(SANITIZED)UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICATION ON THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1945-1946(SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00038R000500140001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 310
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MISC

?????71, ? ?
cl"lapter
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VaLl: OF :;ONTENTS
Pages
0.04,v0m 0,0=boubtoos vii
LCONOMIC AND POLITICAL CL1MAg: 19i, 1949 4)
la The Economic Setting in 1945-1946: France
F.?Ind the United Klngdom * 4 * *
The Changed
(4 ? (3 #
AdticaI Situation of 1945-1946
II 7!:?XECUTIVE ow AND TIT PLINNFD ECONOMY ?
Au"' ?
6-2.2
23-64
10 French and British Planning Contrasted C 24-48
2* Cabinet Hierarchy: United Kin dom 0 ? a ? . 48-59
3* Cabinet Hierarchy: France 0 0 0 0 ? ? ? ? 5941.64
III, PUBLIC CORPORATION AND EnCUTIVE POWER 65-103
la The Rationale of the Public Corporation ? ? (,)6'73
447 ;ompitriAson 0i Ten(41 pansi British Thooriee of
Public Corporations ? * 0 0 ? 0 ? 0 * ? 7182
. Increased Ministerial Jur15diction over
Govornmntal Agencies ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 82-96
31 o Ministerial Determination of Proportq Pi hts
..?
In the United Kingdom a . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 964*100
..), The Public Corporation and Executivo Power:
4.1
An Appraiaal u ? ? * 0 ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? 0 0 ? ? 100..103
TV, THE BEITISH EXECUTIVE AND DELEGATED LEGISIATION 104-131
1* The Constitutional Problem Created by
Delegated Legislation ? ? a, ? ? ? 0 1054.108
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1,4
1,
1
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R
STAT
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied
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Chapter Pages
Exceptional Delegation in Becemt Legis-
lation ? a0 a 0 0 0 0 G ? 0 a 1084.411
* The Executive and the Statutory instruments
Committee 0 0*** 0 0 0*,??? **0 111-131
Ikr4 PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE Alir EXECUTIVE POWER:
UNITEP KINGrom, '945-1949 0 0 0 0 . . . ? . . 132-161
10 Modification in Parliamentary Procedure Q 1324"451
.-)
Z-S Forllamentary Modification of Government
Bills ?**???a? ? 0 0 ????? 0 0 151-161
VI* EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM 1945-1949 a ? ? 4 ? 0 0 0 0 ? ? ? 162-217
10 Constitutional Rationale of the French
Republic o o o 0 000 e * QQ00400* 163t169
20 Constitutional Solution of 1945-1946 0 ? ? 169l83
..? 'Weakening of Assembly Government: (1)
Exploitation of the Premieres Status 4 0 ? 183?.188
4* Weakening of Assembly Government: (2)
Lack of Control Over Cabinet Tenure ? ? 188-200
5. Inability of the Government to Influence
the Assembly ? 0 0 ? ?00 ?000? 4 200-210
The Actuel Locus of Executive Power in
Fr'ance 0 a ? 0 ? * a ? 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 a a ? 211.411217
VII, EXECUTIVE POJ ER AND THE BUREAUCRACY * ? ?
?
218-240
1* The Increased Size of the Public Service
In France and the United Kingdom ? 0 ? ? ? 219-223
2* Criticism of the Civil Service ? ?0 ? ? ? ? 22k228
-A The Movement for Reform ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 228-23:3
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Chapter
Paget
111
vITT
4
HOW Has the Bureaucracy Affected the
Political pxecutive 2 , 000 000 0
w".4)11
.?,,L
CONC/USIONSV CO 01) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2411.250
10 Me 'Effect of Economic PInn1i in the
United Kirigdom * 0 0 OD 0 0 0 0 ??2 41-244
24 Tho Effect of Economic Planning in France 244.247
Political Responsibility and Centralized
Controls ?,00 ? as ? ? ? 0 a * 247'6.250
'"DPENDICES 0 ? ? 0 ? * 4o ? 0 0ffi 0
? * ? 0
:10 French Ministers Occupying Cbinet Posts
Four or Moro Times 0 0 ? ? ?0000 0
II0 Occupanvs of Economic Ministries" p 4.:1
rance,
Nov0 1945 .... Novo 1949 0 ? 0 ? ? W 0 ? ? ?
Tr!. French Premiers Since September 1946 ? ?
IV. D4cret du 4 mai 1947 ?????????? 256
BIBLIOGRAPBX 0 0 ? ? ? ? 0 0 ? ? ? ? 0
vi
4.
vi?
53
254
r2-r-5
apf
258-285
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PREFACE
Modern democratic governments find themselves
obliged to solve important problems of political and
constitution 1 organization la order to maintain an equi-
librium between the neceasity for prompt and decisive
executive action, on the one hand, and the ethical neces.
sity for continuous popular control on the other. Tra.
aitionally, such controls over the executive have been
exercised by representative leglslatures. But legisla-
turts were evolved for a political frame of reference
which differs from the contemporary one, and find it In-
creasingly difficult to perform their traditional functions
adequately under moLiern conditions. The concentration
of real authority in the hands of the executive in an era
of exceedingly rapid economic, and social change has ex.
posed the anachronisms of older Institutional control
mechanisms.
Modern governments are placed under increasingly
heavy pressure to find solutions in the area of public
policy, and through the organs of the state, for economic
and social maladjustments of a quasi-permanent character'
Inevitably, the power to search for and apply these solutions
has been assigned to the more flexible and compact branch
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tit
the extent to which older forms of contra
executive respond to the needs of contem
So far as France and the United Kingdom
the subject has its own intrinsic import
similar problems are encountered elsewhe
of France and the United Kingdom may als
ceptoral value.
To analyze executive authority i
1 over the
orary democracy.
re concerned,
zoe; but because
e, the experience
have some pre-
Western Europe
from a locus of operation in Southern Ca ifornia has its
obvious limitations. The opportunity fo personal contact
and observation of the actual scene has peen absent; nor
was it possible to obtain authentic mateials to support
research on all aspects of the problem. Working entirely
in the contemporary period, it becomes difficult to assess
developments to ,reach more than tentative conclusions and
judgments which may be reversed by tomorrow's events.
Because the subject of administrative adjudication, an
important area 611 related activity, has been competently
treated by others, that field has been excluded from the
present study except as briefly considered in the chapter
on public corporations.
30 far as possible, this research was based on
official texts and documents, but because the official
record has not been completely adequate, current periodical
an newspaper sources have also been consulted. The materimi
als have been widely scattered and it has been necessary
ix
*ciXtf4t
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L) mak6 14ie of the faoilitiew of a rauther of libraries:
The Library of the Universit of California, Los Angeles;
The Hoover 1Aibrar7 on War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford
Univeraity;.The Lav Library, County of Los Angel; The
New York Pukic Library, New York City; and the Los Angeles
lie iary Te ite..ff peraonnel of these libraries
hl?4b been most helpful ia the location of u2efu1 materials,
pa;lc.ag me heavily in their debt. T am also gratettu to
the British Infdrmation Services, and the Information Sorvioc
of the French EtAbasal In the United states for providing
aoces to documents and txixts not readily available else-
where.
STAT
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(.e r
NORIC, NE FOLITI CA 1, CLI KATE:
'0)11;
4.10.
201/(1
*./T.>
The 1.,/ 11-1, Co' ft?
Kdagdon an d were probubly the most'
7 1 4
oly.oescifu) examples of the typical economic and political
order ot Vestern Furckne in 19(34 7
, Zach of thew nations had
long
been hiz tori
ca.l1j nt1fied with westen po1itii con-
ceptions of firidiv.ual Vroodom, responsible governmsnt and
eccalonzie systems of an essentiallt
ccon.om
dent
.????????????Ok....M11.011.?
charti.oter,
had been inflicted upon the politioal nnd
Iundationa of prsu.W orid jar
II France an Britain
but the r.c-amework. vas basically unshak(an,
some respe ts the old order 5ed to he more secure
in 29;9 than previous4, The Third French Republic had sur-
vived c.-le anti-constitutional attacks of Ms.ur.t4s1 ActiOn
lerflucdse and Colone' de la Roccukt,oft
006...A.H41,619.1orp
11.1101V
4.44 ?.44.
40.1104004.40444 minor
de Fela.t
A.O.P1.04 Pftutpaifthin,
wa.SalimiemomIVIOMORIOIND
fascist
movement of the right ;; as well az the attacks of Mf.turIce
Thore2. end his Communistqz of the leftt. Until 1935 the Com.
1,1:1
unisto with thelr battlecry, "All power to the Soviets,"
hal demanded the destructIon of the Republic 0 The Staviskv
scandal of 1933, however, emphaeized the langer from the fascist
right, and brought about the partiotpation of the Left in the
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Popular Front of 1936*
cvne4vvrtel
lthougl the Popular Front did not
Ictladieres National Gove4nment of Defenoe in 1938
solaoa positiw force for the perpetuation of the old order
It united the country against the threat posed by
Hi 0/*1te German-jv In the United Aingdom? where the fund
mental consensus about tho political order bad not been. dis-
turbed ?n comvanapie degree, the soctial and c.00nomic pattern
ir2Leni''fictd with ecNni?aism 71em1ned In tLAe asceilidancy0 The
PLbollr) Folf.rty had not completely recovered
Mk-J-=Donald fiasco of 197.%).;,, and the
unchal:lenged.
Iron
th,6 Enima,8.7
ore rv t v dpawer
1. IhIFLeonomic Settila in l 5.i96
t...000?01?46
baJ
Prance tann the eci,77,1.irw.k. 0 In
....*MAP.OPA64.40.410,141.14.
4
yei.z.m of total wur Crom 1940 to 1945 brought latent
rn.nd ecoarimte. foroes to the forovound and Droduced
nwp,,
3'rob1.4=e
basi
charucter cbat it714.1ortnt changes
In the nolitical lu.16 economic order cou..1.a he expected In
wi
t? oP k 460 I.,
tb.(:;! United Kinisdom the binaic probleas to be dealt
e3sent1;:ill"d the same.
eret
a deti
internal eoonomic situation, re lilting from the physical
dredn ocetizioned by lp:ars of grindIng war; second, the #4.4,1
-point to whic the international economic posit on of each
c.ouT4tr'y hlk4
aunR; th rd, the popular eildeNnvement of a nostwar
political leadership espouBlng a broad program of collective
economic and socie..1 orgaraztlon; fourth, intorn&l. =dirlmtions
In the organization and operations of the party systems in each
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rizAion; nnd Idfths. the creation of a new international
tic$1U environment most as deltcrious in its effects
on domeatic noiitics r.L2 open var itself,
??????????4160.1.?
ome3tle.t, IZoonomic Situation, The F:rench economy
????? 40.110.0.? A 4?1?14?1614.4.1 .101~Week...o0"18~011~~1:11.
Nae
ProS triite In it7440
Detvecn 1937 and 191424 general industrial
I
production In 1 lance fell from an lru.ex of 100 to 'PTJ1v. Goal
productt1on2 for ex.axor, decreased more than one-third, aver-
k4r n ,.
TAII*OVic21.H.T civr4repclq0"'-t..1
0.1 ? a, ?
1.1
e
1,1 3. .3.
't S
pove r tos
py.:Infr4134.1
tionsp often
'They woreA wver
%.4 1.4.0 ;,4 es ;bI1h con..
1-11w,e.0,01.11-, lavoy.Iftteriba
n? ml:u thor
Intor.nr(-:t the constitution An te.Pms of gre6t4.r
1Dove:r.
J. rai S ti tt4 4..
wawa...A ala./..???.1.00[41
404..
Presidcnt of
(.1,1
e
it
441
Premier, In thc Fourth Repub-
wpwaaltsama.PAPM.A......?
the Republic chooses the Premier after
consultzt.tions (conzwitations dtusage) The latter then
?
4??????+, to0.14m1).00*.t. ~0.0 AW?10W010 4 0?0 11*?601.100.1
must pretiont himself to the? Azsombly for to procese of
ilinvestituroo invostiture or confirmation., confers a
334.3,
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1811
pc
tus on the Fret % -which. distinguishes
bis position from thr2.t of thc c2.binet wMch he forms, nven
thou& ..3.bse.uently the cabinet ...2,1so is subjecteil to the
scrutiny of the?
-er.st-Jects
scfmbl-kr
?r This
vvsLm doparts in several
from previous Yrench narliamentarT nrPot*rc(:4 and
te ch.,.:Al.F.cs it involves type of interest in :t sin; the
position of the Premier wit t: respPct to
Tho development boun with the lam of November 2
.1% prescrib e dcflnito legal procedure (re-
cruitement 'oropre) for designation of the Promierc Here
toforc undt7:1., thc ifools of ,14,3',r, the 'emierwp?.,c.t
Itnter pares.,?
,......**181.400????**Eamo** 4.14.0.11.***4*??*1.1.....V1***
He z]tild his colleagues INere directly
11).Lmc by the PresIdent of the 1%:cpubl1c? The 105 lam re
:wired that 1i be elected by an ebsolutc majoritlor of the
:ssemblw nnd, &fter havins constituted bis Government, that
he)4.ppear before the Assembl seconc time to obtain its
approbotion for tbe remaining ministers ancl for the pro-
c-ontemplated by the Government. The draft constitu-
tion of P,pril, 1946, went even. further In asrzerting the
stprmac:y of the Assembly,' Under Its terms the Premier
VEL2 elected by absolute majorit;f of the eLssembl $ by publi.,
ballot and without any prior reference to the desire of the
"cbief maelstrate," the term applled to the strictly ornamen-
tal president env isaged in the draft constitution. This
****.******4414.441444.44?40.444**444?0444*44**********44~444.44,444.444.4?00.41,4**********.******.******4...
-r2Journal OffIciel, November 3, IJ
...M.**????.********??????APINN?wie ememo~olorowemulmil*Mwroam.1*.
15$ Po 7159,
? .1
4
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election of
the Premier was entirely divorced from the
t1rr ?-1.0
?..0
Awfl,
LJ
4"
unk9
fml4rtlp
day
"" fie.te election, and not
1:41, "7,24 rt
of the ls:iiy,lizilative so.ssion? the
liT,S 1.#.1UiTL1dto rit hi nn irra If a icy
proa-
",
to the f.ssemhl. which had the prerogative a
A t- -
oither to accor0 or refuge its confidenco
Governmnt3 including
In contY'aot to
th.-13 the
? g
1.?1"""itt
t
*1.1471
newly elected Premi/Ini0
at" r",?1.1."4?. of
? j t.? cd
4 .4 ? ,jrI , 101.4,?, t Oft 1 41 073
of the Pre-
undex. the terms of
??
,...oria titution of S ,
Sp Introduoed an
tertor ser. lnn the orocess Prld permitted some defilnite
in in (ixecutivo power:, The Assembly retains the right
to fietormi?no 117 &13!17,olute winr..5.17 whether it
1
permit
the PremAer's confirmation, but if confirmation oocl/v11 the
r'recilier
not subject to further t3crut1nli as 0.re his oro-
osec,5 cabinet and program*.d.'
Ono ofVect of the modifjefttion in September of tbi5
element Gf the draft conetitution of April, is to strengthen
the constitutional position and executive alath.ori,?,y of the
President of the Council at the expense of the Assemb170
In. addition, the Wold with whIch confirmation surrounds
the Premier improves bie position In comparison with the
Constitutiqn of April 1946p Art o 770
343ee Andre Sauvageot? "Le cabinet Ramadier et la pr&.
ticrue constitutionnellep" avgg, olitiaue 21;41eFlementaires
Tome Clk;74IV, No 576, pp a arch, 1,04d).
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Of theA
Pre m...A.4.e: 11 n the crt'Ll-fct
4, ? ' JC. ???Cc'ince
cons titUtiOtL.
A
sdcnt o1 the
being otoprov
1 ? j 1- ?
e
1.1.6 2.1
2.86
practice did not separt 6 Prest-
Councll from 1113 program or
At ??i 4 A:a oLf
n.lae1.; ,111 three
liqnnw d ove at the V.-1X40 time*
???? 4?? % fel 4
now sntem was 41 4"
st put to use on january
y
A??? 4.06
desiinnto
before
dier 4) pp eba s?;.,.
. /
.0. ?
1,.rldre 17-.10 r?
crIer3 reportI tIscot the candidate?
fa ?41.
p
hLvfincrt been deignet...fl by
doplat7
1:7',"":4%0,?1?411"" Vtlert
Vincent Awoiol? arose
rein the Miniaters
I.
A.LS
not co11ect1v inistFlr)h.,1 declarr Ion but a
on t3.11:-; Ministerst
t
V
r41,111
???? .1.4,????
repdinu
,
it 1.-e,
si'Lt down alone
S-
en am
cit ong tvo rovs rtf empty se&J.,s0 ieg
frto likened hin ptlition to thEA or
j.USILVVr7 ft ? ?14.
OC.'.05 of thc
, ?
biz?.
infn concepttm of
i..-., 4i11?41?~4/440.4?ACKAPA.14.6. WH40401444111441061.0~4#0
confirmation by the ,Assembly
comvanleated
4?4,1r.
rc.C11.rt-W4A
of the mem-
Gov.:.trnment which he htld chosen to President
T1e3c were or-1mfocie
incorporated into E. nomina. 74 mi4
.?
r 'h/11" 3 IN 1 ,'"1 -et IV" "111 "er"
L. 4e... %; 4,1 ti t??? %a A.? cr
22 and trans/n:1 tted to the
'asembly* Pccopto,nce of them "hv the zr,ssembly on the same
-,/
1
:y
"4,4'
%'4+ P. brougL., into being tb te
uovt;rnment of the Fourth Re-
"n1.11-L1 9J1
.} 4,?
" ""'""".1.0.01.??????????.???????.?????-1.44..????????? ???????????A ??? ???????? ? ?????????????????????*~?*????????????????????????14A..?
-r-lournal
Ufficiel:
??????????461.4.6?041?0?1141......0441.0.1
debats?
:*
- "reulTm Renullilque a Itautrel nouvelle
"fAndre negfrled?
,e Figaro, January' 220 19470
ProceOu're. nouvel esprli,?
*WO.
'.0WW~4h4WIII1
'-7 7
Journal Officiel? january
1947, P* 919*
4
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j t
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? .4 ? ,
.lortinf'e of
f
La. Jcn iv
G. vernwent
Y? N'
t???"
I ,
A
,r? ,
?1.X41
?? ? 1 4'
.21-Ls of
r'tb61::-aunc th(--
n.
4 4 l 1". 14 C. j
A
1;1#...6. ,3?.. t??04????
fff i4:0.01 .1????????????? ?????101.6?1126?Noti?????????? ffiffn?40
4...1.40t 4
pz,-1,;.
tr??(-1???f?? 4.1
p1 ur-
or, ?
J:la" .
C 0 1;1. t
t
.1: I.' OM cIipci e 1,41
though one,
187
minIctterzi are rejotc:d or rosign. rn
, 4 07., iro V P.1.1m ter,:le,,lin11-0---,(.1 the
???0
four communis I IA
hPd votod
r".?
C. r; t, (yre-????????)1 fr.
??.t?
.P?r-thr
inst the Governmnt,n antt-
:sident Au:1:01 Tie Id tIencttc.rn on
after the
i t:rolitfoza
tt 1
???? ?
L. (
"te, eN 4
1.? 4 ?;... i?
Irs?1. IstY ;
1,t1-1,414.7n,Q4-10.4
?41.
.3. r1(..4 C.,
-
r'cw4;iicr
1..".inrt of
??? A ..;?Q
th municin
'stivm..771N
Cabinet
1. onz
not; n S on
to regi ter Ats sions ,iama6ler coatf.nu rArem5er an
7"
?_. of ...... mandr.,,te nine months old. Morflover:0 by
membc:rs or thc formcfr ce:11)5.not.v vhc close
Lis3.)c.1.te2ft
c:r
conni5tmble -.LatItl!de
4.71,verzi-; ?I,re
....la, 6., IS .1
11????????te????? f????????????????? ?, o.???????????????????? th?tP?l?PPA??? 0.-ACONIS ,C.0.1????? 00.0.4 ???? ....VA ?
.1,
er
)
14. or the text ol Auriolts decree
ippen1xIV
Premier does
May 4i947,see
.12See New York Times, October 20, 1947,2 p4, 2, for an
account of f,herGarAil -7c to r:tesj tbE.4 municipal elect/OM
0", "r
. ? ? 'NI ? ? The t r . r?I' " 1 r tn rice of the IT- ; L1-16 4:1, c?fr ? v
rs
vis otb/ni 3t1Lgrollps was sr, great as to destroN4
Cab A ne t 1 3 c idence in itself as the collectIve agency of a
raajari t.7 of the Arh3ambi-j- deputies*
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r
? k4, ? .3
ri 4
0- tin t1oj.ort for" Athe p031 t 4., ?,-11
rt
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.kome.1?-= attainabl
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only by ,1,...132o1ute
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1111174.
r V 0 4t; :AZ Pa
:????
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4.4
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On October
e.An
t.q.flkLt WeQk0
$
t_
,ei? -441
The Aasemo It-
P - tion ? ?
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CXIf
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- ?
ro
,
jr1.1 .1r.
r IM ?4
.71 ? J 4.2 ?
a
e r!'rkrt:
(V
nezt Premier
1,7*\hr
;11 cf:i! a
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ts....t.t.
-.4 1
F, ram a a W r C 4. C 1..Z.Vt ' nciC; 22 vot C.: -3
,E). el 1
P.-7- t
a ? t
L.fr
k e net* of 1\33 eZ11_._ iv, GO Verrailerit
(a)
c,ViVevseir14.4.0 .4.*Iapro ? 46???????????1?410.0.4?4611711.~?????????? ?Or??????????111,,C11001dtre0.011014.
? 4 C
4.. 7T1
- t J.? v(-1 rin tiexture
worw..,,r;eokeirwo snr~.srooritemobp,,ihroMes.A; $rostoilf11161,111,were.ankwoo
ember J1
0 ell. or
1?,1.11,01?7?11?4???.7? 0??????14.,(1.
From the first de Gaulle rog1m4 vhich be
1944, to the second Bicault Gouernment6 inaugu-
rated on October 28,, 1949 ten men have served al5 Promier
4.'"ul."0....m.wit.Pkt.usso.ormas.p....br,expwassa?vir,....4.scroxisluirssos...,??P????N?060????14?WWW??????4?01.11,4?????????
Journal
4~,WM..0,M44011.A7.1.6110OPPOSA,
Officiel, October 71
4??????.~0?7??C?P.1?4?4,??????..411
1947.
4.1.?
on the same day the Assembly fixd the absolute or
"constitutiorlal" majority at 309 votes o This decitiion vas
taken on the basis of the actual number of deputies rather
than the luical number*
t
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/05/09: CIA-RDP82-00038R000500140001-2
(
of
33azt
fvanee,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/05/09: CIA-RDP82-00038R000500140001-2
three of
tImes
P
n
vtAt....1 01
re :,34ticn
,
tetri k.A4 C e 9
but onai
C3bints. have been
*410.tr
In the case of the Sauman cabinet
no confldi beenoe-
cause of ab met
The NF.Ltion1 Assevibly has thus
ha.A.-d17 con-
t4polled the tenure of the French Lremlor as tbeg constitution
intonded:.,
n
4.1.?
docIsions
about cbnet r=r1
hT,:i been made In th, cabini?t itself,
,inuation us-
Thic Tuo de OtJulle Ministries, When General Ohara S
MOV?????0041101?~1?0111Pfh." 1.44041104.14.~rome.~1Net...~tatbor.?
e Ci au .1 Lie
reeigneia
in November, ,19P:5, 4.4,s Presiaent of the
?rovisiom!1 Governmnt aad Premier he was mrely exercis-
in? f. form of courten, freein the newly elected Gonztituont
Asaembi-y from -171y mored obLIgation to continue him in efficel
reeig-
aithollgh his Pe-election wa,s nimost assured, 42
nation vas a brillient move politic-all'd, eince the Con-
t, n t
..,
' PIL ?"". mvi I ?-? 0 ? P (")
Cl.:1 ,,L bringilk 0 ?.t. kw. LS,. t.) t? e e.
?
by unanimous decision., to c3rry out a program which
47
fr%
11,,
_ one ofrogressive nationalizationen'''
1-*uring Gaulle's second experienscm t?s h4T.,:1 of
the ProlOs:ionaI Government hi views of executive power
clashed sharply with those of a malority of the lissembly,
When deGfiAulle daoided upon the tactical move of riuttinz
the .:uestion of confidence In the matter of military credits,
the disagreement about how much nover the executive should
P.V.44.444.444?~414?44.041/44.44440.14441144?11.14?444.144444444,-.44?44.4.444.4.44444"...444....."'""1"."".."4".'
"t4.0e, r", nxf
.1.44 York _times,. November 7 vot:
A p* -Luo
vio0a014$4??????????0? ?4600110110`di.vio?OrSani.
1,cv.
4T"^"NO
....orimorooso
York Times, November 24
19
p*
4t
?
???
it
Ii
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/05/09: CIA-RDP82-00038R000500140001-2
1 oLd l'.1.1.1.rdi v.t 4 .tat
, 0
n a.n..Ar3 allquAretit
??? G.
dettuties
of ce:mfide=e de
trO'Wf?, -01,:K)fl
vote cred1te4
1..ae Gene:,
Views but
?.
1
contended tbat In putting
ullt?t bad exceeded the
xr.f
the ,.-oles ticn
tut-o11 t v
t 0rt-and a? *
r f3 Pu* al to
not he ex.y.z.5-tmed az a 1ack or cortfidenc,e
lizas terreoorkr1.1",
A
eucceasfu.A. in rintj.ninr
suddenly on, Jam:Larry 20$
URS narent17 nnother tactical move wbiah he 074pected
would enbanGe.
diffle111L
the ?moment
tt,1
e.41 C
WPS not
Lat1 ono
1.?t?
41:
0-% .
pu t 'n
"
4 4...11t:. ,?rommunisto
it 1,7
%.014, 1.0
.1 4- 4 on
A
tt.?o
ittI401,..740.4,v1
of de G110
P1,70t1
? op., Nfr
In
In any part appeared, tc./A?
114).
hi.lve, the .6..11 t
t?P ? IV
- ??)
t ;41 er11.0 114:, "
2. a
AZ, 4
?
46
Pe GJLie
cfaled baak by aeciAmntion after his second resia.,-
but
brc
t about
A
t t#..1 CP.A.;ir that
the ection,
the Assemb17-0
Esiglizat12.2a. for 1,41.(1.4c of Mandate?
1/64.1." Gouins de
MMEN.440.04, 1 LUEUarifainisok 160411000001101PINVOW.pillopielp
GalAlle*t4 ,5ocia1i3t succez%ors reeigned in circumstancvs
resembling
thoso of de Gaullels
V 4
t 6iU3tiOLfl, Gouln
?
'soma PremAer-PT.Psident during the periou of the first Co*.
3
ti tient I aeIj?
when he resigned
He was not under any
the
1()givitiwAlfir troessure
a
first meeti the seGond Con-
stituent Arzusembly on Juno II, 1946, nor was any
crisiz immed-
lately ?atic014,kted, TIm Communiatss in facts indicate(
4411,1,ty
yorli.: Tittles
Idez?
January 0, 1946,
Timetss ?Textuary
1)
1946,
P.
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Pope ia:!
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.1, Or the
1)-
r-plod
.191
Gouln Government ow.q1 that. of Mdault?
CRbInet Lir?ttded by rine,
71-:epublican Ge o: 131.dault announced on November
?
td a
..at 1.
resign t tho first
Assembj't, on Nowmber 23 because Bidault
t.f e
An end. The Assemb:14 did not ex-
withhold its e"Ir-411(zortee 1ne thai- :nueStion uns
noL :oalsed, (...ithough Bidault subsoquentiv failed of
az 4
PrOVASiOnal Premier, - Leon Bluzi, the t 1n-
-'1.u.47.iildier? took the ponition only 'with the understanding
t h would reiF-sn in J&nuarv .391,7 0
rill 2.i ir.`? r
???
??44?01????)***?? 4,0?;.4.0.4.?????tab.r.ro??????????...4
Pala flamax1J3r f.;onducted a
'
4.0
c-r2r."4-0).er, 19495 the political
e*? Radicals, Popular
Republicans and Socialists, Ipalich up to that time ha41 kept
a republican regime in oporation in France, appeared to be
perilously close to permanent eclips. The principal dif-
ficulty, in 1.WAit_on to danger from the extreme pigbt and
left, was rooted in the unfortunate effects of manipulation
of executive position and of government policy by particular
party leaders, the same on partici ating in each negoti
ation for & new cabinet* In the midst of the crlsis of
October, 1949, the newest Promier-designato, Georges Bldault,
inaugurated a tactical technique which has the practical
effect of rendering unnecessary the second appearance of
the new Premier before the Assembly to secure the approval
of the latter for his ministerial choicei. Bidault simply
framed hls cabinet before appearing for confirmation. The
s.
4.
IL
tr
41.
4.
?Ii
4.
?11.
le
'
"
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/05/09: CIA-RDP82-00038R000500140001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/05/09: CIA-RDP82-00038R000500140001-2
lys.t
R14;,SCA n4 " and th0
enjoys the distinction of havin
199
ssellibly, Henri
been Premier of
the Fourth French Republic longer than any other during the
years 2945-1949. He resigned of 1-14
own
1,CACI.
tx
;r a1iot thirtuen mo;f1.4.4.1.8 In office;
zccord on Oqober
k?7t. dic!ogreement Idth
his Soc:
allst Minister of Labors Paniel
Mrsyer, over wage increases* The Awsembly was not in seasion
tat the time of the resignation 4u.nd was not consulted*
TF.w.ticai Innow;.tion of Bidault, After the
r??????40.0.1.4.141?.0.0.00.01.0. in.o.o....4.41??? ? ..ot amo
faillires of Moth .1d Mayer in October, l9492v the po..Itical
clomblnation or the TM.Th Force, 10 et, Radlcalsp Populztr
Republicans P,nd Socili t Tabicb up to th0', t..stie. had 14ep,?
republican regime in operation in France, :vpeared to be
perilously close to permanent eclipse. The Princin-aa dif-
_
acuity,
A .1.n zAddition to danger from the extreme rigtt and
left, was rooted in the unfortunate cfrects of mrinipul t ,n
of executive position and of government policy Iv particular
party leaders, the sam ones parLici)ating in each negoti-
ation for a new cabinet* In the midst of the crlsis of
Octob41.N, 1949 the newest Promier-designate, Georges 5dault,
inaugurated a tactical
technique which has the practical
effect of rendering unnecessary the second appearance of
the new premier before the Assembly to secure the approval
of the latter for biti ministoriaI choiceti. Bidault simply
framed his cabinet before appearing for confirmation. The
Ikoiliammemmawmarairaiwormommarammanamol000mm""460.~famodeme"~".".."""."6"...."."'
,
Oa
le
? ?
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/05/09: CIA-RDP82-00038R000500140001-2
result was the
F3ficlault oi
1.t would.
cedure of
ourinw
(lAtion in
wb,ch w.-"ts
e6use thL
1949,
ansver as
the
PTar".
--woott?
to .2-P.7
appear
?rr
200
successful confirmation vote for
onINJ V
Commurists voting against
that this partial return to the Dm-
Third Renttli
years .1:9
may alleviate labat came to be
45-l949 a Gomewhat super1,1. vs i'%1m.L1.
4o.
c-xecutIve-legialatf,ve relationshipp albeit one
intended
to strengthen the executive pos,tion4,
VAZ r31..)sucQes b rate, sful, at any ra f-'"3 to
f,
intrDduction of a bill in the Assemhly on October
t 0 rte,.k.-0 12; e procethlre p?.1)rmancInt4, The definitive
whether the Premier is tied more clo,zely to
the fate of the vbinet by reason or virtual joint confll
1411V
J.4-441.
?
()Ti i$s t to be :eached,
irubilit
of tho Government
to Int uen"(;#7rie
The practicen -which tended to weaken Assembly con-
troi ofe4eautive.? power in l95i949.3 devoloped concurreway
vith arl,othr aet of condltiQw which ter Ed to restrict the
infillence of
Premier nd hie Cabinet over the Afieembkty?
These condltione imluded (1) the presence of a large oppo2.
bloc in the Assenibly that vae not congenial to rPpub-
11 can 1.r ti tutl o,ns
and vbicta
a 001180 e. ruerwel
deliberately to emb re
arss the Cabislot whenever ponBible;
(2)
the essfqltially negative character of the Government
coalitions wbose $1.1ppolt of Governments wan only nominal for
ri
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tAJV
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/05/09: CIA-RDP82-00038R000500140001-2
mr:Ist par t
(-4;\
? fi-%
,c rdorc?:' t rfic
"i?it,T,Ct
imtabiIity ofcabinets, ,,9evei-vel
long eno Ligh to de ve lop in d
roltAtf,a40-,Ip 11 1 th the A eib 6!ind ( )
the new .:,!4.11d pecull4Lrly "un.Frenal? party discipline 'which
prow:,
o
rgLc that Governments mtlx. $el.dom 0)1, to
Txnetrl.i,t it in thc inthrekit of natiomi un1.ty0
ThG ti an the r asrun le Ok ti, on
0 The
ardobmiawoor owwpwrim
e4 =1I' v. P'
' J.-At:111r, I F (
" L *
,?0.4o 4.44,14
part?-ytn 71'
In 41. " .19
It
4.1S,t,r rec.; t14 4'
11?? ? + ? AN1/4. kut?
t oL irs. c. zf 1.1.11fli and one-half
-, ot. .
rai 1i1en votes ift the, g&ne r;.11 c91ect1ons to the Natiorizi
.;:sscrmol3 in the f 1946 and captured 11Iev,ittm The
Commuxd. t. rt x fncutIn s loyal to Prrc 1te rine;
of' I 1.n. rcorc Jur tag, the four jarz under 2 'Ludy it lee..der
hclELuri.c flOXE.
pub 1 c 1-y
,.., j3 is.gd
fIQ rn to asnist
tho Sc)viet Union ls troops If they should invade Fruncle?-/
4 ?
11" 34 t:1 113 C. el. to..,/,') r .1".11Z22.0 1,1) or cny
V XV ria.
) lie J. Ant0 11.1e1;21L?N r 1 r, Fr,..;, net- t 1v5 -Yib 1 17 ter
or the four Gomm-ads tminis t erF.,1 in the; Ram,dier
I.. re.
iii Msmizisei which wa2 ecadorteld
GovernmiPnt on M6y 4k
both by the President of the :,Aettublic .51x,Id by licanalierts own
c,...?? ?
Pe.rtN The %maxaltist N:rty of Fr 11 'Lsaace tried 1
ow 3 446
thsyugh illwocceasfullit to wreck Mersheal Plan aid through a
general Itrike In 1947059 in e ?arts :speech r?portecal.y made
'Se extract of his statement of February 220 1949,
reproduced in the New York Times, February 21.
19490 p. 1.
5 9NPIg York Time October, 1947.
Various i3SUCS*
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.0'11
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by Thorez on February 60
accelerate the usbotage
by u4ircolt
10
9, be directed the Party to
f Fxreb national defense efforts
to the tactics of
ttmass battleo" it expressed
discontent and oz)position toward the Government of the
Fourth Republic hr inteneifying and supporting every element
ov resistance to public authority that occurred in other
groups*
the
far ras constructive participation in the work
National
Assembly vas concerned, the Communists were
necessarily considered peraona nonzz.y.L.tt. by other parlia-
mantar?) gnourts,
the opposite ex.treme from the CommunIste was
another threat to parti government labial Leon Blum identi-
fied as "Caesarismen This was the Rassemblement du Peurlo
T;Iv4nrials of ChtLrlea de Gaulle, i group whose leader at