UFO ENCOUNTER II , SAMPLE CASE SELECTED BY THE UFO SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE AIAA.
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RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
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Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 12, 2001
Sequence Number:
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 1, 1971
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A,~,,,,4, /' od,, C~'-- C-k_4_/ Vl:e~
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in
UFO ENCOUNTER II
Sample Case Selected by the UFO
Subcommittee of the AIAA
The Lakenheath
England, Radar-Visual
UFO Case,
August 13-14, 1956
Introduction
The following story-a second exam-
ple of the type of observation which
forms the core of the UFO issue
-has been selected by the UFO Sub-
committee of the AIAA for publica-
tion not only because of its puzzling
content, but also because of the mul-
tiplicity of, observations. The author,
a former member of the "Condon
Committee" (University of Colorado
UFO study team), discusses the case,
but does not offer an explanation.
The same was true for the first case,
published in the July 1971 A/A,
where the principal observers were
highly qualified professionals making
sightings in their line of duty. Both
case studies are intended to give the
reader a flavor of the observational
residue material which underlies the
UFO controversy. We hope he will
give it his independent assessment as
engineer or scientist.
On a pleasant August evening in
1956, the night-watch supervisor at
the Lakenheath, England, Radar Air
Traffic Control Center (RATCC), a
U.S. Air Force noncommissioned of-
ficer, was startled by a telephone call
fremn the Bentwaters GCA (Ground
Controlled Approach) radar installa-
tion (see map) asking, "Do you have
I pat
contact was lost about 15-20 mi. to
the WNW of Bentwaters. The radar
operator estimated the apparent
speed of the URE as 4000 mph; but
By G. D. THAYER tur
was the name of the U.S. Air Force
UFO investigation). At least three
separate times unidentified radar
echoes (UREs) were tracked by the
GCA unit at Bentwaters before the
telephone contact with Lakenheath;
and although these are highly inter-
esting events in themselves, they did
not involve confirmatory visual and
airborne radar contacts. A detailed
account of these first three radar con-
tacts can be found in an earlier
paper by James McDonald (FSR 16,
"UFOs over Lakenheath in 1956,"
1970, pages 9-17). "Scientific Study
of Unidentified Flying Objects"
(Bantam Books, 1969; hereafter re-
fered to as the "Condon Report")
contains no account of these because
the pertinent Bluebook files were ob-
tained too late for inclusion. The
Condon Report does contain an inde-
pendent account of the primary inci-
dent at Lakenheath, as reported by
the night-watch supervisor, not found
in the Bluebook file; this separate
report forms the most coherent ac-
count of the events at.Lakenheath.
Following a brief description of
the events at Bentwaters based on the
Bluebook file, the Lakenheath inci-
dent will be described here based
mainly on the night-watch super-
visor's account.
Account of Observations
The four events at Bentwaters
GCA (see map for plots of these
radar tracks) took this order:
1. At 2130Z a URE (No. 1 in
any targets on your scopes traveling map) was picked up on the Bent-
at 4000 mph?" Thus began one of waters AN/MPN-11A GCA radar
the strangest and most disturbing about 25-30 mi. to the ESE. (Note
radar-visual UFO episodes on record. that Z time-zero meridian time-,
There is a very large, confusing re- or GMT, is also local time in the
port on the Lakenheath-Bentwaters Lakenheath-Bentwaters area.) This
incident in the U.S. Air Force Project URE moved steadily on a constant
the transit time of 30 sec yields an
estimate of 4800-6000 mph, and the
operator's estimate of 5-6 mi. cov-
ered by the URE between PPI
sweeps (2 sec apart) gives an esti-
mate of 9000-10,800 mph. "The
size of the blip when picked up was
that of a normal aircraft target. [It]
diminished in size and intensity to
the vanishing point before crossing
the entire radar screen."
2. A "few minutes later," say
roughly 2135Z, a group of 12-15
UREs was picked up on the PPI
about 8 mi. SW of Bentwaters (No.
2 in map). These echoes "appeared
as normal targets," and "normal
checks made to determine possible
malfunctions of the GCA radar
failed to indicate anything was
technically wrong." These URE's
appeared to move as a group toward
the NE at varying speeds reported as
80-125 mph. The group covered a
"6-7-mi. area" on the scope. These
echoes "faded considerably" at a
point 14 mi. NE of Bentwaters, but
were tracked to a point about 40 mi.
NE of Bentwaters when they merged
into a single strong echo "several
times larger than a B-36 return
under comparable conditions." This
single echo remained stationary at
do
16
in
tim
as
t the
we
OP
on
co;
in
rep
thi
gat
ma
the point 40 mi. NE of Bentwaters Be
for 10-15 min., then moved to the La;
NE for 5-6 mi., stopped again for th
3-5 min., and finally moved out of ' he
range (50 mi.) of the radar at i his
2155Z. The average apparent speed of
of the URE group for the time it was the
as between 290 and 700 mph (58 mi.. in?
in 5-12 min-again differing from' at
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tion or deceleration apparent-the
changes varying in indicated length
from 8 to 20 mi., with stationary epi-
sodes of 3-6 min intervening.
There were visual sightings at
Lakenheath during this time, but
the reports of these are confusing
and inconclusive. Perhaps of greater
significance are the investigating
officer's statements that "two ra-
dar sets [Lakenheath GCA and
RATCC] and three ground observ-
ers report substantially the same,"
and "the fact that radar and ground
visual observations were made on its
rapid acceleration and abrupt stops
certainly lend [credence] to the
report."
After "about 30-45 min," or 2340
to 2355Z, the RAF "scrambled" a
de Havilland "Venom" night fighter
aircraft to investigate the Laken-
heath UFO.
(At this point, the account of the
Lakenheath night-watch supervisor
and that of the Bluebook report
diverge. First, the watch supervisor
says the aircraft was from a field
near London and was picked up on
the RATCC radar inbound from the
southwest at a range of 30-45 mi.
from Lakenheath. According to the
Bluebook file, the fighter took off
from Waterbeach RAF station (see'
map), which is only 20 mi. SW of
range-given as 50-60 mi. for targets
at 5000 ft or above. Second, the
watch supervisor relates that the
Venom was vectored to the then
stationary URE (No. 5) at a position
about 16 mi. SW of Lakenheath, and
that this was the aircraft's first and
only contact with any UFO. Accord-
ing to the Bluebook account, "the
a/c flew over Lakenheath and was
vectored to a radar target 6 mi. east
of the field (No. 6). Pilot advised
he had a bright white light in sight
and would investigate. At 13 mi.
west [of Lakenheath] he reported
loss of target and white light [N.B.
-this implies that the pilot had the
unknown on his airborne radar as
well as having had visual contact].
Lakenheath RATCC vectored him
to (presumably) another target 10
mi. east of Lakenheath and pilot
advised target was on radar and he
was "locking on." This target would
be URE No. 5, identified by the
watch supervisor as being about 16
mi. SW of Lakenheath. Except for
this discrepancy, the account of the
Lakenheath watch supervisor agrees
with the Bluebook file from here on
in virtually every detail.)
The Venom fighter was vectored
by the RATCC radar to the sight of
the URE, which (according to the
night-watch supervisor) was station-
BENTWATERS-LAKENHEATH URE/UFO CONTACTS
August 13-14, 1956.
1
2130 Z
Bentwaters GCA,
AN / M PN-11 A.
Not confirmed.
2
--2135-2155 Z
Bentwaters GCA.
Not confirmed.
3
2200 Z
Bentwaters GCA.
Not confirmed.
4
2255 Z
1. Bentwaters GCA.
2. Bentwaters
control tower.
Not AP.
Possible AP.
Not AP; possibly
same as No. 4.
Not AP; No. 5
could have been
3. C47 a/c at 4000 same "object."
ft over Bent-
waters. Appar-
ently same time
as radar contact.
1. Lakenheath
RATCC, CPS-5.
Ground observa- Not AP or radar
tions not confirmed. malfunction; may
4. Pilot of Venom have been No. 4
made visual con- from Bentwaters.
tact coincidental
with the three
radar contacts.
2. Lakenheath GCA,
CPN-4.
3. Venom airborne,
A-1. All coinci-
dental at various
times (airborne
contact when a/c
was on scene).
62
ft about 16 mi. SW of Lakenheath.
Shortly after Lakenheath told the
pilot the URE was one-half mile
dead ahead of the interceptor, the
pilot radioed, "Roger, . . I've got
my guns locked on him." (The pilot
refers to a radar fire-control system.)
This pilot later told a U.S. Air Force
investigator that the URE was "the
clearest target I have ever seen on
radar." There was a brief pause after
the Venom pilot said he had gunlock
on the URE and then he said,
"Where did he go? Do you still have
him?" The Lakenheath RATCC in-
formed him that the URE had made
a swift circling movement and had
gotten behind the Venom. The pilot
then confirmed that the target was
behind him and said that he would
try to shake it. Since no tail radar is
mentioned, the pilot presumably
saw the UFO behind him.
The pilot of the Venom intercep-
tor tried numerous evasive maneuv-
ers, but he was unable to lose the
URE, which the Lakenheath
RATCC radar continuously tracked
as a distinct echo behind the aircraft
echo; this implies that the separation
was greater than about 500 ft. Ac-
cording to the Bluebook report,
"Pilot advised he was unable to
`shake' the target off his tail and
requested assistance." After about
10 min., the first Venom pilot, who
reportedly sounded "pretty scared,"
said that he was returning to base-
because he was running low on fuel.
He asked Lakenheath RATCC to
tell him if the URE followed him on
the radar scopes. According to the
Lakenheath watch supervisor, the
URE appeared to follow the Venom
only a "short distance" as the pilot
headed SSW toward London [or
Waterbeach], and then it resumed a
stationary aspect.
A second Venom was vectored by
Lakenheath RATCC toward the
position of the URE; but before he
got close enough to pick up any-
thing, he radioed that he was ex-
periencing engine malfunction and
was returning to his base. The fol-
lowing conversation was monitored
by the Lak?nheath watch supervises
between the two Venom pilots:
Number 2: "Did you see any-
thing?"
Number 1: "I saw something, but
I'll be damned if I know what it
was."
Number 2: "What happened?"
Number 1:. "He-or it-got be-
could
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3. At 2200Z another URE (No. 3 BENTWATERS-LAKEN HEATH SIGHTINGS MAP
in map) was picked up about 30 mi. CP IoE 2?E 530N
east of Bentwaters and tracked to a 53?.N-
point about 25 mi. west of the sta-
tion; the tracking period was about SCULTMORPE
? Approx. Range of
16 sec. The radar operator estimated Bent waters GCA Radar
the apparent speed of this URE to be
"in excess of 4000 mph" but the First Motion to Here NORWICH n
(time unknown) Sint ionary 2
time and distance figures indicated ~
a speed of roughly 12,000 mph. All 5 ? 3 5m;n
the returns "appeared normal, ex- 1.0
cept for the last, which was slightly AK HH ATH / Stationary
10-15min
weaker than the rest." The radar l?---~-? 6 /~
operator indicated that the "[re- -
RAF STATIONI Approximate
turn] disappeared by rapidly WATERBEACH o Intercept Point 011
'
BENTWATERS 2200Z
2255Z
moving out of the GCA radiation CAMBRIDGE I 3.4
pattern." No further UREs are 'a r3 ~~_ Il -_
mentioned in the Bluebook uebook report `5 Lokenheoth UFO Firse ?-?----:
on the Bentwaters incident; and Picked Up Here 00102 1J IPSWICH i1 2135-21552
52?N
considering the confusion prevailing 52?N-' -; + ~.
in reported times in Bluebook re- 2t30Z
ports and the similarity of the e~?uin9 Wins
reported tracks and speeds, possibly oirea"O" at
this LIRE and No. 4, which insti-
gated the phone call to Lakenheath,
may in fact be the same.
4. According to the Bluebook re- EoNOON /~~jr
port on the Lakenheath incident, the
Bentwaters GCA radar, at 2255Z,
picked up a URE 30 mi. east (of
Bentwaters) moving to the west at
an apparent speed of "2000 to 4000
mph." In the map shown at right,
the track of _the URE appears identi-
cal with No. 3 except for the vanish-
ing point. This URE then "disap- + SI?N
51?N- i
peared on scope 2 mi. east of station SCALE:
and immediately appeared on scope -~ c Ic Rc
FO 30
3 mi. west of station . . . it disap- l o ttEES
peared 30 mi. west of station on ? XItAMETERS
scope." If the word "immediately" - l
means that the URE was picked up ?? top 2?E
on the same PPI sweep, after 180
deg. rotation from east to west, it
would imply that the apparent pilot of, a C-47 aircraft flying over less than 40-50 knots, the radar
motion covered 5 mi. in 1 sec, an the station at 4000-ft altitude re- personnel could detect "no move-
inferred speed of some 18,000 mph. ported a "bright light streaked under ment at all" from this URE. The
At this rate the URE would have his aircraft traveling east to west at watch supervisor called the GCA
covered the 60 mi. track in about 12 terrific speed." The Lakenheath unit at Lakenheath to see if they had
sec (6 PPI sweeps). As pointed out, watch supervisor, although admit- the same echo on their scope and
this may have been URE No. 3 from tedly skeptical of this report, "im- "they confirmed the target was on
the Bentwaters Bluebook report, mediately had all controllers start their scope in the same location." As
which is estimated at 12,000 mph, scanning the radar scopes ... using the Lakenheath RATCC personnel
although the reported times are full MTI (moving target indicator), watched this URE, it suddenly began
different. which eliminat?d entirely all ground moving in a NNE direction at a
At this point, someone at the returns." speed that they subsequently calcu-
Bentwaters GCA station called the Shortly after this search began, lated to be 400-600 mph. In their
Lakenheath RATCC station asking one of the controllers noticed a sta- words "there was no . .,. build-up to
the night-watch supervisor there if tionary echo on the scopes at an this speed-it was constant from the
he had any "4000-mph targets" on indicated position 20-25 mi. SW of second it started to move until it
his scopes and describing the track Lakenheath (No. 5 in map). Note stopped."
of URE No. 4. The caller stated that the position of this initial cont,-ct on The watch supervisor contacted
the control tower at Bentwaters had the map; it is almost directly in line local AFB command personnel and
reported seeing "a bright light pass- with the path of UREs 3 and 4 from kept them informed of the happen-
ing over the field from east to west the Bentwaters report. Although the ings from this point on. The URE ave altitG PP S E of tiic ur g 4ehaase 20QTTI~O should
4nC AgR?1a6~O0586R00010 064100''?-fi~waysl at made several changes in direct
September 1971 61
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lmost o
-
ith
i
l
the damnedest thing I've ever seen." sighted visually and by radar, the
The pilot of Venom. Number 1 meteor hypothesis must be ruled
_1 I$
also stated that he had radar gun-
lock for several seconds so "there
was something there that was solid."
Following this strange "chase,"
the URE did not immediately disap-
pear from the Lakenheath RATCC
radar. In the words of the night-
watch supervisor, "The target made
a couple more short moves, then left
our radar coverage in a northerly
direction-speed still about 600
mph. We lost target outbound to the
north at about 50-60 mi., which is
normal if aircraft or target is at an
altitude below 5000 ft (because of
the radiation lobe of that type radar
[a CPS-5])." The time of loss of
contact was not given by the watch
supervisor; according to the Blue-
book file the time was about 0330Z.
The night-watch supervisor also
stated "all speeds in this report were
calculated speeds based on time and
distance covered on radar. This
speed was calculated many times
that evening...."
Discussions
The interpretations and analyses
that have been made of this intrigu-
ing UFO incident are almost as
numerous as the investigators them-
selves. The investigating U.S. Air
Force officer wrote: "My analysis of
the sightings is that they were real
and not figments of the imagination.
The fact that three radar sets picked
up the targets simultaneously is
certainly conclusive that a target or
object was in the air. The maneuv-
ers of the object were extraordinary;
however, the fact that radar and
ground visual observations were
made on its rapid acceleration and
abrupt stops certainly lend [cre-
dence] to the report. It is not be-
lieved these sightings were of any
meteorological or astronomical ori-
gin." We quote this statement,
although these are hardly the words
of a careful, scientific investigator.
J. Allen Hynek, the well-known
UFO consultant to the Air Force,
wrote in part: "It seems highly
unlikely, for instance, that the Per-
seid meteors could have been the
cause of the sightings, especially in
view of the statement of observers
that shooting stars were exception-
ally numerous that evening, thus
implying that they were able to dis-
tinguish the two phenomena. Fur-
ther, if any credence can be given
The Condon Report in its analysis
of this incident states: "In conclus-
ion, although conventional or na-
tural explanations certainly cannot
be ruled out, the probability of such
seems low in this case and the proba-
bility that at least one genuine UFO
was involved appears to be fairly
high." The meaning of this last
statement (by the present author)
has puzzled some later investigators;
in this context a "genuine UFO"
was meant to imply precisely that;
there was a material object, it was
flying (in the sense of moving
through the air), and it was (ob-
viously) unidentified. Hence, the
conclusion that there was a "genuine
UFO" was not meant to imply, for
example, that the UFO was neces-
sarily of extraterrestrial origin.
In Chapter 5 of the Condon Re-
port, "Optical and Radar Analyses
of Field Cases," the analysis of this
report concludes with: "In sum-
mary, this is the most puzzling and
unusual case in the radar-visual files.
The apparently rational, intelligent
behavior of the UFO suggests a
mechanical device of unknown ori-
gin as the most probable explanation
of this sighting. However, in view
of the inevitable fallibility of wit-
nesses, more conventional explana-
tions of this report cannot be en-
tirely ruled out."
Philip Klass (private communica-
tion) believes that the Lakenheath
RATCC radar was malfunctioning
because of a faulty MTI unit; he
feels that once the radar evidence
has been explained, the rest can be
accounted for by either confusion
of witnesses or conventional causes.
The reader may draw his own
conclusions as to which of the above
"explanations" seems the most
likely. However, a few things are
worth pointing out in summary:
1. The possibility that meteors
might have accounted for these
events seems to be easily ruled out,
and it was so discounted by early
investigators.
2. Visual mirage is ruled out by
the large angles (i.e., simultaneously
seen over a control tower and under
an aircraft) at which the UFOs were
observed and by the manner and
directions of movement.
3. Anomalous propagation of
radar seems equally unlikely as an
over-all explanation. All but No. 2
p
er a
ng e
y mov
apparent
posite to or across the prevailing
winds, ruling out ground objects
seen by partial reflections from
moving elevated inversions (or
other layered structures). Such re-
flections produce false targets that
appear to be at twice the range and
twice the height of the reflecting
layer, and appear to move in the
direction of the prevailing wind but
at an apparent speed twice as great.
Thus the group of echoes (No. 2)
observed from 2135 to 2155Z moved
generally from the SW (exact azi-
muth not given) at "80-125 mph,"
commensurate with winds of 40-63
mph from the same direction. The
actual winds are given as 260 deg/
45 mph at 10,000 ft and 260 deg/
63 mph at 16,000 ft. Although the
reported stationary episodes of the
merged echoes at the two points
shown on the map would, taken at
face value, rule out the moving-
layer reflection hypothesis, there
remains a possibility that this may
have been the cause of the No. 2
URE contact at Bentwaters. This
hypothesis can be ruled out, how-
ever, for the other URE episodes at
Bentwaters, and particularly for
those at Lakenheath.
The "disappearance" of URE No.
4 as it overflew the Bentwaters GCA
station was mentioned in the Con-
don Report as being "suggestive of
AP" [anomalous propagation], and
so it is. The elevated-layer partial
reflection phenomenon that causes
this type of AP involves a reflection
coefficient that is typically propor-
tional to the inverse sixth power of
the elevation angle of the radar
beam (cf. Wait, 1962; Thayer 1970).
Thus caused by a moving layer, if
such a false target appears to ap-
proach the radar site, the signal will
drop below the noise level when the
beam elevation exceeds some critical
angle; the false target will often re-
appear on the other side of the radar
when the beam angle once more
drops below the critical value. With
a fixed-elevation PPI display radar,
this results in a "zone of invisibility"
around the site with a radius on the
order of 5-15 mi. in which the target
disappears.
Two additional factors seem to
point to AP as a possible cause for
URE No. 4:
1. Radar operators who are fa-
miliar with their sets will not norm-
ally report the "disappearance" of a
target unless they do not expect it,
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Going abroad?
..think of us!
The AIAA now maintains two fully
chartered student branches In Europe-
one at the Von Karman Institute In
Brussels, and the other at the Institute
of Aerodynamics at the University of
Naples. In addition, we are now forming
additional branches In Europe, Asia
and Africa. In order to provide more
services to these student branches, we
are establishing an International Speak-
ers Bureau.
We are asking all AIAA members who
are planning to be abroad during the
next six months and who are willing to
speak to a college audience about a
technical or general aerospace topic
to complete and return the following
form.
AIAA
INTERNATIONAL SPEAKERS BUREAU
REGISTRATION FORM
Return to: AIAA Student Programs
1290 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10019
LANGUAGES OTHER THAN ENGLISH
(SPOKEN)
I WILL BE ABLE TO ADDRESS STUDENT
GROUPS IN:
A. THE CITIES I AM NOW SCHEDULED-TO
VISIT 0
B. OTHER CITIES IN THE SAME GENERAL
AREA ^
SIGNATURE
w~?.ew-no MW an?=W
which would preclude targets that
enter the radar's normal "blind
zone" (if it has one).
2. The target was "lost" at 2 mi
east but reacquired at 3 mi. west,
an asymmetry that is possible with
AP but not usual with radar "blind
zones."
However, a strong factor argues
against the AP hypothesis in this
instance: the URE was moving al-
most opposite to the prevailing
winds. In addition, because of the
apparent speed of the URE, it should
have reappeared about 3.5 mi. west
of the radar on the second PPI
sweep after "losing" it 2 mi. east
(on the first sweep it should have
been almost over the radar, and
probably not visible to it) , so that
the "asymmetry" can be assigned to
the "digital" sampling by the PPI
sweep-scan display. It is therefore
most unlikely that URE No. 4 was
caused by AP, a conclusion also
reached in the Condon Report.
The Lakenheath episode (URE
No. 5) is even more unlikely to have
been caused by AP. That the com-
plicated, stop-and-go maneuvers de-
scribed by the Lakenheath night-
watch supervisor could have been
caused by AP returns, and at that
on two different radars operating
on different frequencies and scan
rates, is almost inconceivable. Ghost
echoes have often been observed that
will appear to "tail" an aircraft echo
-sometimes the radar will even
track a jet-exhaust plume-but such
echoes never stop following the air-
craft and become stationary, as did
the Lakenheath URE.
In summary, although AP may
possibly have been a factor in the
No. 2 Bentwaters sighting, it is not
possible to assign the rest of the
events reported to propagation ef-
fects, even aside from the visual
confirmations.
Possible malfunction of radar
equipment, and especially possible
malfunction of the MTI on the
Lakenheath RATCC radar, has been
suggested as a cause of these UREs.
It is true that a malfunctioning MTI
unit could conceivably produce false
echo behavior similar to that ob-
served at Lakenheath. However,
the coincident observation of the
URE by the Lakenheath GCA radar,
a different type, and later by the
Venom's airborne radar, seems to
rule out this hypothesis. The detec-
tion of an apparently stationary tar-
get while the radar was on MTI is
not as surprising as it seems. A vi-
brating or rapidly rotating target
will show up on MTI radar even if
it is not otherwise in motion.
Thus, none of the conceivable
"simple" explanations for the events
at Bentwaters and Lakenheath seems
to hold up under investigation.
Moreover, the credibility of the
accounts is increased by the number
of redundant radar and visual con-
tacts made coincidentally. The table
on page 62 summarizes these re-
dundancies, which are seen to be
present primarily for events No. 4
and 5 (Bentwaters URE-UFO No. 4
and the Lakenheath UFO).
One slightly disturbing aspect of
these contacts is that the Laken-
heath RATCC radar operators failed
to "pick up" Bentwaters UREs 1
through 4, even though they should
have been well within range. (A
target at 5000 ft, for example, should
have been visible anywhere west of
the coastline in the vicinity of Bent-
waters). Note that URE No. I was
headed almost directly at Laken-
heath at the time it was lost by
Bentwaters GCA. Of course, it is
possible that the radar did pick up
these objects and that, for various
possible reasons, the operators did
not notice or report them.
Conclusions
In conclusion, with two highly
redundant contacts-the first with
ground radar, combined with both
ground and airborne visual observ-
ers, and the second with airborne
radar, an airborne visual observer,
and two different ground radars-
the Bentwaters-Lakenheath UFO
incident represents one of the most
significant radar-visual UFO cases.
Taking into consideration the high
credibility of information and the
cohesiveness and continuity of ac-
counts, combined with a high degree
of "strangeness," it is also certainly
one of the most disturbing UFO
incidents known today.
Bibliography
1. Condon, E. U., Project Director,
and D. S. Gillmor, Editor, "Scientific
Study of Unidentified Flying Objects,"
Bantam Books, New York, 1968.
2. McDonald, J. E. (1970), "UFOs
over Lakenheath in 1956," Flying Saucer
Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 9-17.
3. Thayer, G. D. (1970), "Radio Re-
flectivity of Tropospheric Layers," Red.
Sci., Vol. 5, No. 11, pp. 1293-1299.
4. Wait, J. R. (1962), "Electromag-
netic Waves in Stratified Media," Per-
gamon Press, Oxford, pp. 85-95. IN
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