STATEMENT BY MR. W. DONALD STEWART ON THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROGRAM AND ITS RELATION TO POSSIBLE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002900050002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 24, 1978
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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STEWART SECURITY SERVICES
Crystal House i, Apt. 202
1900 South Eads
Arlington, Virginia 22202 [phone]
W. Donald Stewart, President Security Consultant - Investigations
February 24, 1978
Statement by Mr. W. Donald Stewart
The Security Clearance Program
and Its Relation to Possible
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Defense Information
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
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Page (s)
Qualifications of the Author 1
Purpose 1 - 2
The Meaning of a Security Clearance 3
Who Has Access to Classified Data 2 - 5
(A) The Press 2 - 3
(B) The Congress 3
(C) The Military 3 - 5
(D) Civilians 5
Variations in the Investigative Criteria for
a Top Secret Clearance
Adjudications
The Polygraph for Security Screening
5 - 6
6 - 7
7 - 9
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The Security Clearance Program
and Its Relation to
Possible Unauthorized Disclosures of
Classified Defense Information
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Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Defense Information
This statement is being voluntarily furnished by W. Donald Stewart
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence specifically for the at-
tention of the Subcommittee on Secrecy and Disclosure.
Qualifications of Author
I served as an FBI Agent from July 1951 until August 1965, the last
nine years as an Espionage Supervisor at FBI Headquarters, and from:
August 13, 1965 until December 1972 as Chief Investigator for the Office
of the Secretary of Defense with the primary responsibility of investi-
gating Unauthorized Disclosure cases. Because the Directorate for
Inspection Services (DINS), commonly known then as the Secretary of
Defense's Inspector General group, was phased out for economy purposes,
I was appointed Inspector General of the newly. formed (October 1972)
Defense Investigative Service where I remained until I retired on
June 30, 1975. During my tenure in DINS .1 handled 222 Unauthorized.
Disclosure investigations and numerous major criminal and counterintelli-
gence investigations in accordance with the provisions of Department of
Defense Directive 5210.50 entitled "Investigation of and Disciplinary
Action Connected with Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Defense
Information" dated April 29, 1966, which made DINS the focal point of
all such violations, and with the provisions of Department of Defense
Instruction 5200.22 entitled "Reporting of Security and Criminal Viola-
tions" (to DINS) dated September 12, 1966.
In April 1969 I prepared a pamphlet entitled "Analysis of Unautho-
rized Disclosure Investigations." This consisted of a review of 125
investigations conducted between March 1965 and March 1969. I described
the whole program - Background, Authority, Source of Unauthorized Dis-
closures, Mechanics of Handling, Program Improvement, Positive Results,
Personality Characteristics of Individuals Responsible for Unauthorized
Disclosures, the Question of Prosecution, and observations.
Since I retired I have written a book entitled "Leaks" (not yet
published) and founded Stewart Security Services.
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is twofold. One purpose is to show how
haphazard the Security Clearance Program operates, and secondly to show
that weaknesses in our Security Clearance Program could be responsible
for unauthorized disclosures of classified information through the
improper conferring on of a security clearance on an undeserving person
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or through the failure to remove a person's security clearance when
the person becomes a security risk for one of several reasons.
Specifically, this paper reflects who has access, legally and
illegally, to classified Defense data; examples of weaknesses in our
Security Clearance Program permitting undesirables to obtain a security
clearance; variations in the investigative criteria for a Top Secret
clearance;. how security clearances are adjudicated, along with an idea
for a Central Adjudication Branch for economy, security and privacy
purposes, and finally the introduction of the use of the polygraph for
pre-enployr nt checks and for background checks. The polygraph could
minimize invasion of an individual's privacy, expedite his date of
employrrent and clearance, and save the U.S. Govern nt a large amount of
money in various ways.
Hopefully, the Committee will recognize the need to bring the
entire Security Clearance Program into proper focus with appropriate
standardization and safeguards to all persons concerned.
The Meaning of a Security Clearance
What does a security clearance mean? Actually it means that a
designated authority has sanctioned a person's access to view classified
defense material at a level of Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret.
Actually there are also what are called "Exotic" clearances or "Special"
clearances which are over and above Top Secret.
Who Has Access to Classified Data
(A) The Press
The press does not, in fact, legally get a security clearance;
however, they are often given "Backgrounders," which are fankiliarization
lectures in order to-prepare them to write a story. These generally
contain classified defense information. There is a stipulation that the
data imparted is "Off the Record." In 1969, there was a case where a
Vice Admiral compromised our 10-year lead over the Soviets on Anti-
Submarine Warfare. Reportedly the press was not told the "backgrounder"
was. "off the record" and 14 papers ran the story. But, then again, what
authority exists by anyone to confer a clearance on any mesriber 6f. the
press through a "backgrounder," "off the record." When rembers of the
press are taken into the Defense Department's Office of Public Affairs,
a Top Secret background investigation is conducted before the clearance
is conferred.
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(B) The Congress
Members of Congress are awarded a Top Secret clearance by virtue
of the fact they are elected to Congress, so said the late Mendel L.
Rivers, on February 1, 1965, when as Chairman of the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee, he addressed his Committee and, in particular, the
new rrexribers. Interestingly enough, Representative Robert Leggett was
then a new member of the Committee and later came to the public's atten-
tion because of his indebtedness due to his association with a mistress
and fathering illegitimate children. Not too long ago, Representative
Frank Horton was jailed for drunken driving. And while Congressman
Rivers headed his above Comni.ttee, he was known to imbibe heavily, very
heavily, but in none of the above cases was there any thought of remov
ing the Coongressman's clearance. Yet, in any other Government Depart-
ment, such conduct, as above, would cause the person to be cited as a
"Possible Security Risk" and his access to classified defense data could,
and probably would, be suspended.
As a matter of possible interest, a request by David Young, then
the White House Plumber Chief, -to Fred Buzhardt, then Defense Department
General Counsel, caused me to conduct an investigation concerning leaks
attributed to Congress. The results were incorporated in a report dated
February 13, 1973, entitled: "Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified
Defense Information Possibly Attributable to Members of Congress and/or
their Staffs." This was requested by David Young at a time when the
White. House and Congress were pointing the finger at each other as to
who the biggest leaker was. The report reflected the loose handling of
classified data by Congressional people; the "bootlegging" of classified
data to Congressmen; the lack of accountability of material sent from
the Depa.rtnent of Defense to the Hill; and in one case the refusal of a
staff member to execute a Personnel Security History form so a background
investigation could be conducted of him.
(C) The Military
All enlisted personnel at the time of entry into the Armed Services
are given a National Agency Check (NAC). This consists of the individual's
name and birth date being run through the appropriate indices of the FBI,
State Department, and CIA. Also, the person is fingerprinted; however,
his fingerprints are not checked at the FBI, only the name from his finger-
print card is checked in the indices of the Identification Division of
the FBI. 'So what happens if the individual gives a false nacre and birth
date when he enters the service? Naturally, all such checks are worthless;
however, the enlisted man receives a Secret clearance based on a clean
NAC.
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What proof of identification must he have to enter the service and
later obtain his Secret clearance? He must produce a high school
diploma and a birth certificate. Are they verified? Yes, the mili-
tary recruiter causes checks to be made at the high school and the
appropriate Bureau of Vital Statistics. What does that do? It merely
inform the recruiter that John Jones graduated from Holy Mount High
School - it does not tell the recruiter if John Jones is white or
black, tall or short, blonde or redheaded. The Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics merely informs that one male was born on such and such a date
to William and Doris Jones, perhaps it might gratuitously give the
baby's name as John. Can the required documentation be fabricated?
Yes, I've had a couple of national news stories on this weakness in
our security program, but to no avail. Additionally, no change has
been made even in view of the fact that last summer it was discovered
that 500 Panamanian aliens enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps by util-
izing fabricated docu rents. Can this be stopped? Yes, by requiring
the enlisted to submit the naves and addresses of three references who
should be interviewed to verify the John Jones is the person he pur-
ports to be, and also to have the FBI do a search of his fingerprints
from the fingerprint card he submits.
Do you have any examples of people entering the service illegally
other than the above 500 Panamanians? Yes, about two years ago I had
a national news story about Thomas Ragner Faernstroiu who reenlisted
fictitiously ten times during a 13-month period between November 1973
and January 1975, collecting approximately $30,000 in bonus. Subse-
quent interviews with him revealed he had done this over a 10-year
period and bilked the U.S. Government out of $600,000.. A check of his
fingerprints would have uncovered him at any stage.
Last July a 28 year old North Carolina m n-was arrested and held
40 days as a deserter from the Army in spite of his protests that he
never joined. Someone else joined using his identification which he
had previously lost. An FBI fingerprint check would have probably
nipped this fraudulent enlisttrent in the bud at the enlistment stage
as the fraudulent enlistee rmst likely couldn't get in under his own
identity.
In January 1975, a sailor in Seattle, Washington hi-jacked a Navy
plane and was subsequently caught. Later it was developed that a year
before he had been discharged from the marine Corps as a mental case.
An FBI fingerprint check would have surfaced him.
Actually on the subject of poor security I have acted in the ca-
pacity of a one-mn vigilante committee before I retired and for
2-1/2 years since without success. I could cite example after example,
but the purpose here is not to show how the vulnerability to our
security exists from the fact that you are an accepted person. Since
you live with people who have Top Secret clearances, they are likely
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to impart data to you because you are a serviceman like them. Further,
you have a legitimate right to be in the proximity of certain areas
which contain Top Secret data and are likely to learn about them be-
cause you are accepted as another service person. Actually, one ser-
vice person does not enter a room and say, prior to a conference,
"Plho's got Top Secret here? I want to 'shoot my mouth off'."
The 500 illegal Panamanian aliens who joined the U.S. Marine Corps
undoubtedly got some exposure that probably the Marines wish they
hadn't. Further, wouldn't it be ironic if our U.S. Marine Corps be--
came engaged later in a battle in Panama and net stiff resistance and
learned later the enemy was trained in our U.S. Marine Corps camps?
Hopefully that won't happen.
(D) Civilian Employees
Civilian employees and Department of Defense contractor employees
have access to classified information. Most are awarded a Secret clear-
ance on a straight National Agency Check (NAC). If, however, any deroga-
tory data develops, an investigation is undertaken to resolve the
matter.
Civilian employees requiring a Top Secret investigation undergo a
thorough background check involving verification of birth data, resi-
dencies, employment, and interviews of references.
Variations in the Investigative Criteria
for a Top Secret Clearance
The FBI, Defense Investigative Service (DIS), and the Civil Service
Corrmission.(CSC) each do background investigations for Top Secret clear-
arms. Possibly State Department and the CIA also do their own. How-
ever, my point is that the criteria differ and to this end I'll speak
of the variations in the FBI, DIS, and CSC criteria for a Top Secret
clearance.
If there is any specific interest here, I have written a detailed
paper dated February 25, 1975 entitled "Criteria for Security Clearances"
where I go into greater depth. Briefly, the FBI is the only one of the
three which is recognized as a polic{ agency and thereby permitted to
review all police agency criminal files in checking for a reference to
the person being cleared for Top Secret. This being so, why do we worry
about a person being a homosexual in connection with his getting a clear-
ance since DIS and CSC are not likely to surface this data? As you may
know, most homosexual subjects are often booked. by a police departnnt
in the category of "Disorderly Conduct," given a small fine and released.
For example, a forcer Special Assistant to former President Lyndon Johnson
was arrested at a YMCA in Washington, DC, in about 1963, for his
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participation in a homosexual affair. If this affair had happened
in New York City, for example, and DIS or CSC had been conducting a
background check based on the fact that Jenkins lived in New York
once, neither having access to NYPD files could have uncovered this
arrest, but, of course, the FBI, having such access, would have the
data, would probably have caused him to be denied a clearance as a
possible security risk. There are also other crimes which would not
necessarily cause the person's fingerprints to be forwarded to FBI
Headquarters and his arrest would go undetected during a fingerprint
check of FBI files.
Let's look at the scope of an investigation. The FBI does
neighborhoods for only the last five years unless derogatory data is
developed. DIS and CSC go back for 10-15 years. The FBI verifies
birth data from records and not Bureau of Vital Statistics' records
as does DIS and CSC. FBI checks three listed references and no de-
veloped references are sought unless derogatory data is developed. If
a listed reference is not available when the FBI knocks on his door,
no effort is made to locate him again. DIS and CSC locate all listed
references if possible.
The House Appropriations Contnittee hearings in April 1975 re-
flected that based on its. review of DIS and CSC from May 1974 to
November 1974, the following was noted. DIS charged $390/investigation
and CSC charged $604. At that time FBI charged $799. DIS cases aver-
aged 19.8 leads/case whereas CSC averaged 30.7. DIS reports averaged
four pages and CSC averaged 21 pages. FBI then operated under a 30-day
deadline whereas DIS and CSC were taking in the neighborhood of 45-60
days. In regard to updating 'lbp Secret clearances, FBI never updates
those of its personnel; CIA updates its personnel every 3-5 years, and
the Defense Department does a 5-year bring-up.
Adjudications
Who decides who gets the clearance after the background investi-
gation is done? The Defense Investigative Service at one time ser-
viced 1400 customers. That meant that each customer would get a full
background investigation on its person and determine if he or she
qualified for a clearance. I can't personally state that much addi-
tional .investigation was often requested because the adjudicator
wouldn't make a decision on the facts available. Yet, more than. likely
another adjudicator in the same agency could have - that's the differ-
ence between experience and lack of it.
Most important is the fact that the 1400 agencies had in their
files much personal data on the person being cleared and this data,
in my opinion, should not be in the files of the agency. The natural
solution would be a Central Adjudication Branch within DoD,
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for example, which would handle and retain all background investiga-
tive reports and simply inform the customer that based on the results
of the background investigation the Department of Defense is awarding
John Jones a Secret or Top Secret clearance. Much is saved in logis-
tic costs in this manner because every agency doing its own adjudica-
tion must have its own classified file room complete with personnel.
Also, many potential invasion of privacy suits could be avoided be-
cause personal background data would be much more restricted. No one
at the agency has any need to know personal type data offered during
the investigation about one of the employees being cleared. I per-
sonally have had complaints from employees about the discussion of
such personal data such as age, past marriages, etc., contained in
investigative reports on Personal History Questionnaires executed by
the person being cleared.
The Polygraph for Security Screening
When the idea of using a polygraph is mentioned, instant resent
meant takes place. Immediately every one thinks in terms of its use
being to convict someone; however, the polygraph is often used for
exculpating purposes. Also, it is used for a veracity check such as
was recently done during the interviews in Korea with Tongsun Park.
Its use in connection with the Justice Department interviews of Park
more or less set a precedent as far as the Government is concerned in.
that it places a great deal of belief in the ability of the polygraph
to show deception which does not necessarily mean guilt.
Now, let's consider using the polygraph for general security
screening. What I would propose is simply taking in hand the Person-
nel Security Questionnaire, FD 398, which all persons requiring a
clearance must execute, and one by one reviewing each question with
the applicant. For instance, is your name John Jones? Were you born
April 10, 1928 at New York, New York? Have you ever been arrested?
Did you reside at 1212 Vermont Avenue, Ventnor City,. New Jersey from
1964-1972? etc. This is not an invasion of privacy since we are only
reciting what the applicant has told us. We are not going to dis-
qualify him if he shows deception on the above residence question and
arrest question. We are going to instruct the field investigator to
dig into these areas. We may very well be able to eliminate all other
areas if no deception is noted.
What is the advantage of the polygraph in this type of screening?
There are several. One is probably a quicker clearance for a pre-
employment check enabling the person to report to work earlier. Often
while the U.S. Government is checking out someone, the person becomes
tired of waiting and gets other employment; hence, all the investiga-
tive effort is lost and if the person was to become a Government
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employee, a new recruit must be found. Secondly, in a case that horo
sexuality may be developed during an investigation, a polygraph with
the applicant would reflect deception and confronted with same the
person might make a full disclosure. The alternative to his lack of
cooperation on that subject or other subjects of possible personal
embarrassment is to resolve the derogatory data in a full field in-
vestigation. Even if the person is determined not to have committed
the suspected act, be what it may, the line of questioning pursued in
neighborhoods where the person now lives and formerly lived, as well
as present and past employment, leaves him with a stigma.
In the case of the military enlisttee, the polygraph again being
used to just verify what the enlistee has told us becomes an excellent
screening device and may even serve to expedite his entrance into the
service. On the other hand, at the recruiter level, the utilization
of a polygraph at the'recruiter level may also surface a potential
fraudulent enlistee, thereby saving the U.S. Government a great deal
of money by eliminating associated cost with processing and training
a recruit. The polygraph could indicate that the potential recruit is
or has been a drug user, is presently a fugitive from justice, or has
served time for a crime which would disqualify him from military ser-
vice, is not the person he purports to be, has certain physical limi-
tations, etc. Again, only his questionnaire is being reviewed with
him.
In a July 8, 1976 Los Angeles Times newspaper article entitled
"At Least.1 in Every 250 Recruits Enlisted Fraudulently, Pentagon
Figures Disclose" by Norman Kempster, 1,935 cases of fraudulent en-
listments came to the attention of the military during a 15-month
period ending March 31, 1976. What the article does not bring out is
that these people for the most part surfaced themselves in order to
gee: dischargeca.. T have to ac i.t that when economic condition, are
not the best that the $403/month pay, plus room and board and a cloth-
ing allowance for a Private in the military, can look awfully good.
Locally I can think of Army Private Angel, who killed two
Montgomery County (Maryland) police officers after a bank robbery
about two years ago as being one of the persons falling into the
fraudulent enlistment group. He was not truthful in the papers he
executed before entering the service. Whether it would or would not
have altered the death of the two Montgomery County police officers,
I cannot say. I can say that a pre-enlistment screening by polygraph
would probably have excluded him and saved the Army a great deal of
tine and expense associated with his induction and training and em-
barrassment to its service. Angel was also a suspect in a murder
prior to entering the service.
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Another point, not only in favor of expediting the investiga-
tion of a civilian or military employee and saving related costs, is
that many areas where a person may have formerly resided or was
employed are now considered "high risk" areas and are not normally
entered by Defense Investigative Service agents because of possible
personal jeopardy. Therefore, to develop the fact a person lived
there or worked there, other investigation must be. launched to
verify same. A similar but less dangerous type of a case is one
where a person has listed a residence or employment, necessary to
be verified being in that part of this country which is 400-500
miles from the nearest investigative office, making it necessary
for an investigator to take a road trip to the location. A poly-
graph might well resolve our interests in this matter.
in closing, I believe our present Security Clearance Program
and pre-employment check could be upgraded by use of the polygraph.
At the same time in many cases there would be a substantial saving
to the U.S. Governrc nt and a minim= of invasion of privacy to an
applicant.
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
TO:
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To 3: In his memo of 22 February, the
DCI sent along to you Mr. Stewart's
earlier testimony before the SSCI. The
attached is provided for your information
and appropriate action in that
ecutive 5e4rbtdFj
28 Feb 78
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