in a sensa,diotator-
ehipe. With the eubsLantial AiffArenQe t}nL, however, the responsible
ohiete are always awa=y that they moat render account to parliament of
their actions and decisions. T.hren in time of xar,in democratio govern-
mente there may be eleetiona and lava passed by parliament, Wile dictators,
being unreachable and uncontrolled, give account of their notions to no one
and in that wad the possibility of going astray is increased considerably.
Wolff listened with attention.
Proceeding with his theme Huaroann spoke enthusiastically of the
Brltiah ID~Pira and of Churchill and then also of Russia andStA7.in1 He
then pointed out to Wolff the difference between realism in ppiiticm and
a soralsense in a private indiMdual. He suds a specie/ effort to clarity
the difterenoes between Churchill and Roosevelt an the one hind and Stalin
as the other, in regard to the interests that united them.
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 "The Ang1o-9axons'1 , he e*id, "an aoou.0assd to soles diftiaulb
probina one after the other and until they have diipoeed of the prinaip*l
oroblsm, they do not +-llahr their attention to be dirtr*otd by seoaid*ry
or trivial matLere. While thebern-~ne were trying to create the milleniuw
in pez'many, Churdiill 1lnritid his efforts to trying to &eeur* peso. for
20 or 30 years. In bhe d.etiny of the indivicfualas in the destiny of na-
tions, unforeeQen t'actora occur such me the inordinate ambition to '1sh to
plan the course of the o.nturise."
Wolff interrupted, "You have talked much of Roos.Ys1L, Churchill,
Stalin, and their psopls. What, now, do you think of Hitler? Is it in-
tenLional th&t you bavbnvoidsd epeaking of him?"
Huemann replied in the negative and added ttrt eery w1 *4e guided
in his aotione by three fundamental factors: reason, e~-tiwsnt and oon-
aaiencs.
Conaoienca is not born of inotinot, it ie a complex that i greatly
influenced by aLaviem and by education. Using this ae an example, he ds-
monetrnted that ~aneibility and conscience wrrs very little d.velepd is
Hitler.
"But F+itler dose not even use rds,oc- in his present way oP aotinq
and thinking. He D.lonRe to the category of Etre poss.ued."
A long diecusslon resu].ted? Nuswann d.xaneLrated that Hitler ryas
daainated by an obeesaion, while Stalin had to b? credited with at the
1~asL an ab~o1at~l7 rationalistic mentality. 1Thn-,Por instwc-ae, Roosevelt
informed Stalin thatCongrers, the Senate atnd even the A*erlosi- People,
would never accept the a111anas with Mn atheist and orginiser of world
revolution, Sfelit- did not hesitate to re-establish the Ghurah in a few
weeks, to wipe out bhe"Kasintern", and to eetablieh a new national anther.
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 a Ibler
v'ou
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io.
Hitler, instead, oantinuid quarrelling with the ohurchu, closing
planes of oultun, persecuting religion. He continually RtLaoiarA bhp Jrws
of America and gland, and tirel.sely pushed the diapsrsal ani sxterminabim
of those in drops. This xaa the essential ditf.rsno. bsLw.an Stalin and
Hitilar* one **Sl 11MD u poiitioal re+rliet, the oC}nr a madman witb an idM--
logiwl complex.
Continuing, Nuemann followed and pictured the developments of the war
up to the time thaLChurcMll himemlf had admitted that the situation of the
Allies was notably better because of the inexcusable errcro oo^miOLed by
Hitler. It one considered events objectively, one had to admit that the
United States riid not enter into the war of their own free will. Rooeerslt
iadioputably deserves the credit of having foreseen the inevitability of
Intervention on the part of his oonntxy. Alpo at the very beginning the
President had made ovary effort to avoid war. Then, due to events he had
been emp?lled to help !7iglancl. In the final analysis, however, it was not
Roosevelt who decided the intervention of they United States, but ttn in-'
credible deed of the Japanese, whop with Lhe metihode of gangsters and the
advantage of a military eurpriae, thought that they could in orie night force
a great nation to bend the knee.
Had Hitler anriRibbentrep influenced the Japanese to etrllae and act
in this manner? At any rata, the Japanese, through Pearl Harbor, euooesdsd
in one night in achieving a result that probably aail.d not have been ioooa-
pliehed in many months, with millions spent in propaganda, namely, the !k-
sian of the American people into a jingle block facing the psoblemn of the war.
Huepnn continued. 'Ici the other har-d, in the long years of fighting,
years that are the bloodiest in the histor~- of the world, the opposing forces
of tt-m(1srmans and the Russians succeeded in Acing nothing moms than slapping
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any
bls
ter
Hitler
You
unbry.
11.
each other in the faoe. The loe,,eA of theRueeiane have been ]aanenee,both
In ~-ctunl combat and ae a result of the oocupabian of vast aeatians of t1y
9oriat t.rritoriee by ths0e naane? But th" eaora.fiaee Of the Ttueeiane gam
the Mltlw9Rxon3 the time neasneary QvoA.x%M'4;; t;ci: critic]. ~i.tuAtian
sflr1 their Anforoed conduct of the war on a defensive ba-eie. Now, in the
last phaeo of the conflict, they have roughed the Tlhine with a .taB&Arin
advantage both in men and materiel. The pxeparationr were long and diffi-
cult but ones again the effect will be oataolyen-ia.
Hitler frequently spoke of Providenoe. It doeR n~ ~ttr what you
call it -- UmtiPotence, fMd, or Providenoe. But if you observe the develop-
ments of the last years rebroepe?tivsly, you can readily sae that i.t was
not the Will of Providence to guide Hitler to victory.
It is evident t1un1: the Qerriat- Array, created from an inpoverishsd RueBi people by a fanatic like Hi, fiat able 3talin of ?tioday a notitths ss~ras~
~'nxoeii but it ie also apparent
at the beginning of the war, and likedae that the BOl8hSvi* of today
is not the came as that of be.?c+Y'e the ter."
Yfolit had listened attentively to Wtsmann's discourse. He began to
talk hisaelf, recalling the years of hie youth, his diepair for (ka"mafly and
for her future as a nation, torn apart by a dozen different politics/ pax'Eiae,
all striving against one anothsr, and how, in his desire to find some means
of a rebirth, he became interested in and jade t acquaintance of Hitler,
whose life had always been a `rorY simple one, but who had made the mistake
of surrounding hlarselP with incapable aseietants.
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Wolff continued, outlining, the oharaotar of soee of Zhess oallabora-
tore * Goering, for .xaapl*, with his bos*b*st, hie vanity, hie luxury, was
a *ere shell. The judgment that he fonud of RibMntrop, w.ighing the
pnlitioal and diplomatic qualities of the Minister of ?oretgn Affair. of
the Third Reich, way aver. or ;+~!'T. Urn wfltjir,d with t) question, "W
dose the world hate Hitler?"
Nuamanr- r.plid, "firsn in private life ? failure le gil.ttoiasd end
censured{ even by associates end friends, while suaoeme provokee the ad-
oiration of everybody. The greater' the position of a man, the more he is
in the public eye, correspondingly the more severe willthe critioe be. If
puler had achieved euooesa, many things would have been overlooked, and any
piaaadilloe would have been suhserpA in the tide of adairstion. But the
Will of providence, the decline of Oeriarn power, Hitler~e own mistakes, in-
dicated clearly that from failure to failure, the end must be rear. Horrible
deeds have been unveiled to the world that called down on him animates/ exe-
oretian. Thy destiny of Hitler is already formed -- the molds are fixad.
To cuzEinue the war would mean only tuxAtng the Qerman cities into slaughter
houses and cutting short the existence of ou*n"
"But", said Wolff, "the Allies wish to destroy thetleY'nien pecPle. "
Husmann acnaatsrsd, "5t is not passible to destroy a people. Even Hitler
did not succeed in extenoinat1-16 the Hebrews. Qne can wipe out a assts. You
and Z lined in the times of Williams II. That era passed with the first World
ifu. You and I lived in the tree of the cur, and in the Russian Revolution
princes sad `rand dukes disappeared. But the Russian and German people still
remain And after this war the ruling a2+rrs in Aeraany Will be wiped out,
but ? nation of 80 million people ostu-at be 'piped out. Not the A1lioA, but
the Os:wans themselves, in obstinately insisting on lighting this foolish
and hapsl.ss war to the bitter end, can destroy their people end their country.
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13.
The lanpr th. oontl.iot lash the greator Will bi the misery, the irsat.r
the possibility of famine."
"prom rat you have told men, replied Wolff, "I Rust believe that yrou
have an .xaot und.retanding of the psychology of German officere. Add to
that the military trYinir*c iwv~ racrivc?". ?h* rerrult le that the eery
foundations of our aaietenoe ire obedience and loyalty to our oaths. For
thess principles we can dig, but we cannot break them and continue to live."
"Doee the principle of obedience prevent your thinking?" asked Flus-
mann. In additiOfl to obedience, ought not those Mt-o find themselvee in
high places reflect on the orders they an about to isew? You have taken
an oath of loyalty to Hitler. But twn'E this game Hitler stated that any-
thing is dust and right that ie for the good of the German people? Isn't
Hitler a symbol? Do you think you should keep your oath to a man men ywu
p.rsonally are concerned that to oor-tunue the war will reeult in ruin for
theUerman posPle4 The genezala who organized tte plot of July 20th were not
bad Germane, but men whop having seen that the psr was lost, wasted Loand it
as soon ae possible for the good of the people and of the oountrr. Hietoxy
will fudge them; they will be considered se !?roee axxi patriots, not as
traitors. Isn't this the oonlliot that is going on in your rind, asnens7.
Wolff? In the bottas of your heart even you are oondnosd that the wr is
irremediably lost for 4ers+ugY? when you return to Italy vd.th what conviction,
with what justification can you issue orders to your eoldien to tight and
die for i ZOAtr Wilii`Zn
1No1lf asked Husmann to leave h1a alone for a whip. Snow had blocked
the line and at Uoaehsners the brain had to come to ? lilt.
After a half hour the conversation was resumed. Wolff aelasd Huarann
what grounds he thought would be acoeptabls for the opening of negotiations
with the Anglo-,Americans.
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14.
Huaoann stipulat,.d that the diaauaeiane suet ba limited .ntirsly to
military questions, beorus. if they went into political niattsre only ttu
grs*t leaders of the Allies, Rooeswlt, Stalin, and r,hurahill, oauld saki
tM deaieion. The niilit*ry surrender of a single sector, on the other hand,
ars quite within the competence of General Eissnhrnra'.
Wolff stated that neither Hitler nor Hisaler knew of hip jourruy to
9R1Es.rland. He himself had decided to take the step attar hearing what
Dollmann had to nay and attar tt-e talks he had fuRd with Parilli at 1-tuno,
e~pealally ae he felt it was imperative that he psreonally should +valua't.
the e1Lw0lon.
Thn disauemion continued and Husaann aeked Wolff the question which
initiated the final etepz "9hs11 the greatest tragedy in German history
take plane without any 4stmrn haring the oowPap to sot for the good of hu-
sanity? I am sure that you realize that the bask os the AArowa people is
broken, and that nothing further can be hoped for from them. You,as well.ae
1G-reha11 Keeeslring, command troops in ? sector that is aonplet.ly upar*te
from the other sonaa of opexrttion, and are thsr~fore able to initiate, and
bring to a conclusion, a plan that willdlrsotilq have its effect in shortening
the war, independently of the other organiaatione in the center of t1 Reich,
a plan that will hays undoubted repercussions, on Ohs ether fruits. Under
thesa conditions everything seeire to point to you as the wan chosen for the
fulfillment of a ~ieaicm that your people dan neither ignore nor forget. 1t
The group took up their residence in Zurich in fNesnnn'a house, where
they had planned the meeting with the A,*sricsns. They, hhowever, hesitated
to cane at the last sa~snt as Dulles' suspicions had bees aroused. He
thought that Wol!f xas acting at an agent of itianSer, E-d his conviction s
based on tM ].stet Sulormation rsoeiwd ba- the imsricans, aocorctng to which
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I.
i5.
1(altenbswar-sr rras trying to cmtaot the Allies in l9witswrland. It way
another example of the sxtraorclinary suspicion of the Aserioarta in regard
to every move undertaken by thepsrmam, which wopiaion aLoeb cauead the
ifiole plan to fail. It way Huestuin rho, by exerting treat pressure, finally
euoossded in inducing Wille? to reaeiw Wolff.
This was not the only time the aegotiationenearly broke dog, for
sersrel time they whre in danger of ohipwr.ok.
If this did not happen, it 1s thanks to Huaa4mn, 1gaibe1 +ux! Pkrrilli,
who, besides hating to overcome certain teahniail obstacles, had to create
a bamie of understanding, adjusted to the completely different ment*litie
of the Americana and theUsraans, differences that would have cmaied the break-
ing off of negotiations at the first disagreement or wiieund.retanding.
Aft,. r introductions had been made, Ftusaann asked the following quee-
tione of Wolff: "General, ae the roeult of our talk on the train are you
convinced thatUermary haa definitely lost the war?"
Wolff: "Tee."
Husaanni "[rid you also understand that we cannot dlecues in 3Nl.t~er-
land any problenu concerning the Iteicsty but only those affecting the acne of
operations in Italy?"
ltollt: "Tea.,'
Nusuann: ?Thioe you have loru].ly aseur.d me that your trip to
9wibserland has been *dertaksn without the knowledge of Hitler and Hi~],er,
and that your presence hers can in no wary be ooneideored as your being the
agent or repneeentatiire of thee. two persons?"
Wolff* xi.., n
Iwnanns nThros our talkyour rival oonalueion was tt*t the only pos-
?ibls thing was an uncandi01anal surrender, as any other for* of surrender
would bring the isLLer into the field of politics, and thereby of uneurmount-
able problems?"
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16.
j
I
Wolff: ~IYes. H
Then lfiioatenn add~1 r 'If, in rpiN of this, you ehauld attuapt to ex-
tend the pr.esnt diwouedan to the whop Reich, it is duet se well that you
should realize that these diAOUeaiane xrn+1d end in 30 ?dO?r"d~ - am I right,
Yr. !111eeV'
?)ullee agreed, and Husmann, after a few words, withdrmr and left tM
p.raao, with the Amerio9-M ? Their talk /sated more than an hour and Y1olrT
Dame out from it satisfied! and t)uu?d declared himisit pleased with the
visitor.
The following day another meting took place b11tN0A1 the Osraane and
theAmericans, at which the 5wiu were aldO Prn.nL.
Those participating were Wolff, Dollaann, Huemann, W~ib?1' and 01?vT"
nits. The problem of the PrrLieana was dieouaeed and the Proclamation rras
drifted that would have to be lesued at the time of the eurronder.
The meeting broke up under the beet auapioee.
#;tMiFif*tt1F#IF
when Wolff, Dol]awrn-, Wean'r . Zin??n'?r and Pai'i'illi returned to Italy
they realised that Harlin auepeeted the neBatiationa beaauee Raltenbtvntter,
in the twee of 41jnm1er, had eenL a telegram to Wolff forbidding contact With
theAllime and orderinfS the ?rreet of 1'arri111.
1Galtsnbruniter 'e telegram did not worry Wolff too mw*. 14. kr*w he
could juatify his trip into 3Ritser1and by making it appear se an attempt
at creating a rift in the en~wY camp.
After the iiret trip of DolLann, at the raQ-ieet of Dulles, Perri and
Usmajani were set =men and Rn.e a],lanrod to go to 3witserlandf even Sor this
,emu= had a reason, gs the two ohiefe of the F~rtieans had serTed to obtain
the libsri-tiaa of Col.ironsoHs, ex-'aide of littler, iho was a prieana~ of the
Allies.
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17.
The traveler at thrt Dims of K.asIlring from the Ttaliim to the Ihst-
Arn Front came ue a nurpriam to AU.
Trc uuccoasor Tna no!? Rnii a.,7.ff .a~n no lor-per in a position to
treat with the Military Commander. Parrilli xae asked to inform Dulles of
the new coruiitione that had arieen.
Parrilli aocepte~i this n~rr mlenian, in spite of tM danger of being
atahine punned by the Allied Air Ford, which almost inaeeeantly patrolled
the road between ldllun and Chinnao, and alero the danger he ran fromthe 31)
suspicions and surveillance because they could not understand how Wolff
could permit a man to warder freely about the frontier when Berlin had or-
dered his arrest.
parrilli aoncludeh1e miaeion and on liie return to Italy trantimitted
the three following queetiona from I7ullee to Wolff:
1. Had Wolff the authority to act alone?
2. If, ae a replacement to Keaselring a nep commander should arrite,
could and world Wolff persuade him to act with hiu?
3. If the new oamoander was not disposed to cot in collaboration,
would Wolff act against his ardereR
Wolff told Parrilli that he was certain Ksseolring would not return
to Italy and thst the ne a of the new cc, red r was still unknoxn. He
stated, "Thillea may count on me whatever happens. It is my flan intent to
bring to fruition the plane arranged with Dnllea the 8th of March in Zurich.
I hope to be able to convince the neR ooamande~r -- and I have narU- arguasnte J "
Then before letting Parrilli /sate for Switzerland he gage the orders
in his pxeea-tae which ownternanded the projected destruction in North Italy.
Airri],li, as soon as he reached Swiss territory, got in tc*ich with
Husann and reported the result of his ai'eion.
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.r.r.
18.
11
Hue,urm and Parrilli anted as intarm.diari.a with the Meriou-s and
had to use all their influ?nae aad their power of pereuadon to aonvinoa
the Americans that Wolff had not changed any of his int~ntiaene. qull.s was
finally persuaded and went to the Allied HsRdgwrtierh in fiance to ask that
a milit,ary delegation be sent to Srritserland to treat with Wolff.
Oawarnitw said to Nusmrnn, "You can see, Professor, it te not easy
to Mart n.goEiationel"
The 15th of March Parril.li returnr,d to Italy to inform Wolff cram
flullee that a silitary mission would crane from GHQ Caserta to Switzerland.
It was ?Yolff this time who eeem.d to be in not too much of a hurry.
He had realised that, amtrary to hte first summing up of tM eituaCion,
'without the oonaurranoee of the Army, it would be very difficult to accom-
plish the eurrenA~r.
General vonViettinghof, who Rae hie friend, had been appointed ae
Kseaelring'a auoo.seor,and he hoped to readily associate him with the project.
But the newCaromander in Chief had not yet arrived in Italy aM he had not
been able to confer with him. He accepted, however, the 19th of March a~
the date of the next meting in Switzerland, at which he appeared accompanied
by Wenner and Ziamer.
pr- the date arranged the Oenuns and the Amerioane met at Aacoru.
The technical preparation of the new meeting had been entrusted to Major
1Faib.1, who was absolutely trusted by bheAaerians. The Americans, however,
being aware of their proximity to the Italian frontier &: therefcx'b to
thepsnmap troops, thought it wipe to prepare for any eventuality by having
machine gone in the garden and to keep a lams bit of the lake under sur-
llana~.
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19.
Bstors the nk+et1flR xusm'nn and F1~rrt111 had a talk with llolff at LuB*no?
Huw*M wnt~d to talkwi0h 1lo1ff before the misting to clear up an
aaibiguitY tlu-t he thought present in the rrtatffi-ent of the Oer**fl an*r&1?
)il1i$ had dusunone'3 the Allied a~i1ltw7 ~Pmeentatiwee an the buffs
of the jfnfl1%tiye .ply given by Wolfl to Parrilli; that ti to ??y, that he
would bring about the surrender e~rsr. agiinet the rrillof th aCosma-uler in Chief
of the0ez'm*n ~nssd Forces in Italy. When Parri111 told I{ueawnn that 1H~lif
oyld ac*O an the 19th of 1Aarah, he had al'+o told him that 7Yo1ff eeeraed to
have changed his nindr inWllUCh a? h.i Qoneidered it ~ou1d be Smpoeei.ble to
act in opposition to tliefjss'man millta'Y uthority in ]'Ma1Y?
~uern&nn, faarinq that Dulles, when confY'ontert with Z-ie reenrvation,
would cancel the meeting, aeaumed the rneponnibility of not trar-amitLing this
part of Wolff'e reply.
By! meeting him at Lu6aflo and by talking with him Dc+f?re' h? met the
Alliee, he hoped to inform him of xhe state of affairs and to w*Tn him that
a contradiction in hie statem?nt> in view of ttr auepioiona of the Americ&n3,
could be fatal to the whole outcome.
Vlolif wao able to prove to Hiiemxnnthgt there wae no contradictioc-, but
only a miaurrjeretanding. He had said to I'3rr111i,"nu'lle5 can couc-L on ms
with or without the Aeraan nd?r ? " ( Ich atahA su thllles mit and ahns-
dpi deutsChen Koaaeandanten.) P~rri111 had undsretood that the surrender
could be aoco~rpliehed with or without the +~A'Pr?v*1 of the Cssw'#M?r of the
peraan troops,mnd had eo inforredDullse, who, as a milt of 'dim ?0"?nuni?i`-
Lion, had summaned the Allied Military Mienion to 3nitser1*nd. Wolff, in-
stead, had merely meant to reaffirm his loyalty to 1)i11es, but not that the
wurrender would be brought about agalYUSt the wiahss of LheCaenander of the
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20.
the E'aa$on would Kos nani~htd that
Arm-? Tbroagh this ~ai~undrrst~andinB
had oaussd Tulles to eurwor+ thsM~?~~?rioan miseiar- to f.Mitsrrlay-d?
This could re*w*kem the dornt ,u.Piolans of Dullss, ~t-o alight t-$w ?een
in Wolii' I cords an +xD+diant to pin tisu ou1A oonfuw the dtuation.
It w~$ &grs?d beta^:'?Qi~f and Wuaaann to PrsSnt the followit-g Pro-
powle to theAmerioana, givinK them a ehanue to ohoo$S ~iah~ver they pr'-
fund s b~olut~lY neoe~eary,
1. Ii, in the fin*1 analysis, it Mar raneiderei a
Wolff r+ould be tlling to try to bring about the eurr'a'by hinieelt, but
he would eatplaln the diffirultiee to be enoounte2'~d? o~ ~d to
2. IL might be proferabin to await the arrival ofV'settingh
in view of t) trisY-dehip sxletinR
persuads bia to collaborate, eeoealally
atwsan lfoltf and the rung Ca1flfl-ander in Chief. Wolff was aanoet oertain that
he could favorably influsnaeVist~ir-ghof.
' e new He~dw-rtere an the
3? Wolff MQu1d p~ glad to go to Xeeaelrinq
V(eatern Front and ae? if he could obtain hie authorisation to 4oocmp1ish the
surrender. enough
~y~R a1~t,ained Keeaelring'a authorris~t~ion, it would be easy
n a nnon-politio~l" general and a. great
to conyiuae oiettiiaghet, who, bei g
friend of Aeee41ring, *0uld pry?'*bly 1l5ten most x1111ng1y to the uBgae-
tions of theField Yarsha11? for thc~ future, ~~3'' that
~1olif streseed an &drlltional poseibilitpde him to combine the mx~~sr
in his talk with Kemse1rin6 he hoped to pe ~
of the lfsstera !rant 'with that of the Tt+11*U Bator. h~-
}ue~ persisted in rnrning Nalrf of the r-eoeseitY o? caeo~pc~inB
pelf in euoh a awcfleY' a s not to destroy Du11AS' a?nfid?nce; it xae there fare
necessary' bh&t he pr.e.nL hie deaieion $e definite and irreyooable, while
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21.
putting in proper relief the toot that the r~arrn-*l of Keses1rin6 11*d
oreatsd an entirely new and unforeseen state of s==sira?
Wolff for his pert Mind i,nilateA on the avtitionn at surrender that
would be tooordsd his aollaboratore, particularly theQenerals (among whom
was Oruiani) who would !-4ve followed him. He wie'ri to be +-aeurad by tho
Allies that they would be accorded hanorabin and chiva].rour~ ~sreatment? He
asked nothing for hiseelt,bub eCated ttwt he could cb nothing until he hid
been given s fotma]. .saurar-oe ae to this matter.
At 11eocma in a little villa be1or-g1n2 , to thn Amerioane LMt'e was held
. first conference between Wolff, Du11ee ant aev~rntt$~ 't a eeaand con-
fsrenes tMneraL Terence `3. Airoy of the British mineral Staff, and fleneral
Ijman L. I,amnibYer of tkMAmerican Army, were also present.
The two genex*le, with they aid of tNaibel, had asnwed in SKitssrland
the names of two ?ergeante in the Amar'icfl An4Vj Nicholson ani McNeely.
The3Wies ganermaent continued to the very end to remain in the dirk
in regard to all theee events.
Tluring the maeticg , Huemann took Wenner into the garden to Connince
his since he had been pointed out by Zimmer ne being the most sceptical.
Having 4],so learned from 7.isaer that Wolff had brought important
docynMmLe with him, 1iueann bagged Aolif to turn tMes over to the Allies
as a proof of his loyalty and good faith.
At the Moons onnfsrenas it was decided to let Roli'f?go to Keeaelring,
to endeavor to obtain his authorisation Co accanplieh tb eurrender. Wolff
had planned to leap the next clay and be back xithitt three days at the most.
Wennir =,eaarked, nx~re is Many a slip ~trrJ.xt the cup awl the lip."
The prophetic words of Wenner proved too true; Yfollf ran into diffi-
culties on his trip. U'- the date ref for his return, that ie the 24th of
March, he did not appear nor did he send any sees*6?.
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22.
It was not till the 29th of March that tYoiff r.tnrn.d Co Italy. Thy
night before the 9t,anpart.nlLhrer of theS9, Muff, notified Parri113 of
lloltf'e return. A~rri111 Mai ably to convince Rauff Lhat it *s 1p~?Ltvs
b)-*t h~ oo ^t onoe to 4wit,srlsnd to nernanally confirm Lho news to OaiMl
and Humnann.
Parrilli, with the oonnent of hie friendM, Lrierl in awry tray to win
over to their plan the Find of the O.nean F'oliae for Lombardy *a-d the Piermont,
for his attitude was yieibly unfavorable to Lhn negotintione.
1Yaibell profited by Rutf'a visit to aak for the relase~ of ' political
prisoners, to which Rautf ogte.d.
Tho 30th of March Wolff and Perrill.i met at Fanrno. Wolff reportsd
to Parrillie "RsaeelrinR, in epite of bnlrg flnowsd under with work, re-
oeiveri me twine and lietened with great interest. He,alsa, !.n of the
opinion that we nhould enter into negotiation with the A111An, particu-
larly ae he is oert+-in we cannot reelet on tho Western Front for more than
three, or at thA most, four weeks. Attho end of thin period the roanrvoe
will b4 oxhausLeA. "
lf.sselring had also epoksn to Wolff concerning the issuance of a riN1I
~'perxwrillungawaeffr(weapon of Aeep.ntion) which wsAxp.atsri daily and
wfiloh was to be uuid on the Western lAront. Kesselring himself did not Imaw
the exact nature of the weapon but theetfeots had been deeoribed to him an
no terrible that to had decided to ?srwf in his resignation rather than have
hie name linked with such a weapon.
In his eeooruf talk with Wolff the Field lianhall was aorx regerveG,
paying that a surrender on the Western Front ?esed iwpoeeible an he felt
he was not oowplet.ly master of the ettuation.
However, hi was not opposed to euoh a step io~inq taken by Viettinghot,
nor to wolif'? plan In general.
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23.
Nhilm the talks rrors ts~ing place with Ksuslrins, Wolff r.o.iv.d
an urgent Ca1ilroaHerlin, requesting hip to explain his contact with the
Allies.
Thee contretemps had prewntad Wolff ms.ting Viettirghof. f'ir-
rill.i announced then to the head of the S3 that he would not return to
Ascona till he had been inforinad of the result of the msetinR with Viet-
tinghof. Zimmer had to qa to Ancona to inform Cho Ameri.oan delcgates of
what had happened and to announce Lhe lirminsnt arrival or worry and ,tar-'
rillt, The last named had had the impression that, after his talk with
Hiaou],er, Wolff had become more cautious and waa seeking to gain time.
However, he preferred to stay near Faeano, because he believed that per-
sonally he oauld influence theQernwn Qensral. On the other hand, the
General considered it holnflal to have A~rrilli within reach.
The 318t of March the meeting of Wolff and Viattinghof took place.
Oenexul R3ttiger, Chief of Staff of th+ Commander of thA German Foroe in
Maly, was also present.
The predictions of Wolff xmre fulfilled because both Rottigar and
ViettinRhof announced that they favored a eurrsndar, They, like Kesael-
ring, knew that the Allied ofteneive sae in an advanced state of prepara-
tion,and that Choy did not have the means of opposing it fcr more than a
few wsake.
Wolff informed them that he would go to Switserlsnd where he would
definitely arrange for the surrender and that he would accept the date net
by Dukes: eight o'clook in the evening of April 2nd.
In the meanwhile Hlinlmr, sating on a rumor that had reached him
from I'Ea13r, took Wolff 'a family under his "perea-a1 protection".
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?r~
24.
y1I1Sr himwlf telephoned Lhie dAOielon to wolf!, warning him once
igain not to l~*Ve the YtIli.+u- sone?
Wolff said to Parrillit "I do not lack the courage to go to Switser-
lunch if neoeseary I would not hseitata to even e*arifiaa my faailY to the
aaus?. But I aa pertain that now that Hider has spoken to me, tMt there
is already an individual with s bullet ready for me. Hq rciay mien be 1~sre
at GHQ, maybe on hie way here. The end of the ebory Mould be a superb
!1u-eral at the exp.nee of the 9tats. But elY corPen would be of no ueo to
the Allise, nor, being dead, could I render any eerviap to mpg people. It
ie iapoesible, therefore, for m9 to leave Fgsar-o at this time. Uo to
Dullee and ask ifs instead of my coming, h~ will send an Allied Superior
Officer to P*eanc, have him lodged secretly, and from here he can contact
aHQ in Caeex'ta.??
(lene~+al Lemnitsar i.n8wit$er1end made the oninter proposal, invier
of the impossibility of Wolff'! coming, of sending plenipotentisriee acrnee
the firing line. The passport to base the Allied Ling was }tNurembaorg".
The 5th of April Parrilli was presented to Viattl.nghof and FCdttiger.
At this meeting there was such talk of the weather, but there were only
brief and vague al3ueiazia to the subject dear to '.'arrilli+e heart.
D~ a subsequent tete-a-tete Wolff informed F'arrilli that Viettivghot
de*and.d guarantees. The deuan Commander in Chief xi9hed to be certain
that the surrender would be aocanpliehed in such e xr-Y that history could
not $ows day call, him a traitor to hie country.
Also Vi.ttiinghof asked to see the drat`t of the articles of surrender
before authorising it. sisnebursj in that way the plenipotentiaries dele-
gated to sib would only have to nslce one trip across t1 front ithe a.
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25.
Zimmer was sent to tr*nrrnitVisttinghol's requset to Huwann. The
8th of April liusearin and Zian-er were joined by A*rri111, bearing a doou-
ment in which thb gsrnan nmpoealr rrore speoified. TM doouMnt w,n given
to the Americana in Aarn. Dxl;~n and f]aowornits translated it and asnt it
in code to the Allied Headquarter in Caserta.
Qn h1e return to Agsano, Parrilli real Led that other delays threatened
to hinder the negotiations V1etEinghof had preaentod another proposal,
namely, that the Allies should advance about 10 kilauetere a dry.
ViAttinghof, according, to Wolff, wee profoundly upset by the informa-
tion reoeivxd fromAerlin that the ed.tuntion was about to be completely re
versed and that perniany wse ss~ured off' victory. The Gonpnandnr in Chief was
naoillating and did not want to lay down his arms until he had been con-
vinced that every last eaorl.Pios of human life had been proved to be futil,.
Also Himmlor had again called Wolff to Berlin.
FEarinF the xoret, Wolff thought it wiser to inform Himmler eam~ewha0
of the state of affairs, No, Lherefors,xrote him a letter in rich he in-
formed hi of the neaeoeiity or finding a solution, based on a compromise,
before this became lmpoealble due to Russian intervention.
The terms roqueeted would inalud.=
1. The avoidance of iiaprisomaent for tM penman troops.
2. The granting of an honorable surrender.
3. The unhampered withdraws], of the troops.
In his letter Yfallf reiterated that he "ad acted in the best inter-
eats of the German people. 8e stressed the importance of the teat that the
negotiations rrould preserve the troop, who by thus avoiding capture on the
Southern Front, would bnavailable later for keeping order in gernwnq, end
probable also to font a future nucleus of the SA urd?r some other name.
He ended by asking Hider to etas to him to psr*onally take 0ognjance of
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the sitwtion? an is, 'NOl.ff, could no longar 1S*Ita1y' i YtI of ttr
politio*l developtaente. brurt~d
Thie totter waa e~nt to Him~aler by mane of f)r. tla~'ia say)., a
iriond of wolff, who ~se su'1tlAOn^( r0u )0fl1tco for that Pux"PoAS. Paxrilli
5Lsyed at T+assno to axait Himmlor'R reply.
During those days ~ooflevelt'e death way annowc-oed? The decease of
the Provident of tho tmited States had i 1*rtf.cu18r Marine, on th n ponsli.ng
aegotiatione beaaue~ thAriby )u11es 1o9t hie math uPPart.
Hinonlor'e anrnrar to 'gol..ff xae prampt. ft ~ummoned him to aPMar in
Berlin jn,cji.ately. 'PhouF.h v1QUbbt~1 of the outcome. Wolff decided to obey.
'(;efozg leaving he gave Parrilli a !older containing hie testamer~tc
"My Will to be given to Nr. *lullee by Aaron Luigi Parrilli"
Th the event that I da not return from Berlins ~ ~e ~riaone~:
~~1. If I ~ho~~ld losP ~'~Y ooat of Coron~-nd, or ahwl
and thereby the plan to which I have agreed could not be broht to frut-
tion, I beg trwt You Will not let the coneequAnceo fall on ti$ Oet'T82l
people nor on the tlsriaan troops in 7ta1Y? honor ehauld be attacked. I
a2. If after mar death my memory or my
bg that UIr. ilullee Will rehabilitate it my nuking public tha true rea~?na
and the humane ideals that were my motive, and to make it known tint t did
not cot for any eelfinh rAaeon, nor ae a traitors but with the hope a xl
conviction of saving the Qerman people ae tieuoh se possible.
"3. Afta my' death I beg 1Ar. Tnz7lee, in zemembranoe of the ideal
for which I e1'-0-11 have died, that he will accord to the Germ en and Italian
troops honorable conditions of surrender.
?ii. Ana q drath, I beg t~r? tul1i?e to protect my two families,
as far as he is able, that they be not destroyed."
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 d( j, ! YrLtfti f
4
0 ;1 :f. V tI Ti R
'~
.0 h, a (U1
hr( ?h:v
nN~
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zr.
Carrying Wolti't beetatasnti Parrilli oroued tho frontier once again
to bring the document and the news of Wolif' s departure for 9er1,in to }hus-
monn an1 Y7aibel.
They w?r~ received by tullee, but they thought it wiser aot to speak
of Wolff' testament, either bsoawe of thc+ ef[eot on t)ullee of the ds-th
of PraeidenE Rooeawlt, hie friend, or because they felt that the news of
Wo1iP'e departure for Berlin would cause enough of an unfavorable impree~ion?
Du11ee took advantage of the westing to tell them thuC the Ttue0lanm
were opposed to the negotiations, of which feat Roosevelt had informed him
a few days before ha died.
lteamfiile Wolff arrived in Berlin.
The 17th of April he had a long talk with Himml~ar, which l_aetnd from
two in the afternoon till one the following morning. After four hours
KaLeebrunner joined them and remaine~t till t}r encl.
Before Kaltenbrunner appeared, Wolff infonred Himoo].er the.t if the
Germane had agreed to an iinediete surrender to the pnglo-kTrt-eoricane, these
would not have been avsrae to continuing the 'gar or- the side of Germany
against the Rusiafla.
giamler ' s anin-sr was that he had burned the letter because it wan so
oomprwi. !n`
Hasler appeared to 'galtf ? broken man, devoid of all energy and will
power. Kalbenbrunn?r, on the other handy seemed more aggressive and aue^
piQxoud than stet. NeverEhelese he did not seem to pOeseBe the power to
decide lfolff's ht,., so Wolff decided on a bold move, turned to the attack
and charged that Xaltsnbrunnsr' a intelligence service was poor, and that
the aaouu-tion$ brought against him were frankly an oflenee and a rank
injusZias.
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ze.
lrinally 1lo1tf agreed to Qo with Ilaltenbruuisr to Hitler to explain
the taoti and to ?ek him to fudge thew. iti~alsr preferred to abe.nt him-
eslf from the conference with Httler.
At fire o'clock on thn 18th of April Kaltenbrurn-'ir and Wolff were
received by HiLlnr. Hitler, even more than Hi.roaler, }ud the appsMranoe of
w finished man. Ne seemed suddenly to have ?gvd by 20 years; stooped,
with trembling hands, piste face anA eye+e distraught, he eoarasly seemed to
know what wan goi,?p, on abort him.
Hitler barely lieten.d to the juntifieation of Wolff; he interrupted
his almoat immediately to launch an interminable monologue in rhioh he al-
ternstely talked of "reeietanoe" erid cez+,ainty that there would be a split
between the Allies. He ended by charging Wolff to tell 9lettinghof to de-
fend the Ita].iin front with the Rreateet determinatdon. The canferonce
ended thus. Wolff hail bluffed and won.
~**t #au+frt
The 23rd of April Wolff returned to Swi.tssrland determir-ed to Biqa
the eurrender. He was accompanied by limner and by VieLtinghof r'r delegate,
who poseesasd !1x11 pvMere, Lt. Col. Victor von 9chwninit.
Qr.atly to the surprise of the Qarnana, Ihi].lee refused to receive them.
}ii had received inetruotione from PPo~ehington to break oft negotiations.
Dulles was uncertain at to whether this was due to a veto imposed by the
Russisr-s, or to the euepioiooe aroused by WoliP's journey to Berlin.
Raibsl, Nusmann and Aarrilli ids every possible effort to prevent
Dulle~' letting the German delegation depart without aooonpliahing their
project, r~-ioh the three had brought thus tar through difficulties and
hindrances of every kind. (fRevsrnits, an American of Cltrnian origin, and,
therefore, the sost capable of understanding tM peychol4gy of :ha group
lend by Wolff, took it upon himself to explain to Dulles the point of view
of the Qermana and the Stallai-n.
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29.
chiller let hi~asslf be convinced, era/ telegraphed to Qutar'ta announa'
ing the Rrrival of the German delegation in !3witer1hnd.
]lost aptly a telegram camA from E11ma-ler to 'Nolft, forwarded by Tiawer
to Nua$rnn. Hia-n].er forbade i'lolff for the nth Ci.auI to leave UIe Italian
Zone and ordered him to +emPloy every pnaoiblM m&nn in combatbir-~ bl'-* of-
feneive launched by the Alliee on the tat oP April on the 1tJ1i.a-n Fz'or-t?
It wan n proof that Wolff' wan acting on his own initiative, anA againnt
tho will of Hitler.
Hinuu].er'o telegram had no effect on Wolff. T3nfore /Having for
3witserlarnl hey had agreed with VivttinYhof, Ftottigcr, Pohl and finally
with the O?ul?iter Hofnr, not to obey any fl-rther orders that Berlin might
issue concerning the Italian zone.
The reply from Caserta to Thil.].oa ' tOlpg1"ani waa in ttxs nffirm4tiw s
Alexander was still inCeroeted in the nogotiationa and Uullee was re-
queeted to hold the Uerman delegation pending i`urthe~' oommunio~tiona.
Hueaeann urged Wolff to leaves for t'taty and to announce the capitula-
tion, together rrl.tA Viettinghof, without tlirther lose of time. Wenner
could go to Caserta to eipn rho aurxender, if he we re given full powers,
together with Sahweinits. It would only be neceaeary foo^ P/o1fP to delegate
YYennor as hip official representative.
Wolff accepted the euggeation and left for Italy.
At C.rnobbio he was eax't'cunded by P~rtieu-e and stopped. He sua-
cieded finally is continuing the journey, thanks to ibol, assisted by
the American Vice-Consul at Iugano, Donald Jones, Sgt. Franmo I,ivio of the
Swiss Intelligence 3errics, and of the Italian Doctors PsreBrini and Ventura,
who possessed the oonfidsnae of the Italian 0 L N.
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 Lsd
iet
arms.
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30.
gohx?inits end Winner lift 9wttsIrland the 28th of April ;M on t1.
29th signed the surryndsar at dasata. They sfrixsQ their dgnaturea with
the ervatien that the surrender could be aonfirned by Piottinghoi at-d
Wolff. The oonfir~eaLion Kse to reach the AmeriotnI not. later than 12 on
the 2nd of May.
In the ntw-m,hile the Ger*an Hesdquar't~re were Crane=ermd to Bolsano.
pi.Etinghof was no longer in eoioaarnl be+oauee on thn 29th of Apr1l he was
relieved.
With the AhoxteninR of the I.inAe on tha //Astern Front, Keaeslring
found that he was being aeeipned a sector that include~a Bavaria, the Saith
Tyrol and the Italian Zone.
In place of Vi.ttinghot, 1Ceeae1rina named C3onerals chulLa and Want-
sal, who refused to listen to any talk of eurrender . 1t~ttigor, who tempo-
rarily waa taking Diettinghof'e place, insisted with Schulta and 1Nentsel
that they would have to recognise the eignatum of the surrender, as eignmd
by Schweinits and Wenner.
The Osnerals Herr and Lemeleen, commanding respectively the 10th
and 14th Armored Forces, were of tM same opinion a' R6ttig.r.
As 3ohults and Nentsel were not diepoeed to agree, i,ttiger, with
the approval of Wolff, had them arreeted.
The arrest took place on the let of May. The German Military authori-
ties had taken the irrevocable deaielon to Mru-euncs the ce9eabion of firing
that night,
auleiter Hofer changed hie mind at the lest moment and informed
Hsadqu*it*a~s of what was haPWninft
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31.
CLb
rie!
irnie.
iW,t.nbrunn.r irssdiate]y sent into the South Tyrol a rpeaial foroi
of 98 With the order to arrsat all who h+-d taken path in the ospitulation.
But the .nvoya of Kaltenbrunn.r ouuld not aooosplioh this M1eeSon
due to the general ooMuian, the rapid suooesslon of events (eaang xhioh
sae the death of Hitler), and above R11 des to the dmt.rmirr-Lion of the
leader of the group, Wolff himself, who Rae ready to dt-ter Lha 11sZe with
any one oppoeed to the execution of the capitulation.
The 2nd of May at It in the morning he tad a Ueb long talk on thn
telephone with Ksseslring.
TheMeld lMrshall was still doubtful and reeu?d racalcitrsnt, but,
in view of the general dieeolution, and the fact that VieLtinghof had been
officially represented at Caserta, Kessslring finally brnrsd to the accom-
plished teat.
At 12 on the 2nd of May the aeraar-a ceased firing. Schultz and Went-
$1 were released and left for (}ermany, while Viettinghof rexa~woed oonmand
of the WihrmaohL in Italy.
The 4th of May an Anglo-American Canrrieeion arrived inAolaano to take
oryr the gcvercaent. The 14th of May the Allieil troops completed the occupa-
tion of North Italy.
Thus was concluded the active phase of the Qeman capitulation in Italy.
I have written the facts as they w.re told to me by qualified and
authoritative sources.
The es+-atr?ss of ~ep- wrdon wag aonrireed by the 0e nnans, whore it
wts possible for nee to gather details concerning the r.asone tint lapelled
the Ossnanr to enter into nsgotiaLions with the Allies.
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;2.
It is still not clear for wtrb xraJona i?1!f i.na his group aondiot?4
long and dangsroue di.cu$rioona during two aonblu to finsl]Y aoao11d0 ~n uu--
oond.ltioonal eurrsncler, which could 1sva bAsn aocoaplishs d with a YerY brief
exa}&ng* of views bstwr.n the parties.
IS it was vrsly to surrsndea' without condd.Cioc-s, the a=s?Y' troops
could haw quietly awiited the Allied offeneire and bhp laid don thou arms.
At F'lsniburg, the o.rnor de Doer-its, ImaKinB that bhe troops wire
cut off in porW&Y and ~"nm?rk, and were in no position to resist, ended the
war with an unconditional surrender. T1bre Rero no negotiations with the
Allies and the responsible aonnanders did not expose thememlree to being
considered braitare.
It could be ea-id that in Italy Wolit erxI his collaborators sought
their own ssxeGY? The po8~tiO? held by Wolff and his rank in Lt~ 35 Wight
justif'y this observations ? ? ? '? ? ? His responsibility ae~ A max criminal ro-
maine to be proven.
If Wolff' s action had been dictated purely from a selfish aaCivei
he might have asked for himself and his collaborators the assurance of
several si111oas and a hospitable reception in some fir country that was
peaceful and neutral, to which,as a /amt siseion, the Allies would have to
transport his. Unconditional surrender of the Italian Front was well worth
such a concession, and such a request would not have saand&lls~d the uearsb
msryices of his adve naries.
To judge the results, the personal welfare of t M negotisbore of the
surrender must instead be put in the backgrounds Kopf for three years has
been a prisoner of the A?Blo-~xa'ioans, i+hile his wily and family are in
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33.
dire need. The poet ~rar adventures of !)olLean have already bean told: as
to Winner, wr may add that until a ehorb time ago he also ewe dspri,vsd of
his 1 iM rty.
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