A SURVEY OF ALBANIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00038R001100040002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 144
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 29, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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T HOP.
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CALL NO,
A SURVEY OF ALBANIA
:DEC. ci ASS.
S ARMY
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TABLE OF 00:4TEITTS
PART I
HISTORY, SOCIOLOGY LID GEOGRAPHY
- 1. Early Hiztory
20 Sociological Survey
3. Geo c;raillay
PART II
AN,
4. Political
5e How the Community Achieved Hegemon,y in ALBANIA
6. The Yugoslcz A11 iii
7. The Cons-r)ir;-:.c:7- of Geaeral KOGI XOXE
Gs Russian Interest
PA.FCC III
PAGL"
GOVERMENT
9. Structure of the Peoples Reraublic of ALBANIA 251-.22
10. Statute of the Albanian Workers' Party 26.32
PART IV
it)LLICZ, BREAD AUT D WO RIC tt
11. The Conwunist Conce-,Ition of the Togiu. Freedwas
12. Surmression of Rellion in ALBANIA
13. Albanian Political Parties in E;41e
PART V
ALBANIAN MILITARY SITUATION
14. Natural Defenses
Section A.. Defease Possibilities 43.44
Section B. Albanian Nature...1 Defense and. Possible Invasion 414.50
Routes
Section O. The Coastline of .ALBANIA 50?"52
Section De, Military Defense of ALBANIA
Section E. Soviet Military Mission 53-54
Section P. Ground Forces 54-?55
Section GI Rates c'Pay and Rations of Albanian Armir
personnel 55--56
Section H. Order of Battle 56-57
Section I. Organization of Armed Yorces 51-6l
Section J. Technical. Equipment 61-.63
32-.35
9
39"43
? t ?
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TA.TEAD OF COLTTELMS contd)
Section K. 11r7,7.c.d()orstu;. Dotenses
Section L 1.:ariue Ifanry clad Ocastra Defense
Section M. Coastal Fortifications
Section IT. 41.1:47 Force
Section 03 Gonoral liobilization for Pre--Military Training
Section P. Albardza Law Insirmia of Rr?..nk. and. Uniforms
PART VI
it1T.-RIT I IT 7C0170I-TY
?
lilinera Weal VI.
Section A. The Baslx. I.S.1.1ccv:.c.f...DE---roll
Section B, Basia of P....stoji.
Section C. Trzlnr,-22ortation, Store and Oil Research
Section
Section
Section
DO I.:1. ineS
liines. of lutes a-ad...Kr..a...-rse
2. Chromium Miae a
3. Bitumen Mines
4. Ru1.21z Area
E. Hydroelectric Power
P. Miscellaneous Industries
1. T irano.
P re
21 ?bisptpr
3. anss2
Yieri
5. Du_sm
6 Masom
7. pibo
8 ? a&sta
Section G. rishing Industry
Section H. TrfAnsportation and Traffic
1. Maritilae Traffic
2. ititilroad Communications
4. litighwing Ooramunioci.tions
? Aqueducts
5. Principal Bridges which were rebuilt between
19114 an&3,916
Section I.. Agriculture
Section J. Ports
1* big=
nakt
Ottizer,PiArte
akingri4 Ilconogtic Information
i.ofigh illation Quotas
Section IC
Section Ti
?
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77
77
is
is
7s-80
80,41
81
81
52
82
82
83
83
83
83
IECL7
814
514-085
85
85
660-87
87
Spes08
83
88649
89
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LA_BLE OF CONTENTS ( contd)
PART VII
Page No. Iii
Albanian Version of Forei51 Intelligence SU ctivitiez,withii
411,13.4.1q141. 92r.e100
Miscellaneous Information 100-101
Possibilities of Revolt 101-2.03
ALBANIAN Military Information obtained from an Albanirm
Refuzee. M.OIC report dated 7 August 1950, Reference
No,
CHART I
Pc1ble 1.111.p-Itzi 'Rpliteq Trttn ATITIAITIA
Exhibit I
Brec.1.;:c1.own of Albanian and Soviet 41.1.rzcci Forces in JUJILUTIii.
Exhibit II
Brealaiourz. of Soviet Military Mission. cneL Albii War Ministry
r-Ir.b.ibit III
Breda:clown of Soviet 14ilitary Mission LInd. Albanian National
Defense Division
Exhibit IV
Breakdown of Soviet Military MiSGi01.1 cid jabaaic.:111aval
Headquarters in Isikciatii
Exhibit V
Albc.nian Road and Rail System
rixhibit VI
Ports of Volonp. and. Dura.EN
ExhibitVlI
Relief Map of ALBAITIA and Division of the Territorici Surface
Exhibit VIII
Olimate
Zximibit IX
Hyd.rogropb7
Exhibit X
Geology
Exhibit XI
Agriculture and Forests
Exhibit XII
Density of Po:9ulation
Exhibit XIII
Po.pulation Statistics of 1.941.
?
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FC
In presenting the fo1loT;1_nr7 material on AL2A17A, three principal
objectives were kept in rd_rid, (1) to give the reader a simple and.
concise accolmt of the historical backround: (2) to present a cross-
sectional analysis of the Communist Party covernlental pattern; and
(1) tn ita*(ir5pei. ai trp1rirforrinr tn t'In74e ,7.71-nrms
interested in this field.
Tr varinns irc;tRrrpn, extracts1,r,01.0 rn070 report n since
this information appeared best srited to illustrate particular points
throughout the survey. Althourh far from presentin a comprehensive
suLmation of the surtject, the practical utility of this report lies
in the coverage of the most important aspects of 1.:od_ern ALISAI7IA.
An effort has been made to demonstrate the development of AILAUTA
by the USSR for political and military reasons. Inasmuch as the Soviet
foreign policy has incornorated ALBANIA for the ultiate purpose of
providing the USSR with an outlet to the Mediterranean, it is reason
able to assume that eventually Yugoslav Macedonia will have to be sacri-
ficed to realize this undertaking. In view of the intrnational sit-
uation today, and of the aggressive attitude assumecl by the U.N? it
may be some time before this "ussian affbition in t-_-te Balkans can achieve
frultinn. The pariftp41-?ility that YTTGLOVIk will do an about ff'"Ic" innA
return to the Cominform fold cannot be discounted.
AL3ANIAts importance stems from the eeogra-ohical factor rather
than any national accomplishments or contributions. Her strategic imp.
ortance weighs heavily in the balance of power in tiereditsrranoan and
the Near East_
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Hieto17,,
1. Early History
STRA:J, the Roman h:J_8t,r1.an. mentioned that the Aabens
as a people settled in the tranF4-Caucasus flatland in the era before
Christ. The Romans had established contact with these people during
the century preced_ng the birth Df Christ. The Albanians, meanwhiae,
had obtained possess ion of the fertile valley of the Cyrus' .aver (at
present known as the Kura, in Azerbaijan). By means of a military
agreement concluded with the Albanans, the Romans used Albanian con-
tingents during their wars against MITHRIDATUS, King of POYTO.
According to STEUCSO, at that time the Albanians were
al-
ready an important ethnic group, since they were able to form an army
of approximately g0,000 men. An excellent cavalry formed the strongest
component of this army. The people lived dispersed throughout the
Cyras River Valley, and also occupied territory in sections of the
mountains north of the river. Various tribes had a similar language,
but there were considerable differences in dialects. These tribes
were ruled by chieftans whom STRABO called "kings", however, it is
difficult to compare this term with its contemporary meaning.
The Albanians were heathens, like the nomadic peoples who
invaded their territory, and they differed from these nomads by race
rather than language. To historic dccuments remain from that time,
therefore, it cannot be determined at exactly what period Albanian de-
fense of their own country _became possible. It is certain, however,
that pressure from the south and east became so strong that further
:Ae ? -AM- -411* N ? .
defense of their territory could not be carried on by the Albanians.
In conjunction with other racial groups from the East, the
Albanians began to migrate toward the Mediterranean area. By one route
they travelled across Asia Minor (Capadocia, Galatea, etc.) and the
Sea of Marmara, reaching Tracia (Thrace), south of the Rhodope Mountains;
and by another route the Albanians crossed the Aegean Islands and reach..'
ed. Euboea, Attica, and Boetia. Until this day, strong Albanian racial
characteristics are perfectly preserved in the islands Which are now
part of GREECE. However, the northern wing of this migration, not hav-
ing found conditions suitable in Tracia, first turned to the north
ward. Macedonia where part of this origina1 group has remained to the
present time. The remainder of the group gradually spread until later
it had reached. the coasts of the Ionic and Adriatic Seas. The unsuit--
able conditions pointed. out above concerned the inadaptibility of these
people in cultural and. social fields rather than in any dislike of the
climate or environment.
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A Survey of ALBArIA ?r)n. ?
In their new colcitr-d, t.o AlbaniEin mixc ri. with other
racial grolms rIna V/..4c . bar/ttc.tlien3C1-7CS to the
gra a% aa. -
- .
AL4t.11 4.11 kit)(.1g, . -" -1 ? J.
means of
rival in
. 11h L .
_. I
-
".
T '
c.) c ;-? by
1-11.y1c..1 ccrtac
thr-.1ir an.
i iii AlbaLlan louna PeirLsgle
remnants of ti ct7:1:7e road civni2,atf.nn, w172ch
their own e7c1ubr71. 111.hr. not iec PLA.assic
peoples Who ha (g -ofu-md.r';d I:I their to the
Mediterranr'va bei./iL.d. to the same racial groups is
a problem which has fiever been solved.
1111 p In .r1 c cw, In f-N ." t:h
1 ea ....I ? .1 ? -:. - - - ??? ? -
e eL,Jall(grapnt,rs 13-ei1uVe
11,4nc.
1 it-J. Li
?-? 4'1 101 In +
or 1*.r ?
they were part of
the large ndo peng:-up ihi ch had. :P.igratect from ASIA arriving
in Tracia and then scittling during the following centuries in the
impenetrable EUC-3S of AL3A1TTA, In an ethliic sense,
ALBA:CIA occupy es ne.--1-.-Ty a,11 cf -ch.) teTritt,ry surrounded by the bor-
ders of thr, country am'. asc, the areas vfaich extend. :into the littoral
of Crna GJ rn. Y.fo.:.,tonegro) (Rairtija Mountain, Point 1593, YIMCSLATIA,
1:250,000: Sheet Y, 46,Q o3c..93,), and from there across the lbar River
into the Sandialc Region 17b"--1. 1..)azar (YUCTOSLAVIA, 1:250,000; Sheet
gi0.531), then to the fla.t:tand uf KtD SS,)V0 Polje, well to the
other side of Pr. s na ( YUGOSLAVIA, 1: 250 , 000 Sheet Y-35, S58273).
The ethnic border then follows the Vardar- ?Aver, grazing
Skopl,ieTUG-0 SIAVIA , ;250 ,000 , Sheet Y-45, 573903) until it reaches
Titov Veles kYUGOSTJAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet 3008y0), from where
it turn9 the scuthwest Strqga (C-IEE(E, 1:i250,000, Sheet
????Zonlymmoll..0????????????=.0
Ga-1, 20.3n5) on the northern sire t)f Lake Ohrid. The ethni.c border
then f_!.,7-.)ss the p:)11-LL(N-':1 "uou.ad.ary of and AITIANIA, following
a line i92;7, L4-.ECE, 1:250,000,
Sheet ce4i 2:127Lit ( GIEECE ; 25(. ?000,Sheet
G1,14-1 202650), und. th Greek coast ai.:177;:.r-,:s,:c.: not available).
*rms.. ? .1. ?-???
Albanians 1iv3.ng in the Albalitan-Greek territory between
p..linolcastro rs oPLEcis , 1 : 250,000, Sheet G-4, 146701), and PaTr4a, are
mixed with Greek ethnic stock. 11,3tually, it cannot be c3ta..,;ed with
certainty that these are ethnic Greek, but the cultural ocLtacts
these people ila 70 had during the 2.ast ten centuries with purely Greek
elements have their mark, since there is a great resemblance to
the Hellenic e3iv:Ilization. The arthodox religion has also exercised
a profound. influence, while the people in some of the valleys have
aesumed the Greek language as their own.
Southern Albanians also live in contact with ethnic groups of
nueo-41ahsn (Roumanians) residing in the Pindus Mountains of GIMES:
while there are ten of these ethnic groups living within the borders
of AIROLA itself:
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A Survey of AL3A1-Ik (r'on
(1 1
Page 3
The AlbariP.r la--L1r,:,-- of o(le..7 prcsey.7es some phonetic
forms belongL--
_ L. ,- 7- ,. :,.
..il_N, ,:.1 '. _:_
)_4 -, peoplas 1J1-1-) had come from Tracia.
This ss t'ie con-:.u'n pith the ancient inhabitants of
Tracia whi7o onny:te duri!ir. tho migration toward the Adriatic.
Th _ ? i_d t.,"::..67 t d. A:.....=1-1271.A, 'bat 'had. ne-v-er suc-
-
ceeded in asi.rxi.L4 h. ()opi;:latton. The ronouerd Aroanlan
territory was organ'eally cltachud from the rcst of the T1:::man
ire. It It is a very significant fact that the Albanians were the only
barbarous people along tho Mediterranean coastline Who had the
strength to resist national and cultural consoliclation by the Romans.
Albanians lived in the mountains and Roman civilization
could penetrate only with the utmost difficulty, since it followed
nlaYt ri9)(lq. in infhece Toln4P the rnnelq
ended. Therefore, the Albanians remained in their primitive state
clue to the lack of roads. In the main, Roman culture was established
along a narrow coastal strip and along the valleys of the main rivers.
Since the Albanians had chosen mountainous areas in which
to live (possibly due to a healthier climate) their main national
chracteristics remained intact. It is known that the "Romans select-
ed the easiest routes of Penetration for their political and comm-
ercial activities. These routes did not cross b-Jioken ground, as a
rule, except in cases where there were no better passages available.
Therefore, the Albanians had practically no relations with
the Romans. Raman culture, which had left indestructible monuments
In the form of public works in some valley areas of AMAITIA, had
never succeeded in impressing its mark on the Aroanian spirit,
language, and traditions. Due to this zealous nurture of tradition,
the Albanians have remained somewhat primitive since the days of
the Romans.
Judging from the nature and character of these people, it
requires but elementary deduction to discover that they have not
been very progressive in advancing toward what is the moderh COntept
of civilization. Undoubtedly there has been a process of evolution,
but it has been quite independent, taking its particular place within
this molecular cell of universal culture, and devoid of any foreign
influence.
In approximately the year 395, which was the year of the div-
ision of the Raman EMpire into the Oriental and Occidental EMpires,
ALBANIA was assigned to the Oriental. Empire. However, this releg-
ation took place on paper and did not represent anything more, since
ALBArIA at that time was nothing more than a series of small, feudal
domains which were more or less tributary dependents of larger do-
mains which were then being formed in other parts of the Malkans and
in ITALY.
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1 A Survey of ALBA:L-4'1A (cplt?d)
page 4
This situation was a result of the fact that both the Balkan
and Western states aspired to the possession of the Albanian coastline
and. the Straits of Otranto, either to establish protection for their
commerce or to penetrate further into the Mediterranean. The first
large-scale barbarian invasions of AL2AFIA took place in the 5th cent-
ury. when the Goths invaded the country in 493. Holrever, in 535 the
Goths were driven out by JUSTINIArUS, Various invasions of ALBAYIA by
Slav tribes took -place immediately after their arrival in the Balkan
Peninsula. During the latter part of the 7th century there were sev-
eral small Serbian principalities in ALBA-ZIA, micjects of the Byzantine
Empire, but independent to a certain degree. The Byzantines, who con-
trolled but a narrow coastal strip, could only exercise a very limited
influence and their power in the central parts of the country was of a
purely fictitious nature. The Albanian coast was also divided into
two areas at that time; the coast of Epirus in the south, and the zone
in the north extending as far as Boka Kotorska (YUGOBLAV/A, 1:250,000,
Sheet Y-35, 0g0930).
The 9th century brought an event of great historical importance
in regard to AIMA:IA. It was during this period that first approach to
the country was made by any of the Italian states. This marked the be-
ginning of cammercial traffic between ALUM and the Republics of Venice
and. Amalfi. The !public of Amalfi established a small domain at Durres,
while the Venetian Republic established a hold. over Shkoder and Lesh
(YUGOSLAVIA. 1:250.000, Sheet Y-46, 123g94). The Yormans, mbo had con-
solidated the southern part of the Italian Peninsula under their rule,
also intervened as a consequence of family ties which connected them
with the Emperor of the Byzantine Emilire, Michael DUCA. In turn, RICA
was succeeded. by Alexis 0074rEN0S. who came to the assistance of the
Republic of Venice and who was successful in eliminating the Normans
from ALBAYIA. Although the Forman attempt to settle in ALBANIA had fail-
ed., it signified. the beginning of their hegemony through the establish-.
ment of the Kingdom of Veples?
Along the coast, the influence of the Venetian Republic was aPP~
arent. since the Venetians wanted to safeguard their sea routes. The
Albanians who were settled along the coast came into contact with var-
ious institutions which the Venetians had imposed upon those people, but
the greater portion of the population continued to live in the mountains,
defending themselves from invasions by either the Turks or the1 Mays. The
peirple in the lowland.' 4erived some benefit from contact with the waste"
ern world, but continued to remain quite immune from oontinenta Influen-
ces.
The Unettan Republic continued *to penetration of 4.14B4jaA, from
the north, using the Dwane of Dubrovnik MOOOMJNIA, 1:250,000. Sheet
7"35. 0359,7) whidh vete the strongest force of the Damtian 000404ne,
and which remained in contact with western malice through aemmemalla
and mature emohenges. Venice obtained, nominal possession of 41 of
AIAMMULand Writs during the Wirth Crusade. iv* at the time. ?motion
influence fais" Halted to the osaefillne.
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SUrroy of ALBA:0MA. (cont' d) Page 6
A source of this report is not of the same opinion. He claims
with some certainty, since he has lived with these people and knows them
well, that the idea of nationalism has been fully preserved, although
restricted, during the course of the countryis political strire, to areas
where invaders never were able to maintain themselves for long periods of
time. However, the particularism of individual groups is still very much
alive
A combined survey of the medieval and. modern history of ALBAITI.a.
reveals that while the country was always divided by conditions imposed
from abroad., it was also divided by disagreements between individual
chieftans. In spite of the factors, ALBANIA. has always been extremely
jealous of her independence. The Emrvev r SO reveals that requests far
assistance addressed to the small states of the Italian Peninsula were
always favorably received, particularly in Naples and. Venice.
In 1230, ALBAlTIA vn.s conquered by the Bulgarian Czar, Ivan Arson
II, who extended the Bulgarian lIcapire to the coast of the Adriatic. ? But
this invasion was of very short duration. The Bulgarians were forced to
withdraw because of an alliance formed between the Serbians, Byzantines,
Hungarians. and. Tatars. With the departure of the Bulgarians there foil.
owed. a short period. of Serbian domination. But this too, was short since
the =rot' Dynasty in expending its power; invaded ALI-1/1171A during the years
between 1272 and 1279. In 1279 all of ALBANIA was firmly held, by the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The Serbians fought for years against the
ANnti without achieving any success. Venice, however, succeeded in re-
covering the city of Shkod.er.
During the latter part of the 1.4th Century, ALBA IA was divided
into a large number of minor feudal domains. These waged permanent wars
against one another and they would not be reconciled., even by the Turkish'
menace, which was growing increasingly imminent. Some territoried, like
the city of Janina, became subjects of the Ottoman Empire of their own
accord. However, Venice was anxious to save its territorial possessions
in ALBAFIA.
George CASTRIOTA, bettor known as ?S1ci=2:1113EGft, became the nation..
al hero of AIZAITIA when he succeeded in uniting his compatriots in the
common war aptinst the Turkish invader and. defeating the Turks on several
occasions. In 11143, exploiting the victory of Janos HUNYADI over the
TurkishAmy in the vicinity of Nis (MOS/AVIA, 11250,000, Sheet Sim39,
923340), SKINISMO hat litinacat nomina.ted GeTrosorsibast 41. xmic CritylstiAviA,
11250,000, Sheet Ta?46.1331562). In the spring of 14144 he formed. the
'League of the Albanian Peoples* at /Ash, which was supported. by the
principal chieftains and the Venetians governors of Lesh, Shkoder, and.
*se 81=1031) .then began a series of brilliant campaigns against
?
inaMEW first defeated greatly superior Turkish forees on
29 June 3444. The fighting then ceased for a period of three years when
it vas roomed. in AWN ank3.so144Lmmtll 1453. SMNERIBIO received a
greet deal of import fres AIMMIeji The Magnanimous, King of Naples.
EGRET
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A Survey of 41.1:3A: A (co]ttd)
Page 7
Avery short period of peace followed, but during the years
1457 to 1462, SKEITDERBEG annihilated Turkish armies at Mokre, and
again at.Skopljo. The fighting cnded again, but only for a period
of one year since the Pope ana western sovreigns mauu uiforLb ipo
sundc SKEVTIMEG to continue in his fighting against the Ivurks. Again
he ,as successful, his victories culminating with the Seige of Kruje,.
SKENDERBEG died in Lesh in 1467. His death signified the end
of the Albanian victories over the Turks. Some writers have depicted
SKENDERBEG as a king. Actually, he was only the general of a military
league since individual princes and tribal chieftans would not have
0^^(1.,,tc%el 0 trAvIcp PrIniff,Ir Wr3DP noTlinat. the ifir41.1 of a lrinp, who would have
........ ....I. ? .L e rtevveart,Nill AiNrilin4Y10
?4%7?J.UC.I.LAL J Pij 111V14.0 WIW0 6J.WQUA.L.LUL; A.U.LUU i.Vti.?..4..L
SKENDERBEGIs leadership stopped the Turkish migration towards
the west, at least for a brief period. It is certain that this sue
-
cess was duo solely to him, as the fighting spirit of the neagueu
died out completely after his death. Other military leagues were for-
med and supported by Venice and Naples, but they always lacked a lead-
er of SKEIMETTBEGis skill and valor. Such alliances were never very
successful from that time on.
After the death of SKEEMERBEG, the Turks again conquered
ALRAITIA with a campaign of short duration. Venice, however, continued
to defend Shkoder and some coastal cities. As previously mentioned,
only the flatlands and. valleys came under the domination of the Turks,
as the mountains presented an intAcuuzible barrier. After this re-
newed loss of Albanian independence, many of the inhabitants emigrated
to Venice and other Italian states where they formed large settlements
which partially still exist.
Venice later sought an agreement with the Ottoman Zmpire and
succeeded in effecting an arrangemett in 1479 whereby the Port of
Durres was returned to Venice, and. her ships had free access to all
other Albanian ports. This agreement was a major factor in the pros.
ervation of the Catholic religion. But in the interior valleys, part-
icularly in the area surrounding Tirane (GREECE, 1:250,000e Sheet 0.-1,
132642), the Turks began the conversion of the people to the Moslem
faith.
It is not credible that a phase of guerrilla warfare and
conspiratorial activity might have spent the fighting spirit of these
people. The Archives of the Republic of Venice contain documents
proving that the Albanians had. requested assistance from the republic
for the planned. invasions of the years 1570-.71, 15804-.96, and 16024.6.
In 1592 the Albanians offered. t)heir throne to Charles Dananuel
of Savoy'. and in 1606 to the Duke of Parn. Still later, the crown
was offered to several Popes. Those facts prove that the Albanians
had, never abandoned. their desire for independence.
eimeRgar
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During the 18th Ccntrry, the Napoleonic Imperial Invasion
occurred in ALBA77.A. t1.1.is expedition was unsuccessful, as
were a number of --;1.t11 klbrinian forces of the Turkish
mu?
??? A..
'1 ?
?. eT.,? L),
W.1 ? ? ???? ?
WI ;Ad
APOiT'011a Of ??? ?
exparg persz)nai
LAubu inportant of ticAeso
insurrections was that led by All PASHE TLTELEI:A, Lord of Janina.
After the end of the Napoleonic Wars, during which the
Turkish Government remained extremely alert, fehmed 11 decided that
once and for always, the rebelling generals of the Albanian forces
would be forced into submission. He managed to win the support of
the Christians and Greeks, then 'oegan a inng and.
which
campaign
which terminated in 1g2n; whc 2114 PASHE =ELENA was killed ut
Janina.
Although Ali PASIM cannot be compared to SYRYDEPBEa ir re.
gard to military and glory and noble aims, he is undoubtedly one of
the most remarkable personalities in Albanian history, After his
death, many Albanians migrated into GREECE and valiantly fought ng.
ainst the Turks during the Greek insurrections in 1821 and 1827.
The movement for the liberation of the small nations which
composed the European part of the Ottoman Empire had started under
the leadership of RUSSIA, which already at that time claimed to be
the "Protector of the Slav Nations of the Balkans!! and placed the
Albanians in a very precarious position. This was due to the fact
that the Albanian population was made up of Moslem, Catholic, and
Orthodox elnnertg. rlirthnrmor, the convenient location of AL.BANIA
excited the imperialistic alma of the small Balkan states seeking
an outlet to the Adriatic, and simultaneously expanding their zones
of influence. The Albanian struggle always had an antio?Slav charact-?
er, since Slavism represented an eternal menace. This is the main
reason why the Albanians, who had fought heroically against the Turks
in a number of insurrections and revolts, fought under the Turkish
flag against the Russian armies in the Crimean Whr, Later they fought
against the united Rassian and Bulgarian forces.
In 1877, Prenk BIB DO, Prince of the Mirdita Tribe, who had
been defeated a year previously by the Turks against whom he had led
an armed revolt, refused all offers by Russian agents and fought with
his followers (all Catholics) it the ranks of the Turkibh Army, both
at Pleven and at Sipka Paalgi* Facts like these present ample evidence
that the national spirit of ALBAIT/A, has derionstrated exhibitions of
vitality and of unity. She bas recognized the route toward:her own
intetests independent of religion, when such dmalilim was allowed
by ptevailing conditions, since the religious factor had, as it still
has, a great importance in all of the Balkans.
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A Survey of ALB:',..T:A(cont' Page 9
After thc political events of 1878, ALBAIMA demonstrated
other proofs of an admirable national conscience. The Berlin Treaty
(June 1878), in ap-peasing Russian demands, assigned the Albanian
4. 4 1. ?. ..,C* .! ft. v #0,-. r-or dr A
4. '14 tj N. A. V ?,./ .4.41. 9
eNir?^
riff
1...04 1601161 ?11
Tst...0Nrr'?
and Kursumlija (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-38, 872325) to SaTiBLL;
Bar (WOOSIAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-460, 981932) and the districts
of Play (YUCIOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet Y-37), Trepca (YUGOSLAVIA,
1:250,000, Sheet Y-36, 7114296) and Gusinje (YUGOSLAVIA, 1:250,000,
Sheet Y-37, 749274) were assigned to CRNA GORA (L:01-T2GRO), while
a part of the Epirus was given to GREECE. The "Albanian League" was
formed in protest against this division of Albanian territory. This
organization was both political and military in nature. The "League"
decided to resist the occupation of these territories with arms,and
wassupportee4 by .61birinie-is of P%11 ,rse.."1 4 1.4 "i1 "b1P, e-? el 'A." it.v es ip*
WJAU viss
without any differences on this occasion.
The Turks, recognizing the Trevty, withdrew their forces,
then these were immediately replaced by forces of the "League" and
who were ready to resist occupation of these areas. However, the
powers which had signed the Berlin Treaty, led by G2ZAT BRIMAIN,
were anxious to conclude the political contest with RUSSIA, therefore,
they sent an ultimatum to the Turkish Court. In response, the Turks
sent a force of 30,000 men, led by Dervish PASHA., against the insurimi
gents. The forces of the "League" were defeated and its leaders kill-,
ed or exiled. The Mirdita Prince, Prenk BIB DOD, was retained as a
hostage.
At that time. Albanian patriatic publications began to appear
all over the world. Artori I i ('roe Country), the first newspaper
in the Albanian language, was printed, under the direction of De R&M,
the Italos-Albanian poet; Calendar, published in Sofia under the direct-
ion of Kristo LAURASI (a mamber of an old Albanian family from Tirane);
the magazine Albania, published in Brussels; Del I (The Sun), at
Bostan; and. ShlOpOtuti (The Albanian) published in Constantinople.
The "Albanian League? appeared again in lgS3 led by the 'tribes
of Hoti, Oastrati, and. Stroll who revolted mAinst the Montenegrin
occupation of the territory of Podgorica (YMOSLAVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet
Y..46, 700265). On this occasioi7FTEalcs and Moslems fought side
by side in defense of their territory. MOvements of a similar chars?
actor emerged during the events of the Grecos-Turkish Wftr (1897). The
PRASE= Brothers, A1441 and Sarni, gathered Albanians in a patriotic
movement based on a federil program.
In 1908,, the revolution of the "Young Turks" took place. The
Turkish Government at Constantinople again sent an expeditionary force
headed. by Shefket TURGUD PAM to pacify AIMAMIL. The Albanians spa d
have utilize& the unstable situation during the revolution of the
Young Turks". Paradoxically enough, the moment demanded that the
Tutkigh DIPire be preserved rather thnn destroyed, since *Om! Balkan
states, Itn attacking the Wm', *raid have divided up ALBUM as a
ft-Alai Province, with =KA, 10121111120. and GISIECE benefiting.
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A Survey of ALM'', .;ontY1)
77-R.:774?CE usc1.
? -`
?
in COnfuSinC the issue. The Greeks
claimed that th, _
t'i-..(--;se areas 'who were of
qreek Tv-It +
Page 10
ol%ims to areas of Soatherr.
, -
resent? (71 thc tre%tlient
turbed by the r:emorics of t1c
ar- forces under Shc-.1_ Tot
PA-
Coi1roso of tho Ottomal.i.
c el
of norti-IL:-...?
k.
"Albania^. as F.,-7c1;-1,
?
c .
I
a
t
t
""`,4 IrM1,,r1
I
a.
17-14- the
'I
..... a 4. -
4 4-
.LJ 0 -f.-)
fl0,(7!-''*
r.
?1:[-r?-:. 3f
r.
()nil r'sr!i
-I- ON , ^
-
?
- t.. td .1 1 _ ? J- lo Z.) .1. III di
Battle of Kumanovo (-77-nrc,vi,A-"T...k ,
r?IfTh ?sfY n 1 "7 \ and. ' ' -
....... --- ----, - . , , L'.4:-..c....-t 7...-r ? 1? C?'? ?r?f . C _ ) Ca) ) ?L. 1 I
-1,.e).-) cnr)
jo.L.:-..?
cd the opposir,r - Serbian -force,, Skoplje ( YUGC7L22.VIA, 1:250,000, Shoot
274907) and. Monastir
_ (Bitol i )( r"-P=CE, 1250 ?Oc- 0 , Shoot G-1 25:---,7r)7)
. ,
. ?-_
were trik en 1-.,/- the Sorbian Arrc-, which r-11 so 1- 7adeci..21.1 "or Ynft. r'_,.:-. t c rrit 0 r:-
and reached. the Adriatic Sea at Tiarres (3-?a70E, 1:-0,OCC, Shoot 17;-.-1,
,
1038414) and Shen Gjin (1 iJCICSLAVIA , 1 f; 25C ,000 , Sheet Y.--L:E, 10 E 7 -' ) by
menas of a rapid maneuver. At the same time, 1:ont:.,:.-le-7rin forces be.-
siegea Shkokler (YUGCSL;LVIA, 1:250,000, Sheet -y,---, 'Th ) , -lai ch , at that times,
,
-
?
.?.? 6.- the :-....1...! ' AeL .L..1 City
of A.L_L;x1...' I.ii..,
,.-1,
Albanians of Catholic, Moslem and Crthodo:.:. creeds then arrayed
themselves against the Serbs and 1:Tontenog,rins the second phase
of the Balkan War. in 1912, an uprisin,c7 took plL),ce in the Kossovo under
the leadership of politicians and mill t a :7 T
_ _ (,-;.10.1'1. TIRczln n (IA
7eIrhin7)7,AaA. nylA
.41pi ,>:?,?oplow AeoorniOW ? ? -;101441t
Isa 3CLETIYI conoucred Skonljc and PriE.71tina, and -Intio-nal independence
was gained on 2g -..To7eM_er 1912. Although 11-1e Cttoilar. Empire /:ras ap
roaching its end, AI2A:711A was still in danor of the Slays.
Even though sovercinity 1-Tas recognized in 21.21:...11-T.A, her ethnic
territory was cut nearly in half. The tribes of C-ruda, and part
of the Clementi wure completely cut off .Albarian torL-itory. The flat--
land of Podgorica (Titorad), and the ports of Lar and Ulcinj were in
E01.7TE1EGRO. The fertile flatlands of Pee (Prja)TMC-0S1:1"1 1:250,000,
Sheet Y-37, 7872g0) and Djailo-vica (i-Jr-TXT-11250,000, Shoot Y-47,
1.5-953) had also been given to :!0==aRc to enable to 7aintain an
independent econoriy, and in doing Su, the ethnic and national fa:-tors
of the Albanians living in those regions were coLlpletol, disregarded.
The flatland of Kossovo, Ilith its cities of PI-Izron(YUGOSIALVIA,
1:250,000, Sheet Y-47, 218532) and Prishtina (YUGC--iL21.7'1A 1:250,000,
Sheet Y-38, 859273) were assicned to SELF131A for sent.;rta) reasons
since these cities were reminders of the Battle of 7;.cssovo; vhiLh had
cost the Serbians their independecc. The ri.ght o2 thu :Black Drin
River up to and across the cit7 of Debar (Dibrn.)(YUGOTTL, 12504000;
Sheet T-48, 4152 1948) was given to SE3LA, while all of the Epirus
with the cities of Janina and Cianurtja, became part of ?TREEC.I.
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Throe Al'Janian provisional governments were fo ri.led in order
to prevent more 1-inrm, One was located in 71one and headed by the
prominent Dail J,),ucmal MORA,: the second was located in Mirdita,
, qr! A son C.* 1,s r? 0-t A ,-, A
, , ,4
/ 77.7% 4 vs ,.... .-, ? 1)l T A . 4 4r -r) N" TN . ?.1" 1 ,-. - 1" ,-. 4- A.. 4 -0. #.1 vApmr?
ti .,...1?.
\ ??? ??? .???? .6.,.., / .???., ?6..?.? 0.0^%., dot* jb , 4 ? a? 4. .1.. ... .., %0 4. ?? ,..
...MINIVINI.M.M.OW?MINg.. 7 nna honanA by Illad PASHA TOP? TATja, thp rinfcmArn.
.,.....t. ??? %??? ? 4 yr.. sr
nf CIstrtrinr
in
. fri rn_nn _
During the worse. of the same year (1913), the Ambassadorts
Conference was held in London under the chairmanship of Sir GREY,
with the participation of several power: ITALY, EITGLAYD, AUSTRIA,
FRArCE, RUSSIA and GERITAITY. The puinose of the conference concerned
reaching an agreement ol the Albanian problem. By January 1914, a
commission was established for the delimitation of the Albanian bor6-
6ers. In March 1914, William WIED, a German prince, was sent to
ATMAlqA as Its anvnrnign? However Prince WT.ED vrta forced to abandon
Durres in September 1914 aboard an Italian vessel in order to escape
an insurrection provoked by Esad PASHA, an Albanian general who was
assassinated in Paris a few years later.
2. Sociological Survey
As mentioned in the preceding section, the Albanians have
preserved almost intact certain social frnstitutions which have bem?
come quite uncommon and virtually non-existent in other European
countries. While fighting for their independence, the Albanians
maintained themselves in their inaccessible mountains. There they
preserved certain traditions and characterisitics which may be primp,
itive and anachronistic; irstitIltinnR which right be unacceptable in
other countries; but which prove that the Albanians have remained
genuine and that their race has remained pure.
It is well known that the family is the basis of society,
and when the family ceases to exist, the nation itself is subject
to collapse. In the sepcific instance of ALBANI4r which was so
hard pressed trora all sides, the state had to retroat leaving the
defense of individuals to small, collective groups. Although in
feudal form, Which corresponded to the time, these groups managed
to solve the problem by retreating into the mountains, organizing
small groups, and subjecting tilam to a severe moral and military
discipline. The aim of this policy was to protect the primitive
cell, the family. If the family had been allowed to disintegrate
and disappear, the Albanians as a nation would be nom...existent to-
day. For example, the Etruscans disappeared leaving no descendants,
only a few remnants and monuments of their civilization.
The Berlin Treaty appeared to have been largely affected by
the general belief that the disnitogration of AIMEZIA was already a
completed fact, and that a division of her territories could be made
without causing any difficulties. However, as events proved, just
the opposite transpired. Mainly, this was due to the extraordinary
vitality of the Albanians, who, while giving ground to the secular
rule progressing in the valleys, preserved intact their ethnic
structure in the mount- ,a.W oneroglpressure had been unft,
able to penetrate. The W tity 65 centers of Albanian
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contt pagc 12
resistance, /./hich rorri?sponded to 65 tribes. At -present, thc most
portant of thocc, aro: thL, 1,;r-ti (29,000), and the 1:irdita (1g,000).
2#. _ -
111.
???-' ?
particularly -4"nc, r+1,4c,r, T.r1-In
I ,...Tv \---.4.,-
of predominance. In the areae under li:oslem influence, the chiefs are
called "Bey" or "Der, while the foremost carry the title of ttBajraktar".
These titles al-0.a carryover from the days of sammum, when
the titled wore crIlle'3 "ruke5","Counts", and "Captains". "Bajrktar" bo
"came a hereditary title, and is still in use today in central and north..
ern. AL34117IA.
-'4'
(-1-licfs)
merit
merit the honor, hold places
The nlIthOrit'r of the chicftan, or xia,lratar, nus 1:tA-talned wv-
tglo Catholics in
toucneu in the northern
-% r'
rtic-flari
rImnr,r7-
spite of the fact that the Communists IvIve tried to dilAnish or com-
pletcly abolish their -7)ersonal nnd h-L1-7toric prstige. However, there
is reason to be11e70 that resistanc, tonL; .7,1theritieS today has not
.
yet ceased in the northern mountain areas,
Yet been able to penetrate the territory.
mined as to how popular a successful resistance
munist regime uses deception to a 7iteat extent,
employed against these pcoplo, even o:/?* the 4A)6t
not
as
The "Canon of the Mountain"
coded during the 12th Century by an
of the DUKAWIYI, and widely spread
otherva.a. %.1 A, 0.1 th S _ T , ( A1
rnevril-In.r? f",-F*
tc! covernr:4L:nt has
It cannot be deter
-
/rill be, since the Corp.
which is a
violent, of
weapon never
OJprLs2Gro
(Kanunt I Lek:c DIT:CaVGjIITIT) which was
obscure 1710.1--fber of the groat family
durinL; the of SD=EG by an-
exarder) DL JI,I. constitutes the
_ ___?
codification of th mores. Du.ring that period, all A.T.Z.AIA was under
the influence of the law. It has- been altered sllhtly by Turkish and
Slav influences, but basically remains the sane.
The basis of the Kanunt 1. Lekc DUKAGJILIT is the law of "Blood
Revenge", which imposes upon the next of kin of an assassinated person,
a "duty" or "task of honor" to redeem tle dead relative by killing the
assassin, or one of his family who is "able to carry arms". Excluded
from this law of revenge are women, children, and_ priests, since they
arc considered unable to carry arms. The redemption of a human life by
payment of a sum of money is considered unmanly and is allowed only in
unusual circumstances, and then only by tribes considered as unir:port-
ant. Tho Luria and Matt Tribes exclude this practice altogether, al.
though they maintain the institution of "spontaneous pardonn. This
allows blood revenge to suspended by mutual accord, but not abandoned.
It may be suspended in every instance whereby the assassin is
under the protection of "hospitality", which is a sacred institution in
ALBA:LA. Hospitality begins the moment the "Family Chief?, allows a
guest to pass the threehhold of his home. The guest, no matter who he
is, is given all possible care and attention, more so if he is a stran&w.
Cr. A fly escorts of the guest are also immune from revenge or inhospitim
able treatment.
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Parc 17,
shown absolute respect. :o :Ian would dare dis-
turb a woman. IlnrIon 7rly travel unharmed, even thol.7.gh they travel
for several dac, though various regions strange to them. It is an
unwritten lar which rrovide:. authorization for a yorlan to sock hos-
Aka. 11,0 ri
???
ty V J.. -A,
,
,? ?
vJLAi LLL. ou Lulu I15
the duty of all concernld to accept her and give her the utmost at-
tention and care.
Bascd upon the Kanunt i Luke DUKACJII7IT is another important
institution, that of the oath riven in the form of a liord of honor. It
is known as the ?been? (vbesan moans word), ly taking it, one assumes
the duty to protect and to keel-) in safe custody a person, to defend a
locality, or to -.richt in the national interest. To break one's nbcsou
would expose the offender to the unlimited conte:-Ipt of his fellowmen.
The j-idges or r--forcers of such laws as tesc werc the chieftains
to whom the collective: o'rcd bliridobedicrce, rtio'llarl:- in t'-le case
of a call to nrr-:s. Such tradition of command cyil'ted until the arrival
of the Cor:'unists, although the authority of t'-le individual Boys had
previously dongenerated somewhat since many of thcm had adopted the
Western wa:- of life, especially after 1913. In wantinE to give their
sons a more cultured background plus a formal education, they wore sent
to various European capitols. There the sons came 1-.1to contact with
nontalitics quite different from t'.eso they were -railiar with, and re
turned home with many ner ideas. King Dolau was a prime ox-mple of a
dual education. Ho had spent some time as a youth at thc Court of the
Sultan in Constantinople, and later was attached to the Court of Emperor
ckpl... in VI en' th,?
t).Ly -L td1.1C., necc: 7sar7 exparien c e 4 -
come a ruler. He had learned both Oritntal and Occidental principles of
vita
mvernmont and mentalities.
It may be safely assumed that none of the Communist social in-
stitutions could penetrate the areas occpied by the Clemonti, Kastrati,
Kraisnioi. HUba, Bityci, Dtikagjini, Kruma, Lumat and larditi tribes.
These tribes of northern pressed between TITO on the
north anci the Tirane government on the south, find theriselves in an
identical situation as prevailed during medieval times. Their resist-
ance, in addition to purely physical efforts, is maintained by a shrewd
political sensibility, which is a result from the times when these tribes
were forced to employ to the best of their knowledge, a sense of polit-
ical and Military intelligence in order to continuo their defenses.
In approaching thu center of AL3AITIA, the predominance of ruse
over physical violence and overt defense becomes more noticeable. This
In particular reference to the tribes of Malakastre and rusacia. This
Is true of the Molakastre tribe more so because of their poverty whioh
forces them to bolJ to the Communistauthority in order to physically
survive. The Musacin tribe is the center of a Communist collectivizat-
ion experiment (due to the wealth of this group), and is supervised
quite rigidly by a large nurber of Communists.
?
t_??% ?-?
?
???????
?
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A Survc7- of(cm-it'
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3. Geogrrlphlr (See Exhibits VII, viii, Ix, X, XI, XII, & XIII)
ALBA=A is an extrciely mountainous country, averaging more
than 3,000 fact abov:: Lor Thc Dinaric Alps in the north and
northeast, and thc Pinftws nounins in the south and southeast form
the walls of a huge ar_lphithc,Ater which enclose a marshy plain along
the Adriatic See. Several rivers cross the narrow coastal plain,
flowing rapidly because of their relatively short courses, since they
average 130 kilometers in length in their steal.) descent from the mountip?
ains. The most important rivers arc: the Bojana (tho only navigable
river in the country), the White Drin: the Black Drin; the ati; the
Erzeni: the Vojusa; and the Shkumbin. The last named river separates
ALMITIA into two separate regions, with the Ghogs living in the north,
+ Prti ea1p-c, 4 r. rv,.
ins, and toward the hinterland, there are wide valleys and plateaus
which contain the canters of population. The Albanian climate is
1:cditerranean: sw2mers are hot and dry, and winters are moderato. Coast-,
al temperatures are higher than those inland. There arc beech, pine,
and fir in the highlands, and large areas of oal:, walnut, chestnut, and
elm in the coastal plains.
nneral resources, although relatively unexploited, are bolievi-
ed to be considerable, and include aluminum, petroleum, lignite, iron,
bitumen, asphalt, gypsum, and capper. Only a all part of the inter..
ior is arable, although nearly the entire population is engaged in a
combination of farming and stock raising. Chief craps are: corn, rye,
wheat, 'barley, tobacco, oats, spelt, olives, and citrms fruit.
PART II
Political
4, Three events have occurred Which, although external to exm.
ternal to ALBAITEA, are likely to have an important influence on her
internal situation. Diplomatic relations have been re-sopened with
ITALY; the Greek Rebels have announced that for the present they have
called off military operations; and YUGOSLAVIA has formally denounced
her treaty of friendship with AL3ArIA.
In more fortunate countri os, the welfare of the people depends
mainly upon the effectiveness of the govermmentts internal policy and
administration. In AzaArzA, to a quite unusual extent, the life of
the people, oven down to the adequacy or inadequacy of their rations,
is affected by the actions of neighboring countries, by their rolattions
with her, with each other, and with the Great Powers. Ever since the
final departure of the Turks in 1913, ALITIA has required the expend..
iture or invostmnt of foreign money to keep her immediately supplied
with consumer goods, and to carry trough the longimterm development of
her resources which may one day make her economically independent.
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Thcrofore, II2A.:IAls foreign policy consists primarily of
the search for a patror rtnd a "meal ticket?. This is, in a most
literal sense, thc tr by which she earns her daily bread. In
Z3G-J:b Liuu, was functioning on Italian loans. A beg-
inning was made in thc establishment of the state framework and in
the development of her minerals. But the ITALY of nus9ala1Tl wanted
repayment in the form of strategic control, so the indigenous moil-
archy was expelled, and AMAX/Ms precarious independence was ex-
tinguishcd. The new regime under ITALY was not morc noticeably op-
pressive than its predecessor, its greatest handicap was that it was
foreign. Economically, AIBAYLA flourished as the favorite child of
Fascism. Buildinp. and dovelormnt 'ore anphncized., the pcoplc wcrc
furnished adequate foodstuffs, and the shops were well stocked. As
later developments revealed, the price of this investment and pros-
perity never had to be paid. ITALY lost the war before she could
either colonize the land, or recruit Albanian conscripts for her garma
risons or overseas armies.
ITALY had Vlone and Sazan Island (Saseno) under her dominat-
ion from 1914 on. During the First Wbrld War, she extended her occw-
upation over to Durres and central ALBA1TIA, rhcrc Esad PASHA had for-
med a temporary government with Italian aid. Apparently the Italian
aim was to limit Austrian influenoo in the Mediterranean. In 1915
AUSTRIA occupied puuja. Lesh, Shkoder, and Durres; while Bulgarian
troops penetrated, to Elbasan. On 17 December 1920, the Ambassadors"
Conference in Paris recognized the constitution of the Albanian gov-
ernment. In 1921, ZOGU made his entrance in Albanian politics as
Minister of the Interior.
ZOGU was born at Burgajpt on g October 1895. He is a descendr.
ant of an old feudal family. Hb spent part of his youth at the court
of William MED, and during the First World War was appointed "colonel
ad honor" by the Austrian Emperor CARL. In 1922 ZOGU performed a
coup d'etat, and brought order to the country. Ho then became Prime
Minister. From 1922 to 1924 Albanian history depicts a chain of in?
surrections, with ZOGU having the chance to display the characteristics
of an energetic statesman. In 1924 ZOGU failed to suppress the movem.
ment of the National Party led by Theofan S. NOLI. As a consequence,
ZOGU was forced to escape to Belgrade, Theotan S. YOLI then became
Prime Minister. ZOGUIs unexpected sit in Belgrade was a favorable
event in regard to YUGOSLAVIAts policy toward ALBAITItL. Mk:01a PASIC?
a very capable Yugoslav statesman, gave ZOGU arms and money and asked
him to return to AIBAKI.A.
On 24 December 1924 ZOGU returned to ALaAZIA and forced NOLI
to escape to ITALY, from where he went to AUSTRIA, the USSR, and later
to the UNITED STATES where he lives at present. On 31 December 1925,
=CT announced the constitution of the Albanian republic. Ho was then
elected president, and among the first lams he introduced was one which
callod for six: months compulsory military service.
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Therefore, IIEArLits foreign policy consists primarily of
the search for a patror nncl a "meal ticket". This is, in a most
literal sense, thc trrv by which she earns her dail7 bread. In
in ZCG`Cts timo, LfU was functioning on Italian loans. A be
inning was made in the establishment of the state framework and in
the development of her minerals. But the ITALY of /IUSSOLIYI wanted
repayment in the form of strategic control, so the indigenous mon-
archy was expelled, and ALBArIAts precarious independence was ex-
tinguished. The new regime under ITALY was not more noticeably op-
pressive than its predecessor, its greatest handicap was that it was
foreign, Economically, ALBAYEA flourished as the favorite child of
Fascism. Th.IldInf and do-Telornent /!fere emphasized., the people vsk;.1.-Q
furnished adequate foodstuffs, and the rfhppn were well stocked= ks
later developments revealed, the price of this investment and pros-
perity never had to be paid. ITALY lost the war before she could
either colonize the land, or recruit Albanian conscripts for her garw6
risons or overseas armies.
ITALY had Vlone and Sazan Island (Saseno) under her dominat-
ion from 1914 On. During the First World Whr, she extended her occ-
upation over to Durres and central ALBAITIA, /qhere Esad PASHA had for-
med a temporary government with Italian aid. Apparently the Italian
aim was to limit Austrian influence in the Mediterranean. In 1915
AUSTRIA occupied puja,. Lash, Shkoder, and Durres; while Bulgarian
troops penetrated to Elbasan. On 17 December 1920, the AzThassadorbs
Conference in Paris recognized the constitution of the Albanian gov-
ernment. In 1921, ZOGU made his entrance in Albar4aTL?nol,itics as
".."110.41 ,IU101kr?
rtftiftleili kfirriaM ? ..q1NOIIF -**011, ? %Mt - .
ZOGU was born at Burgajet on g October 1895. He is a descend-
ant of an old feudal family. He spent part of his youth at the court
of William ICED, and during the First World War was appointed "colonel
ad honoremn by the Austrian Emperor um. In 1922 ZOGU performed a
coup d'etat, and brought order to the country. He then became Prime
Minister. From 1922 to 1924 Albanian history depicts a chain of in-
surrections, with ZOGU having the chance to display tho characteristics
of an energetic statesman. In 1924 ZOGU failed to suppress the moves-.
ment of the National Party led by Theofan S. NOLI. As a consequence,
ZOGU was forced to escape to Bel rade. Theotan S. ErOLI then became
Prime Minister. ZOGUIs unexpected sit in Belgrade was a favorable
event in regard to YUGOSLAVIAts policy toward Als3AITIA. Yikola PASIC,
a very capable Yugoslav statesman, gave ZOGU arms and. money and asked
him to return to AIMAKIA.
On 24 December 1924 ZOGU returned to makzLa and forced NOLI
to escape to ITALY, from where he went to AUSTRIA, the USSR, and later
to the WITED STATES where he lives at present. On 31 December 1925,
ZOGU announced the constitution of the Albanian republic. He was then
elected president, and. among the first lams he introduced was one which
called for six months compulsory military service.
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When ZOGU care into power, he turned toward ITALY for assist-
ance in solving his economic and political problems. An agreement to
this effect was signed on 27 November 1926 at Tirane, by the Albanian
Yinistor of the Trtorinr, uysor 77PTOFT 7112(.1 the Ttalin.r L7inistor
Pcompeo AZOISI. This agreement favored a political, judicial, and terr-
itorialnetatus quo!' in ALBAITIA. ZOGU knew that a reciprocal political
interest could only be based upon a military alliance between ITALY
and AIBArIA. On 22 November 1927, a military agreement was signed at
Tirane. It is natural to consider that ZOGUis policy was not dictated
by any love for ITALY, but more because he was only too well aware of
YUGOSLAVIAts aspirations toward. AI3A1TIA. On I December l92g, after
having previously obtained tho consent of the National Assembly, ZOGU
wLL elected King of AIBALA with the title of ZOG the First.
Financial support was necessary for the reconstruction of the
country, YUGOSLAVIA and G2FEC2 ln i,osition to grant the funds
needed by AL.TLAVIA. Therefore, King ZOG again turned to ITALY. In 1925
SVEA (Societa Sviluppo Economic? ALMADIA, Association for the Economic
Development of ALBAPIA) granted a credit of 43 million lire to be re-
irabursed over a 40 year period. In 1931, although A.1,17,,A17/A had not paid
the interest on the first loan, ITALY granted another loan of 100 millas
ion lire under the conation that ITALY be permitted to supervise the
finances of ALBAlTIA. (it was then established that this new loan should
be gradually settled bach time the balance of the Albanian government
exceeded 50 million lire. The Italian request sounded like an insult
to king ZOG, who then endeavored to find new markets. The Italian
government then wasted no time about the matter and promptly dispatch-
navy sips re7nTSMItkiy31). Ln advised to set-
tie the matter in a peaceful manner. It is quite possible the Italian
move was initiated by the fear that King Zog might negotiate a secret
agreement with YUGOSLAVIA. Loyal pelitical and economic relations be-
ALBArIA and. ITALY were virtually ended, and there "pecan an atmosphere
of "nerves until April 1939.
It was then that the moment of groat events 1)egan, and ITALY
thought ft-necessary to invade AnArrk. From 7 to 17 April 1939,
Italian troops landed in ALBA-1111 while ZOGU fled to GREECE, taking
with him the national treasury. YUGOSLAVIA remained silent about the
proceedings mainly because of the agreement signed earlier in the year
between mussairui and the Yugoslav Prime I'linisfer 1=i1an
The only resistance to the Italian invasion was conducted by
Apbas KUPI, who led the Albanians in a brief movement by utilizing the
troops stationed at Durres and Vlone. ITALY soon consolidated her
position in the country. It should be mentioned thnt the Italian act--
ion has been preceded by a systematic preparation. Francisco JAtC140111,
Italian Ambassador to AIMAITIA, very efficiently handled the diplomatic
angles. He secretly contacted anti..-ZOGU elements %411.o agreed to collm
aborate with Um, blinded by his promises (which, incidentally, were
never kept), of sharing in the government.
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Daring the latter patt of his reign, ZOGU indulged. in a rather
dangerous policy, since he had closed. all Catholic schools, and. failed
to observe the formation of the first Communist cells in ALBANIA. In
failing to see the infiltration of Comrrunists into various governmental
departments ZOGU allowed a situation to begin which would. have ultimately
cost him his throne had. the Italians not beaten the Ooramnists in expel...,
ling him. ZOGU appeared to be more interested in creatinc," an antagonism
between the Christian and. Moslem trilip of the country, in view of the
fact that the Italians were supportile the Catholics. He swung his sup-
port to the Moslens thereby creating a situation which undoubtedly would
have regifstered. sufficient repercussions had not political noves devele?
oped earlier.
5, griw the Communists Achie a EC emony in ALBAITIA
The organization of the first Corrru.nist cells, known asnommunist
groups'', originated. in 1931??32. There were three groups and. their res..
pective centers were in Shicpd.er, Tirane, and. Ksrvee. 'ron these three
centers, branches were organized in other towns and. zones. Propaganda
material (books about MARX, MTGELS, IsEktiN and. STALIN) was brought into
the country through various channels which included mysterious visitors
who cane every week Zrom YUGOSLAVIA. Contacts were made with Albanian
elements abroad.. /n 19314., ZOGUts administrative policy wat shaken when
he decided to close all Catholic schools. This move brought about dies.
astrous psychological repercussions among the youth. A tionplete chaos
reigned in the Albanian State School System, especItsliy th 1.....p9tb The
Minister of Public Education, Mirash IVAltia, was the Ilumbtr One latemy of
all Catholic Schools.
Slaking advantage of this *liberal policy's, Albanian of
who up to this time were not known to be extremists, appeared. on the ?
political, an administrative scene, Some examples are: Zef MIRDITA,
a high official in the Ministry of the Interior; Isnot TOO, former
high official in Shkoder: Professor Skencler LA.URA.SI (at present a member
of the .Agit.-Prop in Tirane) who used. to deliver long speeches on social
progressive theory to groups of his students after classes. The most
fanatical Albanian Communists graduated from LAURLSIss school, anong
them: genial MAU, National Hero, killed on 5 May 3.94.2 by the Italians;
Giovalin MU, at present a Deputy, raerlea.- BROJA, at present an official
of the SIGURIMIT: Rrok IZOI, at present- in the Officers School in Moscow;
Vasil /JAW!, at present a member of the Albaniamp4oviet Culturik Cebb.
ittee; Cin SOMA (killed in an automobile accident in the fall of 1949);
Vojo ICUSHI, National Hero, killed in combat at Tirane.,1944; Zija ranx,
at present the Albanian Consul in is .rav. e; Mark MX, at present 71rst Sao*,
tetary of the Albanian LegatiOn in Paris. The following is a list of
those persons who collaborated during?We first years of the formation
of clandestine Communist groups at Shkoder and. who have important possa
itions in ;into,. at present:
a. Tuk JAKOVA la. a carpenter' s apprentice in 19431 today he is a
Vice Prime Matta?, Major Oesiseval in Albanian Amyl and a megaber of the
POLITECTIO.
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b. Mark WON. -- Member of the Albanian--Soviet Cultural Committee,
and member of the S}31113/4 (Shocinija Per N&i1ic Ushtrise e Mbrojtjes
Association for Aid, Army, and. Defense).
c. Kole JAKOVA Tukts brother, n. nenber of tho Albn.nian.Sol-L .
Cultural Committee.
d. Arif GJYLI ? ma an on t a ry Scheel Teacher, at present a high
Party official in Shkoder.
The group in Korce boasted such members as: Xoxe KOCI, Enver 110Xliat
and. I:Mello MUM, The groups from both Tirane and. Korce had. lesser ideol--
ogleal preparations, but had a more developed political adhesion among
the followers due tn thee gnm-.^-ra:
a. Southern ALBAITIA was particularly hostile toward MGT', who had
neglected their region, and had. failed to include any southerners in his
government .
b. A rather liberal, but not very religious character of the people
C. The war, which totally impoverishe0_ southern AlalITI.A.
Although those Communist groups were in contact with each other,
they ,were pormbated with sectarian and. opportunist feelings. The Party
in AtBAVIA is a Yugoslav product, and. without the aid. of the Yugoslays,
there would be no Communist Party in ALBANIA today. Before the arrival
of Milan POPOVIC and Dusan ilUGOSA, who wont to AI2AITIA to organize and
guide Albanian Communism, the existent groups were rather insignificant.
There were discrepancies in thar policies and they indulged in
a continuous and bitter straggle.
The situation dominating these groups of Albanian Comnunlsts of
the time was defined by Milan POPCNIC in 1949, as follows: nWo had found
a real chaos. Altogether there wore eight groups of Trotikyists. Each of
them struggled for supremacy over the others, rrequently thoy cane to
see us and accuse the others. Discussions with those groups lasted from
ten to twenty clays. We wont from one illegal meeting to another. We
discussed with the group in l'orco in the houses of Myer ROXETA and
Kee? TASHICO. This group attempted a refusal in any admission of its err'-.
ors. They claimed to be *the Partyll and considered the others as groups,
but we succeeded in persuading them that they should accept the Consitutem
ion of the Party. Tho highest contributions from the group in 'Como
were given by Koci XOXE and Kristo
6. ThoTuos1avA1lianco
litulbwhis ruign, ZOGU showed. pronounced ability, and his groats-
est SuCcOSS vas the organization of the police force 'Whose commanding
officer was a British bffiecir, Colonel BILL. ? ???? ? _ ?
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ZOC-17 kn.,14.- his people better than any other Albanian. He was
not loved, but accepted. His greatest ctiticism would lie in the fact
that he did not express the peoples will through a more representative
government. Re held a virtual nonepoly of governmental posts, and he
failed- in including representatives from all over the country in his
cabinet. The fact that he developed the Mati area, his own birthplace
.and strictly Moslem, above all other areas in A.L3411TIA showed a favorit?
ism which rankle& in the South. For reasons such as these, the Clandme
es tine groups of Communists were making rapid headway. They had much
to offer in the way of propaganda even beyond the ordinary Communist
t eachings .
The allinnce with YUGOSLAVIA. was made possible be Albanian
Corneunism is a movement developed almost exclusively in the South. Had
the northern Ghegs been in power, they would have undoubtedly looked
askance at such an alliance. A few reasons Why there would have been
no such alliance are: YUGOSLAVIA is in possession of largo tracts of
land which are inhabited mainly by Albanians, both in the wheat lands
of Metohija and Kossovo, and northwestern Macedonia: in 1912 the Serbs
and Montenegrins endeavored to obtain possession of most of northern
ALBANIA, including the city of Shkoder; and the way of life in the
North did. not lend itself to the Communist way of lift:D.
However, the Communists were recruited from the Tosks, whose
fear of foreign domination stemmed from the other direction, GREECE.
They turned to YUGOSLAVIA as the only available aid, since
ITALY had, been beaten and was discredited, and GRMCE Tong try.r. furel-
7.41.44;-&. the Yugoslav Communist Party was the
channel through which directives from the Kremlin were recieved, and
the two or three sinister figures who briefed Enver HOXHA during the
struggle for power were all Yugoslav Communists.
Milan POPOVIC, Dusan l'ILTGOSA, and later on, Svetozar VUKMANOV/C?
alias "Tempo?, were the creators and the oxides. They wore in truth
the real leaders of tho Albahian Cornur_list Party. They smoothed, as
much as they could, the conflicts, brottglit discipline, organized dis?-
tricts, appointed leaders, and issued orders. They insisted that a
National Liberation Army be formed. As soon as the let Brigade was
assembled, Mehmet SEW vas appointed Commandinz Officer while his
advisor was Du.san MITGOSik, the virtual dictator. MERU at present is
the Minister of the Interior, holds the rank of Major GamPral, and is
a member of the POLITBURO.'
On a certain occasion, Milan POPOVIC made the following state..
ment, *Before we left for YOGOSLAN/A, Dust= MUMS& was invited to the
Assebbly of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, and
it was at this time that he announced that General Spiro mom; was not
adequate and-that his place should be taken over by leaver EOM, (Wm-
issar of the Supreme Command, The Central Committoe approved 1111.061.40
suggestion, and daring the course of the conference held in Permot &arm
/mg Nay 1914, 110111.4 was appointed Supreme Gorynandauto with ra311.14.7.07 eole's
onel General!.
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conpletely dominated. the Albanian Coi-
rnuni
sts. When MUCITOSA 4.-k:turned to YUGOSLAVIA, Albn.nian Co ouunists
corresponded with him. A paragraph from a letter written by the
present Ministor of Interior, Mehmet MI=1 read.s as follows, ff'
did not have a party, but merely a confused state of things. With
yours and POPOV/Ct instructions we were able to form our party, You
helped us; you taught us; and. cured us as does a mother with her
childP. Major General. Bedri SPAHIU, present Attorney General of
the Albanian Peoples Republic, wrote, nye learned from you, "Salon
(alias of )4UGOSA), what was indispensable for us. Therefore, I
personally, with everyone else, feel something of you in ourselves.
Our lives as Comnunists are bound with yoursn. Expressions
of servilism are contained in letters written from Enver BMA,
roc(' :WM, and IliEunadan CI7=1, 70.rhich reached their peak in the words
pronounced by HOXHA at the Assembly of the Central Committee of the
Albanian Communist Party held at Berat, in 1Tovenber 19104, "Comrade
Blazo (Blazo JOVAYOVIC, delegate of the Central Committee of the
Yugoolav-Communist Party for the Albanian Central Committee) contribem
uted a great deal to the conference . nlazo was for us as GOD from
heaven".
Maxi ng the Italian occupation, Communist groups were pass-ft
ive and their only action was the publication of a manifest on 8 Nov--
ember 1941, issuod on the initiative of POPOVIC and. 147UGOSA by the
Communist Group of Shkoder, on the occasion when HITLER attacked the
Soviet Union. The manifest read, "The chances to start an armed rol-.
volution against the Italian occupation increased with HITLIER.ts ag
ression against the Soviet Union". However, due to lack of politio.-
al activity and organization, the manifest went unheeded. During the
course of the first conference for the formation of the Albanian COM?
munist Party (g Nbvember 1941), and in the resolution of the first
conference of the Albanian Communist Party held at Labinot, in April
1943, the passive attitude of Connunist Groups was severely admonish-.
ed.. During the conference at Labinot, it was mentioned that, gthe
S truggle among the VAriOUS groups of Albanian Communists impeded a
favorable action during the following historical phases:
a. Occupation of ALBANIA on 7 April 1939 by Italian troops.
b. Other internal Albanian affairs,
C. Second Wbrld Whr, and during the war declared by ITALY on
YUGOSTAVIA tnd GNEMCE.
In 1939 ttBalli ICombetarn (Nationa Front) was founded on the
basis of a revolutionary program which included, liberation of the
country from the Italian Fascist Occupations and the establishment
of a democratic regime with applications of economic and social row
forms which were to bring real liberation to the people. The form-
ation of this organization was due mainly to British policy which
was designed in AIZALIA, to harry and obstruct the Italian occupation.
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In 1939-40, the British had daily contact with the exponents
of "Balli Kombotarn. During this period. Colonel HILL (organizer of
ZO(ts Gendarmerie) was living in Tirane where he had become very cog-
nizar.t. of th pclitical ?roils, tlic; pkA)plL:, anti tiiir 1angu4A.6.
"Balli Kombetarn was responsible for propaganda which was offs-,
icacious in promising to struggle for the nFrec and Independent ALBAITLA",
which was to have a republican government, with a social policy based
on froedam for everyone under state control. The policy further in,.
eluded a ',Greater ALBANIA, which meant the return of iletohija, Kossovo.
and Ciamurija, the first two from YUGOSLAVIA, the latter from GREECE).
It is quite clear that the political pro ram of nBalli Kombetarr
had nothing in common with rnnrinrist aSpirrItinrIgw The following are
somc passages written by Milan POPOVIC, published in nYugoslavemAlbanian
Relationship, page 7: "The lenders of the rBalli Kombettrn disregarded
every other organization and considered the Central Committee of the
National Liberation Resistance as a typical Communist organization. Sews
oral discussions took place with members of the ":Bailin but these failed
to produce any results. Seesanambers of the Central Committee of the
Albanian Communist Party, /among whom were Enver 110:MA., attributed too
great an importance to these discussions and neglected the activity
which should have been performed among thc masscs of thenBallin and
aiming to disclose their reactionary leaders%
The Albanian Communist Party refused to apply the decisions
taken at the General Conference in Labinot, regarding the organization
of a Communist Army or a National Liberation Amy, without first hav-
ing reached an agreement with nBalli Kombotarn. Svetozar VUXMANOVIC
and Blazo JOVANOVIC exerted pressure on the Albanians along other lite*,
because a few days after the First General Conference, VUEMANOVIC arras
ived in Labinot, where part of the Central Committee was gathered, and
in company with JOUNOVIC, they urged the Albamians to examine the mill-
itary problem. VMMANOVIC did his utmost to convince the Albanians of
the necessity of forming a "Supreme Command of the Eational Liberation
Army" without waiting for the conclusion of negotiations with "Balli
Kombetarn, which was organizing its own army and intentionally daa7ing
the discussions with the National Liberation Movement.
"Unless a Supreme Command is formed immediately, it means that
Kombetar? plans are being followed. Some of the members of the
Jabaxian Central Conmittca of the Albanian Communist Party did not under-.
stand the situation, among them being Enver FLOM and 33tr. Ymer DISMT/CA,
which clearly shows their lack of political intuition. Because of the
same reasons, some members of the Central Committee of the Albanian Comm,
=mist Party were against the organization of mobile units. VUKMANOVIO
suggested that field companies (whi(:11 ad not load a military life) be
converted into partials/1 detac%ments, w1Jvh regular military discipline,
in a continuous offensiw status, and siiy moved from one place to
another. /t was further suggested that larger units be formed without
delayw.
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The Supreme Conmand was organized four months followlni; the
First General Conference, and the first brigades were mobilized five
months later.. Mobile and assault military units were formed after
the intervention of Svctozar ITKMAYOVIC, Who in July 1943, vhilc ro.
turning from GREI;(;.E stoppea a7, t-ic -411.1ago of Kucako (in thc icinity
of pprco) and submitted his opinion to the Central Committee of the
Albanian Communist Party. repeatedly insisted on the fact that it
was necessary to immediately convert field companies into partisan de?
tachments, which could, in turn, be converted into larger and more me?
bile units. Due to the fact that the organization of forces in liber?
ated territories was rather neglected, I urged them to form a military
authority in the hinterland, before the and of the discussions with
nnlli Eamtstftr".
After his suggestion was accepted by the Central Committeu of
the Albanian Communist Party, VUKMAUOVIC left for Macedonia. On 1 im 2
August 1943, the exponents of '!Balli Kombetarn gathered at Muka, where
they met the leaders of the National Liberation Movement (Communists)
to decide about the policy to follow in connection with future military
olwrations against the Italians.
It was than that the ',Committee for National Salvation', was
formed and was given full power to wage mar, Instead. of tho motto
"Freedom to the Peoplegoteath to Fascism", the Committee chose the
words "Death or Freedom% They drafted. a program for the Committee
which contemplated the organization of a Greater ALBIZIA.
Following instruction from high and official sources in
YUGOSLAVIA, VtIKMANOVIC dissolved the agreement reached at yuka), and.
created a strong antagonism within the Albanian forces, which at that
time, were struggling among thenselves. SUbsequent to the breaking of
the yukaj Agreament, Mehmot SKAWY and Dusan MUGOS4 were leading a
number of troops in the vicinity of lennia where they surrounded 168
soldiers belonging to "Balli. Kombetarn, and massacred all of thcm. By
employing all sorts of ruses, deviations of policy, dishonest pract?
ices, and all other means to further the Party Lino, the Albanian Comp.
munists with the aid of the Yugoslav Communists, achieved hegemony in
the country.
Germany never administered the country. For a year, and for
purely military reasons, she occupied ALBANIA with troops and held the
ring Mhilo the Communists, Who were pledged to fight the Germans, wore
liquidating anti.-Communist forces against the day of liberation. Tho
British were instrumental in aiding this practice since their interest
was reflected only in the groups who were capable of killing the most
Germans. The negalitetiff (Abas KUPIts Zogist Forces) and the Irian
Kombetar? were not as local organized or equipped as the Corumlnists,
therefore it was the better part of British discretion to support the
group tiho produce lathe greatest results. To complicato =litters a bit
further, the Communists wore recognized as allies, since ZAMA was
fighting with the United Nations as an ally.
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A Survey of ALBAFIL. (cont' d) Page 22
The Supreme Cor-nand was organizad four months followin tho
First General Conference, and the first brigades were mobilized five
months later.. Mobile and assault military units were formed after
the intervention of Svctozar VUMAITOVIC, Who in July 1943, ',Philo re.
turning trom G.LE stafipea a ag oI Kacal?:L: (In tne icinity
of treo) and submiti;cd his opinion to the Central connittee of the
Albanian Communist Party. repeatedly insisted on thc fact that it
was necessary to immediately convert field companies into partisan de-
tachments, Which could, in turn, be converted into larger and more mo-
bile units. Due to the fact that the organization of forces in liber-
ated territories was rather neglected, I urged them to form a military
authority in the hinterland, before the end of the discussions with
"RniiiIromtatorn.
After his suggestion was accepted by the Central Committee of
the Albanian Communist Party, VUKMAUOVIC left for Macedonia, On 1 - 2
August 1943, the exponents of "Balli Kombetartf gathered at 1uka,, where
they met the leaders of the National Liberation /ovament (Communists)
to decide about the policy to follow in connection with future military
operations against the Italians.
It was than that the "Committee for National Salvation" was
formed and was given full power to wage war. Instead of the motto
"Freedom to the PeoplemiDeath to Fascism", the Committee chose the
words "Death or Freedom% They drafted a program for the Committee
which contamplated the organization of a Greater ALBAITIA.
Following instruction from high and official sources in
YUCTOSTJANIA, VUXMANOVIC dissolved the agreement reached at Muka,j and
created a strong antagonism within the Albanian forces, which at that
time, wore struggling among thenselves. Subsequent to the breaking of
the Mbicaj Agreament, Mbhmet SECEHU and Dusan MIMOSA were leading a
number of troops in the vicinity of Lushnja where they surrounded 168
soldiers belonging to ItBaili Xombetartf, and. massacred all of them. By
employing all sorts of ruses, deviations of pdlicy, dishonest pract-
ices, and all other moans to further the Party Line, the Albanian Comp.
munists with the aid of the Yugoslav Communists, achieved hegemony in
the country.
Germany never administered the country. For a year, and for
purely military reasons, she occupied. ALBANIA with troops and held the
ring while the Communists, Who were pledged to fight the Germans, wore
liquidating anti...Communist forces against the day of liberation. The
British were instrumental in aiding this practice since their interest
was reflected only in the groups who were capable of killing the most
Germans. Tho "Legaliteti" (Mops =Its Zogist Forces) and the !Bain
Kombetarn were not as well organized or ?quipped as the Communists,
therefore it was the better part of British discretion to support thm
group who producedthe greatest results. To complicate natters a bit
further, the Comnrunists wore recognized as allies, since RUSSIA was
fighting with the Mated Nations as an ally.
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A Survey of ALBA"Ls. (cont' d) Page 23
Had RUSS.i.:1. policy demand.od. that SUBANIA should becor-le one
of the federal republics of YUGOSLAVIA, 1.10XHA and. his associates would.
undoubtedly not have objected; but as it happoned, RUSSIA was hoping
that ALBAITIA would. be a.dnitted to the Unit ga Nations where another vote
would have been added to the nstern trBloct2.1 To 1UO qui tk: et.; r
Yugoslav Alliance would be accepted by the Partisan soldiery and the
enthusiatic Communist youth, an intense pr000kYugoslav propaganda was can.,
ried on, complete with fraternal visiting, presentation of bronze plop-
ques of the nigoslav dictator, and exuberant shouts of wEnver..?Titoe.
Economic cooperation with YUGOSLAVIA was not unfruitful for
ALBAITIA. Even if the former ..is backward by Western standards, she is
richer than ALB.M.:IA in technicians. and. could hp in exploiting the
copper and. chrome. and even send. groups of y-buthful voluntoers to work
on ALBAITIAts 'ono-promised but never completed. railway. Most in-portant,
YUGOSLAVIA sent wheat from the Zossovo so that the Albanians had enough
broad. Some of the Albanians may have reflected. that under the Axis
yoke, that sane wboat was coning from an Albanian province. But no one
really worried, about it just so long as the wheat continued to arrive.
The entire situation was altored by the Yugoslav breach with
the Cominform during the survner of l914g. At the critical moment,
.ALBAITIA did. not align herself with her partner, but switched to a more
distant relative, STALIII. Prom the standpoint of choice to the Albano.
tans, the Russian agpeared more attractive. At that time, TITO N?ras not
expected to mako good his rebellion. It was generally accepted by every??
one (Communists included) that either TITO would bo forced to make his
infacii ? iiiirtmli -01.1r urnuld be
brought back into the fold, by a more obedient Communist leader. But
even without this exception, any Albanian Communist politician would
have been strongly tempted to seize the chance of freeing his country
from a patronage that was beginning to become extremely irksome. Acceptance of outside influnenco inevitably 'brings with it a measure of fon.-
eign influence in the administration of a country, and. this factor has
always boon resented by xenophobic Albanians. Thus, ti the first con-.
stant ?la:lent in Albanian foreign policy is securing foreign aid., the
sccond is normally to rid the helper of any influence in her affairs.
7. The Conspiracy...2f General Koci_XOn
The most dramatic incident marking the decision to stand with
RUSSIA, was the foil (sudden) of the Minister of the Interior, Comm,
issar Lioutenant Gonoro3. foci XOXE. In viow of the assidu.o- us pro?Yugo
slav propaganda, it is not stroango that some of the servants of the re-..
gime had. adhored quite closely to a policy of cooperation with the
Yugoslays. As a consquencoc in en the Party Line changed, the so pooplo
were considered as politically. 1.1nrelin.b1c to carry on in thatr posts.Tho
persons who r o most Irt7otr.i.c7-,b1-,7 ..;,:.3.-ttod had to be liquidated. Tho
Switch-Over was accorrpz.,nkc:d. -iv crops of arrests, which woro followed in
duo course by troason trials.
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page
In all th the principal casualty was thc.) nan who had. been
all.-powerful as Minister of the Interior, and as Chief of tilirbi rojte
Popullorert (political Police).. The fall of xom is typical of politi.
icn1 life in AL2.."1.171.2. His 110.uidation cc as a result of outsidc in-
tervention rather than any internal force. However, the conspiracy
which led to his undoing was his own idea, and from an ir.partial
point, he earned exactly what he had worked for.
In a Conrrunist regime there is always an element of chance in
the selection of a suprene leader from the list of Party bosses. In
ALBANIA, Enver HOXHA was chosen. But he was not such a connanding pers.
onality as to rule out the possibility of a replacenent by a favorably
placed and determined man, especially when that man. was already his
Doputy. XCXE was the only Lieutenant General in AVEA1114, and as such,
he wia tho highest ranking officer under Colonel General ROMA.. XOXE
had. presided over the first treason trial of importance when 6o ?var
criminal and enemies of the people?? were tried in Tirane in April 3.9145
after the maxinum nnount of publicity. Seventeen of those tried were
shot. A year later, XOXE succeeded in eliminating the veteran, Moscow..
trained. Communist Sejfulleh MALESHOVA. touring the first half of 1914,
XOXE succeeded in surrounding HOKETA with his own spies and police, so
that the nominal loader's real power was reduced to practically nothing,
and. ROM was under what amounted to house arrest. All that was necosisa?
ary vas more time and Hoxia could have been suppressed altogether, and
with no difficulty, succeeded. by xors.
TM. feet that foci XOXE failed, when success seemed within his
grasp, was not that he was insufficiently clever or strong, but that he
was promblrugoslav. The Russians decided that they needed a reliable man
of their own ch6ice to suit their own purposes, to be head of Albanian
affairs. Uhfortunately for XOXE, ho wasn't selected since the Soviets
preferred 10.101k. Ithen the Russian Mission gave the word, XOXE was arr...
ested, thus restoring NOM to his forner power.
S. MISS IA had nover taken much interest in ALBAUIA, except at con-
tain, particular moments. It vas XOXE' s misfortune that his =rest was
one of those moments. The Soviets attached considerable importance to
the harrying of GREECZ by rebel forces, then under the leadership of
General WARMS. Por this activity, they required. unimpeded use of. Albano.
tan soil. As the =reliability of 'YUGOSLAVIA& becano more apparent to
RUSSIA, the importance of ALBAITIA. Increased, and it was from the latter
that the Greek operation was conducted. General 1-1ARROS had his main base*
headquarters, armies, and. even his wireless station moved. there. All this
was too valuable to the Russians, since they could net afford to allow
EP ATAILITIA to parallel the Yugoslav action. This was the main reason for
re...imitating the docile EOM, eliminating the ur4re1lable X0X31, and raw-
aligning =AVIA with the Cominform countries. ALBANIA represented. to
STALIN eacsottir what she had represented to MCTSSOLINI, a jut:vino-off point
for attack von G11141C3. The Yugoslav 4,11tance, for all practical puri?
poses, was sactsd. /424730/TAI a new patron was IIISSIA.
RET
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A Survey of ALZAITIA (cont' d.) Page 25
Enver HOXHA was received with honor in RUSSLA, and most imp.
ortant of all, Russian advisers were sent to ALBA1A in over larger
numbers. Russian and Thumanian ships began to atrive with greater
frequency at Durres and nano. Meanwhile, the Albanian and Greek
rebel armies were kept mobilized and supplied, and at convenient mo-
ments, the latter was sent across the Greek frontier to bring war and
desolation to the Greeks.
The Battle of the Grarinos, 1.948, cane and went. The Greek
Army, in an arduous campaign, drove the rebels from their positions
and ',pacified,' northern GREECE. But the operation was not permanently
successful since the rebels retired to their refuge, there to rest
and ro-cquip for the next seasonts campaign. In 1949, they appeared
once more in GIMECE, in the region of Vitsi; and driven from there,
they retired across the frontier, nove1777aw kilometers to the west,
and again emerged upon the Gramnos. This Uric, however, they had to
contend with a fine soldier, Piaci Marshal PAPAGOS, who in 1940, had
defeated another and larger invasion from the same direction. The Bat-
tle of the Grammos,1949, was more decisive than its predecessor since
fewer of the rebels escaped . The Greeks moreover, adopted a much more
menacing attitude toward Albanian troops who used. cover fire across the
frontier, and for a tine, it appeared that the Greeks night even pursue
their enemies across the frontier into ALBANIA itself. Tirane Radio
ahnouncod, as it had a year previously, and with equal truth, that
armed Greeks arriving across the frontier wore being interned..
The 2attle of the Grerilos,19149, was decisive, not only for the
Greeks, but also for ALBANIA. For the time being, at any rate, it led
the Russians to wTitc off the Greek rebels as ineffective, and the sue-?
pension of military efforts was announced by General EARKOS.
PART NI
Governnont
9. Structure of the Poppies Republic of ALBAVIA
a. The Albanian Government and the Albanian Mrkerse Party
(Cennunist) are constructod on a pattern familiar in all Coninform
countries. The structure may be described as vertical, with tho Gov-
ornment and. Party forming two parallel. and norainally independent colem
tons. Although unrelated in theory, the leading positions in both the
Government and the Party are occupied by the same, anal group of mon,
and. the party exorcises a dominant influence) ovor the Government. The
various wiliront Organizational, are independent in principle, but are in
fact subsidiary to the Party and constitute instruments for the furtbo
oring of Party interests among specific elonants of the population.
b. The Presidium (Presidium) is technically the highest gov-
erning body of the Albanian Republic, and its rionbors aro elected by
the Peoples Assembly. The President (president') of the Presidium,
Dr. Orior NISEAN/, is the noninal Chief of State.
?
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C. The Pe-plc's Assembly (lcuvendi Popullor) is
deputies (Deputet) from the ten Prefectures of ALBAITIA.
ident of the Assenbly is riter DISI/A.
d.. The Cabinet (Cr`abinoti) consists ofCa. xt o on portfolios,
currently held, by thirteen ninisters. These are:
Page 26
conposed of
The Pros
HOA Illn.ver
trAXOVA Tuk
SEETTI Melinet
ITUSEI Gogo
EruAzi Abciy1
=EU Kico
KONOMI Manol
KOLEKA Spiro
TASEKO Goco
SEMI Abed
YLLI Karan
SPAHIU Bedri
Premier (Kryerailaster)
Minister of National Defense (Minister i Mbrojtjes
IConbetare)
Minister of Forelfgl. Affairs(Minister Punevet To Jash~
Vice???Premier (rrenrgrryerittliat or) tome)
71cc2.-.15ronier (ronr----Zricreriinis ter)
Minister of Internal Affairs (Minister i Plinnvnt To
Mbrendeshme)
Minister of Industry (Minister i Industrise)
Minister of Finctnce (Minister Financavet)
Minister of Commerce *Minister tregetise)
Minister of Justice (Minister i Dreitosise)
Minister of Connunieations (Minister i Konunikao-
sonovet)
Minister of Agriculture (Minister i Zujciesis)
Minister of Public Works (Minister i Punevot otore)
Minister of Education (Minister i Arosimit)
Minister of Social Welfare (Minister i Mimes Shognore)
e. Also on cabinet level are the Control Cot:mission (Komisjoni
Kontrbllit), under the Presidency of Haxhi LLESIII, and the EC0110Mi C
Planning Commission (Komisonji i 33conomi1c), under the Presidency
of Spiro KOLEKA.
f. Uhder the jurisdiction of the Minietz7 of 3110.tivna1 befease
is the-Army (Ustrija) =der Chief of Staff (Kryetar i Shtabit Madhuer)
Mehmet MERU.
g. Under, the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
are the political Security Police (Sigurirlit), the Political Direction
(Drejtorija Politike), and the following regional units: Prefectures
(Prefekturat); Subewkrefectures (Nen-Prefekturat); Commas (Konunet);
and Cities and Villages (Qytete The Fshate). There ten Prefectures,
twenty-nine subs-Prefectures, and. la Communes in 'ALBAITIA.
h. The highest organ of the Ikbrkerst Party of A/MATTIA (Partija
0 Puntorovet Shqyptare), formerly the Albanian Commnist Party (Partija
Zomuniste Shottare), is the 6 Secretariat (Sekretarija), composed of the
following meraberst
EOM Enver
JAXOTA !We
SEM Melsmet
SPAM 30421
Secretary General (Sekretar I Pergjithcham)
Second Secretary lkien?sSekretar)
Secretary (Sekreto?r)
Socrotary (Sekrotar)
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A Survey of AILT3A1-It1(con-0d)
is
Politburo (Politbui.),,
has nine members:
Page 27
ac body of the Central Connittee is the
o2' Comnittee (Komiteti Eksfkutiv). It
TTOXTA
JAKOITA Tuk
SIEZU Ilehmet
SPAHIU Bedri
KOLA Spiro
VVITIn
BrIiSHOVA Liri
BULL.= Beqir
YUSBI Gogo
j? The Orgburo Orgburo , or Organi zatlon1 Corm t tee (Koniteti
Organizativ), is the Central Committee body dealing '4th Party administra,..
tive problems.
11.
1.4.1-L L.;
Assembly or regional delegates of the brokerst Party, /t consists of
nineteen members today, the twentieth, ISLAM/ nazi, was killed three
months ago:
g:4-41-1 T1 VV?1 2
4NS -
ff 0"17-rrn .41.?r't
7I4-' V
(Komiteti qendrcur) is the General
Commit tee:
ROMA Enver
JAKOVA Tuft.
SHERD' Mehriet
SPAHIU Bodri
=PO HYsni
BELISHOVA Liri
BALLUKU Beqir
NUM/ Gogo
ROM Nexhmij0
KOLA Spiro
SKIM' Abodin
BE-ECM:MU Sadik
MESA Teodor
KOTTOMI Manol
PI2ISTERI Pilo
DUME Potrit
ALIJA Ituni s
MYPTIU Manush
PRIM'
There are also nine Candidate Members of the
ITDOU Beqir
LLESHI Haxhi
XHANGOLLI Ramadan
V/Natil Nexhip
ORMAN/ Salt
HAM ITI Zejnel
SOW' Sedik
PITO Spiro
KELLEZI Shintri
Central
1. The Control Commission (Komisjoni I. Kontrollit) is the body
of the Communist Party authorized to adjudge the correctness of measures
taken by the Pgrty Im whether by the Secretariat* Politburo, Central Com..
mittee, or any other committee ??? and, where it secs fit, to condemn the
decisions. /n this sense, it constitutes a Party supreno tribunal, and
stands apart from the direct chain of command.
an. A nurabor of specialised committees exist within the Central
Committee, including: The riene Committee (Koniteti remnuer); the
Youth Committee (Xoniteti 1. Rini s); Mc Albanian Popular Cultural Comm
nittee (Koniteti Xultura Popullore Shoptare); The Agit?sprop Oomnittoe,
I .e. the Conmittoo for Agitation and Propaganda (AGiteseroP, goriltoti
Agitacjon e Propaganda); and the Press and. Propaganda Committee (zomiteti
Shtypit Ihe Propagandsb)
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? c A
cts with Julian AMERY of the
HOXHA met VUKMANOVIC Sveto7ar
The tvo were also Party organiners
ce
c'if of Staff of the Albpnian
k rt .(` of the Government and Forel . Yin
:hief of Staff.
Paris as leader of the Albnian Delegrition
.nference.
received the followinc, decorations: the Albenian orer
Soviet "ORDER OF SUVOROV (1st Class); an the hist
"ZA '4RAEROST" (For Courage)'as well as several other lesser
In 1?!-.7, he vf,rit to Moscow for the first time.
,
In December 1 .' he agnin went to Moscow but this time with a request for a
1,ece treaty and a mutual assistance pact. Up to the present, all negotiations
ba_.ed on HOXHile requests of 1949 have remained wishful thinking on the part
of the Albanian Government.
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ITALY.
;trec:Ir: (Date Unknovn)
Deutv at Himara
t
147- 19 - - Minister of Public
and Scientific Institutes.
1943 - Minister of Communications
1950 - President of the Ste Econ-
omic Planning Commission.
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KAPO Hysni
Major General, member of the POLITBURO of the Central
Committee of the Workers Party, ALBANIA.
Born: 1915 at Terbac (Valona)
leducation: High School
Political Career: 1941 - Political Secretary of the Party
Regional Committee, Valona.
1943 - Member of the Plenum of the Party
Central Committee.
. intoko? oe'404104k #1k*} OA., ? # * AM'
During the war he was a Brigade
and Army Corps Commissar.
After the war he was appointed
as Minister to Belgrade, and as
Aide to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs.
'Became a member of the POLITBURO
of the Central Committee of the
Workers Party, and a Deputy in
Valona.
1950 - President of Political Direction
for the Army.
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- A At,..L..4
BELISHOVA Liri
Member of the FOLIT3URG of the Central Committee of the
Workers Party, ALBANIA.
Born: 1926 at Mallskastra
Zducation: High School
Political Career: 1943 - Secretary of the Regional Com-
mittee, Albanian Communist Youth,
Tirana.
1944 - Member of the Central Committee,
44?.?..4mig la tan ran" it, ta: iwarty.
0
1946 - Political Secretary of the Central
Committee, Albanian Communist Youth.
1948 - President of the Albanian People's
Republic Youth, and a candidate for
the POLITBURO of the Central Commit-
tee of the Party.
1949 - Member of the POLITBURO of the Cent-
ral Committee of the Party.
SFC
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MEMO of the Central
ttAil
4i4=1 1927w
litineatleins
jillitary
; e ? ?*, .1,, 4 ?:???? ." ?
.,???411111.411Millr APOPikitor t,i1Apat: hvt
7"
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. A Ourvoret ALUM; cola** '. Page 28
The structwro of the Albanian, Iftrkerst Party belt* the direct
Jona level follows that of the Albanian Government. PAitecturault BD*
ecrative Committees (romitoti liksekutiv i Prefektutes),Ettit on the
prefectural level, ferried of representative fron the 11004,rofectural
Comitteesc(romiteti 1. NerpePrefektures), which in tutii are elected by
the Communal Offices (Zyrja e Xemtulevet). The Coil- COolula) constitute-
?. the lowest level of tho Party at livery Prete:tau= has in
its Party organisation an Economic Committee (Xoniteti Ikettatlik) which
is composed of various sections (Sokojett) cleating with'ilnances, Econme
=ice, Sanitation, etc.
n. Mho front organizations serve aq instrimaents tor Corraunist
penetration and inidoctrination of specific elements of. ithq-Albanian pop,'
ulation. They are designed to gather Into .Party eontrollS organisam
tions those persons who are not eligible foi. Party racriberWiDe' The
structure of these organs pa:04103.s that of the torkcre PRrty. 5he7
include: Thdi flnion. of Albanian Wbmon (Bashkial. I Oravot Shoptareh
The Committee, of Albanian lb* Casualties and. Partisans (1Cortiteti line*
validet..Shoptare &he Partings:tot); The Albanian Tract? Union atiosociap.
tion (Sititialcatat): The Union of librking Youth or AZANZA (Ittstilcimi.
PLIAS se Punes Shqiperise), fornerly the Commtuitst Youth of 414310U.
(Ring0a Xormiete eb.uptaro)g substitioxy to tho Union of 101dd* Youth
(of AZBANIA. is the Pioneers (Pionori), an organitatiAn for bbi34ten
under twelve years of agog the Albanian It Orefp-(ihritti IPut-abgleVtar);
The A1bantan4aviet TIntcyn Oatural Association (Show:Li,* Per
in IttliltUra abglIPat"Upe)t The Association for 1047si4t*.liencation and
aport (fteikulturete OPOrti)t The Union- of Albanian Aiifitte4rescist Youth
(3ashkiadt BintiAintioseashiste Ethoptare), with a nosh broader nemberm
ship tkon'the elite.,16liking Youths The Professiona untOo 03askildat1et
Profesionsle): and he Association for Assistance to Ithiii_,Aittr and 3)..?
tense (scinija per ildhisne tishtrise Zito 31brojtjes) or 190101.. an antis
animation designed tot) prepare Albanians for rttlitary Service and for
efficient national defenett.
10,
Ilbrivrezotv
Yellowing Is the trawl of the getatsiste of the abrAidian, Ifbrkerie
Partryt rejortsdk, won* Wilke Altenian ocarranist Ciagittes during
the early part et? ?
A', Statute at the AlbanliftiOlgekors I1/441471
1. The pititary am of to. Statute_ 'Via es
Socialist and Comaripsist soda wrier in AMOR&
2.10 APON102% 11/4V0M10
MUM lir the
1111101$111. -101iiart
Of 441014161,111011 of
atiftett0 the ebbe* 0
t of a
?
4
?
?
?
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A Survey of LTIA (contld) Page 29
the country in their struggle against the rennants of Fascism and.
Feudalism; aganst the mentality of the bourgoisic and, of the re.-
actionaries; for the defense of national independence and. territ?-?
orial inviolability; for the consolidation of democracy and of the
night of the people; for the edification of the country by means of
its industrialization and. electrification; and, for the edification
and devolopment? of the States s economy and of cooperatives. By worlam-
ing toward. these aims, it will be possible to achieve higher economic,
cultural and to standards for the working class and. for the
whole nation.
3. The Party gives its full support to the rievAlepriont
education of the Proletariat and of the generation. It directs the
democratic front (Fronti Denokratik) and. all organizations of the
workers and of the State's employees, also the efforts to improve
living conditions of all the workers. It fights for the strengthen.ing of the democratic cause, against warmongers, against racial disem
crimination, for a defense of the ethnic and. democratic rights of tho
minorities, and. for a consolidation of the international solidatiier of
the workers of all countries,
4. The Albanian Workers, Party concentrates all its efforts
toward a close cooperation within the democratic antiivaimperialist
field and. primarily toward a sincere friendship with the USSR, the
guide in this field, and. with the countries which have a Peoples*
Democracy.
5. The Party demands from its members proof of their act--
ivity and self?denbe in the performance of the work for the real?
ization of the program and the observance of the Statute. This is
necessary in order that the Party may effectively carry out the prom-
gran and insure unity among the ranks of the Party.
B. Duties and Rights:
1. /11 is the duty of each member: (1) to fight for the pro
gramof the Party; (2) to become familiar with the basic doctrines of
Mandl?! and. Leninism; (3) to observe discipline, unity and vigilance;
(4) to be an example of good conduct and morale; (5) to act in accord.-
anco with the norms of labor (planned according to the Russian brigades
system) and. of the StateIs laws: (6) to becone perfect (to improve) in
the skill of h$0 profession; (7) to strengthen the ties with the masses
and be 8772Pathe1$0 to their wishes and to guide then and to elucidzsto
to then the pent), line policy; and (8) to be a member of ono of the
mass organization. or a laborers, organization and to establish the
organization Where it does not exist.
2. The member has the right to particippte in discussion, to
attend meetings, and to take part in the activity of the Party prose.
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( con 0 d) Pace 30
In the COUVWC of Party meetings, he has the riGht to critic-,
ize the activity of any menber. He has thc right to elect or to be
elected into any of the Party bodies, He has the richt to refer any
question to any Party body, including the Central Conuittee,
C. Admission to the Party:
1. A portion car. 'tic) ?Aril ttel to the Party art?cr ha has been
a candidate for ono years In the case of induotriel workers and, tz.4.witars:
candidacy is only six months, The candidates attend. the Party meetings
and have a consulting vote. They are bound to respect the same rules
as the Party members. Necessary age to be admitted. to the Party (nerbms
bership or candidacy) is eifilteen yenr ron-ronnyl flyal, f?i t4 nc; the labor
of others are not eligible to become members,
2. Adnission of workers as candidates nust 'be accompanied
by a recommendation on the part of two members who have to their credit?
it at least one year of activity within the Party. Poor peasants need
a recommendation by one Party member whty has had one year of activity
vrithin tho Party. Moderately wealthy peasants ( =al holders) and arty-
leans (handicraftsmen) need, a recommendation by two Party members with
two years activity within the Party. Intellectuals need a recomend-?
atiqn by three Party members, each of whom must have had three years
activity within the Party.
3. With regard. to the first two categories, the nenbers
recommending the candidate rust have known the person for at least
six nonths, With regard to the last caterzories, this period nust be
at least one year.
4. The suggestion to admit a person to the Party is nade
by the basic organization of which the canlidate is a member. His ad,.
mission as a Party member must bo approved by the nearest higher corm
ittee.
5. Expulsion from the Party is usually decided in the basic
organization meeting and then approve& by the nearest higher comnittoe.
Tho expelled members can submit an appeal against the
expulsion decision to any Party body, including the Central Committee.
D. Structure and Democracy:
1. The structure and organization of tho Party is based
upon the principles of democratic centralization. The Party leaders
who represent the various organs of the Party are elected by secret
ballot and are obliged to render account to the masses by whom they
have boon elected. Decisions are discussed liberally: however, when
adopted by the majotity, they are to be adhered to by the minority
without question. The decisions taken by the suprame organs aro coo.
pulsory for all subordinate organs. Local problems are solved by the
respective organizations, according to the principles of autonomy, with..
out distuating the general course of action of the Party.
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A Survey of AT.2!1.2TIA (contt d) Page 31
The supremo body of the Party is the Congress, Which elects
the Central Committee and the Committee on Revision. Por the cities
and their administrative sub-.divisions, the supreme body is the cow'
rrosponding Conference, which elects the eommittee; while for the
basic organization, it is the General Meeting., which elects the Sec--
rctary General or the 3ureau. In cases where the majority damands,
or whore the Central Committee wishes to verify its policy, political
issues of the Party can be submitted for discusilion by all in the party.
E. Superior Bodies (National):
1. The Conrress of the party generally meets every three
years; the Central Cotwittee nay, how-ever, convene the Congress for urr-,
usual cases or by a oneumthird vote of the participants of the last Con....
gross. The Congress ratifies the work performed on the part of the
Central Committee, it modifies the program of the Party and the Party
Statute, it elects the Centra/ Comnittee and the Cammittoe on Ravision,
and it fixes the number of their compononts.
2. The candidates of the Central Committee attend all meets-6
ings, having the right to express their consultative opinion, The Conti*
ral Committee elects the Politburo for the performance of the general
work and it appoints a secretary for current affairs. The Central Com.
mittee meets every three months. Every year it calls a conference of
the representatives elected. at the plenary ranetings of the Special Com.
mittee for the purpose of deciding on important questions of the Party
aad it may call an additional conference if onom.fifth of its members
were deprived of representing the Sommittee. The Commission on Rom
vision checks on the speed. and accuracy in which the Party affairs are
being handled, as well as its financial situation.
F. Party Bodies within Cities, Districts, and City Districts:
1. In these Party organizations, the highest body is that
of the Conference, which meets once a year. Special meetings are held
following a decision of the corresponding (city,city district) Central
Committee, or the Committee or the delegates to the Congress. The Can?
mitteo elects a Politburo and two secretaries with at least three years,
activity within the Party; their appointment to be approved by the Party
Central Committee,
2. The basic organization of the 'arty is established in
every working cebter, military unit, public institution (organization),
or village where there are more than two members of the Party. The
basic organization organizes the masses and conducts the agitation and
propaganda activities according to the Party line policy. The coil edos
ucates the members and. is responsible for the working plan being =via
nod out according to the mission; it mobilizes the masses towar& a
realization of the working plan; it fights against deficiencies and
works toward the improvement of the material and cultural standard of
the masses,
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A Survey of ALBA171A (conttd.) Page 32
Ea ch basic organization totalling less than 15 menbers elects
only one secretary, while those totalling a higher nembership elect
their own Politburo. The **eras Party directs the organisation of
the youth, and it provides for their education in conformity with the
principles of Marxism and Leninism.
3. A member who fails to obey orders from superior bodies, or
who commits actions considered as crimes in the opinion of the Party,
can consequerxtly be admonished, with the punishment entered in the off-?
enders s records, or he cart be temporarily deprived. of the right to ?comp
up 3r a leading position with the Party, or as a further punishment he
can be expelled from the Party. The members of the Central Committee
oraz. be expelled. from the Central. Committee or from the Party itself by
two-thirds vote of the plenary. meeting,
4. The financial resources of the Party are constituted from
contributions and. income from Party enterprises. The contributions
range from 5 lek to 3 per cent of the monthly income of the member.
PAP.T IV
?Peace, Bread and stibrk?
11. The Communist Cone tion of the Pour Freedoms
A. Following is a resume of a state:lent made in the
Albani (In Refugo o Camp Itlfaxhim41rjakow in nraeus, GREECE, by lifehdi 33DRUSI14.?
p:n.4.1bania.21 who esceroed from his native country to GREECE in 19471
1. "After almost insurmountable difficulties, I succeeded
in shaking off the Comnunist yoke and. finally reached Piraeus. It was no
easy task to circumvent the Albanian Communist frontier so Now that
I have regained liberty, / feel it incumbent upon no to reveal to the
world what is going on in ALBLNIA, and to disclose the hardships that a
proud and distinguished nation like A.LEANIA, has to endure. Under pretense
of democracy she has been deprived of her liberty by the barbarous sup..
porters of the Bolshevik program,
By April 1947, the jails of Berat were overcrowded with
political prisoners who were serving sentetces at hard labor. Guarded by
armed Red agents, any attempt to break away would have proved suicidal.
These moral and notarial sufferings natured in us the
determination either to regain liberty or die. it so happened that about
forty of the internee had formed a group, and on 17 Lpril 1911.7, when re-
turning frcen their work, attacked their armed escorts in the vicinity of
Berat. Defying machine pistols and hand grenades, those desperate nen
were soon engaged in an embittered handr-tombhand struegle with their guar-
ds. Only three of the prisoners survived and. finally reached the Greek
frontier. I was one of themP.
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A Survey of ALBAITIA (contid) Page 33
2. The First rays of the Red Regime After It Had. Assumed Power
nIt was common knowledge that Communist bands had been organ-
ized under the pseudonym ?Nacional Clirintarft (rational Liberation) head.
ad by two Slav agents from Belprade, and known only by the names niIILADI"
and. !WSW". They were followed by fanatic Albanian Communists who blind.
ly obeyed orders -they received. After a complete victory over the Albanr-
ian democratic Nationalists, they entered Tirane and. immediately col:Inane.-
ed carrying out the program of the Russianution of 1917. This mho,
ant was marked by the mass executions of intellectuals, workers, merchants,
proprietors, and ecclesiastics. Persecutions and. arrests were a daily
occurence. The Red. bandits justified, their barbaroud methods by placard.
ing thece crincs az a strucclo aga.thst Na.z.1.-brakicist collaborators and
traitors. No time was wasted in establishing.a Democratic Front by means
of intimidation, such as tortures and. arrests, thus separating the pop-
ulation from a regime which had fought for the liberty of ALUM with un-
remitting valor.
On 2 December 1946, an election days I was jailed and deprived
of all my civil ri.ghts. Today, I an in a position to testify to the many
terroristic acts and measures that were resorted to on that specific date
to ensure a majority of votes. It must be mentioned at this point that
not even the slightest opportunity was offered. to the population to exp.
reels its own opinion or to vote against the so/id electoral body of the
Red Regime. But, in spite of all that, there were many who remained un-
dauntedly true to their patriotic sentiments and. either buioned their balmy
iota-papers or Otherwise refrained from voting. The Rod Government, in
order to complete the number of votes, forced minors to the voting booths,
with the result that on 2 December 1946, a regime 14as set up ?that bore
the brand of a legal, self-nominated, government, constituting the basis
of the Peoples. Republic of ATZA1?,71A, though practically built up on Sovim.
let Republican principles. Thus, 2 December 1.9146 becames the date that
doomed the liberty and independence of the Albanian nation and actually
was the date of issuance of a death WEL ',rant for the population.
Thus ALBASIA became part of the governmental machinery of
TITO (STALI1T) in a political, militarr, administrative and economic
sense. All orders and directives emanated from the Ierenlin via Ilelgrader
3. The Disintegration of Albanian Culture and Traditions
"Under the new regime all existent laws were abolished and
substituted by acts dictated. from Moscow. This was followed by bux?ning
all private and. public libraries arir Tiger books, which caused an irr.
?parable loss to national culture. New books published were pervaded
by Marxistialieninist propaganda. Traditions that had. been so jealously
guarded by the Albanians and respected. by previous occupation forces
had. to yield to a destructive opposition characterized, by show con.'
ferences and theatrical performances. Where legal measures failed to
attain the desired effect. executions and arrests sealed the fate of
wreactionary elementsw/
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Page 33
2. The First rays of the Red. Re the After It Had. Assumed Power
"It was common knowledge that Communist bands had been organ..
ized under the pseudonym ?Nacional Clirimtarft (National Liberation) head-
ed. by two Slav agents from Belgrade, and known only by the names IIMILAD11:7"
and. ?DUSEAVIT. They were followed by fanatic Albanian Communists who blind-
ly obeyed orders they received. After a complete victory over the Alban
Ian democratic Nationalists, they entered Tirane and immediately commenc-
ed carrying out the program of the Russian7c-T) .u.tion of 1917. This evus
ent was marked by the mass executions of intellectuals, workers, merchants,
proprietors, and. ecclesiastics. Persecutions and arrests were a daily
occurence. The Red. bandits justified their barbaroud methods by placard,-
ing these crimes as a strutscle against Nazi-Fascist collaborators and
traitors. No time was wasted. in establishing.a Democratic Front by means
of intimidation, such as tortures and arrests, thus separating the pop-
ulation from a regime which had fought for the liberty of ALM= with un-
remitting valor.
On 2 December 1946, en election days I was jailed and deprived
of all my civil rights. Today, I on in a position to testify to the many
terroristic acts end measures that were reserted to on that specific date
to ensure a majority of votes. It must be mentioned. at this point that
not even the slightest opportunity was offered to the population to exp-
roes its own opinion or to vote against the solid electoral body of the
Bed Regime. BLit, in spite of all that, there were many who remained un-
dauntedly true to their patriotic sentiments and. either bui?ned their bal.
lot-papers or Otherwise refrained from voting. The Red Government, in
order to complete the number of votes, forced minors to the voting booths,
with the result that on 2 December 1946, a regime was set up that bore
the brand of a legal, self-nominated government, constituting the basis
of the Peoples, Republic of ALBA:Lail, though practically built up on Soy-'
let Republican principles. Thus, 2 December 3.946 becames the date that
doomed the liberty and. independence of the Albanian nation and. actually
was the date of issuance of a death warrant for the population.
Thus ABASIA became part of the governmental machinery of
TI TO (STALIY) in a political, militaw, administrative and economic
sense. All orders and directives emanated from the lerenlin via Oele,rader
3. The Disintegration of Albanian Culture and Traditions
"Under the new regime all existent laws were abolished and
substituted by acts dictated. from Moscow. This was followed by burning
all private and. public libraries an-au-lager books, which caused an irr.-
eparable loss to national culture. New books published were pervaded
by Itfarxistp?Leninist propaganda. Traditions that had been so jealously
guarded. by the Albanians and respected. by previous occupation forces
had to yield to a destructive opposition characterized, by showy conp?
ferences and. theatrical performances. Where legal measures failed to
attain the desired effect, executions and arrests sealed the fate of
*reactionary elenents*/
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A Survey of ALBANIA. (contld.) Page 34
4. Tho Fainination of National Emblems
"Changes in this direction were becun by adding spikes of
grain to the right and left of the Albanian bicipetal (two-headed) eagle
and addine a rod star on top. The tombs of earlier martyrs that comm.
enorated. Albanian history were done away with. The Albanian nation had
been spending a fortune on the maintenance of these sacred synbols.of
the past* but the iron heel of Comunism, with merciless indifference,
destroyed these shrines leaving no trace of monuments to those whose
name appeared on the national roll of honor. All this happened in the
wake -of Communism in which the Albanian nation had placed its only hope
for justice and liberty%
5. Destruction of the Traditional Honor of the Papily,
"One of the most virtu.ous features of Albanian tradition
is the education of womanhood. These were customs anxiously guarded
by parents durinr the past centuries in order to give to the nation
mothers capable of begetting a sound. generation. It was duo to these
mothers that the characteristics of the Albanian nation were preserved
throughout the past, turbulent centuries. One of the salient traits
was the practice of moral duties based. on rigid patriarchal principles, It
required all the cunning and. intelligence of the Corimunist agents to un?
dermine these traditions, and. in part, they succeeded. Albanian women
were drafted, to serve in Partisan units; some were used in the espionage
service: others, actuated by overindulgence in Communist doctrines even
went to the extent of denouncing their own parents and, causing their exh?
ecutions. Prostitution, which had been unknown in the past, became ramps
pant, being promoted by Communist commissars. Brothels were later abol?
1. shed, and in thar places cultural centers were sot up where conteren.?
ces were supposed. to be held. However1 these centers served as meeting
places of amusements, Drastic measures were in store for those parents
who objected to their dnuebters freokenting these circles, for they were
taken care of by the MOM, police of both sexes, Marriage, a sacred matt?
ter in ALBANIA and. celebrated In accordance with ancient traditions, bo??
came a thing ofthe past. Parents had no voice in planning the futures
of their dauebters.
In March 19145, on the occasion of the demobilization of Alf-?
banian women, Major General Bedri SPARIV addressed his audience in a
speech. After having eulogized the active part taken by the Albanian
women during the war, and having strested their loyal attitude in crit-?
lea situations, WARM bade farewell to the demobilized women, who, as
he said., were returning to the domestic fireside. On this occasion, ho
promised every demobilized soldier at' aommunlist civilian willing to cons,'
tract marriage with a -demobilized an a ignittivm of 6,000 francs, equal
to 60,000 lole. The number of women vas conistaerablet many of thateboing
conscious of the volcome they wctul& be accorded due to their post Gond,.
uct, refused to return home. The Bed Ciovernment leas forced to concen-
trate these hamelessimmumt at Durres, and. later ocmpelled them to get
married, Than conditions were a source of crime sad suicides.
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In the village of Tat zat in the Delvina District, for instance,
a father sbot his partisan aiaughter to vindicate the disgrace brought
upon the family. Sinilar occurrences took place in other parts of
ALBA1TIA and. serve to prove the corrupt methods practised by the coru.
unists to destroy the traditional patriarchal ties".
6. Public Instruction
ItEducation as practised in the past has been abrogated. Sch?-
ools _and educational institutions that had been conducted on national
principles and. western methods were substituted by Oemmunist schools,
characterized by a revolutionary and. polittasa program of action airline
at the individual considerinp: himself as a simole means and not as a
factor of civilization. The Russian and Serboo?Oreat languages have
become obligatory in Albanian high schools. The educational program
of politics, economics, history, and socialism has been adapted to that
practised in the Soviet Union, with special regard to the biographies
of Yugoslav and Soviet personalities wllo took leadine parts in the revs-,
olutior.s, National songs or hymns have been prohibited and. intonations
on the Soviet Revolution have taken their pitmen.
7. Agrazian Refoirm and. Expropriation of Land
The promises made to the Albanians as a means of satisfying
the demands of the partisans were not kept. On the contrary, they were
d.eprived of their principal rights. The Agrarian Reform was put into.pr-
actise, thereby ignoring justice and the democratic spirit. The land
was simply taken from owners who were suspected. of reactionary sentiments
"sleet. 44.i.rieraithsibuted ca."4041.t those who enjoyed the confidence of the govorn?-
ment. This procedure had. a killing effect on the bourgoisie, and gave
birth to a new ideological class. It was the mountain population that
was primarily and most seriously affected by the new agrarian reforms.
They openly voice their discontent, especially of the fact
that they were not accustomed. to the change in climattif conditions; that
they were not housed. properly due to lack of housing facilities and vase
feted unclue hardship; and. that they had been deprived of their agricult??
ural implements. The Albanian press did not fail to give the clatter a
twist, in that it prominently displayed these reforms as measures taken
along lines of extrome,justice. The objective was to gain the confidence
Of the population and to throw sand into the eye's of foreign observers.
But as with a3.1 other jugglery, these tricks perfigned by
the governr2ant were soon unmasked.. later ono all tarn products were da?
clared Its property of the state and. had to be delivered to the authoritoi?
tee. The farmer, having been left with inadevate supplies to cover his
own personal demands, was compelled to buy products at cooperative stores
and at higher rates than those paid to him*,
12. 3prossion of
4. The following infoltiation war obtained from an Italian
Catholic Sister who lived inthicoeytr, fox: over 2) year'', attd returned to
MAW in the Mal of 19149.
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A Survey of AIEIAITIA (conttd) Paco 36
B. In 19-, aftur the Communists gained control in ALBAITIA,
persecution of VI:: t; 'Ia:-.11.c clergy conmenced. The Communists, aco-?
ording to the abovertioned Jource: have executed or imprisoned the
following Catholic TrIgots:
1) Francisan Padre Anton HAPARI was &liven a trial in Tirane
and charged with being a member of the National Regency during the
German Occupation. In spite Of the intervention of the Catholic Aposta?
olic Delegate, S. MGR'S, in the Autumn of 1945 Padre HAPAZ1 was convict-.
ed and shot.
2) Padre Alfonso TRArai, of German extraction, was sentenced
and shot to death at Shkoder in August 1946. The reason for his executip,
i011 i Unknown.
3) Don KURTI, of Tirane, was santenced and shot after having
been accused of collaboration with the German and Italian Occupation
forces.
4) Monsignorc Vincence PREUNUSHI, Bishop of Durres, died in
jail. February 1949, while serving a sentence for alleced subversive act...
ivities.
5) Monsignore VOW, Bishop of Lesh, was shot by the Albanian
Communist Government for reasons unkno?in.
6) Franciscan Padre Gjon MLA= was shot in 1947 for having
disobeyed. government orders. (Type of orders unknown).
7) Padre Leke SIMANI, of 3oca, was slain in 1946 for having
refused sumort to Communist Partisans,
8) Franciscan Padre Frano Ena was shot in 1947 for having
alleredly concealed firearms.
9) Padre Anton KIRI was shot in 1947 for reasons unknown.
10) Padre Torn leil.C47 was sentenced to serve a prtion term for
having sympathized with anti?-?Cortmunist movement B.
11) Padre Mlhel MITZI, of Shkoder, was sentenced to 30 years
at hard labor after being tried for collaboration with the German and
Italian Occupation forces. He is now in forced. labor near Elbasan.
12) Franciscan Padre Agostin ASICEETT was sentenced to 20 Years
at hard. labor for having possession of firoarns.
13) Jesuit Padre Giacomo GLBDINI was sentenced to 10 years at
hard labor in the concentration camp at PUka.
14) Franciscan Padre Gasper SUM. of Thethii was sentenced. to
10 years at hard labor for having opposed Communist Government orders.
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PaGo 37
15) Jcsal t 31%;Iro IVOAPI Nark was sentenced to 20 years in
prison for roc.
16)
i-I,..
?3 11177L L!lc
unknown reaso.s,
I
.?" - 'r" 5 s tal p.zison for
).??????? ?
. .
17) Jesul..-/ r= jun F.A.J.Ti.ini.A sentenced to 30 years for
collaboration 1?'.1.7:11 the J.ernar.;3a.ici This pr erit attempted an
escape from prison, but was 1.111SUC3OSSfUl and. died. of the wounds receiv??
ed. when apprehended.
18) Franciscan Padre Cask ASHTA has been jailed for unknown
reasons.
19) Franciscan Padre injao mmai has bean jailed for unknown
reasons.
20) Luigi PICI was an Albanian priest who was known to have
collaborated with a group of rational connunists in 1947, However, he
was tried and executed by a firing squad.
C. The Source of this report estimated that approximately
forty priests have been executed since the and of the war.
D. In the Spring of 19146, the Apostolic Deleo,ate S. NIGRIS
was expelled from ALBAULA. on a charge of having resisted government
orders. This action was in aacordance with an Albanian directive which
grants the police a free hand in the removal of strong adversaries.
E. Du.ring the Autumn of 1911-6, the Albanian Government issued.
an order to close all Catholic 004.avoats and seminaries in the country.
On 20 December 1946, one group of nuns were told to vacate
their convent on a half hours notice, and. were allowed to carry with
them only a minim= oriount of their belongings, This convent, on Via
Shen Mehilli #3, Shkoder, was then occupied by the D.M.P. (uniformed
police). In view of this action, the nuns had. no alternative but to
turn to the civilian pc,pulation for hospitality. They were no longer
allowed to wear the garb of their order. The Franciscans shared the
same treatment in having to vacate their seminaries* raonasteries, etc.
Their monastery on Via lia3hington Shkoder (now called.
Corso ROXFIA. Diver), has been co:averted into a food . ratioting office.
The Bishopts residence at .5.11.kA7.er has become a tobacco
warehouse, The Shkoder parish house 101-7e3 as a school for apprentice
shoemakers* while the Jesuit Seminary has 13cen converted into a medical
clinic. The Salesian Sisters were also evicted and. their convent in
Shkoder, located at Via &TECO"! Shtjefea 4110 has become a physical train..
in center for the ?Pieneors:! oormurd s drens Organization).
movable assets of the Jesuit propcity at :Bn.A..d.?11.cianjore have been requiem,
itioned and are now statoopowned land.,
1. Among the ecclesiastical properties which were confiscated
by the state. were the libraries of the Franciscans and Jesuits, and
which were renowned. for their value, wore burned. The epic works of
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A Survey of ArIA./TIA (conttd) Page 3g
Padre FISETA, such as the tfLahuta 0 Maicier were also destroyed. Those
books were burned because there was no room in the Communist curriculum
for such conservative teachings. Tho Nasal= of the Franciscan Padres at
Shkoder and the Physical Institute of the Jesuits were also confiscated.
EFITle state and. d.eclared. governnont proorty. In additton to the above?
mentioned properties, the printing estal..)::ishraent of the aorta Irdoc
Io wn as tho nTipografia Nikajn; the tinpografia Zoja a Paperlyerien of the
Jesuits, and the nipografia Pranceskanen were all turned into state--owned
enterprises.
G. Visits to hospitals and. jails by priests are permitted only
in case of death or during religious holidays. Sisters continue to pezN.-
ff...%rn. thotr duties in hospitals but ar cora-IA-ale& to wuur strut clothes.
The em?vernriont has placed no restriction on attendance of the
Catholic Church, although. this practice of at church is considered
react ionary.
H. The Albanian Government favors the Orthodox Church but it is
rumored that a purge of certain elements within this church is projected.,
in view of objections raised. in regar& to the state's interference in re--
ligious natters. The head. of the church has been substituted. for by anima
other nan whose name is unknown at the monent. The Orthodox Church in
ALBANIA. is a national institution and, the government is expected. to proem,
tect her since its followers are the most faithful in their attitude tau.
ward the state. Noteworthy to mention is the fact that members of the
Orthodox Church simultaneously act as leading exponents of the Corezninist
Party.
I. The Pope's eximconnunication orders concerning Co .munists
have produced sensible moral repercussions among the population. True
to form, the Albanian press interpreted the decision taken by the Vb.tioan
as an indication of fear on the part of the Church,and the Albanian
Communist Government has disregarded tho ban imposed by the Vatican and
will not permit any compliance with the clauses contained in the exaecomrak.
unication order,
J. The following is a list of known Catholic clerevriern who have
been authorized. by tho Albanian Communist Government to pursue their ?co.-
lesiastic works in that country:
Padre Zef SARA.CI, a Jesuit
Padre Ernesto MBA., at Shkoder
Padre Marin SIR:AD-11 a Pranciscan
Padre Ferdinand :94L.T, a Frnnciscan
These priests receive identical treatment as the 6Loral pubm?
hie in regard to rationing of foodstuffs and. elothint.7), fs in.-';1:rost?-
ing to note furaker that approxi.raal;:Ay th.rtrse 1,0r of the
Catholics hold. government posituns, and arc) thc Pars.
ty. Other than Padre X.iuigj who W.s XN1 s1/4.ree nr,rao
only Sister Margherita GT= as a known Df :;he Alban:Lan
Cocanunist Party,
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A Survey of AL..711.1-12:. cont d) Page 39
K, The Albanian Mohammedans have also been subjected. to per,-
secutions, but within certain limits. They form the backbone of the
Albanian population (70%.> r therefore, the government is anxious to avoid
reactionary currohts a.a.;114-; ThsNy 110 ignored the ordinance against
the veil and for., havo their 'Mohammedan festivals,
such as the frBoiran j Vbfol.n. 11-ic wood.clay c7,..a.ss of Moslems, tha
tashi* have been affected, most soversza-y by the reforms of the now regime.
They have had to pay lica-.7 contributions to the state and.
have had to part with their movable as3etz2 which were nationalized. The
"Sheherlites", who are the poorer class, and chiefly inhabit the north?
western regions of ALBANIA, have civen Pall support to the Communist Govhe
ernment.
13. Albanian Political Parties in Exile
A. In the "Pre? ALBANIA Committee" the following parties
in exile are represented:
1. Ball! Kombetar (National Pront)
2. ALBANIA. Agrarian Party
3. LegalLteti (Monarchist Party)
B. Other parties in exile, but not belonging to the above
committee are; the Bloku Kombetar. Independent (The Independent National
Bloc); and. The Prizren League. These latter groups are politically to
the extreme right and philoweItalian, in accordance with the conception
that history and geography tie ALBAITIA. to ITALY and that without ITALY,
ALBANIA becomes a paralytic ethnic unit.
C. Ohiof 3ivipOnentit Of the Independent Nationa1 Bloc are:
1) Dr. /snail VERIALCI, son of Sheuclet VERIACI, Prime Min?
ster during the Italian Occupation of ALBANIA, presently residing in
Rone? VERLACI is undoubtedly pro-.Italian, and he 'advocates the
forhation of an anticaCommunist front, regardless of the form of govern,*
tient, Republican. or Monarchist. He has considerable authority and. finds
many followers, particularly anong the younger elements with wh.on he is
in constant contact. Consequently, he is much feared. by the present re-.
gine in A.T.ALN:A, as well as by.' tkc prospective candidates of a future
democratic governnent. The policy adopted by VM.LACI to justify his pros.
Italian sympathies is in substance as follows: rOne must seek support
from /MY because the Italians are the least interested in the deo?nationvo?
alization of our people and. the partition of our territory; the Italians
have only economic interests in our cotmixelfr-?- end it is to thoir vital ins..
terest to advocate a united ALBANIA!. Por those principles, Israil VERLAZI
has been made the object of attacks from the Communists. VERLACI has been
and. is still in touch with the former prefeet of police in V.rane,
PAPALILLO, an able politician, about sixty years old.
2) Marko, Gjoni 0,10117, spiritual head of the resistance
movement in Miedita (Northern ALBANIA) and prince of that zone. GJONI
advocates the formation of an united anti0-Communist front, and. several
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A Survey of ALBAITIA ( cont.! d) Pace 40
times he has cor,t3to'l_ Dcy MISURA, the most prominent exponent of
Barn Xorabetar; rv'llimre this. Ar.3 cording to GJONI, the
Monarchist JleF11:.(1. .b7 moans ufa public xaferondum
after the Cori-.7.4Li:Ls.;-: p 0 WC:Tc, rewc,...Lr s 11.j :posttivo
results WO1%,r n11?":- A LA:a ( C :If :C. 0:11 116 a6titio
itude of the I:pi:L:1.11 ::::-.C";ef:1 to c44-70 up1-L t3 11-1:03--1-
principles, allecidt...nr7 that this would. mar. nf the nrxaticnal
front,' and. place ICIISITP;$. in the "baciccrottnda ZLIKTRe; Is at prc.:scnt
al
lied with the British? while GZ:':YITi io entt.roly d.e-rotoci to tho
cause of AkIZAZTIA rwnd. docs not, EITprove of British intJrft.:roned in 4.1bane-?
ian affairs? Wan: is eonsidera by nany to be the raost sultable pers..
?natty to 'bring about the overthrow of the Cornunit inALBAITIA., both
as a patriot, and a practical man. Several members of his family wero
kfll anrinp.: an uprising in .A.T.O.ANIA. In regard to the Greek territorm.
ial claims on .11.1131.331.4%, (which arc supported by sone powers), WO=
tains an absclutcay uncompromisin(; attitude in not adzitting any tertu.
itorital concessions of any nature.
3) Professor rnest OLIQ,I, diuxing the Italian Occupation was
Minister of Public Educa.tion, rresident of the Chamber of Deputies, and
currently is professor of tAilban.lan literature at the University of Acme.
ItOLICI,I is the most educated and perhaps the most intelligent
in the itabaniari community in Rone politically, he is antic ,Comunist
and. prospitalian; he has no proforence betwoen a monarchy and. a republic;
advocates only a free and independent ALBAITIA. In this he is upheld by
the Italian oreign Office, which seems to give considerable moral suppw.
ort to the cause of an indepcmdent ALBA.171A, (withott, howc-bver, any presto
cise viewpoint on the question of .abiiiiian frontiers). Because of his
worldr?wid_e fame as a sch.olar, KOLIGIT has much influence, both in Rorlt
and. abroad.
D. The best known exponent of the Prizren Leaguo is Xhafer DM,
who was Minister of the Interior during the Gernan Occupation. =VA is
a violent charter, 'urging military action against the Oorrrunists; it
is rumored that he is presently organizing some gu.errilla negionan of
Albanians and Ilaccdonians. /t is the general opinion that this is only
a bluff, for he tea little authority and cannot rely upon resolute inrs?
dividu.als..1 to the vigilance of the Its?lbanian Army along the Greek
border and also tho activity of the 7r..16c) e populaore (Comunist Popular
Mill.tia), which has many infornants anonc the ?1:o1nian refugees,: It is
known that =IA has made proposals to the British aad 11.7-ioricans for ob?
taining a supply of arras, 41:0477:, Wh 1.11 is now an Verzleptian cititzen, is not
on goo& terms with KL/SU'ilii, and. the groups of VLS.A.CI and. xoLig,I.
E. Objectively speakin6, these Albanian parties wore all created
by political interezta whi.ch seek: f2.3nt:cJi and.hegraiony over the Balkans.
Thus, the rations taking active lirteret in the welfare of the various
parties are as follows:
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A Survey of AMBAITIA (conttd) Page 41
Legal iteti (Monarchists): ENGLAND
Ball! r.ombetar (Nhtional Front): ENGLAND
Albanin.r. Agni-A.a/, Party: YUGOSLAVIA
Inde-oenaent National Bloc: ITALY (and indirectly the
UhIted States.)
The Pri zren League; ITALY
The structure of the above parties varies as do the foreign
interests in the Blakans, and it follows that instead of any collaboration
among the parties, there is only suspicion, intricue and. rivalry.
7. The Nhtional Fraat (Bain E:ombetar) managed to gain the upper
hand. in the ncommittee for a Free ALBANIA' when this committee was formed.
in Paris in August 1949, after a quasi formal consultation among the various
party representatives responsible for the policy of the committee. As the
dominant party, the National Front has been mostly responsible for the
policy of the committee. Within the ranks of this party it was 'believed
that Colonel Fitzroy MACIal,' N had reached some accord with TITO in regard
to ALBANIA. A few con.sid.erations bore out this belief. For example, TITO
had. given some signs of a plan, the principal aim of which was to bring
pressure to bear on Enver HOXIIA's Cominformist goverment ??? probably by
stirring up some activity on ALBANIA'S northern border. Actually TITO
delegated this task of harrassing the Albanian government to Serbophile
Gani KEYEZITY, head, of the Albanians in Kossovo and. brother of Saill KRY:FlatT,
leader of the Albanian Agrarian Party. (The Kossovo* ethnicaly Albanian.
w4.s.3..assIrgned. to )UGOSLAVIA by the London Conference of 30 MaylSal.7,,) This
MACLFAN accord and Koss, vo plan were later substantiated sufficiintly so
that the National Front modified its policy within the 11Committeetr and in
Albanian circles. Fearing possible developments of the TITO?MACLEAN accord,
and. fearing further isolation from the Prizren League* the National Front
toned. down its policy of domination and. hesitated in making sztycdtlear deo-
cisions and in taking any definite action. This has naturally hampered the
activities of the Committee.
G. Meanwhile, National Front exponents also fear that the British
may bring pressure to bear on ALBANIA through GICEECE, who claims a part of
southern ALBANIA (Korce and. Gjinokastre). TITO has had. his own troubles
and has not been able to do anything on the northern border -? not even
through the Albanian exiles. Thus, the Albanian government, fearing the
threat from the south, has concentrated two divisions along the Greek
border. In the meantime, the Soviet Union, seeing ALBANIA thus isolated
and encircled., foments disorders in Macedonia, promising and intending to
set up an independent I4acedonian state.
H. In National !tont circles, it is known that roads are being
built in ALBANIA with the purpose of joining Elbasan with the GreekreTugoslav
border in the vicinity of Lake Ohrid. This mi t De the result of a plan
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A Survey of Ar3A17:LA cont* d.)
made by the Sovi(
Macedonia. A1t"1:-,
the problem
were to suce,;?
_;
to defeat t1-.1. s i-0:t ? 4.
throu62, the southc,:l...,4-
the route of thr)
still exist8iotjji AL:die-L7.111.
been signed.)
Lc.
4
.1 -.1 ,
1. -
? ? V.S
?
.1
Page 42
jcin. BULGARIA end ALBANIA through a corridor in
s difii-nlit it wol.O.d solve
, ,,.,? by h.6Aio
-
7:4
198i'
1frlQ rig. n.
( ?
7.7r,1440
L Ne- don.,
C
\'? _
?t Sc
,
)0 1180
? fi
????-
fl /Jr/
t J
_)
rjr7
PESHKOPIA
411
Burreli 0
/e
LI r/ bade
DURAZZO?
:0
? pip.ra
Kavajai
?-.
cgEty
BASA
lyeqm
r
1)
(,1
io/en
Or 0
1/ALONA-
-V------
'7--
i'al"Cle ...i\ \
,1, rifir&li
...., .
) f'-', . n,
./10Clairt,04 ir? ????
6-0.,(2.,4 . ? ....
_sz)Lushy 3 ?
--0" .
-"S
,r. Perolo :
PAPA: rluiova .
, 9.U-ill. ? ? ? ?? ? ? ..2.:
ji3ERAT 2480 ?.
68 TIL Zaruc)?.
t).
Cif
?
110
0 1,..Shoi
..???,,-9/an/
0
.2020
? 1885
???????
/1
// 5
ik-1131'
1144A?..
Gramshi 5:
1203
Ballsh
\,
P?nrowo
Oro tr,o
:1978
so
Tepeiena
? 1596 :\
054,,vw,c1r-?
*..
0?
Himar "u81A. ARGIR?
C-Ar Ducal,
?-? 2050
\\\
?\\
.r.
ALBANI4,
,STThS
2764
2132
I. ay.
P ;-0 , '1 N
I F?VF.,A!-,TRI)
EF.(A-7"
KuRGI
KO 00V0
DID Fx A
Li U k 4:;:k.)
ELEASAN
SCUTARI
TIRANA
VALONA
1941
r--
s;AP IT AL
JN OS 3T TR')
(Iii, P;36)
PE RAT 1
( 10,403 )
KORGI A
(a2,807 )
KUKES: 2,03 8
( 2.00)
PESH KOP J A 2,151
(1,u0u)
DORA...Z.0 ,55
(9,739)
ELBASAN 3,549
(13,796)
SCUTARI 5,560
(9,909)
TIRANA 911
(30,806)
V A LUN A 1,448
(9,10G)
SQ .KM3
4 ,1 25
3,666
28,743
r1_1?7 I 4f
15 9,6v 5
r'..-?,431
1 9,234
46,666
3,4 91
9 u,243
110,447
160,929
59,160
56,607
1,105,903
DENSITY
,7
46,2
45 , 1
22 ,9
38,8
5 8 ,
31,1
64,9
39,0
38,6
X T NV; FIGURE EXCLUCES THE ISLAND OF SASENO ( 5,6 SQ.KMS) WHICH WAS RETURNED TO
ALBANIA AF TER THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE TREATY WITH ITA THE I SLA'VD IS
UNINHABI TED BY CIVILIANS.
.-2148 1899 czgradeci
..... ......." /1ck
0,:bilok
;1950..\
Vostophe,CCR I TZA
Bilish
.. .2584 0 908
.. .
Cerovode : 0
?,ix6 ' ''.. , ??? .... I
, a
1920 ?-. ???.0,,
.4,-, ? \\\\ .? 'Pr_
`Z.4')::: ? l:5,
.?
? `,,,? ? ?
? . t___,, ....-----
?... ? ? cr., a .
. . poi,,,..., v, r. y
1493
Mot., cwou",ci
0
\\ -------)
\\
r r '3 IQ r' ... Coioni
korrten, raj
A,. Po kilatrii0:-
alb
ASTRO
550
6ohowo
0
Delvina467
Sants Quaranta 0
iSttlArta
1601
1.411r, 'VG
I?
hontspol
?
854.
tft
mete(
????1..e_s)t
1671
I
))
I KU
154,-
NOTE UNDER "DENSITY", SUBSTITUTE DECIMAL
POINTS FOR THE COMMAS.
EXHIBIT " X1111
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