IMPROVED SOVIET READINESS POSTURE ON POLISH-SOVIET BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81T00380R000100970001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
Imagery analysis report
~ Improved Soviet Readiness Posture
On Polish-Soviet Border (S)
Top Secret
Top Secre
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'DECEMBER 1980
copy 179
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
Top Secret RUFF
IMPROVED SOVIET READINESS POSTURE ON
POLISH-SOVIET BORDER (S)
1. (S/D) The Soviet Union's ability to invade Poland has increased significantly in the past three
months. Imagery indicates that since the political situation in Poland became unstable in late August,
seven of the ten Soviet combat maneuver divisions within 50 nautical miles of the Polish-Soviet border,
which would be likely to participate in an invasion of Poland, have been out of garrison conducting
probable mobilization exercises.
2. (S/D) Analysis of imagery taken prior to the Czechoslovakian invasion of 1968, prior to the Far
East Theater (Mandalgovi) Exercise in March 1979, and prior to the invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979 has revealed several common photographic intelligence-derived indicators which are being monitored
in connection with the Polish situation. These indicators were noted over a period of months prior to the
actual events. In all three of these case studies, units involved were upgraded with equipment when
necessary; units were deployed to dispersal areas to practice mobilization training; there was extensive
command, control, and communications activity; logistics networks and dispersal areas were established
and civilian vehicles mobilized; and airborne units were training for deployment. An NPIC report on the
three case studies is being prepared to illustrate the similarity of Soviet activities in each military buildup
and will be disseminated in the near future.
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3. ~ During the past three months, imagery has revealed evidence of all of these indicators 25X1
relative to the Polish crisis. The 46th Tank Division* at Slonim and the 51st Guards Motorized Rifle
Division (GMRD) at Vladimir Volynskiy (both category III divisions) have been augmented with addi-
tional equipment and may now be ready divisions. The 1st GMRD and the 1st Guards Tank Division
(GTD) at Kaliningrad and elements of the 26th GMRD at Kybartai were seen out of garrison. The 40th
GTD at Sovetsk, the 128th GMRD at Mukachevo, the 46th TD, and the 51st GMRD2 were observed
deployed in alert/dispersal areas, with the presence of mobilization exercise signatures evident.
High-level communications equipment was observed near
Rembertow in Poland, at Rovno in the 13th Army, and at Bagrationovsk in the 11th GA.
4. (S/D) Logistics activity in the western border MDs has consisted of regimental and divisional
outloading of materiel (ammunition and fuels) in concert with the readiness/mobilization exercises in the
11th GA, the 28th Army, the 13th Army, and the 24th MRD (MD subordinate). Civilian vehicle mobiliza-
tion was conducted in the Baltic MD, the Belorussian MD, and the Carpathian MD. This is normally done
simultaneously with the callup of reservists. Limited activity has been observed reflecting participation by
tactical nuclear logistics and fuel supply units and installations. In general, however, no movement or
dispersal of major logistics (central or operational) has been detected to date in nuclear, fuels, ammuni-
tion, or medical units associated with army or front units.
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5. (S/D) Unusual airborne activity was observed in the 98th Guard Airborne Division (GAD) at
Bolgrad and Veselyy Kut, the 106th GAD at Tula and Kostroma, and the 7th GAD at Kaunas and Kazly-
Ruda. Activity observed includes rail loading/movement, associated airlift activity, and garrison outload-
ing activities.
6. This analysis is based on imagery taken of this area during the past three months. The
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extent of mobilization training could be more extensive than is currently known. In the past month, the
quantity of acquired on these ten divisions has been severely limited by weather. Since E]
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247 usable frames of imagery of these divisions have been acquired. Of these, only 61 usable
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frames have been acquired since Elements of the 11th GA were imaged on for
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the first time in two and one-half weeks. Two tank regiments and major divisional support elements of the
40th GTD at Sovetsk appeared to be out of garrison. The 40th GTD conducted continuous field training
for almost two months in September and October. Also on elements of the artillery regi-
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ment at Kybartai, subordinate to the 26th GMRD, were deployed in the training area near the installa-
tion. Elements of the AAA regiment housed there were out of their sheds and parked in the barracks area.
The 26th GMRD is a Category III division and was not observed in trainin in Se tember. Only one
division of the 28th Army has been seen since On imagery of the 51st GMRD2
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of the 13th Army was departing garrison to conduct mobilization training (Figures 1 and 2).
7. Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 25X1
Soviet units showed signs of increased training and military readiness. The units then returned to garrison
and maintained a low or normal level of activity. This activity cycle was repeated several times before the
actual invasion. The initial characteristics of the invasions were the same as those observed at the begin-
ning of these activity cycles. In the case of the Polish situation, a high level of activity was observed in
September at the following units: the 11th Guards Army's 1st GMRD, 1st GTD and 40th GTD; the 38th
Army's 128th GMRD; and the 28th Army's 46th Tank Division. All were observed out of garrison. The
activity observed since at the 51st GMRD (13th Army), the 40th GTD (11th GA), and the 25X1
26th MRD (11th GA) may be the beginning of another activity cycle.
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Top Secret IAR-0329/80
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
Top Secret RUFF
8. (S/D) Two previously unidentified units near the Polish-Soviet border were identified during this
period. A tank division was identified at Grodno on imagery of
GTD, a category I tank division, which was deployed from
Brezhnev's Unilateral Tank and Troop Withdrawal. On imagery
to be the 6th
as a part of
ne jump tower
was seen being constructed at Vladimir-Volyni . Analysis of previous imagery revealed that an airborne
unit had been deployed there since at leastsk This unit is similar to independent airborne
brigades identified at Chernyakhovsk and Brest within the past year. Although these airborne units and
the tank division at Grodno were probably not deployed as a direct response to the Polish crisis, their
positioning close to the Polish-Soviet Border enhances the USSR's military preparedness in this area.
IMAGERY ANALYST'S COMMENTS
9. (S/D) Poland is considered vital to Soviet national interests because of its geographic location and its
extensive lines-of-communications to The possibility that the USSR will intervene militarily in
Poland to protect its national interests must be considered. The assessments for the number of combat maneuver
divisions necessary to insure a successful military intervention have ranged from approximately eight to 30 plus
divisions, depending on a number of variables.
10. (TSR) Figure 3 depicts the deployment of Soviet forces in Poland, Czechoslovak-
ia, and the western USSR which might be involved in an invasion of Poland. Training divisions and
second-generation bases in the USSR are not included. The USSR has 19 combat maneuver divisions in E:
and five combat maneuver divisions in Czechoslovakia. Only a limited number of these forces would
probably be used against Poland because of the Soviet commitment against NATO.
11. (S/D) The Polish Army has 15 combat maneuver divisions, 13 of which are assessed to be "ready"
divisions by the Intelligence Community. Eight of these divisions, however, are deployed in the western third of
Poland. Only two category III divisions are deployed in the east and southeast-likely directions of the possible
Soviet attack.
12. Figure 4 depicts possible Soviet objectives in Poland, likely axes of advance, and key
rail lines. The 11th GA in the Baltic MD is probably the most combat-ready army in the western USSR.
The 11th GA could probably be used to secure Gdansk and Gdynia. The rationale for assuming this is
based on the 11th GA's ready access to these areas. The 11th GA would also be the likely force to secure
the northern line-of-communications to The position of the 28th
Army in Belorussia suggests that it could have as its objective Bialystok with an ultimate objective of
Warsaw. There are three major airfields in the vicinity of Warsaw. There are four Soviet airborne divisions
in the western USSR, the 7th at Kaunas (which was deployed to Czechoslovakia in 1968), the 76th at
Pskov, the 106th at Tula, and the 98th GADs at Bolgrad. The 103rd GAD is also normally based at
Vitebsk in the western USSR, but the bulk of its forces have been deployed to Afghanistan since December
1979. The Silesian mining/industrial complex and the southern line-of-communications
could be the objectives of the 13th Army, 24th MRD, and the
128th GMRD/38th Army (all from the Carpathian MD) and could be deployed into that area in
coordination with the 28th Corps from the Central Group of Forces (CGF). The 51st GMRD2 (Vladimir-
Volynskiy) and the 24th MRD (Lvov/Rava-Russkaya) might initially be employed in corps strength to
seize control of the broad-gauge rail line which runs from Hrubieszow to Katowice. The 128th GMRD
could be used as a part of either the 38th Army, the 28th Corps (CGF), or the 24th and 51st MRD.
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DOCUMENT
1. DIA. DDB-I 100-UR-79, Ground Order of Battle (GOB)-USSR (U), Sep 79 (SECRET 25X1
2. DIA. DDB-1100-130-80-SI, SI-271273/80, Combined Soviet Ground Order Of Battle (U), Aug 80 (TOP SECRET
3. DIRNSA. NSA Message, 3/00/45349-80, 130004Z, Spot Report Followup Three to 3/00/44824-80, Sep 80
(TOP SECRET
*Extracted material is releasable'
(S) Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed to
Pact Forces Division, Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC,
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Top Secret IAR-0329/80 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
Top Secret RUFF
8. (S/D) Two previously unidentified units near the Polish-Soviet border were identified during this
period. A tank division was identified at Grodno on imagery of
GTD, a category I tank division, which was deployed from
Brezhnev's Unilateral Tank and Troop Withdrawal. On imagery
to be the 6th
as a part of
ne jump tower
was seen being constructed at Vladimir-Volyni . Analysis of previous imagery revealed that an airborne
unit had been deployed there since at leastsk This unit is similar to independent airborne
brigades identified at Chernyakhovsk and Brest within the past year. Although these airborne units and
the tank division at Grodno were probably not deployed as a direct response to the Polish crisis, their
positioning close to the Polish-Soviet Border enhances the USSR's military preparedness in this area.
IMAGERY ANALYST'S COMMENTS
9. (S/D) Poland is considered vital to Soviet national interests because of its geographic location and its
extensive lines-of-communications to The possibility that the USSR will intervene militarily in
Poland to protect its national interests must be considered. The assessments for the number of combat maneuver
divisions necessary to insure a successful military intervention have ranged from approximately eight to 30 plus
divisions, depending on a number of variables.
10. (TSR) Figure 3 depicts the deployment of Soviet forces in Poland, Czechoslovak-
ia, and the western USSR which might be involved in an invasion of Poland. Training divisions and
second-generation bases in the USSR are not included. The USSR has 19 combat maneuver divisions in E:
and five combat maneuver divisions in Czechoslovakia. Only a limited number of these forces would
probably be used against Poland because of the Soviet commitment against NATO.
11. (S/D) The Polish Army has 15 combat maneuver divisions, 13 of which are assessed to be "ready"
divisions by the Intelligence Community. Eight of these divisions, however, are deployed in the western third of
Poland. Only two category III divisions are deployed in the east and southeast-likely directions of the possible
Soviet attack.
12. Figure 4 depicts possible Soviet objectives in Poland, likely axes of advance, and key
rail lines. The 11th GA in the Baltic MD is probably the most combat-ready army in the western USSR.
The 11th GA could probably be used to secure Gdansk and Gdynia. The rationale for assuming this is
based on the 11th GA's ready access to these areas. The 11th GA would also be the likely force to secure
the northern line-of-communications to The position of the 28th
Army in Belorussia suggests that it could have as its objective Bialystok with an ultimate objective of
Warsaw. There are three major airfields in the vicinity of Warsaw. There are four Soviet airborne divisions
in the western USSR, the 7th at Kaunas (which was deployed to Czechoslovakia in 1968), the 76th at
Pskov, the 106th at Tula, and the 98th GADs at Bolgrad. The 103rd GAD is also normally based at
Vitebsk in the western USSR, but the bulk of its forces have been deployed to Afghanistan since December
1979. The Silesian mining/industrial complex and the southern line-of-communications
could be the objectives of the 13th Army, 24th MRD, and the
128th GMRD/38th Army (all from the Carpathian MD) and could be deployed into that area in
coordination with the 28th Corps from the Central Group of Forces (CGF). The 51st GMRD2 (Vladimir-
Volynskiy) and the 24th MRD (Lvov/Rava-Russkaya) might initially be employed in corps strength to
seize control of the broad-gauge rail line which runs from Hrubieszow to Katowice. The 128th GMRD
could be used as a part of either the 38th Army, the 28th Corps (CGF), or the 24th and 51st MRD.
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DOCUMENT
1. DIA. DDB-I 100-UR-79, Ground Order of Battle (GOB)-USSR (U), Sep 79 (SECRET 25X1
2. DIA. DDB-1100-130-80-SI, SI-271273/80, Combined Soviet Ground Order Of Battle (U), Aug 80 (TOP SECRET
3. DIRNSA. NSA Message, 3/00/45349-80, 130004Z, Spot Report Followup Three to 3/00/44824-80, Sep 80
(TOP SECRET
*Extracted material is releasable'
(S) Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed to
Pact Forces Division, Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC,
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Top Secret IAR-0329/80 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
Top Secret RUFF
8. (S/D) Two previously unidentified units near the Polish-Soviet border were identified during this
period. A tank division was identified at Grodno on imagery of
GTD, a category I tank division, which was deployed from
Brezhnev's Unilateral Tank and Troop Withdrawal. On imagery
to be the 6th
as a part of
ne jump tower
was seen being constructed at Vladimir-Volyni . Analysis of previous imagery revealed that an airborne
unit had been deployed there since at leastsk This unit is similar to independent airborne
brigades identified at Chernyakhovsk and Brest within the past year. Although these airborne units and
the tank division at Grodno were probably not deployed as a direct response to the Polish crisis, their
positioning close to the Polish-Soviet Border enhances the USSR's military preparedness in this area.
IMAGERY ANALYST'S COMMENTS
9. (S/D) Poland is considered vital to Soviet national interests because of its geographic location and its
extensive lines-of-communications to The possibility that the USSR will intervene militarily in
Poland to protect its national interests must be considered. The assessments for the number of combat maneuver
divisions necessary to insure a successful military intervention have ranged from approximately eight to 30 plus
divisions, depending on a number of variables.
10. (TSR) Figure 3 depicts the deployment of Soviet forces in Poland, Czechoslovak-
ia, and the western USSR which might be involved in an invasion of Poland. Training divisions and
second-generation bases in the USSR are not included. The USSR has 19 combat maneuver divisions in E:
and five combat maneuver divisions in Czechoslovakia. Only a limited number of these forces would
probably be used against Poland because of the Soviet commitment against NATO.
11. (S/D) The Polish Army has 15 combat maneuver divisions, 13 of which are assessed to be "ready"
divisions by the Intelligence Community. Eight of these divisions, however, are deployed in the western third of
Poland. Only two category III divisions are deployed in the east and southeast-likely directions of the possible
Soviet attack.
12. Figure 4 depicts possible Soviet objectives in Poland, likely axes of advance, and key
rail lines. The 11th GA in the Baltic MD is probably the most combat-ready army in the western USSR.
The 11th GA could probably be used to secure Gdansk and Gdynia. The rationale for assuming this is
based on the 11th GA's ready access to these areas. The 11th GA would also be the likely force to secure
the northern line-of-communications to The position of the 28th
Army in Belorussia suggests that it could have as its objective Bialystok with an ultimate objective of
Warsaw. There are three major airfields in the vicinity of Warsaw. There are four Soviet airborne divisions
in the western USSR, the 7th at Kaunas (which was deployed to Czechoslovakia in 1968), the 76th at
Pskov, the 106th at Tula, and the 98th GADs at Bolgrad. The 103rd GAD is also normally based at
Vitebsk in the western USSR, but the bulk of its forces have been deployed to Afghanistan since December
1979. The Silesian mining/industrial complex and the southern line-of-communications
could be the objectives of the 13th Army, 24th MRD, and the
128th GMRD/38th Army (all from the Carpathian MD) and could be deployed into that area in
coordination with the 28th Corps from the Central Group of Forces (CGF). The 51st GMRD2 (Vladimir-
Volynskiy) and the 24th MRD (Lvov/Rava-Russkaya) might initially be employed in corps strength to
seize control of the broad-gauge rail line which runs from Hrubieszow to Katowice. The 128th GMRD
could be used as a part of either the 38th Army, the 28th Corps (CGF), or the 24th and 51st MRD.
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4
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DOCUMENT
1. DIA. DDB-I 100-UR-79, Ground Order of Battle (GOB)-USSR (U), Sep 79 (SECRET 25X1
2. DIA. DDB-1100-130-80-SI, SI-271273/80, Combined Soviet Ground Order Of Battle (U), Aug 80 (TOP SECRET
3. DIRNSA. NSA Message, 3/00/45349-80, 130004Z, Spot Report Followup Three to 3/00/44824-80, Sep 80
(TOP SECRET
*Extracted material is releasable'
(S) Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed to
Pact Forces Division, Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC,
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Top Secret IAR-0329/80 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
 Likely objective area
Likely axis of advance
L~kely demonstrations
Rail He
AUSTRIA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
? KRAKDGV
ARSZAW
(WARSAW(
BALTIC MD
HUNGARY R ROMANIA
FIGURE 4. LIKELY OBJECTIVES, AXES OF ADVANCE, AND RAIL LINES
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
T O GERMANY
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Top Secret RUFF
GDYNI
GDA S
TO RUN
POLAND
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Top Secret
SILESIAN
AREA
CLtST COWA
KATOWICE
CARPA HIAN MC
LENINGRAD MO
1
MOSCOW MD
1
OCESSA MO
xP!c 1-0412
L1 R-0329/80 25X1
KIEV MO
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/11/10: CIA-RDP81T0038OR000100970001-6