ANNUAL REPORT BY THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 95TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R003000090048-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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95TH CONGRESS I HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPOxT
2d Session J No. 95-1795
ANNUAL REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 3 OF HOUSE RESOLUTION 658,
95TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION
REPORT
BY THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
OCTOBER 14, 1978.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-008 WASHINGTON : 1978
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Hon. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr., D.C., October 14,1978.
.,
Speaker of the House,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 658
(95th Cong., 1st secs.), I submit the following report on behalf of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The report contains an
account of the committee's work in overseeing the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government, as well as the
results of its investigation into specific areas of concern detailed in
House Resolution 658. The committee intends to submit similar reports
periodically to the -House on the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities or the Government.
With every good wish, I am
Sincerely yours,
EDWARD P. BOLAND,
Chairman.
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY TIIE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
For the past sixteen months, the House of Representatives, through
its Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, has beeii- conducting
a thorough, ongoing examination of the intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government. This marks the
first time such a continuous monitorinm of intelligence operations has
been performed by a full committee ofthe House. In establishing the
Permanent Select Committee, (H. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 1st sess.), the
House charged it with responsibility for overseeing and making con-
tinuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the government. In addition, the House directed the Select Com-
mittee to assure that the Executive and Legislative Branches receive
informed and timely intelligence to support them in making sound
decisions affecting the security and vital interests of the nation. One
of the major functions of the new intelligence committee is to produce
annually a budget authorization bill for all the intelligence and intelli-
gence-related activities of the government.
Recognizing the importance of both its oversight and legislative
responsibilities and the complex and diverse nature of our intelli--
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gence services, the Committee created four subs )mmittees to reach
across and into all aspects of the activities of theitellgence agencies.
Those subcommittees are :
Program and Budget Authorization
Bill D. Burlison, (Democrat, Missouri), Chair ian.
Norman Y. Mineta (Democrat, California).
Edward P. Boland (Democrat, Massachusett. ).
J. Kenneth Robinson (Republican, Virginia).
Legislation
Morgan F. Murphy, (Democrat, Illinois), Cher: rman.
Roinano L. Mazzoli (Democrat, Kentucky).
Edward P. Boland (Democrat, :Massachusetts
Robert McClory (Republican, Illinois).
Oversight
Les Aspin, (Democrat, Wisconsin), Chairman
Clement J. Zablocki (Democrat, Wisconsin).
Edward P. Boland (Democrat, Massachusetts
Bob Wilson (Republican, California).
Evaluation of Per f ormanee
Charles Rose, (Democrat, North Carolina), CF: iarman.
Wyche Fowler, Jr. (Democrat, Georgia).
Edward P. Boland (Democrat, Massachusetts
John M. Ashbrook (Republican, Ohio).
To support the Committee and its four sub( )mmittees, a small,
highly professional staff has been hired. At presex there are fourteen
professionals and thirteen support staff. The staff acludes people with
experience in Congressional oversiglit, experienc within the Execu-
tive Branch in evaluating the performance of i telligence activities
and experience within the intelligence communit;,: as budget analysts
and technical experts.
The Select Committee moved quickly to fulfil': its mandate. Even
before the President submitted his fiscal year 1.979 budget to the
Congress, the Program and Budget Authorizat on Subcommittee of
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence-, chaired by Repre-
sentative Bill D. Burlison (Democrat, Missouri, began a series of
informational hearings on the National Foreign I. itelligence Program
totaling some 32 hours, in order to familiarize t).e Members in detail
with the activities of our nation's most sensitive foreign intelligence
and counterintelligence activities. Once the fish 1 year 1979 budget
arrived on the Hill, the Subcommittee began wha turned out to be one
of the most thorough examinations ever given -:he intelligence and
intelligence-related budgets. In all, some 55 hours of hearings were
held on the fiscal year 1979 budget.
Recognizing that one of its weightiest function; is to ensure that the
intelligence components of our government opera +e within the bounds
of our laws, the Oversight Subcommittee, chair( l by Representative
Les Aspin (Democrat, Wisconsin), in November ' 977 initiated a com-
prehensive series of hearings-many of them op, ,n to the public-on
the Central Intelligence Agency's relationship '-ith the media. The
Oversight Subcommittee has also delved deeply i :ito the CIA's covert
activities program and the mechanism whereby Congress is kept in-
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formed of such activities. In its examination of covert operations, the
Subcommittee inspected several intelligence stations abroad, reviewing
their programs closely.
Another key aspect of the Select Committee's responsibilities is to
consider all legislation which may impact on the intelligence and intel-
ligence-related activities of the government. This past year saw the
introduction, consideration and passage of the Foreign Intelligence
Electronic Surveillance Act (H.R, 7308) which established procedures
for conducting electronic surveillance inside the United States for the
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence. This is the first major piece
of legislation to result from the extensive hearings in 1975 and 1976 by
the Church and Pike Committees.
The Legislation Subcommittee, chaired by Representative Morgan
Murphy (Democrat, Illinois), carried the responsibility for preparing
this legislation for consideration by the Committee and the house.
The question of legislative charters for the components of the intel-
ligence community continues to be closely examined by the Committee
which recognizes that this would be one of the most significant pieces of
legislation ever to affect the intelligence activities of our government.
The full Committee realized from its inception that one of its most
difficult tasks would be to assure that the intelligence community pro-
vided high quality and timely support to those who need such support.
The Evaluation Subcommittee, chaired by Representative Charles
Rose (Democrat, North Carolina), has attacked this problem by pur-
suing a variety of studies focused on key aspects of the intelligence
process. A constant thread running through virtually all of the Sub-
committee's efforts has been the problems which have arisen from the
vast increase in recent years in amounts of data being collected,
primarily by highly technical systems. Processing and evaluating this
immense flow of data has presented the intelligence community with
certain technical difficulties and with even more intransigent man-
agerial problems. The Evaluation Subcommittee has held a series of
briefings and hearings an automated data processing and both Mem-
bers and staff have spent many hours visiting automated data. process-
ing facilities and in discussions with managers of such systems in an
effort to ensure improved management through more commanality and
less duplicative efforts in this field.
The full Committee expressed its concern over these matters in the
classified annex to the bill authorizing appropriations for fiscal year
1979 (H.R. 12240; H. Rept. 95-1075, Public Law 95-370). The annex
which is incorporated by reference in the statute has the force and
effect of law.
The Committee has also interested itself in a wide variety of other
issues which impact on the effectiveness of our intelligence services.
These issues range from an investigation into the steps the Executive
Branch is taking to protect the communications of both private citizens
and the government from being intercepted by foreign powers operat-
ing within the United States to an examination of the possible adverse
impac t on the intelligence services of certain provisions of the Civil
ervice Reform Act. The Committee has b een working closely with the
Executive Branch in an effort to develop a joint approach to stemming
the flood of unauthorized disclosures of classified and sensitive intel-
ligence information. The Committee has also focused its attention on
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the problems of foreign terrorism, international -arcotics traffic and
the entry of known or suspected terrorists and KGB agents into the
United States.
That is a brief summary of the major actions take-i by the Permanent
Select Committee during the past sixteen months. Further details are
provided in the body of the report.
The Committee recognized from the first that in order to do the job
the House had given it, an atmosphere of trust ht:.I to be develop be-
tween the Committee and officials of the intelligent + agencies. Without
that trust, the Committee realized it would have a irtually impossible
task in getting the information it would need.
At the same time, the Committee realized that n order to exercise
vigorous oversight over the intelligence activities >f the government,
there must, of necessity, be an adversarial relati nship between the
Committee and the intelligence agencies.
One key element of the relationship of trust w(. ild be the way the
Committee would go about picking a staff; anothe would be the way
the Committee would handle classified information. The Chairman has
insisted on a full background investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of each prospective staff member befc-e he grants a TOP
SECRET clearance. He has also made certain tha each staff member
who is granted access to sensitive intelligence in ormation has met
requirements comparable to those established by t) lo Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence for Executive Branch employees' access to such in-
formation. In addition, each staff member as a condition of employ-
ment must execute an agreement with the Comma tee not to disclose
any classified information acquired while an empl yee of the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence except as authorized by the
Committee in accordance with clause 7 of House tule XLVIII (H.
Res. 658) and the Committee rules.
As to physical security, the Committee invited t (3 Director of Cen-
Ual Intelligence's Chief of Security to inspect its s+ pure storage facili-
ties and to certify that they meet the Director of Ct itral Intelligence's
requirements for the storage of sensitive intellige tee material. That
certification was acquired.
Thus far, the heads of most intelligence entitit have been forth-
coming in their dealings with the Committee and ` hey have provided
the Committee information that has been request, A, although there
have been one or two occasions where it required st eral efforts before
the requested information was forthcoming. The Committee will con-
tinue to insist that it be given access to all the in rormation which it
needs in order to carry out the responsibilities as zgned to it by the
House of Representatives.
The National Security Council and the White House Staff have
taken the position that they will not turn over to th Committee copies
of Presidential decision memoranda on intelli -'nce activities al-
though they will allow Committee Members and staff to read such
decision memoranda and to make notes on them. The Committee ap-
preciates the offer to allow its Members and staff to read such docu-
ments which are key to an understanding of the President's intelli-
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gence policies. The Committee believes, however, that it would be more
in the spirit of the President's own Executive Order 12036 for such
documents to be provided to the Committee for its reference and use.
H. Res. 658 which created the Select Committee also directed it to
conduct a study consisting of some eight separate components.
Section 3. (a) of House Resolution 658 states that:
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence shall
make a study with respect to the following matters, taking
into consideration with respect to each such matter, all
relevant aspects of the effectiveness of planning, gathering,
use, security, and dissemination of intelligence :
(1) the quality of the analytical capabilities of United
States intelligence and intelligence-related activities
and means for integrating more closely analytical in-
telli ence and policy formulation;
(2) the extent and nature of the authority of the de-
partments and agencies of the executive branch to en-
gage in intelligence and intelligence-related activities
and the desirability of developing charters for each in-
telligence agency or department;
(33 the organization of intelligence and intelligence-
related activities in the executive branch to maximize the
effectiveness of the conduct, oversight, and accountabil-
ity of intelligence and intelligence-related activities; to
reduce duplication or overlap; and to improve the
morale of the personnel of the intelligence and intelli-
gence-related agencies;
(4) the conduct of covert and clandestine activities
and the procedures by which Congress is informed of
such activities;
(5) the desirability of changing any law, House rule
or procedure, or any Executive order, rule or regulation
to improve the protection of intelligence secrets and pro-
vide for disclosure of information for which there is no
compelling reason for secrecy ;
(6) the desirability of establishing a joint committee
of the Senate and the House of Representatives on intel-
ligence and intelligence-related activities in lieu of hav-
ing separate committees in each House of Congress, or
of establishing procedures under which separate com-
mittees on intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the two Houses of Congress would receive joint brief-
ings from the intelligence and intelligence-related
agencies and coordinate their policies with respect to the
safeguarding of sensitive intelligence information ;
(7) the authorization of funds for the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the Government and
whether disclosure of any of the amounts of such funds
is in the public interest; and
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(8) the development of a uniform sc of definitions
for terms to be used in policies or guidelin?s which may be
adopted by the executive or legislative I ranches to gov-
ern, clarify, and strengthen the operatio of intelligence
and intelligence-related activities.
(b) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
shall report the results of the study pros ded for by this
section to the House, together with any rs-11ommendations
for legislative or other actions as it dee .Ys appropriate,
not later than the close of the Ninety-fif Congress.
The following is submitted in response to the al we direction.
The Subcommittee on Evaluation, chaired by Re ,resentative Charles
Rose (Democrat, N.C.), has taken the lead for tbb: full. Committee in
assessing the quality of the analytic capabilities of cur intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and in examining mans for integrating
more closely analytic intelligence and policy fornrnilation. This is an
enormous and complex subject and obviously tl,.> Committee in its
little more than one year in existence has only scri: -ched the surface in
reviewing all the analytic capabilities of the govei iment's-intelligence
activities.
Thus far, the Committee has focused on organiz tional and manage-
ment issues as they impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of intel-
ligence to provide support to its users. It has also xamined a number
of substantive intelligence products such as the l itional Intelligence
Estimates and reviewed reporting on such troubl,, spots as Somalia/
Ethiopia and most recently Nicaragua. While it finds the reporting
generally responsive to user requirements,- it has a so found that there
may be considerable room for improvement-espE -dally in such areas
as estimating, forecasting and trend analysis reporting. It plans a
detailed study of this problem during the cominj= year.
Having examined the relationship among collet ion, processing and
analysis in selected areas, the Committee notes tha the attention of the
intelligence community appears to be directed pri 7arily to increasing
collection, while other fundamental problems go rc atively unattended.
These include analytical problems which cannot I attributed to lack
of data.
The Subcommittee on Evaluation has, however, examined several
topic areas in depth, areas chosen because thei,- scope and impact
affect a wide range of intelligence and policy matte s.
One such area is called "Warning", i.e., the r = age of intelligence
collection, processing, analysis and reporting of da "a which is intended
to provide our policy makers sufficient lead time be 'ore an event occurs
to develop our own course of action to either det r, alter or respond
to the. impending development. The Subcommit :-,e on Evaluation's
study of the performance of warning intelligent has examined the
warning process in some detail, focusing on lessoi , learned from past
crises such as Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, theCuba Missile Crisis,
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 1973 Tid-East War. One
major conclusion of this study is that great impi vements have been
made in the collection, processing and dissemine ! ion of data useful
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in the warning process but that improvements in analysis and the inte-
gration of analysis with policy formulation have lagged far behind.
By sharing the findings of the Subcommittee with the Executive
Branch, and entering into a dialogue on these issues the Committee
has already seen a positive step taken to provide a icadership focus
for warning in the intelligence community. This was a direct result
of the Committee calling this inadequacy to the attention of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence.
During its inquiries into the quality of intelligence, the Committee
has found one continuing and persistently troubling issue wherever
it has looked-namely what is the requirement for any particular
intelligence activity? To make a judgment as to whether or not a spe-
cific component of the intelligence community is performing its func-
tion adequately, it is imperative to know what requirements the user
has levied on that component. The Committee has found to be ineffec-
tive the efforts of the Executive Branch to identify gaps in, and take
steps to satisfy requirements for, collection or analysis.
The Department of Defense has created a new position, that of the
Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, who is charged with the valida-
tion of intelligence requirements. The Intelligence Community Staff
is also studying this problem on behalf of the Director of Central
Intelligence. Likewise, the Policy Review Committee of the National
Security Council is charged by Executive Order 12036 with establish-
ing "requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence." The
Committee will be looking closely during the coming year at those
Executive Branch efforts which attempt to determine requirements
and upon which an evaluation of the effectiveness of our intelligence
activities can be built.
The Committee also notes that the subject of requirements is an
enormously complex one and one which the steps taken to date by the
Executive Branch may not resolve. The Committee points for example,
to the fact that the National Security Council's Policy Review Com-
mittee is restricted to establishing requirements and priorities for "na-
tional" intelligence. Responsibility for assigning priorities among
requirements for both tactical military and "national" intelligence
apparently has not been assigned to any official or group of officials
within the Executive Branch nor is there any provision for the rapid
and smooth transition from a peacetime environment to a wartime
footing where intelligence requirements and management is concerned.
The Committee intends to look deeper into these issues in the coming
year.
LF,GTSTATIVE CHARTERS
A key aspect of the present structure and functioning of the nation's
foreign intelligence activities is the fact that only the Central Intel-
ligence Agency of all the elements engaged in foreign intelligence has
been" created by legislation. The National Security Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency have been operating for years without
legislative charters. Further, the CIA charter consists only of a few
paragraphs in the National Security Act of 1947 and a subsequent
CIA Act of 1949 which largely addressed itself to administrative de-
tails. For the most part, authority for the conduct of foreign intel-
ligence and counterintelligence collection, dissemination, and analysis
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is contained in Executive Order 12036 signed by i president Carter on
January 26, 1978. After its own examination of f his issue, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence found a need for legislation which
would authorize the activities of the various inte 'igence elements of
the United States Government, and which would restrict or prohibit
certain specific activities. To that end, the Senaf 11 ? Select Committee
introduced a comprehensive legislative charters bill in 1978 (S. 2525).
An identical bill, H.R. 11245, was introduced in the. House.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intel `igence believes this
subject is important enough to deserve a thorough eview. To that end,
a thorough staff examination has been scheduld I to examine this
matter in detail. Additional briefings and a full complement of hear-
ings will be scheduled in the next Congress. Once the Committee has
completed its investigations and hearings, it wil be able to decide
what legislation to recommend to the full House.
IMPROVE MAN AGESiENT
Executive Order 12036 attempted to establish et'ective mechanisms
within the Executive Branch for overseeing the in a elligence activities
of the government by establishing an Intelligenc Oversight Board
and by assigning specific, responsigilities to the. In Bettors General of
the intelligence agencies. It also acknowledged tl' role of Congres-
sional oversight committees. In addition, Executive Order 12036 gave
greater responsibility and authority to the Direct< n of intelligence
information about a foreign power and which is ignificant to the
national security, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United
States, and which is provided by a government agew y that is assigned
All intelligence mission (i..e., an intelligence agency;.. (Also see intel-
ligence cycle.)
Foreign intelligence service: An orgnaization of It foreign govern-
ment which engages in intelligence activities.
Foreign materiel (FORMAT) intelligence: Intelligence derived
from the exploitation of foreign materiel.
Foreign official: A person acting in an official c.pacity on behalf
of a foreign power, attached to a foreign diplomatic establishment or
an establishment under the control of it foreign pow. or employed by
.a public international organization.
Forward-looking infrared (FLIR) system : An ; rtfrared imagin
system which raster scans the scene viewed by internal means both
horizontally and vertically; it can be spaceborne, ai a borne, sea orne
mounted on a ground vehicle, or placed at a fixed r ite; and its field
of view is determined by the optics used, the scanning,. mechanism, and
the dimensions of the detector array.
Fusion : The blending of intelligence informatio t from multiple
sources to produce a single intelligence product.
.Fusion center : A term used within the Departn tent of Defense
referring to an organization having the responsibility, if blending both
.compartmented intelligence information with all. of -er available in-
formation in order to support military operations. (Ako see actionable
intelligence and tactical intelligence.)
General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) : $ re National For-
eign Intelligence Program.
Geographic (al) intelligence : Foreign intelligence '.ealing with the
location, description, and analysis of physical and cultural factors of
the world, (e,g., terrain2 climate, natural resources, transportation,
boundaries, population distribution) and their than , s through time.
General medical intelligence (GMI) : See medica .intelligence.
Guidance* : Advice which identifies, interprets, cll. Pies, and/or ex-
pands upon an information need. (Also see informat, n need.)
Human intelligence (HUMINT) : A category of intelligence in-
formation derived from human sources. (Also see iumc: a source report-
ing and human resources collection.)
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Human resources collection : All activities which attend collection of
intelligence information from human sources. (See human intelligence
and human source.)
Human Resources Committee (HRC) : See Director of Central In-
telligence Committee. (Also see DCID 1/17.)
Duman source: A person who wittingly or unwittingly conveys by
any means information of potential intelligence value to an intelligence
activity.
Human source reporting : The flow of intelligence information from
those who gather it to the customer; it may come from information
gathering activities either within or outside the Intelligence Com
munity. (A form of the term is also used to denote an item of informa-
tion being conveyed, as in human source report). (Also see human
intelligence.)
Illegal: An officer or employee of an intelligence organization who
is dispatched abroad and who has no overt connection with the intel-
ligence organization with which he is connected or with the govern-
ment operating that intelligence organization.
Illegal agent : An agent operated by an illegal residency or directly
by the headquarters of an intelligence organization. (Also see illegal
residency.)
Illegal communication : An electronic communication or signal made
without the legal sanction of the nation where it originates.
Illegal residency : An intelligence apparatus established in a foreign
^.ountry and composed of one or more intelligence officers, and which
as no apparent connection with the sponsoring intelligence organiza-
on on or with the government of the country operating the intelligence
ganization. (Also see legal residency.)
Illicit communication : An electronic communication or signal origi-
ted in support of clandestine operations; it is a type of clandestine
nmunication.
Imagery: Representations of objects reproduced electronically or
optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media.
'magery intelligence (IMINT) : The collected products of imagery
erpretation processed for intelligence use. (Also see imagery inter-
Aation below.)
Lmagery interpretation (II) The process of locating, recognizing,
ratifying, and describing objects, activities, and terrain represented
imagery; it includes photographic interpretation.
nitative communications deception : See communications deception.
iitative deception : The introduction into foreign channels of elec-
agnetic radiations which imitate his own emissions.
idications and warning (I&W) : Those intelligence activities in-
ed to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on
ign developments that could involve a threat to U.S. or allied mili-
T, political, or economic interests, or to U.S. citizens abroad. It en-
passes forewarning of: enemy hostile actions or intentions; the
ninence of hostilities; serious insurgency; nuclear/nonnuclear at-
,'&: on the U.S., its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions
U.S. reconnaissance activities, terrorist attacks; and other similar
,its.
;iformation : Unevaluated material of every description, at all levels
eliability, and from any source which may contain intelligence in-
nation. (Also see intelligence information.)
e Appendix B, Alternate Definitions.
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Information handling : Management of data or ii r formation which
may occur in connection with any step in the intelligence cycle; such
management may involve activities to transform, x::cnipulate, index,
code, categorize, store, select, retrieve, associate or di play intelligence
materials; it may involve the use of printing, photo aphic, computer
or communications equipment, systems or network:: it may include
software programs to operate computers and proces data and/or in-
formation; and may include information contained in reports, files,
data bases, reference services and libraries.
Information security: Safeguarding knowledge s~_=ainst unauthor-
ized disclosure; or, the result of any system of admit strative policies
and procedures of identifying, controlling, and pr cting from un-
authorized disclosure or release to the public, information the protec-
tion of which is authorized by executive order or sts. nte.
Information need: The requirement of an official involved in the
policymaking process or the intelligence produeticm process for the
best available information and intelligence on whitiiI to base policy
decisions, recommendations, or intelligence productii i.
Infrared imagery : A likeness or impression prodtx !d as a result of
sensing electromagnetic radiations emitted or reflect. d from a given
target surface in the infrared portion of the electrom .rnetic spectrum.
Integration* : A process in the production stop of the intelligence
cycle in which a pattern is formed through the selecti~ n and combina-
tion of evaluated intelligence information. (Also' ee intelligence
cycle.)
Intelligence*: (1) A body of evidence and the co elusions drawn
therefrom which is acquired and furnished in resporE;e to the know ;
or perceived requirements of customers; it is often d rived from in
formation which is concealed or not intended to be .,:ailable for us
by the acquirer; it is the product of a cyclical process.. (Also see intc
ligence cycle.)
Examples :
Policy development requires good intelligence.
Timely intelligence is important to informed ecisionmakin
(2) A term used to refer collectively to the functio,us, activities,
organizations which are involved in the process of planning, gathc
ing, and analyzing information of potential value to flecisionmake
and to the production of intelligence as defined in (1) , Bove. (Also Ff
foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence.)
Examples :
Human source collection is an important intelr Bence activ
Central Intelligence Agency.
Intelligence is a demanding profession.
Intelligence activity (ies) * : A generic term used to encompass a
or all of the efforts and endeavors undertaken by intelligence orgy
zations. (Also see intelligence organization.)
Intelligence agency : A component organization of i ie Intelliger
Community. (Also see Intelligence Community.)
Intelligence assessment: A category of intelligence roduction th'
encompasses most analytical studies dealing with sul sects of poli
significance ; it is thorough in its treatment of subject: utter-as d
tinct from building-block papers, research projects, and refere i
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aids-but unlike estimative intelligence need not attempt to project
future developments and their implications; it is usually coordinated
within the producing organization but may not be coordinated with
other intelligence agencies. (Also see estimative intelligence).
Intelligence asset : Any resource-person, group, instrument, instal-
lation, or technical system-at the disposal of an intelligence organiza-
tion.
Intelligence collector : A phrase sometimes used to refer to an organi-
zation or agency that engages in the collection step of the intelligence
cycle. (Also see intelligence cycle.)
Intelligence Community (IC) : A term which, in the aggregate, re-
fers to the following Executive Branch organizations and activities :
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ; the National Security Agency
(NSA) ; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) ; offices within the
Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national
foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs; the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department of State; intel-
ligence elements of the military services; intelligence elements of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ; intelligence elements of the
Department of Treasury; intelligence elements of the Department of
Energy; intelligence elements of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion; and staff elements of the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff) : A term referring to an
organization under the direction and control of the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence (DCI) formed to assist the DCI in discharging his
responsibilities relating to the Intelligence Community.
Intelligence consumer : See customer.
Intelligence cycle* : The processes by which information is acquired
and converted into intelligence and made available to customers..Chere
are usually five steps in the cycle :
a. Planning and direction-determination of intelligence require
ments, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests
to information collection entities, and a continuous check on the pro-
ductivity of collection entities.
b. Collection*-acquisition of information or Intelligence informa-
tion and the provision of this to processing and/or production
elements.
c. Processing*-conversion of collected information and/or intelli-
gence information into a form more suitable for the production of
intelligence.
d. Production*-conversion of information or intelligence informa-
tion into finished intelligence through the integration, analysis, evalu
ation, and/or interpretation of all available data and the preparation
of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated customer
requirements.
e. Dissemination*-conveyance of intelligence in suitable form to
customers.
Intelligence estimate* : The product of estimative intelligence.
Intelligence information* : Information of potential intelligence
value concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of any
foreign power, organization, or associated personnel.
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Intelligence Information Handling Committee (I} C) : See Director
of Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID 1 4.)
Intelligence information report : A product of the ollection step of
the intelligence cycle. (Also see intelligence report.)
Intelligence officer : A professional employee of an t atelligence orga-
nization who is engaged in intelligence activities.
Intelligence organization : A generic term used to i"fer to any orga-
nization engaged in intelligence activities; it may in(' tide, either an in-
telligence agency or a foreign intelligence service, o4. both. (Also see
intelligence agency and foreign intelligence service.
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) : A body f~ozned by appoint-
ment of the President to provide him and the Attoz ey General with
reports and advice on the legality and propriety of i 1, itelligence activ-
ities; membership and duties are expressed in Exe,. ative Order No.
12036.
Intelligence producer : A phrase usually used to ref ' r to an organiza-
tion or agency that participates in the production s' p of the intelli-
gence cycle. (Also see intelligence cycle.
Intelligence related activities (IRA) : Those acti~ ities specifically
excluded from the National Foreign Intelligence Pry !;gram which : re-
spond to departmental or agency tasking for time-s nsitive informa-
tion on foreign activities, respond to national Intellig once Community
advisory tasking of collection ca abilities which hat a primary mis-
sion of supporting departmental or agency missioi, or operational
forces, of training personnel for intelligence duties, ,,r are devoted to
research and development for intelligence and relatec5 capabilities.
Intelligence report* : A product of the production -tep of the intel-
ligence cycle. (Also see intelligence information rep ,rt.)
Intelligence requirement*: Any subject, general ;tr specific, upon
which there is a_need for the collection of intelligen information or
the production of intelligence. (Also see collection requirement.)
Intelligence Research and Development Council (1 UDC.) : See Di-
rector of Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see .f )CID 1/12.)
Intelligence user : See customer.
Interagency Defector Committee (IDC) : See Di] ctor of Central
Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID 4/1.)
Interagency intelligence memorandum (IIM) : 11, national intel-
ligence assessment or estimate issued by the Director of Central In-
telligence with the advice of appropriate National Foi' ign Intelligence
Board components.
Intercept (ion) * : Acquisition for intelligence pur )oses of electro-
magnetic signals (such as radio communications) by electronic collec-
tion equipment without the consent of the signallers.
Intercept station: A station which intercepts comunications or
non-communications transmissions for intelligence pi rposes.
International lines of communications (ILC) : Those communica-
tions services which are under the supervision of Cie International
Telecommunication Union and which carry paid pt: Alic communica-
tions traffic between different countries; also known s: International
Civil Communications, International Commercial Communications,
Internationally-Leased Communications, Internati nal Service of
Public Correspondence, and commercial communications.
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International terrorist activity* : The calculated use of violence, or
the threat of violence, to attain political goals through fear, intimida-
tion or coercion; usually involves a criminal act, often symbolic in
nature, and is intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate
victims. International terrorism transcends national boundaries in the
carrying out of the act, the purpose of the act, the nationalities of the
victims, or the resolution of the incident; such an act is usually de-
signed to attract wide publicity in order to focus attention on the
existence, cause, or demands of the perpetrators.
Interpretation : A process in the production step of the intelligence
cycle.. in which the significance of information or intelligence informa-
tion is weighed relative to the available body of knowledge. Also see
intelligence cycle.)
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) : See Di-
rector of Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID 3/3.)
Joint intelligence: (1) (Military context.) Intelligence produced by
elements of more than one military service of the same nation. (2) (In-
telligence Community context.) Intelligence produced by intelligence
organizations of more than one country.
Laser intelligence (LASINT) : Technical and intelligence informa-
tion derived from laser systems; it is a subcategory of electro-optical
intelligence. (See electro-optical intelligence.)
Legal residency : An intelligence apparatus in a foreign country and
composed of intelligence officers assigned as overt representatives of
their government but not necessarily identified as intelligence officers.
(Also see illegal residency.)
Manipulative communications cover : Those measures taken to alter
or conceal the characteristics of communications so as to deny to any
enemy or potential enemy the means to identify them. Also known as
communications cover.
Manipulative communications deception : See communications
deception.
Manipulative deception : The alteration or simulation of friendly
electromagnetic radiations to accomplish deception.
Measurement and signature intelligence* (MASINT) : Scientific
and technical intelligence information obtained by quantitative and
qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time
dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from
specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive
features associated with the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate
subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same.
Medical intelligence* (MEDINT) : Foreign intelligence related to
all aspects of foreign natural and man-made environments which could
influence the health of military forces; it incorporates general medical
intelligence which is concerned with foreign biological medical capa-
bilities and health situations, and medical scientific and technical intel-
ligence which assesses and predicts technological advances of medical
significance, to include defense against Chemical, Biological, Radio-
logical Warfare; it applies to both tactical and strategic planning and
operations, including military and humanitarian efforts. (Also see
biographical intelligence.)
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Military intelligence (MI) : Basic, current, or e, .imative intelli-
gence on any foreign military or military-related sitution or activity.
Monitor : To observe, listen to, intercept, record, o transcribe any
form of communication or media for collection of intelligence infor-
mation or communications security purposes, either ov rtly or covertly.
Multi-level security: (For automatic data process:rig (ADP) sys-
tems.) Provisions for the safeguarding of all infor ration within a
multilevel information handling system. The multih-vel information
handling system permits various levels, categories, vv. id/or compart-
ments of material to be concurrently stored and .processed in a
remotely accessed resource-sharing ADP system, while= ~imulta.neously
permitting material to be selectively accessed and m= riipulated from
variously controlled terminals by personnel having ;cl ffe.rent security
clearances and access approvals. Security measures are -herefore aimed
at ensuring proper matches between information sects=: ity and person-
nel security. (Also see uni-level security)
National estimate: See national intelligence estimate
National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) 2,,n organization
established by and under the control and supervision of the Director
of Central Intelligence, which is responsible for produw ion of national
intelligence.
National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) : Aaody formed to
provide the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) ith advice con-
cerning: production, review, and coozdimlation of ntional foreign
intelligence; the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget; inter-
agency exchanges of foreign intelligence information : arrangements
with foreign governments on intelligence matters; U1. . protection of
intelligence sources or methods; activities of common; concern; and
such other matters as are referred to it by the DCI. It is composed of
the DCI (chairman), and other appropriate officers if the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Office of the DCI, Departure. t of State, De-
partment of Defense, Department of Justice, Departm it of the Treas-
ury, Department of Energy, the offices within the )epartment of
Defense for reconnaissance programs, the Defense Int, lligence Agen-
cy, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bu . >au of Investi.-
gation ; senior intelligence officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
participate as observers; a representative of the Assista it to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs may also attend sIieetings as an
observer.
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) Includes the
programs listed below, but its composition shall be subj~ _:t to review by
the National Security Council and modification by the President.
(a) The programs of the Central Intelligence Agency
(b) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the U neral Defense
Intelligence Program, and the programs of the offices within the De-
partment of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign
intelligence through reconnaissance except such elemen as the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defei: agree should
be excluded;
(c) Other programs of agencies within the Intelli..::ence Commu-
nity designated jointly by the Director of Central Ii, =;.elligence and
the head of the department or by the President as national foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities ;
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(d) Activities of the staff elements of the Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence.
(e) Activities to acquire the intelligence required for the planning
and conduct of tactical operations by the United States military forces
are not included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
National intelligence* : Foreign intelligence produced under the
aegis of the Director of Central Intelligence and intended primarily
to be responsive to the needs of the President, the National Security
Council, and other Federal officials involved in the formulation, and
execution of national security, foreign political, and/or economic
policy.
National intelligence asset: An intelligence asset funded in the Na-
tional Foreign Intelligence Program, the primary purpose of which
is the collection or processing of intelligence information or the pro-
duction of national intelligence. (Also see intelligence asset and na-
tional intelligence.)
National Intelligence Estimate* (NIE) : A thorough assessment of
a situation in the foreign environment which is.relevant to the formu-
lat'son of foreign, economic, and national security policy, and which
projects probable future courses of action and developments; it is
structured to illuminate differences of view within the Intelligence
Community; it is issued by the Director of Central Intelligence with
the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. (Also see Spe-
cial National Intelligence Estimate.)
National Intelligence Officer (NIO) : The senior staff officer of the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the DCI's Deputy for
National Intelligence for an assigned area of substantive responsi-
bility; he manages estimative and interagency intelligence production
on behalf of the DCI; he is the principal point of contact between the
DCI and intelligence consumers below the cabinet level; he is charged
with monitoring and coordinating that portion of the National For-
ei;n Assessment Center's production that involves more than one
office or that is interdisciplinary in character; and is a primary source
of national-level substantive guidance to Intelligence Community
planners, collectors, and resource managers.
National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC) : The central orga-
nizational mechanism established under the direction, control and
management of the Director of Central Intelligence for coordinating
and tasking national foreign intelligence collection activities, and for
providing advisory tasking to other intelligence and information
gathering activities.
National security : The territorial integrity, sovereignty, and inter-
national freedom of action of the United States. (Intelligence activi-
ties relating to national security encompass all the military, economic,
political, scientific and technological, and other aspects of foreign de-
velopments which pose actual or potential threats to U.S. national
interests.)
National/tactical interface : A relationship between national and
tactical intelligence activities encompassing the full range of fiscal,
technical, operational, and programmatic matters.
Near-real-time: The brief interval between the collection of infor-
mation regarding an event and reception of the data at some other
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location, caused by the time required for processin_r, communications,
and display.
Net assessment: A comparative review and analysis of opposing na-
tional strengths, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and v x~aknesses. (An in-
telligence net assessment involves only foreign cou tries.)
Nuclear intelligence (NUCINT) : Intelligence de-ived from the col-
lection and analysis of radiation and other effects re citing from radio-
active sources.
Nuclear proliferation intelligence : Foreign inte. 'igence relating to
(1) scientific, technical, and economic capabilities nd programs and
the political plans and intentions of nonnuclear weapons states or
foreign organizations to acquire nuclear weapons ar,.l/or to acquire the
requisite special nuclear materials and to carry on research, develop-
ment, and manufacture of nuclear explosive device , and; (2) the at-
titudes, policies, and actions of foreign nuclear su -plier countries or
organizations within these countries toward provis(,ia of technologies,
facilities, or special nuclear materials which coui assist nonnuclear
weapon states or foreign organizations to acquire r develop nuclear
explosive devices.
O$icial : See foreign official.
Official information: Information which is subjei t to the control of
the United States Government.
Open source information: A generic term descr_bing information
of potential intelligence value (i.e., intelligence info)cmation) which is
available to the general public.
Operational control OPCON) : (military conte t) The authority
delegated to a commander to direct forces assignee so that the conm-
mander may accomplish specific missions or tasks vhich are usually
limited by function, time, or location ; to deploy the forces concerned ;
and to retain or assign tactical control of those fore . (It does not, of
itself, include administrative or logistic control.)
Operational intelligence* (OPINTEL) : Intellig :nce required for
planning and executing operations.
Operations security (OPSEC) : Those measures & -signed to protect
information concerning planned, ongoing, and core Meted operations
against unauthorized disclosure.
Optical intelligence (OPTINT) : That portion of ~xlectro-optical in-
telligence that deals with visible light. (Also soe electro-optical
intelligence.)
Order of battle (OB) : Intelligence pertaining to identification,
strength, command structure, and disposition of thy- personnel, units,
and equipment of any foreign military force. (.zA ]so see technical
intelligence.)
Overt: Open; done without attempt at concealmen
Overt collection : The acquisition of intelligence a iformation from
public media, observation, government-to-governmendialogue, elicita-
tion, and from the sharing of data openly acquired.. the process may
be classified or unclassified; the target and host goN ~rnments as well
as the sources involved normally are aware of the)eneral collection
activity although the specific acquisition, sites, and Processes may be
successfully concealed.
Penetration: (1) (clandestine operations.) Tl recruitment of
agents within or the infiltration of agents or introdution of technical
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monitoring devices into an organization or group or physical facility
f or. the purpose of acquiring information or influencing its activities
(2) (automatic data processing (ADP) operations.) The unauthor-
ized extraction and identification of recognizable information from a
protected ADP system.
.. Personnel security : The means or procedures-such as selective in-
vestigations, record checks, personal interviews, and supervisory con-
trols-designed to provide reasonable assurance that persons being con-
sidered for or granted access to classified information are loyal and
trustworthy.
Photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) : The collected products of
photographic interpretation classified and evaluated for intelligence
use ; it is a category of imagery intelligence.
Photographic interpretation (PI) : The process of locating, rec-
ognizing, identifying, and describing objects, activities, and ter-
rain represented on photography; it is a category of imagery
interpretation.
Physical security* : Physical measures-such as safes, vaults, pe-
rimeter barriers, ouard systems, alarms and access controls-designed
to safeguard installations against damage, disruption or unauthorized
entry; information or material against authorized access or theft; and
specified personnel against harm.
Plain text* : Normal text or language, or any symbol or signal, that
conveys information without any hidden or secret meaning.
Planning and direction : See intelligence cycle.
Policy Review Committee (As pertains to intelligence matters)
(PRC (I) ) . A committee established under the National Security
Council which when meeting under the chairmanship of the Director of
Central Intelligence is empowered to establish requirements and prior-
ities for national foreign intelligence and to evaluate the quality of
the intelligence product; it is sometimes referred to as the Policy Re-
view Committee ( Intelligence) ; its specific duties are defined in Ex-
ecutive Order No. 1203&.
Political intelligence* : Intelligence concerning the dynamics of the
internal and external political affairs of foreign countries, regional
groupings, multilateral treaty arrangements and organizations, and
foreign political movements directed against or impacting upon estab-
lished goverenments or authority.
Positive intelligence : A term of convenience sometimes applied to
foreign intelligence to distinguish it from foreign counterintelligence.
Priority : A value denoting a preferential rating or precedence in
position which is used to discriminate among competing entities; the
term normally used in conjunction with intelligence requirements in
order to illuminate importance and to guide the actions planned, being
planned, or in use, to respond to the requirements.
Processing* : See intelligence cycle.
Product : (1) An intelligence report disseminated to customers by an
intelligence agency. (2) In SIGINT usage, intelligence information
derived from analysis of 'SIGINT materials and published as a report
or translation for dissemination to customers (Also see production in
Appendix B.)
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Production* : See intelligence cycle.
Proprietary : A business entity owned, in whole ~ r in part, or con-
trolled by an intelligence organization and operated to provide private
commercial cover for an intelligence activity of that organization.
(Also see cover.)
Radar intelligence (RADINT) : Intelligence information derived
from data collected by radar.
Radiation intelligence* (RINT) : The functions vend characteristics
derived from information obtained from uninten ional electromag-
netic energy emanating from foreign devices; excludes nuclear detona-
tions or radioactive sources.
Raw intelligence: A colloquial tern meaning col tooted intelligence
information which has not yet been converted into atelligence. (Also
see intelligence information.)
Reconnaissance (RECCE or RECON) : An operation undertaken
to obtain by visual observation or other detection methods information
relating to the activities, resources or forces of a fox ='ign nation; or to
secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrrgraphic, or geo-
graphic characteristics of a particular area.
Recruitment-in-place: A person who agrees to bei,,me an agent and
retain his position in his organization or government while reporting
on it to an intelligence or security organization of a 'oreign country.
RED/BLACK Concept : The separation of electr i.>al and electronic
circuits, components, equipment, and systems whicl- handle classified
plain language information in electric signal form (I ZED) from those
which handle encrypted or unclassified information BLACK) ; RED
and BLACK terminology is used to clarify speci fi, criteria relating
to and differentiating between such circuits, components, equipment,
and systems and the areas in which they are contained.
Refugee : A person who is outside the country or; d ,ea of his former
habitual residence and who, because of fear of being persecuted or be-
cause of hostilities in that country or area, is unwr ing or unable to
return to it. (Also see defector and emigre.)
Report : See intelligence report and intelligence in t'ormation report.
Requirement* : See intelligence requirement or collection
requirement.
Residence : See illegal residency and legal residency.
Sabotage: Action against material, premises or utilities, or their
production, which injures, interferes with, or obsti Picts the national
security or ability of a nation to prepare for or ca.t ;-y on a war.
Safe house : A house or premises controlled by an intelligence or-
ganzation that affords--at least temporarily-securit _y for individuals
involved or equipment used in clandestine operations,:.
Sanitization : The process of editing or otherwis7 - altering intelli-
gence information or reports to protect sensitive int=-lligence sources,
methods, capabilities, analytical procedures, or privil-ged information
in order to permit wider dissemination.
Scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence*:Intilligence concern-
ing foreign developments in basic and applied scientific and technical
research and development including engineering and production tech-
niques, new technology, and weapon systems and thei r capabilities and
characteristics; it also includes intelligence which squires scientific
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or technical expertise on the part of the analyst, such as medicine,
physical health studies, and behavioral analyses.
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC) : See Di-
rector of Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID 3/5.)
Security : Establishment and maintenance of protective measures
which are intended to ensure a state of inviolability from. hostile acts
or influences.
Security classification : See, classification.
Security Committee (SECOM) : See Director of Central Intel-
ligence Committee. (Also see DCID 1/11.)
Sensitive* : Requiring special protection from disclosure to avoid
compromise or threat to the security of the sponsor.
Sensitive compartmented information* (SCI.) : All information and
material requiring special controls for restricted handling within com-
partmented intelligence systems and for which compartmentation is
established. (Also see compartmentation.)
Sensitive intelligence sources and methods: A collective term for
those persons, organizations, things, conditions, or events that provide
intelligence information and those means used in the collection, proc-
essing, and production of such information which, if compromised,
would be vulnerable to counteraction that could reasonably be expected
to reduce their ability to support U.S. intelligence activities.
Service Cryptologic Agency(ies) (SCA) : See Service Cryptologic
Elements.
Service Cryptologic Elements : A term used to designate separately
or together those elements of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force
which perform cryptologic functions; also known as Service Crypto-
logic Agencies and Service Cryptologic Organizations.
Service Cryptologic Organizations (SCO) : See Service Cryptologic
Elements.
Sensor : (1) A technical device designed to detect and respond to
one or more particular stimulae and which may record and/or transmit
a resultant impulse for interpretation or measurement; often called a
technical sensor. (2) Special sensor: An unclassified term used as a
matter of convenience to refer to a highly classified or controlled tech-
nical sensor.
Side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) : An airborne radar, viewing
at right angles to the axis of the vehicle, which produces a presenta-
tion of terrain or targets.
SIGINT activity : Any activity conducted for the purpose of produc-
ing signals intelligence. (Also see SIGINT-related activity.)
SIGINT Committee : See Director of Central Intelligence Com-
mittee. (Also see DC JD 6/1.)
SIGINT-related activity : Any activity primarily intended for a
purpose(s) other than signals intelligence (SIGINT) but which can
be used to produce SIGINT, or which produces SIGINT as a by-
product of its principal function(s). (Also see SIGINT activity.)
SIGINT technical information : Information concerning or derived
from intercepted foreign transmissions or radiations which is com-
posed of technical information (as opposed to intelligence) and which
is required in the further collection or analysis of signals intelligence.
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Sib ial* : Anything intentionally transmitted by visual and other
electromagnetic, nucrear, or acoustical methods for e Cher Gommunica-
tions or non-communications purposes.
Signals intelligence* (S.IGINT) : Inteligence info! oration compris-
ing either individually or in combination all communications intel-
ligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instruX:ientation signals
intelligence, however transmitted.
Signals security (SIGSEC) : A term which includes communica-
tions security and electronics security and which enco ipasses measures
intended to deny or counter hostile exploitation of ele tronic emissions.
Signals security acquisition and analysis: The ae 1uisition of elec-
tronic emissions and subsequent anlysis to determiner; empirically the
susceptibility of the emission to interception and explotation by hostile
intelhoence services; it includes cataloging the transi..uission spectrum
and ti&ing signal parametric measurements as requited, but does not
include acquisition of information carried on the sy, a_em, it is one of
the techniques of signals security surveillance. (44) see signals se-
curity surveillance.)
Signals security surveillance: The systematic exai ination of elec-
tronic emissions to determine the adequacy of sigmils security mea-
sures, to identify signals security deficiencies, to pa ovide data from
which to predict the effectiveness. of proposed signals security
measures, and to confirm the adequacy of such measures after
implementation.
Source* : A person, device, system, or activity from which intel-
ligence information is obtained. (Also see human soi:?ce and sensitive
intelligence sources and methods.)
Special activities : As defined in Executive Order o. 12036, activi-
ties conducted abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives
which are designed to further official United Statt programs and
policies abroad and which are planned. and executed so that the role
of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged
publicly, and functions in support of such activities, but not including
diplomatic activity or the collection and production of intelligence or
related support functions; also known as covert action. (Also see covert
action.)
Special Activities OfRco(r) (SAO) : A control 1o..-oint for certain
categories of compartmented information. (The acraLym is often used
to refer to the compartmented information itself.)
Special Coordination Committee (SCC) : A coma .attee established
under the National Security Council which deals in _er alia with the
oversight of sensitive intelligence activities, such a covert actions,
which are. undertaken on Presidential authority.
Special intelligence (SI) : An unclassified term use i to designate a
category of sensitive compartmented information (ACI). (Also see
sensitive compartmented information.)
Special intelligence conmunications* (SPINTCOIIf 1Z) : A commu-
nications network for the handling of all special into! !igence and con-
sisting of those facilities under the operational and 9 ,,clinical control
of the chief of intelligence of each, of the military dcgc irtments, under
the management of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and under the
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technical and security specification criteria established and monitored
by the National Security Agency.
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) : National Intel-
ligence Estimates (NIEs) which are relevant to specific policy prob-
lems that need to be addressed in the immediate future. SNIEs are
generally unscheduled, shorter, and prepared more quickly than NIEs
and are coordinated within the Intelligence Community to the extent
that time permits. (Also see National Intelligence Estimate.)
Special Security Office (r) (SSO) : A control point for security pro-
cedures within any activity authorized access to sensitive compart-
mented information.
Special sensor* : See sensor.
Strategic intelligence : Intelligence which is required for the formu-
lation of policy and military plans at national and international levels;
it differs primarily from tactical intelligence in level of use, but may
also vary in scope and detail.
Strategic warning Intelligence information or intelligence regard-
ing the threat of the initiation of hostilities against the U.S. or in
which U.S. forces may become involved; it may be received at any time
prior to the initiation of hostilities.
Su ort for the Analysts' File Environment (SAFE) : A joint
CIA/DIA project to develop a now computer/microfilm in system to
support production analysts in reading, filing, and routing cable traffic ;
building and searching private and central files; and writing, editing,
and routing intelligence memoranda and reports.
Surveillance : Tie systematic observation or monitoring of places,
persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other
means.
Tactical intelligencc* (TACINTEL) : Foreign intelligence pro-
duced under the aegis of the Secretary of Defense and intended pri-
marily to be responsive to the needs of military commanders in the field
to maintain the readiness of operating forces for combat operations
and to support the planning and conduct of combat operations. (Also
see combat intelligence.)
Tactical intelligence asset: An intelligence asset funded in Depart-
ment of Defense programs, the primary purpose of which is the col-
lection or processing of intelligence information or the production of
tactical intelligence. (Also see tactical intelligence and intelligence
asset.)
Target : A country, area, installation, organization, weapon system,
military force, situation (political or economic), signal, person, or
other entity against which intelligence operations are conducted.
Target intelligence : Intelligence which portrays and locates the com-
ponents of a target or target complex and indicates its identification,
vulnerability, and relative importance.
Tasking : The assignment or direction of an individual or activity
to perform in a specified way to achieve an objective or goal.
Technical intelligence (TI) : Intelligence on the characteristics and
performance of foreign weapons and equipment; a part of scientific
and technical intelligence and distinct from order of battle.
Technical sensor : See sensor.
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Technical SIGINT: Intelligence information wh-.?-h provides a de-
tailed knowledge of the technical characteristics o r a given emitter
and thus permits estimates to be made about its primary function,
capabilities, modes of operation (including malfun(! ions), and state-
of-the-art, as well as its specific role within a comply c weapon system
or defense network; it is a contributor to technical 34itelligence.
Telecommunications: Any transmission, emission, or reception of
signs, signals, writing, images, and sounds or inf ,rtnation of any
nature by wire, radio, visual, or other electromagnet c systems.
Telemetry intelligence (TELINT) : Technical anal intelligence in-
formation derived from intercept, processing, and a?a.l.ysis oT foreign
telemetry; a subcategory of foreign instrum-!ritation signals
intelligence.
Teleprocessing : The overall function of an informa. ion transmission
system which combines telecommunications, automati: data processing,
and man-machine interface equipment and their into raction as an in-
tegrated whole.
TEMPEST: An unclassified term referring o technical in-
vestigations for compromising emanations from elec' :-ically operated,
information processing equipment; they are conduct d in support of
emanations and emission security.
Terrorist organization : A group that engages in to rorist activities.
(Also see international terrorist activity.)
Traffic analysis (TA) : The cryptologic disciplirim which develops
information from communications about the compo Lion and opera-
tion of communications structures and the organiz.+ ions they serve.
The process involves the study of traffic and relates materials, and
the reconstruction of communication plans, to produce signals
intelligence.
Transmission security (TRANSEC) : The comport. at of communi-
cations security which results from all measures deigned to protect
transmissions from interception and from exploitation by means other
than cryptanalysis.
Unauthorized disclosure : See compromise.
Uni-level security: (For automatic data processing systems) Provi-
sion for the safeguarding of all material within a sin:--le information
handling system in accordance with the highest level of classification
and most restrictive dissemination caveats assigned o any material
contained therein, as distinguished from multilevel set urity. (Also see
multi-level security.)
United States Signals Intelligence System (USSS) An entity that
is compromised of the National Security Agency (inn.?uding assigned
military personnel) ; those elements of the military d partments and
the Central Intelligence Agency performing signals in; elligence activ-
ities; and those elements of any other department or agency which
may from time to time be authorized by the National security Coun-
cil to perform signals intelligence activities durin the ime when such
elements are so authorized; it is governed by the United States Signals
Intelligence Directives (USSID) system.
Upgrade: To determine that certain classified infori_iation requires,
in the interest of national security, a higher degre. of protection
against unauthorized disclosure than currently providi i, coupled with
*See Appendix B, Alternate Definitions.
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a changing of the classification designation to reflect such higher de-
gree. (Also see classification.)
User : See customer.
Validation : A process normally associated with the collection of
intelligence information which provides official status to an identified
requirement and confirms that the .re uirement is appropriate for a
given collector and has not previously been satisfied. (Also see collec-
tion requirement.)
Walk-in : A person who on his own initiative makes contact with a
representative of a foreign country and who volunteers intelligence
information and/or requests political asylum. (Also see disaffected
person.)
Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) : See
Director of Central Intelligence Committee. (Also see DCID 3/4.)
ACINT-Acoustical Intelligence (Naval acronym; see definition.)
ACOUSTINT-Acoustical Intelligence.
ASCI-Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence (Army or Air Force).
CA-Cryptanalysis.
CAMS-COMIREX Automated Management System.
CCF-Collection Coordination Facility.
CCP-Consolidated Cryptologic Program.
CCPC-Critical Collection Problems Committee.
0--Counterintelligence.
CIA-Central Intelligence Agency.
CI AP-Central Intelligence Xgency Program.
CIFAX-Enciphered Facsimile.
C.[:PHONY-Enciphered Telephone.
CIRIS-Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System.
CIVISION-Enciphered Television.
COINS-Community On-Line Intelligence System.
COMEX-Committee on Exchanges.
COMINT-Communications Intelligence.
COMIREX-Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation.
COMSEC-Communications Security.
CONTEXT-Conferencing and Text Manipulation System.
CRITIC-Critical Intelligence Message.
CRITICOMM-Critical Intelligence Communications System.
CRYPTO-CRYPTO. (See definition.)
D AO-Defense Attache Office.
DCI-Director of Central Intelligence.
DCID-Director of Central Intelligence Directive.
DEA-Drug Enforcement Administration.
DEFSMAC-Defense Special Missile and Astronautic Center.
DF-Direction Finding.
DIA-Defense Intelligence Agency.
DNI-Director of Naval Intelligence.
ECCM-Electronic Counter-Countermeasures.
ECM-Electronic Countermeasures.
EEI-Essential Elements of Information.
E & E-Evasion and Escape.
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EIC--Economic Intelligence Committee.
ELECTRO-OPTINT-Electro-optical Intelligen e.
ELINT-Electronic Intelligence.
ELSEC-Electronic Security.
EMSEC-Emanations Security.
EOB-Electronic Order of Battle.
ESM-Electronic Warfare Support Measures.
MW'-Electronic Warfare.
FBI-Federal Bureau of Investigation.
FBIS-Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
FCI-Foreign Counterintelligence.
FI-Foreign Intelligence.
FIS-Foreign Instrumentation Signals.
FISINT-Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intel] ;ence.
FLIR, Forward-looking infrared.
FORMAT-Foreign Materiel.
G-DIP-General Defense Intelligence Program.
GMI-General Medical Intelligence.
HPSCI-House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
HRC--Human Resources Committee.
HUMINT-Human Intelligence.
IC Intelligence Community.
ICRS--Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee
(COMIREX).
IDC-Interagency Defector Committee.
IIIC-Intelligence Information Handling Committee.
II-Imagery Interpretation.
IIM-Interagency Intelligence Memorandtmm.
ILC-International Lines of Communications.
1MINT-Imagery Intelligence.
INR--Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depa . went of State.
IOB-Tntelligence Oversight Board.
IRA-Intelligence-Related Activities.
IR&DC-Intelligence Research & Development Cou cil.
I&W-Indications and Warning.
TAEIC-Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Commits e.
JINTACCS-Joint Interoperability Tactical Coma and and Control
System.
LASINT-Laser Intelligence.
MASINT-MMeasurement and Signature Intelligence.
MEDINT-Medical Intelligence.
MI-Military Intelligence.
NFAC-National Foreign Assessment Center.
NFIB-National Foreign Intelligence Board.
NFIP-National Foreign Intelligence Program.
NIl+}-National Intelligence Estimate.
NIO-National Intelligence Officer.
NITC-National Intelligence Tasking Center.
NMIC-National Military Intelligence Center
NOIWON-National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers
Network.
NPIIR-National Foreign Intelligence Plan for Hurd ran. Resources.
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NPIC-National Photographic Interpretation Center.
NSA-National Security Agency.
NSCID-National Security Council Intelligence Directive.
NSOC-National SIGINT Operations Center.
NSRL-National SIGINT Requirements List.
NTPC-National Telemetry Processing Center.
NUCINT-Nuclear Intelligence.
OB--Order of Battle.
OPCON-Operationa1 Control.
OPINTEL-Operational Intelligence.
OPSEC-Operations Security.
OPTINT-Optical Intelligence.
PARPRO-Peacetime Airborne Reconnaissance Program.
PHOTINT-Photographic Intelligence.
PI-Photographic Interpretation or Photographic Interpreter.
PRC.(I)-Policy Review Committee (Intelligence).
RADINT---Radar Intelligence.
RECCE or RECON-Reconnaissance.
RINT-Radiation Intelligence.
S&T-Scientific and Technical.
SA-Signals Analysis.
SAFE---Support for the Analysts' File Environment.
SAO-Special Activities Office.
SCA-Service Cryptologic Agencies.
SCC-Special Coordination -Committee.
SCI-Sensitive Compartmented Information or Source Code
Indicator.
SCO-Service Cryptologic Organizations.
SECOM--security Committee.
SI-Special Intelligence.
SIGINT-Signals Intelligence.
SIGINT Committee-Signals Intelligence Committee.
SIGSEC-Signals Security.
SIRVES-SIGINT Requirements Validation and Evaluation Sub-
committee (of SIGINT Committee).
SLAR-Side-Looking Airborne Radar.
SNIE-Special National Intelligence Estimate.
SOSUS-Sound Surveillance System.
SOTA-SIGINT Operational. Tasking Authority.
SPINTCOMM-Special Intelligence Communications.
SSCI-Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
SSO-Special Security Officer.
STIC-Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee.
TA-Traffic Analysis.
TACINTEL-Tactical Intelligence.
TI-Technical Intelligence.
TELINT-Telemetry Intelligence.
TRANSEC-Transmission Security.
USSID-United States Signals Intelligence Directive.
USSS-United. States Signals Intelligence System.
WSSIC--Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee.
WWMCCS-Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems.
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APPENDIX B-ALTEENATE DEFINIT, CN5
Acoustial intelligence: The technical and inte' igence information
derived from foreign sources which generate wn yes. (Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defense j), the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 3 Sep 74 (U)).
Agent: (1) An individual who acts under the ci rection of an intel-
ligence agency or security service to obtain, or a&v in obtaining, in-
formation-for intelligence or counterintelligence=irposes. (Final Re-
port, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 26.. pril 1976). (2) In
intelligence usage, one who is authorized or instrtx ted to obtain or to
assist in obtaining information for intelligence or counterintelligence
purposes. (Dictionary of Military and Associated'i erms, Dept. of De-
fense (U), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep 74. (U)),,
Agent of influence : An individual who can b used to influence
covertly foreign officials, opinion molders, organi::ations; or pressure
groups in a way which will generally advance Uni ed States Govern-
ment objectives, or to undertake specific action in support of United
States Government objectives. (Final Report, Sen.;.te Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence,, 26 April 1976).
Analysis: In electronic warfare, a study of elee`roma etic radia-
tions to determine their technical characteristics w;d their tactical or
strategic use. (Glossary of Communications-Elect,-ones Terms (U),
JCS, Dec 74).
Assessment : Judgment of the motives, qualifica:4.ions, and charac-
teristics of present or prospective employees or "Ag nts." (Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defer -:e (U), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep 74. (U) ).
.Asset: Any resource--a person, group, relationship, instrument, in-
stallation, or supply-at the disposition of an intelligence agency for
use in an operational or support role. The term is normally applied to
a person who is contributing to a CIA clandestine -mission, but is not
a fully controlled agent of CIA. (Final Report, Senate Select Com.-
mittee' on Intelligence, 26 April 1976.)
Basic intelligence: (1) General reference materia: for use in plan-
ning concerning other countries which pertains to capabilities, re-
sources or potential theaters of operations. See al;--intelligence-.
(Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Dept of Defense (U),
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep 74. (U)). (2) Facti?l, fundamental,
and generally permanent information about all aspi.ts of a nation-
physical, social, economic, political, biographical, ant' cultural-which
is used as a base for intelligence products in support o.- f planning, poli-
cymaking, and military operations. (Final Report, S( nate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976). (3) "Fundana ,ital intelligence
concerning the general situation, resources, capabil ies and vulner-
abilities of foreign countries or areas which may be .;ed as reference
material in the planning of operations at any level ajid in evaluating
subsequent information relating to the same subject.'' (Recommended
Changes to JCS Pub 1, 25 July 1977).
Case officer : A staff employee of the CIA who is reel>onsible for han-
dling agents. (Final Report, Senate Select Committee: on Intelligence,
26 April 1976).
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Cipher: Any cryptographic system in which arbitrary symbols or
groups of symbols represent units of plain text. (Final Report, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Clandestine operations: (1) Intelligence, counterintelligence, or
other information collection activities and covert political, economic,
propaganda and paramilitary activities, conducted so as to assure the
secrecy of the operation. (Final Report, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 26 April 1976). (2) Activities to accomplish intelligence,
counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted
by Governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure
secrecy or concealment. (It differs from covert operations in that em-
phasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on con-
cealment of identity of sponsor.) (Dictionary of Military and Asso-
ciated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep
74. (U)).
Classified information : "Classified information" means information
or material (hereinafter collectively termed "information") that is
owned by, produced for or being in the possession of or under the
control of the United States Government that has been determined by
proper authority to require protection against unauthorized disclosure
in the interest of national security and is so designated. Classification
and Declassification of National Security Information and Material;
(Executive Order No. 11652 as amended, Nov 1977).
Code : A system of communication in which arbitrary groups of
symbols represent units of plain text. Codes may be used for brevity or
for security. Final Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
26 April 1976).
Code word : (1) A word which has been assigned a classification
and a classified meaning to safeguard intentions and information
regarding, a Manned operation. (Final Report, Senate Select Commit-
tee on Tntelhence, 26 April 1976). (2) A word which has been as-
signed aclassification and a classified meaning to safeguard intentions
and information regarding a classified plan or operation. (Communica-
tions Electronics Terminology (U), U.S. Dept, of the Air Force, 15
Nov 73, (U) ). (3) A word which conveys a meaning other than its
conventional one. Prearranged by the correspondents. Its aim is to
increase security. (Glossary of Communications-Electronics Terms
(U), CS, Dec 74).
CODEWORD: (1) A cryptonym used to identify sensitive intelli-
gence data. (Glossary of Communications-Electronics Terms (U),
JCS, Dec 74). (2) A single word selected from those listed in joint
Army, Navy, Air Force publication (JANAP) 299 and subsequent
volumes, and assigned a classified meaning by appropriate authority to
insure proper security concerning intentions, and to safeguard infor-
mation pertaining to actual, real world military plans or operations
classified as Confidential or higher. (Modern Data Communications
Concepts, Language and Media (U), Willaim P. Davenport, Hayden
Book Co.. Inc.. 1.971, (U) ).
Collection: (1) Any one or more of the gathering, analysis dissemi-
nation or storage of non-publicly available information without the
informed express consent of the subject of the information. (USSID
18, Limitations and Procedures in Signals Intelligence Operations of
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the USSS (U), NSA, 26 May 76). (2) The act,,f employing instru-
ments and/or equipment to obtain qualitative r quantitative data
from the test or operation of foreign systems. (.?efense Intelligence
Collection Requirements Manual (C), DIA, 21' Jan 75). (3) Used
ELINT to mean the gathering or collection of ; fie unevaluated and
uninterpreted information about the enemy or pot( utial enemy, Specif-
ically the collection of data from noncommunie ions radiators such
as radars, navigation aids or countermeasures equal inents. (Basic Man-
ual (U), ELIIT Collection Analysis Guide (U), ational Cryptologic
School, 1965, (S)).
Communications intelligence (COMINT) : (1) T'echnical and intel-
ligence information derived from foreign comm tnications by other
than the intended recipients. COMINT is produr 'd by the collection
and processing of foreign communications passel by electromagnetic
means, with specific exceptions stated below, and i y the prooe$sin~g of
foreign encrypted communications. However transmitted, COMINT
shall not include :
1. Intercept and processing of unencrypted vritten communica-
tions, except the processing of written plai t text versions of
communications which have been encrypted ~ r are intended for
subsequent encryption.
2. Intercept and processing of press, propaganda. and other
public broadcasts, except for processing en .ryted or "hidden
meaning" passages in such broadcasts.
3. Oral and wire interceptions conducted tu_der DoD Directive
5200.24.
4. Censorship. (Signals Intelligence (SIGII _T) (U), DOD, 25
Jan. 73).
(2) Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign
communications by other than the intended recipie as:
A. Foreign Communications are all communications except : (1)
Those of the governments of the U.S. and the British Common-
wealth, (2) Those exchanged among private organizations and
nationals, acting in a private capacity of the V'.5, and the' British
Commonwealth, (3) Those of nationals of tht U.S. and British
Commonwealth appointed or detailed by thr governments to
serve in the international organizations.
B. COMINT activities are those which pro, Iuce COMINT by
collecting and processing foreign communicatiM is passed by radio,
wire, or other electromagnetic means, and by the processing of
foreign encrypted communications. However t~ ansmitted, cofec-
tion comprises search, intercept, and direction 1=riding. Processing
comprises range estimation, transinitter/open.I:or it~lentafication,
signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study
of the nlaint.ext, the fusion of these processes3 iitd the reporting
of results.
C. Exceptions to COMINT and COMINT ,, ivities COOMINT
and COMINT activities a defined here do not include: (1) Inter-
cept and processing of unencrypted written cer imutrieations, ex-
cept written plaintext versions of communicatiat. = which have been
encrypted or are intended for subsequent ence lytion, (2) Inter-
cept and processing of press, propaganda and tai Iter public broad-
casts, except for encrypted or "hidden meaning passages in such
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broadcast. (3)' Operations conducted by U.S., U,IC. or Common-
wealth security authorities. (4) Censorship. (5) The interception
and study of non-communications transmissions (ELINT).
(USSID 3, SIGINT Security (U), NSA, 24 Aug. 72).
(3) Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign
communications by someone other than the intended recipient. It does
not include foreign press, propaganda, or public broadcasts. The term
is sometimes used interchangeably with SIGINT. (Final Report, Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Communications security (COMSEC) : (1) Protective measures
taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from tele-
communications of the United States Government related to national
security and to ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications.
(U.S. Intelligence Activities, Executive Order No. 12036, January
1978.) (2) The protection of United States telecommunications and
other communications from exploitation by foreign intelligence serv-
ices and from unauthorized disclosure. COMSEC is one of the mission
responsibilities of NSA. It includes cryptosecurity, transmission se-
curity, emission security, and physical security of classified equipment,
material, and documents. (Final Report, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, April 26, 1976). (3) The protection resulting from the
application of cryptosecurity, transmission security, and emission se-
curity measures to telecommunications and from application of phys-
ical security measures to COMSEC information. These measures are
taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might
be derived from the possession and study of such telecommunications
or to insure the authenticity of such telecommunications. (Glossary of
Communications Security and Emanations Security Terms (U), U.S.
Communications Security Board, Oct. 74). (4) The protection result-
ing from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons informa-
tion of value which might be derived from the possession and study
of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their in-
terpretation of the results of such possession and study. Also called
COMSEC. Communications security includes : A. Cryptosecurity : B.
Transmission Security : C. Emission Security : and D. Physical Secur-
4tv of Communications Security materials and information :
A. Cryptosecurity-The component of communications security
which results from the provision of technically sound cryptosys-
tems and their proper use.
B. Transmission Security-The component of communications
security which results from all measures designed to protect trans-
missions from interception and exploitation by means other than
cryptanalysis.
C. Emission Security-The component of communications se-
curity which results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized
persons information of value which might be derived from inter-
cept and analysis of compromising emanations from cryptoequip-
ment and telecommunications systems.
D. Physical Security-The component of communications se-
curity which results from all physical measures necessary to safe-
guard classified equipment, material, and documents from access
thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. (Diction-
ary of Military and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep. 74. (U) ).
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Compartmentation : (1) The practice of establishii (, special channels
for handling sensitive intelligence information. 'i'he channels are
limited to individuals with a specific need for suel. information and
who are therefore given. special security clearances in order to have
access to it. (Final Report, Senate Select Committi. ;, on Intelligence,
26 April 1976). (2) 1. In SIGINT, special protec.:ion given to the
production and distribution of SIGINT material o especially sensi-
tive nature because of its source, method of proce sing, or content.
2. In COMSEC, restricting the use of specific primal y cryptovariables
to specific operational units grouped together on l Cie basis of their
geographical area or their common participation in a mission or opera-
tion for the purpose of limiting the information l.'otected by these
cryptovariables and thus limiting the adverse impac of a compromise
of these variables. (Basic Cryptologic Glossary (U', NSA, 1971. (3)
1. Establishment and management of an intelligence.; organization so
that information about the personnel, organization, (. activities of one
component is made available to any other component t)nly to the extent
required for the performance of assigned duties. (D itionary of Mili-
tary and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), tl Joint Chiefs of
Staff,3Sep74 (U)).
Compromise : (1) The loss of control over any CO:.1NT or informa-
tion related to COMINT or COMINT activities resul ing in a reasona-
ble assumption that it could have, or confirmation o' the fact that it
has, come to the knowledge of an unauthorized pe -on. (USSID 3,
SIGINT Support to 'Military Commanders (U), NSA, 1 Jul 74).
(2) The known or suspected exposure of classified ink unation or mate-
rial in whole or in part to unauthorized persons th uugh loss, theft,
capture, recovery by salvage, defection of individu, Is, unauthorized
viewing, or
1971). any other means. (Basic Cryptologic Glo nary (U), NSA,
Computer security : The protection resulting from all measures de-
signed to prevent either deliberate or inadvertent t iauthorized dis-
closure, acquisition, manipulation, or modification of classified infor-
mation in a computer system. (Basic Cryptologic Gla.;ary (U), NSA,
1971).
Consumer: An obsolete term for customer. (B. -:ic Cryptologic
Glossary (U), NSA, 1971).
Counterintelligence: (1) Information gathered an I. activities con-
ducted to protect against espionage and other clande ine intelligence
activities, sabotage, international terrorist activities (,r assassinations
conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizaIions or persons,
but not including personnel, physical, document, or communications
security programs. (U.S. Intelligence Activities, Exec -ztive Order No.
12036,,Tan 1978.) (2) Information concerning the prot etion of foreign
intelligence or of national security information and it; collection from
detection or disclosure. (USSID 18, Limitations aw Procedures in.
Signals Intelligence Operations of the USSS (U), N' `A, 26 May 76).
(3) That phase of intelligence covering all. activity det rated to destroy-
mg the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence ictivities and to
the protection of information against espionage, personnel against
subversion, and installations or material against sal. )tage. See also
counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion. (Dictionary of
and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep 74). (4) That aspect of intelligence activity
which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign
intelligence activities and to the protection of information against
espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or material
against sabotage. See also counterespionage, countersabotage, counter-
subversion. (Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Dept. of
Defense (U), the Joint Chief's of Staff, 3 Sep 74 (U) ).
Critical intelligence : Intelligence which is critical and requires the
immediate attention of the commander. It is required to enable the
commander to make decisions which will provide a timely and appro-
Eriate response to actions by the potential/actual enemy. It includes
but it is not limited to the following :
A. Strong indications of the imminent outbreak of hostilities of
any type (warning of attack) :
B. Aggression of any nature against a friendly country :
C. Indications or use of nuclear-biological chemical weapons
(targets) : and
D. Significant events within potential enemy countries that may
lead to modification of nuclear strike plans. (Dictionary of Mili-
tary and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep 74. (U)) .
Critical intelligence message (CRITIC) : A message containing in-
formation indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which
affects the security or interests of the United States or its allies to
such an extent that it may require the immediate attention of
the President. (Defense Special Security Communications System
(DSSCS) Operating Instructions System Procedures (U), NSA,
6 Feb 73).
Cryptography : The enciphering of plain text so that it will be
unintelligible to an unauthorized recipient. (Final Report, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence 26 April 1976).
Cryptomaterial: All COMSEC material bearing the marking
CRYTO or otherwise designated as incorporating cryptographic in-
formation. Classified cryptoequipments, their classified subdivisions
and keying material are considered cryptomaterial even though they
do not bear the CRYPTO marking. (Communications-Electronics
Terminology (U), U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 15 Nov. 73).
Current intelligence : Summaries and analyses of recent events.
(Final Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 26 April
1976).
Defector : A person who, for political or other reasons, has repudi-
ated his country and may be in possession of information of interest to
the United States Government. (Final Report, Senate Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Defense Intelligence Community : The Defense Intelligence Agency,
National Security Agency, and the intelligence components of the uni-
fied and specified command. (IDHS Glossary of Common Acronyms,
Codes, Abbreviations, and Terms Used in Dept. of Defense Intelli-
gence Data Handling Systems (IDHS) Documents (U), DIA, 1970).
Departmental intelligence : (1) Intelligence which any department
or agency of the Federal Government requires to execute its own mis-
sion. (Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defense
.(U), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sept. 74. (U) ). (2) The intelligence
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which Government departments and agencies genes ate in support of
their own activities. (Final Report, Senate Select Gmmittee oil Intel-
ligence, 26 April 1976).
Dissemination : The distribution of information _ntelligence prod-
ucts (in oral, written, or graphic form) to departr ental and agency
intelligence consumers. (Final Report, Senate Se) ct Committee on
Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Double agent : Agent in contact with two opposin ;. intelligence serv-
ices only one of which is aware of the double agent contact or quasi-
intelligence services. (Dictionary of Military and ,ssociated Terms,
Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 .ept. 74. (U) ).
Economic intelligence : Intelligence. regarding foa ign economic re-
sources,- activities, and policies. (Final Report, Sena I e Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Electronic intelligence (ELINT) : (1) That tec): nical and intelli-
gence information derived from foreign electromagnetic noncom-
munications transmissions by other than the inn 'nded recipients.
(Glossary of Communications-Electronics Terms (, ), JCS, Dec. 74).
(2) The intelligence information product of activit.!s engaged in the
collection and processing for subsequent intelligene purposes of for-
eign noncommunications electromagnetic radiation:; emanating from
other than nuclear detonations and radioactive sours . (Basic Crypto-
logic Glossary (U), NSA, 1971). (3) Technical and artelligence infor-
mation derived from the collection (or interception) rnd processing of
foreign electromagnetic radiations (noncommunications) emanating
from sources such as radar. ELINT is part of the } >A/CSS Signals
Tntelligence Mission. (Final Report, Senate Select ..'ommittee on In
telligence, 26 April 1976).
Electronic order of battle (EOB) : A document summarizing the
deployment of enemy noncommunications and conmiunications emit-
ters in a given area. In addition to deployment, the IOB also contains
data as to the function of each emitter. (Basic Man 3 ial (U), ELINT
Collection Analysis Guide (U), National Cryptolog School, 1965).
Electronic security : The detection, identification.. evaluation, and.
location of foreign electromagnetic radiations. (Fin ,.l Report, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Electronic surveillance : Surveillance conducted ar{ a person, group,
or other entity by electronic equipment which is oft a n highly sophis-
ticated and extremely sensitive. (Final Report, Sena,. Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Encipher : To convert a plain text message into urn intelligible form
by the use of a cipher system. (Final Report, Senate :;elect Committee
on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Encrypt : To convert a plain text message into in f intelligible form
by means of a cryptosystem; this term covers the mea 1 Zings of encipher
and encode. (Final Report, Senate Select CommittC, on Intelligence,.
26 April 1976).
Espionage : Clandestine intelligence collection act . vity : This term
.
is often interchanged with "clandestine collection." (Final Report,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 26 April 1974).
Evaluation: (1) Appraisal of an item of inforrrm=tion in terms of
credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy. Appraisal is accom-
plished at several stages within the intelligence prof : ss with progres-
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lively different contexts. Initial evalutions made by case officers and
report officers are focused upon the reliability of the source and the
accuracy of the information as judged by data available at or close to
their operational levels. Later evaluations by intelligence analysts are
primarily concerned with verifying accuracy of information and may,
in effect, convert information into intelligence. Appraisal or evaluation
,of items of information or intelligence is indicated by a standard letter-
number system. The evaluation of the reliability of sources is
,designated by a letter from A through F, and the accuracy of the in-
formation is designated by numeral 1 through 6. These are two entirely
independent appraisals, and these separate appraisals are indicated in
accordance with the system indicated below. Thus, information ad-
judged to be "probably true" received from a "usually reliable source"
is designated "B-2" or "B2" while information of which the "truth
,cannot be judged" received from a "usually reliable source" is des-
ignated "B-6" or "B6":
Reliability of source: A-Completely reliable; B-Usually
reliable; C-Fairly reliable; D-Not usually reliable; E-Un-
reliable; F-Reliability cannot be judged.
Accuracy of information: 1-Confirmed by other sources; 2-
Probably true; 3-Possibly true; 4-Doubtful; 5-Improbable;
6-Truth cannot be judged. (Dictionary of Military and Associ-
ated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3
Sep 74. (U)) .
(2) In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in
terms of credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy. Appraisal is
accomplished at several stages within the intelligence cycle with
progressively different contexts. (Recommended Change to JCS Pub
1, 25 July 197T).
Exploitation : In SIGINT, the production of information from
messages that are encrypted in systems whose basic elements are
known. Exploitation includes decryption, translation, and the solution
of specific controls such as indicators and specific keys. (Basic Cryp-
tologic Glossary (U), NSA, 1971).
Foreign intelligence : (1) Information relating to the capabilities,
intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons,
but not including counterintelligence except for information on inter-
national terrorist activities. (U.S. Intelligence Activities, Executive
Order No. 12036, Jan. 1978.) (2) a. Information concerning the
capabilities, intentions and activities of any foreign power, or of any
non-United States person, whether within or outside the United States
or concerning areas outside the United States. b. Information relating
to the ability of the United States to protect itself against actual or
potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power or its agents.
c. Information with respect to foreign powers or non-United States
persons which because of its importance is deemed essential to the
security of the United States or to the conduct of its foreign affairs.
d. Information relating to the ability of the United States to protect
itself against the activities of foreign intelligence services. (USSID 18,
Limitations and Procedures in Signals Intelligence Operations of the
TTSSS (U), NSA, 26 May 76). (3) Intelligence concerning areas not
under control of the power sponsoring the collection effort. (Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep 74. (U)) .
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Guidance : The general direction of an intell genre effort, par-
ticularly in the area of collection. (Final Report, enate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Integration : In photography, a process by whirl the average radar
picture seen on several scans of the time base inn., be obtained on a
print, or, the process by which several photograpl c images are com-
bined into a single image. (Dictionary of Milita y and Associated
Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint Chiefs of St riff, 3 Sep 74. (U) ).
Intelligence: (1) Foreign intelligence and counte? intelligence. (U.S.
Intelligence Activities, Executive Order No. 12013(3, Jan 78.) (2) The
product resulting from the collection, collation, e aluation, analysis,.
integration, and interpretation of all collected inforr,lation. (Final Re-
port, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 26 Aril 1976). (3) The
product resulting from the collecting and process ig of information
concerning actual and potential situations and coi ltions relating to
foreign activities and to foreign or enemy-held arc.s. This processing
includes the evaluation and collation of the informa 1 ion obtained from
all available sources, and its analysis. synthesis, r id interpretation.
(Basic Cryptologic Glossary (U); NSA, 1971). ( The product re-
sulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, intt ration, and inter-
pretation of all available information which cons -rns one or more
aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operation and which is im-
mediately or potentially significant to military planing and opera-
tions. (Dictionary of Military and Associated Term , Dept. of Defense
(U) the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep 74 (U) ).
Intelligence activities: Sec. 14. (a) As used in 1 uis resolution, the
term "intelligence activities" includes (1) the collecion, analysis, pro-
duction, dissemination, or use of information wb _1i relates to any
foreign country, or any government, political gf ou, a, party, miE tary-
force, movement, or other association in such for gn country, and
which relates to the defense foreign policy, nation 4 security, or re-
lated policies of the United States, and other ae, vity which is in
support of such activities; (2) activities taken toc aunter similar ac-
tivities directed against the United States; (3) cou 1rt or clandestine
activities affecting the relations of the United State : with any foreign
government, political group, party, military force, r ovement or other
association; (4) the collection, analysis, production. dissemination, or
use of information about activities of persons within he United States,
its territories and possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad
whose political and related activities pose, or may be ,onsidered by any
department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrniientality, or em-
ployee of the United States to pose, a threat to the sternal security of
the United States, and covert or clandestine activit.ic directed against
such persons. Such term does not include tactical foreign military in-
telligence serving no national poli.cymaking funct.ior:. (Senate Resolu-
tion 400, June 1977. )
Intelligence cycle : (1) The steps by which informs '.ion is assembled,
converted to intelligence, and made available to use. These steps are
in four phases :
A. Planning and direction : Determination c f. intelligence re-
quirements, preparation of a collection plan, i- uance of orders
and requests to information collection agencies, ,nd a continuous
check on the productivity of collection agencies.
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B. Collection : The exploitation of sources of information by
collection agencies and the delivery of this information to the
proper intelligence processing unit for use in the production of
intelligence.
C. Processing : The step whereby information becomes in-
telligence through evaluation, analysis, integration, and
interpretation.
D. Dissemination : The conveyance of intelligence in suitable
form (oral, graphic, or written) to agencies needing it. (Dic-
tionary of Military and Associated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U),
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep. 74. (U) ). (2) The steps by which
information is assembled, converted into intelligence, and made
available to consumers. The cycle is composed of four basic phases :
(1) direction: the determination of intelligence requirements,
preparation of a collection plan, tasking of collection agencies,
and a continuous check on the productivity of these agencies;
(2) collection: the exploitation of information sources and the
delivery of the collected information to the proper intelligence
processing unit for use in the production of intelligence; (3) proc-
essing : the steps whereby information becomes intelligence
through evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation; and
(4) dissemination: the distribution of information or intelligence
products (in oral, written, or graphic form) to departmental and
agency intelligence consumers. (Final Report, Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, April 26,1976).
Intelligence estimate : An appraisal of the elements of intelligence
relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining
the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the
probable order of their adoption. (Dictionary of Military and Asso-
ciated Terms, Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 Sep
74. (U)).
Intelligence information: (1) In SIGINT, information which is of
intelligence use to customers whose primary mission does not include
SIGINT operations of technical SIGINT information. (Basic Cryp-
tologic Glossary (U), NSA (P1, 1971). (2) The unevaluated and
uninterpreted information about the enemy or potential enemy. (Basic
manual (U), ELINT Collection Analysis Guide (U), National Cryp-
tologic School, 1965).
Intelligence report : A specific report of information, usually on a
single item, made at any level of command in tactical operations and
disseminated as rapidly as possible in keeping with the timeliness of
the information. Also called INTREP. (Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. Dept. of Defense (U), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3
Sep. 74. (U) ).
Intelligence requirement : A consumer statement of information
needed which is not already at hand. (Final Report, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, 26 April 1976).
Interception : The act of searching for and listening to and/or
recording communications and/or electronic transmissions for the
purpose of obtaining intelligence. (Glossary of Communications-
Electronics Terms (U), JCS, Dec. 1974).
International terrorist activities : Means any activity or activities
which : (a) involves killing, causing serious bodily harm, kidnapping,
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or violent destruction of property, or an attempt or i-redible threat to
commit such acts; and (b) appears intended to end anger a protectee
of the Secret Service or the Department of State or to further political,
social, or economic goals by intimidating or coercing civilian popula-
tion or any segment thereof influencing the policy o1 a government or
international organization by intimidation or coere.on, or obtaining
widespread publicity for a group or its cause; and ( ) transcends na-
tional boundaries in terms of the means by which it. is accomplished,
the civilian population, government, or internation: a organization it
appears intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locate in which its per-
petrators operate or seek asylum. (U.S. Intelligence ?,etivities, Execu-
tive Order No. 12036, 26 Jan. 1978.)
Measurement and signature intelligence (MASIN I'): MASINT is
obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric,
angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependent, modulaN. on, plasma, and
hydromagpetic) derived from sensing instruments )ther than those
normally associated with human communications, electronics intelli-
gence (HUMINT, COMINT, ELINT) or imagery ollection. MAS-
INT includes, but is not limited to, the following d ciplines : Radar
intelligence (RADINT) : Nuclear intelligence (NUCINT) : Uninten-
tional Radiation intelligence (RINT) : Acoustic ir elligence (Non-
Compressible fluids-ACINT: Compressible fluids-ACOUS-
TINT) : Electro-Optic intelligence (El.eetro-OPT ' NT) : Even-re-
lated dynamic measurements photography (OPTL,'T) : and debris
collection. Telemetry intelligence (TELINT) is a sh 'cial category of
signals intelligence (SIGINT) that provides meal