REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002900020039-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: June 23, 1978
• Content Type: TELEGRAM

Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7 SSC
08/12/ ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,4, , ,
ACTION: NONE INFO: CMASS-E ( ), ODPS-S, RF, FILE, DDU-4, CA-3,
CI-3, CR/FE, CRG/EA EA-6, LPS/EG-2, ICS, NIO/EAP, (I ORPA/NOA-2,
SA/DO/O, SiA/FLCS/RF {32-W}
PAGE 001-43 NC 0889292
TOR: 230947Z JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/1 1740944
ZNR UUUUI! ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE vjASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0160
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF wASHDC PRIORITY 0571
RUEAIIA/ CIA "ASHOC PRIORITY 0518
61
UNCLAS SECTION 1 0'F` 15 STATE 159962
'T'kRv
E.U. 11652:
SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE.
CASE STUDY.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: A
J_OLC #78-2Jt ./.1
C`Foh1/~1Fiy1~rA-J (yS
! V
THE FOLLOiNING IS THE REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE/ 3,~ )e- ON INTELLIGENCE, RELEASED AT 6:00 P.M. E.D.T., /J qu-j
THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1978, RE ACTIVITIES OF 'FRIENDLY' ~C
THIS REPORT SETS FORTH THE RESULT OF A YEAR-LONG INVESTI-
GATION INTO THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES 611H RESPECT TO ALLEGED IMPROPRIETIES BY THE
GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTATIVES AND AGENTS OF SOUTH KOREA IN
THE UNITED STATES.
THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION NAS CONDUCTED AS A CASE STUDY
OF THE ACTIVITIES OF 'FRIENDLY' INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
IN THE UNITED STATES. THE SOUTH KOREAN CASE WAS SELECTED
AND MUCH INFORMATION AS ALREADY AVAILABLE. THE COMMITTEE
IS EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS THAT HAVE
BEEN iAADE ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF SOME OTHER
57
Sr
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889292 PAGE 002 NC 0869292
TOR: 230947Z JUN 78
-----------------
- - - - - - w w - w w - - - - - w w - - w - - w ? - - w - ! - - - - - - - - - ? w - - - - - - - w - w - .
FRIENDLY
COUNTRIES. THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK
TO ASCERTAIN THE EXTENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF
OTHER GOVERNMENTS WITH WHOM THE UNITED STATES HAS GOOD
RELATIONS AS WELL AS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO
THESE ACTIVITIES.
THE PARTICULAR FOCUS OF THE COMMITTEE, IN EXAMINING THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD AND INTERVIEWING KEY EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OFFICIALS,HAS BEEN ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT KNEW OF THE KOREA" GOVERNMENT'S ACTIVITIES,
THE DECISIONS THAT WERE MADE, AND THE RESULTING ACTIONS
WHICH WERE OR WERE NOT TAKEN. THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD, MOST OF IT BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE
REPORTING, vAS EXTENSIVEr DETAILED, AND CURRENT. THAT
KNOWLEDGE RANGED FROM SIMPLE ANARENESS AS EARLY AS 1963
THAT THE KOREAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WAS MONITORING THE
ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, TO
KNOWLEDGE BY 1971-73 THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WAS
ATTEMPTING BY UNLAWFUL MEANS TO INFLUENCE AND SOMETIMES
INTIMIDATE HUNDREDS OF KOREAN NATIONALS WHO WERE
LIVING IN THIS COUNTRY, IT INCLUDED KNOWLEDGE IN 1971,
NOT ONLY OF PLANS TO IMPROPERLY INFLUENCE MEMBERS OF
THE U.S. CONGRESS, BUT ALSO OF UNLAWFUL PAYMENTS THAT
HAD ACTUALLY BEEN MADE THAT SAME YEAR TO MEMBERS OF THE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH TO INFLUENCE U.S. LEGISLATIVE ACTION.
MOST OF ThIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED BY THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AS A BY-PRODUCT OF THEIR
ROUTINE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE WORK. NONE OF IT WAS
OBTAINED AS THE RESULT OF SPECIFIC LEVIED REQUIREMENTS,
AND NO INTELLIGENCE AGENT WAS EVER DIRECTED
SPECIFICALLY TO FOCUS ON THE SUBJECT IN A COMPREHENSIVE
WAY. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NEVER SET AS AN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTIUN PRIORITY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER 'FRIENDLY'
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WERE CONDUCTING ACTIVITIES
DIRECTED AT OFFICIALS OR OTHER RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES. ALTHOUGH MUCH OF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED WAS
DISSEMINATED TO THOSE COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
WITH LAY: ENFORCEMENT OR FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSIBILITIES,
SOME PIECES OF RELEVANT INFORMATION WERE NEVER
PASSED ON TO ANYONE IN A POSITION TO TAKE ACTION. THE
Approved For Release 2006107/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889292 PAGE 003
TOR: 2309472 JUN 78
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES' DISSEMINATION OF THE INFORMATION
WAS UNFOCUSED, HAPHAZARD, AND WITHOUT USEFUL ANALYSIS.
AT NO TIME BEFORE 1975 WAS A FULL AND COMPLETE 'PACKAGE'
EVER PRESENTED TO ANYONE WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE INTEL-
LIGENCE COWWUNITY REFLECTING THE FULL SCOPE, EXTENT,
AND IMPLICATIONS OF KOREAN ACTIVITY. ALTHOUGH OVER
SEVERAL YEARS MUCH OF THE INFORMATION WAS
DISSEMINATED ON AN AD HOC BASIS TO VARIOUS LEVELS AND
COMPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, IT WAS NOT UNTIL 1975 THAT
ANY SENIOR ACCOUNTABLE FEDERAL OFFICIAL, THOUGH
KiNO'LE.DGEABLE, ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM IN A COMPREHENSIVE
WAY,,
THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION WHICH
WAS DISTRIBUTED WAS OF SUFFICIENT SIGNIFICANCE TO HAVE
MERITED EARLIER ACTION. THE COMMITTEE HAS
EXAMINED THE FULL RECORD OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND HAS
CONCLUDED THAI PRIOR TO 1975 NO EFFECTIVE ACTION WAS
TAKEN BY ANYONE IN AUTHORITY TO HALT WHAT WAS GOING ON.
SOME CONCERNED OFFICIALS DID BRING THE KEY ISSUES TO THE
ATTENTION OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES; HONEVEk,
THOSE NOTIFICATIONS WERE NOT ACTED UPON IN A MANNER
COMMENSURATE "ITH THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ACTIVITIES
INVOLVED.
THE CONHITIEE HAS ALSO INVESTIGATED THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER 1HERE AAS AN INTENTIONAL 'COVER-UP' BY EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OFFICIALS, AND WE HAVE DISCOVERED NO EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION. VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF HOW
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS GENERALLY HANDLED RE-
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADS"SIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: r , r 4r r r
AC1 ION: IO .E INFO: UDPS-S, RF, FILE, (2/o)
ww---------w------------------ mm- W w----mm------M W M--M---wwww w----wwlw~w.~a ~iw ~wfit:
78 0889290 PAGE 001'y NC 0889298
at TOR: 230949Z JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC 19962/2 1740945
ZNk UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE wASHDC
TO ROAKOHA/AMEr,-PASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0161
INFO RUEKJCS/ SELDEF tiASHOC PRIORITY 0572
RUEAIIA/ CIA vuASHDC PRIORITY 0519
6 T
UNCLAS SFCT1D+\\ 2 OF 15 STATE 1599b2
LATIONS w1TH FRIENDLY FOREIGN IIvITELLIGE"CE SERVICES IN
THE PAST, THE LACE OF EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY ACTION IS
UNDERSTANDABLE, &LIT wE bELIEVE THAT +NEw POLICIES AND NEM
PROCED.'PES MUST iiE DEVISED TO INSURE THAT THIS KIND OF
PRUBLE' DOES NOT RECUR.
THIS STUDY DIE N01 ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE EFFICACY
OF U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: EFFORTS AGAINST HOSTILE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES. THE RECENT'
INDICTMENT INVOLVING ALLEGED SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN THE NEV, YORK CITY AREA DRAMATIZES THE
CONTINUED GRAVITY OF THAT PROBLEM?'M, AND THE COMMITTEE
vvILL SPECIFICALLY REPORT UN BOTH THE MAGNITUDE OF THE
SOVIET THREAT AS +ELL AS THE ADEQUACY OF THE U.S.
RESPONSE IN DUE COURSE. IT IS BEYOND QUESTION THAT THE
ACTIVITIES OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE
UNITED STATES POSE A MORE DIRECT THREAT TO THE SECURITY
OF OUR NATION AND AN EVEN GREATER INFRINGEMENT ON THE
LIBERTIES OF OUR CIIIZEI'JRY THAN DO A FEvd RANDOM, ALBEIT
INTENSIVE, OPERATIONS E3Y THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF
OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. INDEED, IT IS THE COMMITTEE'S
VIEvw THAT THE AMOUNT OF ATTENTION AND RESOURCES
REQUIRED TO BE DEDICATED TO THE THREAT POSED BY HOSTILE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES COULD ACCOUNT FOR THE LACK OF
EFFECTIVE REACTION IN THE KOREA CASE.
IN THE PAST, OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORT HAS FOCUSED
UPON THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF OUR ADVERSARIES. NOT
OUR FRIENDS AK.0 ALLIES. PERHAPS, AS ONE COUNTERINTEL-
LIGENCE OFFICER PUT 11, 'wE HAVE ENOUGH 10 UO JUST
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889290 PAGE 001-1-l' NC 0889298
TOR: 230949Z JUN 78
as s sa a s aaaa aaafaaaaasasaasaasaasaaasaaafaaaaaaaasa aaalw a as a a a a sa a saass a asasaa'
TRYING TO STAY UP V ITh THE KGB.' WHATEVER THE REASON,
IT IS CLEAR THAT NO MEANS HAVE YET BEEN DESIGNED TO
PREVENT 'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES FROM
ACTING IN WAYS THAT HAVE AND STILL COULD SUBVERT OUR LAWS
AND SUBJECT OUR CITIZENS TO INTIMIDATION BY FOREIGN
POw !ERS. OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DO NOT SYSTEMATICALLY
ASCERTAIN THE IDENTITIES OF AND/OR THE ASSIGNMENTS OF
AGENTS OR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OF 'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS vthO ARE IN, OR ARE COMING TO, THE UNITED
STATES IN 'COVER' CAPACITIES. MOREOVER, IN CASES WHERE
THE UNITED STATE5 GOVERNMENT BECOMES INCIDENTALLY AWARE
THAT SUCH AN OFFICER IS IN THE UNITED STATES 10
FULFILL AN OPERATIONAL, AS OPPOSED TU A LIAISON FUNCTION,
NO STEPS ARE TAKEN TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THAT
FUNCTION UNLESS THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT HE IS
VIOLATING UNITED STATES LAW. THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY DOES NOT COMMAND SUFFICIENT MEANS, RESOURCES,
OR MANPOMER TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF 'FRIENDLY'
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES' ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.
ONE OF THE KEY QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE ANSWERED IS 10 WHAT
EXTENT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOWINGLY
PERMIT ANY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO CONDUCT
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES. THE ANSWER TO THIS
BASIC QUESTION 15 IN PART ANSWERED BY OUR OWN NEED TO
CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ABROAD. IF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT ARRESTS OR EXPELS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS OR AGENTS, THEN IT RISKS FOREIGN RETALIATION
AGAINST U.S. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIVES, INNOCENT U.S.
CITIZENS, OR THE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THE
UNITED STATES. AS THE SITUATION Now STANDS, THERE ARE
NO FORMAL RULES, NO WRITTEN AGREEMENTS, AND NO DEFINITIVE
LIMITATIONS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE SER-
VICES. PERHAPS IT CANNOT BY OTHERV%ISE. BUT, THERE MUST
BE A RECOGNITION THAT THE ISSUES AND PRACTICES REVEALED
BY THE KOREAN CASE HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED, AND UNLESS THEY
ARE, OTHER CASES OF ABUSE WILL SURELY ARISE.
FINDINGS OF FACT
WITHIN WEEKS AFTER THIS INVESTIGATION BEGAN, IT BECAME
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006107/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889290 PAGE 000c NC 0889298
P, I TOR: 230949Z JUN 78
---r-r-r--------- r---- ----- rw---w--w---rr----wr-r--r-rrr--?r?r-r-r---?-w'-----?
APPARENT THAT THERE WERE CRUCIAL ISSUES TO BE DEALT
WITH WHICH 0NT BEYOND THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FIRST BECAME AWARE THAT AGENTS
OF THE SOUTH KOREAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (KCIA) WERE
ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO IMPROPERLY INFLUENCE THE U.S.
CONGRESS. A REVIEW OF ALL AVAILABLE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS CONCERNING THE KCIA MADE CLEAR THAT KCIA
OFFICIALS WERE 'OPERATIONAL' IN THE UNITED STATES AS EARLY
AS 1963, JUST T6U YEARS AFTER THE KCIA WAS FORMED. AT
THAT TIME, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED A REPORT
FROM ONE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES THAT KCIA OFFICERS
HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO MONITOR THE ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN
RESIDENTS IN LOS ANGELES AND TO SOLICIT THEIR SUPPORT
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAK CHUNG-HI. THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE THAT ANY ACTION WAS TAKEN BY ANY STATE DEPARTMENT
OFFICIAL, NOR WAS ANY CONCERN EXPRESSED, AT THAT TIME.
IT IS REASONABLE 10 ASSUME THAT THERE AOULD BE PUBLIC
ACCEPTANCE OF THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF LIAISON
WITH OUR UVN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO EXCHANGE INFORMA-
TIUN OF MUTUAL BENEFIT. ACCORDINGLY, THE 1963 INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS RAISED FOR THE COMMITTEE THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION
OF PRECISELY WHAT THE PRACTICES ARE.
1. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT USUALLY NOTIFIED BY MOST
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WHEN 'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS ARE ASSIGNED HERE. ALTHOUGH OUR OAN INTELLI-
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP8.1 MOO98OR002900020039Nl,_ A ROT F T Fr,
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,4, , . ,
7E. 08893 '3- PAGE 0017 NC 0889303
P_ ct ;2- TOR: 230950Z JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/3 1740947
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FMM SECSTATE d%ASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0162
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF N,'ASHDC PRIORITY 0573
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0520
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 15 STATE 159962
GENCE AGENCIES ARE AVARE OF WHOM THEIR OVvN LIAISON COUNTER-
PART IS, NEITHER U.S. INTELLIGENCE, NOR ANY OTHER PART
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, EVER RECEIVES ROUTINE
NOTIFICATION OF ALL 'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS N;HU ARE ASSIGNED 10 EMBASSIES OR MISSIONS IN
THIS COUNTRY. MOREOVER, IN THOSE CASES WHERE OUR OWN
INTELLIGENCE LIAISON OFFICERS MIGHT INCIDENTALLY BECOME
AWARE OF THE IDENTITIES OF 'FRIENDLY' INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS WHO ARE STATIONED IN THE UNITED STATES, THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT USUALLY INFORMED, NOR DOES THE
UNITED STATES INQUIRE, AS TO THE NATURE OF THEIR DUTIES
AND MISSION.
ROUTINE ACCREDITATION FORMS ARE FILLED OUT BY ALL
FOREIGN DIPLOMATS wHG ARE ASSIGNED HERE, BUT THESE
FORMS CONTAIN NO QUESTIONS, NOR ANY INFORMATION, ABOUT
11JHETHER INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS ARE AMONG THEIR DUTIES.
INDEED, IT APPEARS THAT THE POLICY QUESTION OF WHETHER
SUCH NOTIFICATIONS SHOULD BE REQUIRED HAS NEVER BEEN
DISPOSITIVELY ADDRESSED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
2. THE. QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN FORMALLY ADDRESSED
WHETHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO
PERFORM INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.
THE COMMITTEE'S STUDY HAS REVEALED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE
FUNCTION IS ASSUMED. THE ISSUE OF NOT PERMITTING
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IS NOT CONSIDERED. IN THE
WORDS OF ONE U.S. OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR ACCREDITING
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 08893 PAGE 002~ NC 0889303
10k: 23095OZ JUN 78
--. ace-------es.- . neaa+wOe5 wow50055~-~-w~----osoSeoc SOS--_.~w.. 0550e I
FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, '1 AM SO CONDITIONED TO THE
PERVASIVENESS OF OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
OVERSEAS, THAT I v,DULD NEVER PRESUME TO SUGGEST THAT
OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULDN'T BE ABLE TO PERFORM A SIMILAR
FUNCTION IN THIS COUNTRY.'
ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS
ADDRESSED THE UUESTIUN OF WHETHER PERSONS ACCREDITED AS
FOREIGN DIPLOMATS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO ENGAGE IN OTHER
NONDIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES. FOR INSTANCE, SEVERAL
YEARS AGO, THE DEPARTMENT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ACCREDITED
EMBASSY PERSONNEL DEVOTING SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF THEIR
TIME TO NUNDIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS SUCH AS ATTENDANCE AT
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES OR PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.
AT THAT TIME, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE CIRCULATED A
'NOTE' TO ALL FOREIGN MISSIONS WHICH REMINDED FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS THAT ONE OF THE 'CRITERIA' FOR ACCREDITATION
WAS A REQUIREMENT THAT EACH DIPLOMATIC OFFICER 'DEVOTE
HIS OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES FULL-TIME TO DIPLOMATIC
DUTIES.' THE 'NOTE' CONTINUED:
". . .(T)HE DEPARTMENT HAS LEARNED OF INSTANCES OF
PERSONS WHO, ALTHOUGH ACCREDITED AS DIPLOMATIC
OFFICERS, ARE PRINCIPALLY, IF NOT SOLELY, PERFORMING
DUTIES UNDER CONTRACT AT OR APPOINTMENT WITH ONE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH HEADQUARTERS IN WASHING-
TON. . . . (T)HE DEPARTMENT OF STATE VIEWS SUCH
ARRANGEMENTS AS NECESSARILY COLLATERAL AND SUBORDINATE
TO THE MEMBER'S DIPLOMATIC DUTIES. THEREFORE, SHOULD
THE DEPARTMENT LEARN IN THE FUTURE OF FURTHER INSTANCES
WHERE AN ACCREDITED DIPLOMAT IS PERFORMING DUTIES UNDER
A FULL-TIME CONTRACT OR APPOINTMENT WITH AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, OR IS ABOUT TO BE CONVERTED TO SUCH STATUS,
THE MISSION WILL BE EXPECTED TO RETURN ALL CREDENTIALS
OF THAT DIPLOMATIC OFFICER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AND THAT OFFICER'S NAME WILL BE DELETED FROM THE
DIPLOMATIC LIST.
"THE DEPARTMENT NISHES AGAIN TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE
PLACED ON THE PERFORMANCE OF TRADITIONAL AND ACCEPTED
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889 PAGE 00 `~ NC 0889303
3~~-- TOR: 230950Z JUN 78
DIPLOkATIC'FUNCTIONS BY A DIPLOMATIC OFFICER WHILE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WILL
CONTINUE TO BE UNABLE TO CONSIDER FOR ACCREDITATION ANY
PERSON WHO IS, OR, DURING ASSIGNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, v+ILL BE A STUDENT OR TRAINEE AT OR WITH ANY
COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY, VOCATIONAL SCHOOL, MILITARY
INSTITUTION, OR PRIVATE O.R. GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATION, OR
ENGAGED IN ANY OTHER PURSUIT INCONSISTENT WITH REGULAR
AND ACCEPTED DIPLOMATIC FUNCTIONS. IN THE PAST SOME
GOVERNMENTS HAVE SELECTED OFFICIALS FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES vHO, FOLLOWING ARRIVAL AND SUBSEQUENT
ACCREDITATION AS DIPLOMATS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
HAVE ENTERED UPON AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MILITARY TRAINING
COURSE OR BEEN ASSIGNED AT A PRIVATE RESEARCH
INSTITUTION. THIS PRACTICE IS UNACCEPTABLE. EACH
MISSION SHOULD NOTIFY THE DEPARTMENT WHENEVER ANY OF ITS
OFFICERS TERMINATES DIPLOMATIC DUTIES TO ENGAGE IN ACADEMIC
PURSUITS AND SHOULD AT THAT TIME RETURN APPROPRIATE
CREDENTIALS."
NO NOTE HAS EVER bEEN ISSUED ON THE SUBJECT OF WHETHER
ACCREDITED DIPLOMATS MAY BE ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES If THIS COUNTRY.
3. THE PERMISSIBLE LIMITS OF LAWFUL FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC
LOBBYING OF MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS HAS NEVER BEEN SET
FORTH. THE FULLOvING EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE OCCURRED
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,4, , , ,
78 08893+2- PAGE 00t1b NC 0889312
a, C1 O-L, TOR: 230952Z JUN 78
.. w. w. w. w .. w w w ..... . w w w w w. w w w. w w. w w w w w w w w w w w w w .. w. w w w a w .. ww w w w w. w .. w w w w w w w wa .?
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC 919962/4 1740948
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0163
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF VMASHDC PRIORITY 0574
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0521
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 4 OF 15 STATE 159962
DURING HEARINGS ON RATIFICATION OF THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN 1965:
'QUESTION. A DIPLOMATIC AGENT IS TO DEAL ONLY WITH THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY DR THE HEAD OF STATE OF THE COUNTRY OF
HIS MISSION. HOin STRICTLY IS THIS OBSERVED? TO WHAT
EXTENT DO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS TRY TO INFLUENCE THE PRESS,
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, AND INDUSTRIAL LEADERS WITHOUT
GOING THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT?
ANSWER. IT HAS LONG BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT AS A GENERAL
RULE DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS SHOULD CONDUCT ALL OFFICIAL
BUSINESS N,ITH OR THROUGH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
EXCEPT AS MAY HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE AGREED.
ANY CASE OF FLAGRANT BREACH OF NORMAL DIPLOMATIC
PRACTICE BY OBVIOUSLY IMPROPER CONTACTS IS DEALT WITH BY
THE DEPARTMENT BY MAKING-THE DEPARTMENT'S DISAPPROVAL
KNOWN TO THE DIPLOMATIC MISSION CONCERNED.
MANY DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAVE PRESS ATTACHES AND INFORMA-
TION OFFICERS WHOSE PRINCIPAL DUTY IS TO DEAL WITH THE
NEWS MEDIA. THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS THAT THIS IS A
PROPER DIPLOMATIC FUNCTION, SO LUNG AS THE MISSION DOES
NOT MAKE STATEMENTS OR DISSEMINATE POLITICAL PROPAGANDA
WHICH IS OBJECTIONABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.
THE DEPARTMENT IS, OF COURSE, NOT FULLY INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND SUBSTANCE OF ALL DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
STATE
?wwwww.wwwwww.wwwww www w ww ww r wwww w wwww wwwww swwwsww wwa ~wrwwwwww wwww w wwwww.wwsw ww www,
78 08893LZ PAGE 00(2' t t NC 0889312
TOR: 230952Z JUN 78
w w w w wwww w w w w w w w w w e w w a a w_ a w w~, w a w w w w w a w w ww w w a w w w w s w w w! w w w w w w a w w w w w w w w w wa w w a wl
MATTERS OF POLICY VHICH OIPLOMATIC OFFICERS HAVE WITH
MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS AND WITH INDUSTRIAL LEADERS.
SUCH DIRECT CONTACTS, AS DISTINCT FROM CONTACTS BY
NONDIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
HAVE NOT OCCASIONED ANY SIGNIFICANT COMPLAINT.'
A PROPOSAL NAS MADE BY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS TO
CIRCULARIZE A 'DIPLOMATIC NOTE' ON THE [QUESTION IN 1970,
PARTIALLY AS THE RESULT OF 'IMPROPER' LOBBYING BY
SOUTH KOREA. A DRAFT 'NOTE', CONTAINING A WARNING THAT
ACTIVITIES BY FOREIGN DIPLOMATS OR CONSULAR OFFICERS
INTENDED TO INFLUENCE CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS ON
MATTERS iN WHICH THEIR GOVERNMENT HAS A FINANCIAL OR
OTHER BENEFICIAL INTEREST WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE
UNITED STATES WAS NOT APPROVED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT
BECAUSE OF THE 'DIFFICULTY IN ARRIVING AT AN AGREED
TEXT AND THE DOUBTS GF MANY DESKS ON THE VIISDOM OF
AN INDISCRIMINATE. APPROACH TO ALL EMBASSIES,' INSTEAD,
IT WAS CONCLUDED BY STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS THAT
QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WOULD CONTINUE TO BE DEALT
WITH ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. HOW THOSE ACTIVITIES WERE
DEFINED OR DEALT WITH IN THE KOREAN CASE WILL BE
DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL BELOVW.
4. THE ABSENCE OF ANY PRECISE DELINEATION OF WHAT
'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES MAY AND MAY NOT
DO WITHIN THE UNITED STATES HAS RESULTED IN A LACK OF
CLARITY WITH RESPECT TO JURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF INDIVIDUAL U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. THIS IN TURN
HAS RESULTED IN INEFFECTIVE COVERAGE OF 'FRIENDLY'
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ACTIVITIES.
OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND U.S. INTELw
LIGENCE AGENCIES MAINTAIN THAT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTIVITIES
OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES, THE FBI IN TURN HAS MAINTAINED THAT IT IS
THEIR BASIC POLICY 'TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS ONLY IN
INSTANCES WHERE V WE- RECEIVE ALLEGATIONS INDICATING AN
INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTING A FOREIGN NATION IS ENGAGING IN
ACTIVITIES IN VIOLATION OF OUR LAWS OR OTHERWISE
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 088932" PAGE 002 Cl- NC 0889312
a q TOR: 230952Z JUN 78
wwww..wwwCas sw~rwwwfw wwww wwwwwwwww~ ww 55555 wwwwww wwwwww-wwwwwwwwwww wwwwwwwww wwwww*
CONSTITUTES A SECURITY MENACE.' THE STATE DEPARTMENT
APPARENTLY PRESUMED THAT THE KCIA'S ACTIVITIES IN
LOS ANGELES IN 1963 WOULD NOT HAVE FALLEN INTO EITHER
CATEGORY.
IN 1954 THE FBI DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE PRESENCE OF
'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES POSED POTENTIAL PROBLEMS; HOWEVER, THE CONCERN
WHICH WAS EXPRESSED BY THE BUREAWU AT THAT TIME FOCUSED
PRIMARILY UPON THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE U.S. SECURITY
POSED BY POSSIBLE HOSTILE INFILTRATION BY A 'FRIENDLY'
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. WITHIN THE SOMEWHAT NARROW CONTEXT
OF THAT CONCERN, THE FBI IN 1954 URGED THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO NOTIFY'THE BUREAU
'WHEN INFORMATION IS RECEIVED THAT AN INTELLIGENCE
REPRESENTATIVE OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS COMING TO THE
UNITED STATES.' THE BUREAU'S REQUEST WENT ON TO STATE:
'WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ADVISED IN THE EVENT ANY AGENCY SETS
UP A LIAISON ARRANGEMENT WITH SUCH AN INTELLIGENCE %
REPRESENTATIVE AND TO BE FURNISHED WITH BRIEF DETAILS OF
HIS APPROVED ACTIVITY. THIS INFORMATION IS NEEDED IN
ORDER TO GUIDE THIS BUREAU IN DISCHARGING ITS
RESPONSIBILITIES AND, AT THE SAME TIME, IT WILL ENABLE
US TO ADVISE THE APPROPRIATE AGENCY IN THE EVENT INFORMA-
TION IS RECEIVED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVE IS
ACTING OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF HIS APPROVED ACTIVITY.
SIMILARLY, ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF
THESE INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES COMING TO THE
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , ,
78 08P9344- PAGE 00t, It 3 NC 0889317
,I a TOR: 230954Z JUN 78
ware w ww rwr w wrw rwwwwww rwwww wwwwrw r wrwwwwwwwwwwwrwrwwwrw wwwwr wwwwwwwwwwwwww rwww?
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/5 1740950
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE VtiASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0164
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF VVASHDC PRIORITY 0575
RUEAIIA/ CIA WAShUC PRIORITY 0522
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 5 OF 15 STATE 159962
ATTENTION OF ANY AGENCY WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO BE OUTSIDE
THE SCOPE OF THEIR PRESCRIBED ACTIVITY SHOULD BE BROUGHT
TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS BUREAU. THESE DATA WILL ASSIST
US IN ELIMINATING UNNECESSARY INQUIRIES AND IN CONCENTRA-
TING ON THOSE MATTERS OF THIS TYPE WHICH MERIT CLOSE
ATTENTION.
'WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THIS INFORMATION NJITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES NOW IN THE UNITED STATES
AND, ON A CONTINUING BASIS, WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE
ARRIVALS. OF COURSE, WE DESIRE TO CONTINUE TO BE
FURNISHED DATA CONCERNING SUSPECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPRESENTATIVES WHO ARRIVE AND WITH WHOM NO WORKING
ARRANGEMENT EXISTS.'
THE COMMITTEE HAS EXAMINED THE NOTIFICATIONS WHICH WERE
RECEIVED BY THE FBI KITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREAN
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. MOST OF THOSE NOTIFICATIONS RE-
LATED TO KOREAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS WHO WERE IN THE
UNITED STATTES ON OFFICIAL VISITS OR AS GUESTS OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT. IN 1970 ONE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES SUPPLIED THE BUREAU WITH A COMPLETE LIST OF ALL
SOUTH KOREAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHO WERE THEN KNOWN TO
BE IN THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER WITH THEIR 'COVER'
DESIGNATIONS. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE BUREAU
EVER TOOK ANY ACTION UPON RECEIPT OF THE LIST. WE HAVE
FOUND NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY INQUIRY WAS UNDERTAKEN TO
DETERMINE WHETHER ANY OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ON THE
LIST WERE ACTING 'OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF (THEIR) APPROVED
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 088933-7 PAGE 04,6 i 11 NC 0889317
;L ~-- TOR: 2309542 JUN 78
rrwr----- rrsw rrwrr-" ------ r rrr rwrwrwrrwrrrrwwrrrrrrrr?r ---
ACTIVITIES.' MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, THE COMMITTEE HAS
FOUND THERE 15 NO WRITTEN POLICY, GUIDELINE, RULE OR
REQUIREMENT AVAILABLE TO THE FEI OR ANY OTHER U.S.
AUTHORITY, WHICH ARTICULATES WHAT IS AND WHAT IS NOT
CONSIDERED TO BE 'APPROVED ACTIVITY.'
WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE FBI SHOULD
CONDUCT AN INVES1IGATION TO DETERMINE THE ACTIVITIES OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS STATIONED WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES, BUREAU OFFICIALS HAVE INFORMED THE COMMITTEE:
'(A) SUCH AN UNDERTAKING -'IOULD BE PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE
BECAUSE OF THE NUMBERS INVOLVED. AS ONE OFFICIAL
OBSERVED, 'WE HAVE ENOUGH TO DO JUST TRYING TU'STAY UP
KITH THE KGB.'
'(B) SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WOULD HE AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY
SINCE NO RESULTANT ACTION COULD OR COULD BE TAKEN,
ACCORDING TO THE BUREAU, FOR FOREIGN POLICY REASONS, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO LIMI1 VISAS EVEN FUR KNOWN OFFICERS OF THE
KGB.'
FINALLY, ALTHOUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ADMINISTERS
A CRIMINAL STATUTE REQUIRING THAT A REGISTRATION
STATEMENT BE FILED BY ANY PERSON WHO 'HAS RECEIVED
INSTRUCTION OR ASSIGNMENT IN, THE ESPIONAGE, COUNTER-
ESPIONAGE, OR SABOTAGE SERVICE OR TACTICS OF A GOVERNMENT
OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY', THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IS NOT
USUALLY NvCiTIFIED (NOR HAS IT EVER ASKED TO BE NOTIFIED)
ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS IN
THE UNITED STATES.
5. THE COMMITTEE HAS ALSO DETERMINED THAT INTELLIGENCE
REQUIREMENTS PROCESSES DO NOT INCLUDE DIRECTIONS TO U.S.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO DETERMINE THE IDENTITIES AND
ASSIGNMENTS OF 'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
WHO ARE IN OR COMING TO THE UNITED STATES. ACCORDINGLY,
ANY INFORMATION WHICH BECOMES KNOWN TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AND THEREAFTER TC OTHER AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
15 AVAILABLE ONLY BECAUSE IT MIGHT BE VOLUNTARILY
SUPPLIED IN ADDITION TO OTHER U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMINN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889 }-i PAGE 00 IS NC 0889317
:"q; TOR: 2309542 JUN 78
ASSIGNMENTS. THE COMMITTEE LEARNED THAT IN THE SOUTH KO-
REAN CASE, EVEN AFTER SPECIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT KCIA
ILLEGAL LOBBYING MAS RECEIVED, NO INTELLIGENCE
INSTRUCTIONS WERE EVER ISSUED TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL
ADDITIONAL. INTELLIGENCE ON THE SAME SUBJECT. IN THE
WORDS OF ONE FORMER OVERSEAS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
'MY REPORTS w'ET wITH ABSOLUTE SILENCE.'
6, EXTENSIVE SPECIFIC INFORIATIOIV ABOUT KCIA OPERATIONS
BEING DIRECTED AGAINST SUU1H KOREANS LIVING IN THE
UNITED STATES CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES BETWEEN 1971 AND 1973 AND WAS REPORTED BY THOSE
AGENCIES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. ALTHOUGH THE
INFORMATION RECEIVED IN 1963 ABOUT KCIA MONITORING
ACTIVITIES IN LOS ANGELES MAY HAVE APPEARED TO U.S.
OFFICIALS TO HAVE BEEN RATHER BENIGN. IT OAS CLEAR BY
1971 THAT THE KCIA HAD SET OUT TO EFFECTIVELY IMPEDE
OPPOSITION TO THE PAK REGIME BY SOUTH KOREANS LIVING
IN THE UNITED STATES. U.S. INTELLIGENCE LEARNED IN EARLY
1971 OF KCIA PLANS TO DISRUPT AND DESTROY THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF OVERSEAS RESIDENTS, AN ANTI-PAK ORGANIZA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES, wHEt?' KIM TAE-CHUNG, THE
LEADING SOUTH KOREAN OPPOSITION CANDIDATE, WAS PLANNING
TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES THAT YEAR, U.S. INTELLIGENCE
LEARNED OF KCIA PLANS TO INVESTIGATE ALL HIS ACTIVITIES
AND TO BLOCK HIS MEETINGS WITH U.S. OFFICIALS. ALL OF
THIS INFORMATION WAS REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
NOTWITHSTANDING THE KCIA'S EFFORTS, KIM wAS OFFICIALLY
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 78
0889333-
PAGE 0 Ij(,
"? ~..
TOR: 230957Z JUN 78
PP
DE
RUEAIIA
RUEHC #9962/6
1740951
ZNR
UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE VASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMENtUASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0165
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0576
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0523
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 6 OF 15 STATE 159962
RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE 'TO DEMONSTRATE AN
EVENHANDED U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARD THE KOREAN
ELECTIONS,' BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY ACTION
WAS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO BRING THE DISRUPTIVE
OPERATIONS TO A HALT.
BY MID-1973 U.S. INTELLIGENCE WAS AWARE THAT THE KCIA'S
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES HAD INTENSIFIED TO, THE
POINT WHERE THE KCIA WAS TRYING TO BLOCK ANTI-PAK
DEMONSTRATIONS BY ALL POSSIBLE MEANS. KOREAN ASSOCIATIONS
WERE TO BE PENETRATED, MANIPULATED AND WEAKENED BY THE
KCIA, AND DEMONSTRATORS WERE TO HE INTIMIDATED. WHEN
KIM PLANNED A RETURN TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES THE KCIA
EVEN CONSIDERED A PLAN TO USE CRIMINALS IN THE UNITED
STATES TO KILL HIM. THIS PLAN WAS REPORTED BY U.S.
INTELLIGENCE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHICH BY THEN WAS
RECEIVING ITS OWN FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS OF KCIA HARASS-
MENT FROM THE KOREAN VICTIMS. NEWS ACCOUNTS OF SOME OF
THESE INCIDENTS WERE APPEARING IN THE PRESS, AND FINALLY,
IN MID JUNE OF 1973, A HIGH-RANKING KOREAN EMBASSY
OFFICIAL, LEE JAI-HYON, RESIGNED AND SOUGHT U.S.
PERMISSION 10 RESIDE PERMANENTLY IN THE UNITED STATES.
LEE'S RESIGNATION RECEIVED WIDESPREAD PUBLICITY AND
HE OAS QUOTED IN THE PRESS AS CONFIRMING THAT 'KCIA
OPERATIVES WORK OUT OF THE EMBASSY AND SOUTH KOREAN
CONSULATES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES AND CONDUCT ILLEGAL
SURVEILLANCE AND INTIMIDATION OPERATIONS AGAINST KOREAN
RESIDENTS HERE.'
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , ,
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 08893-3-3- PAGE 00717 NC 0889333
c- TOR; 230957Z JUN 78
D-
w w w w w w w w w ----------- w ------ w w w w w w w r w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w
7. THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT ACTION TAKEN BY THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT V:ITH RESPECT TO REPORTS OF KCIA HARASSMENT
OCCURRED IN AUGUST 1973. ALTHOUGH COMPLAINTS HAD BEEN
MADE EARLIER BY THE DIRECTOR OF KOREAN AFFAIRS IN THE
DPEARIMENT OF STATE TO THE KOREAN AMBASSADOR AND THE
KCIA STATION CHIEF IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING AN
EXPRESSION OF CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF KIM TAE?CHUNG,
THE KCIA'S OPERATIONS CONTINUED UNABATED. FINALLY,
IN AUGUST, AT THE URGING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AN
FBI INVESTIGATION VA$ BEGUN, OFFICIAL PROTESTS ABOUT THE
SIZE AND ACTIVITIES OF THE KCIA MISSION IN THE UNITED
STATES :ERE LODGED WITH THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT,
AND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS PERSUADED THE SOUTH
KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO RECALL THEIR KCIA STATION CHIEF FROM
WASHINGTON. THE KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
WAS TOLD BY THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE THAT THE KCIA
MISSION IN THIS COUNTRY 'CAN HAVE ONE AND ONLY ONE
FUNCTION, AND THAT IS LIAISON WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.'
THE FBI'S INVESTIGATION DID NOT RESULT IN PROSECUTION,
AND IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT THE PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION
WAS INTENDED TO BE. FBI FILES REFLECT THAT INVESTIGATORS
WERE INSTRUCTED '70 DETERMINE IF PERSONS RESIDING IN
THE UNITED STATES ARE CARRYING OUT ACTIVITIES ON
BEHALF OF THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD BE
IN VIOLATION OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT.'
STATE DEPARTMENT RECORDS INDICATE THAT THE DEPART-
MENT'S OFFICERS WERE NOT NECESSARILY SEEKING 'THE KIND
OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROSECUTION IN COURT,' BUT
'ENOUGH INFORMATION UPON WHICH WE CAN DRAW A REASONABLE
CONCLUSION REGARDING ROK CIA ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES.' DURING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE FbI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE BUREAU HAD
CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD HAD 'STRONG REASONS TO CONCLUDE THAT
THE ROK CIA IS INDEED INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE
AND HARASS KOREAN CITIZENS IN THE UNITED STATES,
ALTHOUGH EVIDENCE, AS AGAINST ALLEGATIONS, IS NOT EASY TO
OBTAIN.' ACCORDING TO STATE DEPARTMENT MEMORADA OF THEIR
CONSULTATIONS NNITH THE FBI, THE BUREAU WAS 'SENSITIVE
TO THE FACT THAT A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS INVOLVED, AND
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 088933.3- PAGE 001 SS NC 0889333
7_ct~-_ TOR: 230957Z JUN 78
THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT QUESTIONING AS TO THEIR
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONDUCTING SUCH AN INVESTIGATION. AS
A RESULT THEY HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING RATHER CAUTIOUSLY AND
ON A LIMITED BASIS, UTILIZING AS GROUNDS FOR THEIR
INVESTIGATION THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT, WHICH
RESTRICTS THEM TO THE NUNUIPLOMMATIC AREA.'
81 THE FBBI'S INVESTIGATION OF KCIA HARASSMENT AS
LIMITED, DID IJOT INCLUDE DEBRIEFING A KEY PROSPECTIVE
WITNESS, AND WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF ALL
AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. THE FBI'S
INVESTIGATION, WHICH DID ADD SOME ADDITIONAL DETAILS
OF HARASSMENT AND DISRUPTION AT PARTICULAR DEMONSTRA-
TIONS, AS WELL AS CONFIRMATION BY FBI SOURCES OF KCIA
INVOLVEMENT, WAS AS LIMITED AND AS CAUTIOUS AS THE
STATE DEPARTMENT UNDERSTOOD IT TO BE. WHEN THE INVESTI-
GATION NAS BEGUN, ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES WERE INSTRUCTED TO
BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE THAT '(THE) STATE DEPARTMENT
HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICING THE ACTIVITIES OF
SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMATS IN THIS INSTANCE AND IT IS NOT
DESIRED THAT WE UNDERTAKE MASSIVE INVESTIGATIONS OF
SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMATS UNLESS SUCH APPEARS ABSOLUTELY
NECESSARY.'
NOT ONLY DID THE FBI NUT 'UNDERTAKE MASSIVE INVESTIGATIONS
OF SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMATS,' BUT THE INVESTIGATIVE RECORD
REFLECTS THAT Al NO-POINT DID THE FBI INVESTIGATE ANY
SOUTH KOREAN DIPLOMAT. FBI HEADQUARTERS ALSO INSTRUCTED
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
STATE
w e w s w e e e w- a s s e w w w w w w w w w w s w e w e w w e w a w e w w s w w w s a e s e a n a aw e s e w e w s e w w w w S e e w w w s s w w w w w.
78 0889.3- PAGE- 2-J) NC 0889334
TOR: 230958Z JUN 8
w S w e w w S e e w e w w w w w e S e w s e S w e e s w w w w w w e w e w w a w w S e e e e w a s w w w e w e w w w w e w e w w w w w e e w e w e w e w w.
'TO SEDUCE AND, IF POSSIBLE, BUY OFF AMERICAN LEADERS PARTICULAR IN CONGRESS -- WHO HAVE HAD ANY KIND OF
CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH KOREA THROUGH THE KOREAN
WAR OR BUSINESS,
'TO REGIMENT KOREAN COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES BY
INFILTRA1ING WITH FRONT MEN OR UNDERCOVER AGENTS THE
ESTABLISHED KOREAN RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATIONS AND BY
CREATING NEtS ONES WHERE SUCH ASSOCIATIONS HAVE NOT YET
BEEN ORGANIZED. THE PURPOSE WAS TO CONTROL AND MANIPULATE
THE KOREAN COMMUNITIES THROUGH THE PLANTED OFFICERS OF
SUCH ORGANIZATIONS, TO SILENCE CRITICISM OF (PRESIDENT)
PAK'S REPRESSIVE RULE BY SINGLING OUT AND INTIMIDATING
DISSIDENT MEMBERS AND TO STAGE IN THE NAME OF ASSOCIATIONS
FALSIFIED CAMPAIGNS OF KOREAN RESIDENTS' TOTAL SUPPORT
FOR (PRESIDENT) PAK BEFORE THE EYES OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE; . . . .
'TO INTIMIDATE. 'UNCOOPERATIVE' KOREAN RESIDENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES THROUGH THEIR FAMILIES, RELATIVES AND CLOSE
FRIENDS IN KOREA, TO SILENCE DISSIDENTS AND TO MAKE
SILENT ONES MORE 'COOPERATIVE.''
ALL OF THIS INFORMATION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN
AVAILABLE TO THE FBI IF THEY HAD QUESTIONED LEE IN 1973.
YET, HE WAS NOT INTERVIEWED DURING THE FBI'S INVESTIGATION.
FBI FILES CONTAIN NO RECORD WHICH WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THIS
INVESTIGATIVE OMISSION, AND THE FBI AGENT WHO DIRECTED
THE INVESTIGATION IS DEAD.
IT IS ALSO REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE BUREAU WOULD
HAVE DETERMINED THAT INVESTIGATIONS OF SOUTH KOREAN
DIPLOMATS WERE NECESSARY IF IT HAD HAD ALL THE INTELLIGENCE
WHICH HAD BEEN PROVIDED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE DURING 1971 AND 1972. AS NOTED ABOVE,
THAT INFORMATION MADE CLEAR THE KCIA'S PLANS TO INTIMIDATE
SOUTH KOREANS LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES, AND ADDITIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ON THE SAME SUBJECT WAS SENT TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE FOLLOWING YEAR. SOME OF THAT
NEW INTELLIGENCE WAS NOT FORWARDED TO THE FBI EITHER BY
THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OR BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,4, ,
78 088933+-- PAGE 01+t 11 NC 0889334
2-93- TOR: 230958Z JUN 78
PP RUEAJIA
DE RUEHC 19962/7 1740953
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEME3ASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0166
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECUEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0577
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0524
B T
UNCLAS SECTION 7 OF 15 STATE 159962
ITS FIELD OFFICES THAT 'IN THE EVENT IT BECOMES DESIRABLE
THAT DIRECT INVESTIGATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL DIPLOMAT BE
INSTITUTED, BUREAU (HEADQUARTERS) SHOULD BE EXPEDITIOUSLY
ADVISED SO THAT STATE DEPARTMENT CLEARANCE FOR SUCH AN
INVESTIGATION MAY BE INITIATED.' NO SUCH CLEARANCE
WAS EVER RECOMMENDED OR SOUGHT.
IT IS UNCLEAR TO THE COMMITTEE WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION
MIGHT HAVE PERSUADED THE BUREAU THAT SUCH
INVESTIGATIONS WERE 'ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.' IT IS NOT
UNREASONABLE TO PRESUME THAT THE BUREAU MIGHT HAVE HAD
SUCH INFORMATION IN HAND IF THEY HAD QUESTIONED
LEE JAI-HYON, WHO SAID HE HAD ACTUALLY BEEN PRESENT AT
MEETINGS IN THE KOREAN EMBASSY WHEN THE DISRUPTION PLANS
WERE BEING DISCUSSED BY OFFICERS OF THE KCIA, AND WHO
COULD, THEREFORE:, HAVE PROVIDED FIRSTHAND EVIDENCE OF WHAT
HE HAD LEARNED. YET, THEINVESTIGATIVE REPORTS REVEAL THAT
LEE, THOUGH AVAILABLE, WAS NOT INTERVIEWED. THIS
INVESTIGATIVE OMISSION IS OF EVEN GREATER SIGNIFICANCE IN
VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IT LATER BECAME CLEAR THAT LEE
SAID HE HAD DETAILED FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE ABOUT NOT ONLY
THE KCIA'S DISRUPTIVE OPERATIONS, BUT THEIR LOBBYING
ACTIVITIES AS WELL. IN FACT, WHEN LEE TESTIFIED BEFORE
THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN
1975, HE PROVIDED WHAT HE SAID WERE DETAILS OF A COMPRE-
HENSIVE NINE-POINT KCIA PROGRAM 'TO MUTE CRITICISM OF
(PRESIDENT PAK'S TOTALITARIANISM AND TO BUY SUPPORTERS
IN THE UNITED STATES.' HE DESCRIBED THE KCIA'S PLANS:
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 08893++- PAGE #eT-_2 -- NC 0889334
TOR: 230958Z JUN 78
----------------- a---.w-----~r-- aaaa-~----ws----- ~.--------.yea----------~,-a----I
WHEN IT WAS FIRST RECEIVED. NOR OAS INFORMATION PULLED
TOGETHER AND SENT TO THE BUREAU IN 1973, WHEN THE
KCIA INVESTIGATION WAS BEGUN. IT IS THE COMMITTEE'S VIEW
THAT THE FBI WAS NOT SUPPLIED WITH SUBSTANTIAL INFORMA-
TION WHICH MIGHT HAVE CONVINCED THE BUREAU OF THE NEED
FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION THAN WAS ACTUALLY
UNDERTAKEN.
9. ALTHOUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUCCESSFULLY
PERSUADED THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO RECALL THE
KCIA CHIEF FROM WASHINGTON IN LATE 1973, THE HARASSEMNT
OPERATIONS APPARENTLY CONTINUED. AS NOTED ABOVE,
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS PUSHED FOR AN INVESTIGATION
NOT NECESSARILY FOR PROSE.CUTIVE EVIDENCE, BUT BECAUSE
THEY NEEDED TO HAVE 'ENOUGH INFORMATION UPON WHICH WE CAN
DRAW A REASONABLE CONCLUSION REGARDING ROK CIA ACTIVITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES.' PROTESTS TO THE KOREAN EMBASSY
AT THE WORKING LEVEL HAD PROVEN UNSUCCESSFUL, AND IT HAD
BECOME CLEAR BY MID-JUNE 1973 THAT MORE FORCEFUL ACTION
WAS REQUIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ADDITIONAL INFORMA-
TION PRODUCED BY THE FBI'S INVESTIGATION PROVIDED ENOUGH
ADDITIONAL DATA TO LEAD TO THE 'REASONABLE CONCLUSION'
SOUGHT, SO THAT SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS COULD BE
PERSUADED OF THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION. AT ANY RATE,
FORMAL ACTION WAS TAKEN AT THE END OF AUGUST 1973 WHEN
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE SUCCESSFULLY URGED THE
KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO SEND HOME THE KCIA STASTION CHIEF
FROM WASHINGTON. IT IS UNCLEAR WHAT THE EFFECT OF THIS
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,U, , , ,
78 0889595 PAGE 044- ZZ.- NC 0889343
TOR: 230959Z JUN 78
ew w w e w w e e w w e a a e e w w e e w a e e w e e e e w e w w e w w w a e e e
ease a a a e a e s a e a a e e e e e e a e w e a w a ------
PP
RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/8 1740954
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0167
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0578
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0525
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 8 OF 15 STATE 159962
ACTION WAS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, U.S. INTELLIGENCE LEARNED,
AND REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THAT IN THE WEEKS
AND MONTHS FOLLOWING LEE JAI-HYON'S WIDELY PUBLICIZED
RESIGNATION IN JUNE 1973, KCIA OFFICERS IN WASHINGTON HAD
BEEN DIRECTED TO (11 DENY THE ALLEGATIONS OF KCIA
HARASSMENT, (2) CARRY ON THEIR ACTIVITIES MORE SECRETLY
SO THERE WOULD BE NO-RECURRENCE OF A LEE JAI-HYON
AFFAIR, AND (3) LOWER THEIR PROFILE BY COOPTING OTHER
KOREAN OFFICIALS TO DO THE NECESSARY 'CONTACT WORK' WITH
KOREAN NATIONALS. AT THE BOTTOM OF ONE OF THESE
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, A U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER NOTED,
'APPARENTLY KCIA WON'T DESIST FROM OPERATIONS AMONG
KOREAN NATIONALS IN THE U.S. BUT IS BECOMING MORE
SOPHISTICATED.' INDEED, TWO YEARS LATER, U.S. INTEL-
LIGENCE WAS AGAIN. REPORTING KCIA PLANS TO MONITOR
ANTI-PAK DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, AND TO
MANIPULATE THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN RESIDENTS
HERE.
10. A THREEE-MONTH FBI INVESTIGATION IN 1971, WHICH WAS
PROMPTED BY REPORTS OF IMPROPER KOREAN LOBBYING, WAS
LIMITED IN SCOPE AND WAS CONDUCTED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF
ALL AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. IN 1971, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DIRECTED THE FBI TO UNDERTAKEN AN
INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER TONGSUN PARK AND/OR AN
ORGANIZATION CALLED RADIO OF FREE ASIA (ROFA) WAS "ACTING
REGISTRATION ACT. THE INVESTIGATION WAS INITIATED AT THE
URGING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WHICH FORWARDED INFOR-
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
78 08893*-3- PAGE 9-'Z 3 NC 0889343
`~~-- TOR: 230959Z JUN 78
MATION TO SUPPORT THEIR 'STRONG SUSPICIONS CONCERNING
CERTAIN OF THE KEY KOREANS INVOLVED (IN ROFA), THE ORGAN-
IZATION'S LINK TO THE ROK CIA, AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT
IT AND ITS PARENT ORGANIZATION, THE KOREAN CULTURAL AND
FREEDOM FOUNDATION, ARE COVERS FUR ROK LOBBYING EFFORTS
IN THE UNITED STATES.' THE FBI'S INVESTIGATION, WHICH
CONSISTED OF A REVIEW OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE RECORDS AND
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON A FEW OF THE PRINCIPALS, AND AN INTER-
VIEW OF THE HEAD OF ROFA, WAS CLOSED IN LESS THAN THREE
MONTHS FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. THE CLOSING OF THE INVESTI-
GATION WAS APPROVED BY ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL KLEINDIENST
IN MARCH 1972, BASED UPON RECOMMENDATIONS HE RECEIVED
FROM THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION.
THE 'PAPER RECORD' REFLECTS THAT THE CLOSING WAS HANDLED
IN ROUTINE BUREAUCRATIC FASHION, AND THE COMMITTEE HAS
DISCOVERED NO EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
SOME OF THE 'INFORMATION WHICH HAD BEEN FORWARDED TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE NEVER
REACHED THE FAI. SINCE MUCH OF THE STATE DEPART-
MENT'S INFORMATION OAS BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE REPORTS,
A DECISION WAS AGREED UPON WHEREBY ONE OF THE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES WOULD PREPARE AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY AND TRANS-
MIT THEIR SUMMARY DIRECTLY TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, THIS
PROCEDURE FAILED TO TAKE TWO IMPORTANT FACTORS INTO
ACCOUNT:
'(A) THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD SENT 1HE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
SOME OF THEIR OVYN INFORMATION WHICH HAD NOT COME FROM ANY
OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THAT INFORMATION
WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE SUMMARY WHICH ONE OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AGREED TO PREPARE, AND IT NEVER
REACHED THE FBI. PERHAPS THE MOST CRUCIAL STATE DEPART-
MENT DATA WHICH NEVER REACHED THE BUREAU WAS THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION WHICH WAS IN THE ORIGINAL STATE DEPARTMENT
SUBMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:
ONE KNOW FOR A FACT THAT PAK (TON SUN) OFFERED TO
CONTRIBUTE TO THE CAMPAIGN FUNDS OF SEVERAL CONGRESSMEN,
(COINCIDENTALLY JUST BEFORE THE SUPPLEMENTAL MAP
APPROPRIATION WAS SUBMITTED TO THE HILL), AND HAVE SUS-
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADM1N INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889" PAGE 04- Z ~ NC 0889343
ao` TOR: 2309597 JUN 78
sus ass -- s- s o n s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s ss a s s e s s e s 5.s s s .. s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s e a s e s s r
PICIONS THAT HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN MANY OTHER
IRREGULARITIES AS A LOBBYIST.
FORMATION BASED ON INTELLIGENCE GENERATED BY AN
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OTHER THAN THE ONE WHICH WAS PRE-
PARING THE SUMMARY. THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
INFORMATION WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
AND DID NOT REACH THE FBI. THIS INFORMATION STATED:
'PAK TON SUN, MEMBER OF THE KOREAN CULTURAL AND FREEDOM
FOUNDATION, WAS BELIEVEC TO BE A NUMBER OF THE ROK
CIA WHICH 'HAS A CLUB CALLED THE GEORGETOWN CLUB IN
WASHINGTON, D.C.' . . .(T)HE CLUB SERVED AS A 'FRONT
TO CHANNEL CAMPAIGN FUNDS TO CONGRESSMEN.
ALTHOUGH THE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY WHICH WAS FORWARDED
BY THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO THE FBI REPORTED
THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT HAD FORMULATED, BUT HAD
LATER 'TABLED' A PLAN WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN TONGSUN
PARK CONTROL OVER KCIA LOBBYING ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES, IT DID NOT REVEAL THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE
ACTUALLY HAD PRECISE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLAN ITSELF, CON-
TAINING CONSIDERABLE DETAIL REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION,
INCLUDING THE PROPOSED CREATION OF AN OSTENSIBLY LEGITI-
MATE ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES COMPRISED OF
SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND
SENATE. MOREOVER, THE SUMMARY DID NOT CONTAIN KNOWN
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81_M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,4, , , ,
ACTION: NONE INFO; CMASS-E ( ), DDPS-S, RF, FILE, (2/W)
78 0889- PAGE 4-94- Z. NC 0889339
qa TOR: 2310002 JUN 78
i- w w w w w w w w- w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w ws w w w- w w i w w w w w w w w5 w-- w w_ w w w w wl
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/9 1740956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 2300512 JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUAKOtA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0168
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WWASHUC PRIORITY 0579
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0526
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 9 OF 15 STATE 159962
INFORMATION ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TONGSUN PARK,
THE KCIA, AND INDIVIDUAL HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS OF THE
SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WAS NOT AV:ARE OF THE EXTENT OF DETAIL WHICH U.S.
INTELLIGENCE HAD KITH RESPECT TO THE PLAN; AND EVEN
THOUGH STATE HAD F;ECEIVED SOME INFORMATION ABOUT
PA.RK'S KCIA AND SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIPS,
THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS NOT ASKED BY STATE TO IN-
CLUDE THATINFORMATION IN THE SUMMARY WHICH WAS BEING
PREPARED FOR THE FBI. NOR WAS THE INFORMATION
VOLUNTEERED TO THE Ff31 BY THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PREAPRING THE SUMMARY. INDEED, OFFICIALS OF THE
AGENCY WHO V ;ERE PREPARING THE SUMMARY WERE NOT TOLD THAT
THE FBI INVESTIGATION WOULD INCLUDE THE ACTIVITIES OF
TONGSUN PARK AND KOREAN LOBBYING IN THE UNITED
STATES.
SOME OFFICIALS OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WHICH PREPARED
THE SUMMARY WERE RECEIVING MORE SPECIFIC INFORMATION
ABOUT IMPROPER LObh!ING BY SOUTH KOREA, THE, KCIA AND
TONGSUN PARK. THESE REPORTS OCCURRED AFTER THE ORIGINAL
PARK LOBBYING PLAN HAD SUPPOSEDLY BEEN TABLED. THE MORE
DETAILED INFORMATION A AS FORWARDED BY THOSE OFFICIALS TO
FBI HEADQUARTERS IN THREE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
(SEPARATE FROM THE SUMMARY) DURING THE SAME PERIOD THAT
THE SUMMARY WAS BEING PREPARED; HOWEVER, FBI
HEADQUARTERS DID NOT FORWARD THOSE REPORTS TO THE
BUREAU INVESTIGATORS THEN CONDUCTING THE INcURIY.
THOSE ABSENT REPORTS REFLECTED THAT:
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M0098OR002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889 PAGE -O 2- 6 NC 0889339
?_01;L-- TOR: 2310002 JUN 78
w-----------w---w--w----w---ww-w---www---ww-w-----ww-w-w-ww-ww----w sww----w-ww
'(A) TONGSUN PARK WAS DEFINITELY UNDER THE DIRECTION
OF THE KCIA.
(B) A NAMED MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAD
RECOMMENDED TO PRESIDENT PAK THAT CONGRESSIONAL
LOBBYING EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE HANDLED
BY TONGSUN PARK.
(C) PRESIDENT PAK HAD AGREED TO HAVE TONGSUN PARK ACT
AS INTERMEDIARY 'IN THE RICE DEAL.' PARK'S COMMISSION
WAS EXPECTED TO BE ABOUT ONE MILLION DOLLARS, ABOUT HALF
OF WHICH WAS TO BE USED FOR KOREAN LOBBYING IN THE
UNITED STATES.
(D) SOME OF TONGSUN PARK'S COMMISSION WAS PAID BY PARK
TO A NAMED MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
(F) TWO NAMED STAFF EMPLOYEES OF THE.HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVES WERE CONNECTED WITH THE KCIA.
(G) KOREAN LOBBYING ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
HAD INCLUDED AN ALLEGED DONATION OF SEVERAL HUNDRED
THOUSAND DOLLARS TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE 19o8
ELECTION.
THE DECISION BY FBI HEADQUARTERS NOT TO USE THE ABOVE IN-
FORMATION IN ITS INVESTIGATION -- INDEED ITS DECISION
NOT EVEN 10 COMMUNICATE IT TO ITS OWN INVESTIGATORS WAS MADE, ACCORDING TO THE FBI? AT THE URGING
O DINATE OFFICER AT THE INTU.L"E.NCE Y WHICH GENERA-
TED THE INFORMATION. NOTATIONS IN FBI FILLS REFLECT THAT
THAT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TOLD HIS COUNTERPART AT THE
FBI THAT THE INFORMATION COULD BE DISSEMINATED ONLY TO
ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN MITHCELL AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, HENRY KIS-
SINGER, AND THAT 'SENSITIVE SOURCES (ARE) SUCH THAT NO
INQUIRIES WHATSOEVER MAY BE MADE ON T,k1E BASIS OF INFORMA-
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
STATE
ww-----?---.,----------------wwwwwwww----www w-w---ww-w-www--w-w-----w-------w -~
78 0889,749, PAGE @& -vim 7 NC 0889339
TION FURNISHED.' THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAS CONFIRMED
THAT HIS SUPERIORS DID PLACE A LIMITATION ON DISTRIBU-
TIONr BUT HAS SAID THAT NEITHER HR NOR ANYONE ELSE AT
HIS AGENCY RESTRICTED INVESTIGATIVE USE. HE MAINTAINED
THAT SUCH INVESTIGATIVE RESTRICTIONS ARE CUSTOMARILY HAN-
WHERE NECESSARY, BY LIMITATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE BODY
OF THE DISSEMINATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT AS OPPOSED TO
BEING HANDLED INFORMALLY ON THE TELEPHONE, AS THE
BUREAU FILES NOTATIONS REFLECT WAS DISCUSSED, THE REPORTS
THEMSELVES N+ERE DISTRIBUTED TO BOTH ATTORNEY GENERAL MIT-
CHELL AND 1)R. KISSINGER. THE REPORTS CONTAINED THE FBI
DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT THAT NO INVESTIGATION WAS BEING CON-
DUCTED BECAUSE THE ORIGINATING INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 'HAS
ADVISED THAT THE SOURCE OF ITS INFORMATION IS EXTREMELY
SENSITIVE AND SUCH AS TO PRECLUDE ANY INVESTIGATION WHAT-
SOEVER.' DR. KISSINGER TOLD THE COMMITTEE THAT HE DOES
NOT RECALL SEEING ANY OF THE THREE REPORTS WHICH WERE
SENT TO HIM, MR, MITCHELL RECALLS ONLY THE ONE REPORT
WHICH WAS SENT TO HIM WHICH MENTIONED CONGRESSIONAL STAFF
EMPLOYEES, AND HE RECALLS BRINGING THAT MATTER TO THE AT-
TENTION OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN
UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANYONE ON THE STAFFS OF EITHER DR. KIS-
SINGER OR MR. MITCHELL WHO MIGHT HAVE SEEN THE REPORTS.
THE DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING WHO ACTUALLY SAW THE REPORTS
IS COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT MOST OF THE DISTRIBUTED RE-
OPORTS WHICH WERE ACTUALLY DELIVERED TO OTHER AGENCIES
AND OFFICIALS, AND WHICH MIGHT CONTAIN NOTATIONS INDICATING
WHO MIGHT HAVE READ THEM, CANNOT NOtti BE LOCATED.
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,L, , , ,
78 0889,3 PAGE 8' NC 0889345
[A/y44r TOR: 2310012 JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/10 1740957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0169
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0580
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0527
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 10 OF 15 STATE 1599b2
TWO OTHER REPORTS WHICH WERE DISTRIBUTED CONTAINING E-
QUALLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION, WHICH WERE BASED UPON INFO-
RMATION RECEIVED BY FBI HEADUUARTERSFROM ANOTHER INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY, SIMILARLY CANNOT BE LOCATED. COPIES OF
THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE RETAINED BY THE FBI CONTAIN IN-
FORMATION REPORTED IN 1971 THAT: '1.A NAMED MEMBER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND A NAMED MEMBER OF HIS STAFF
HAD BEEN COOPERATING WITH THE KCIA, AND THE CONGRESSMAN
HAD RECEIVED "PAYOFFS" FOR ASSISTING THE KOREAN GOVERN-
MENT BEFORE A HOUSE COMMITTEE.
2.A PERSON WHOM THE KCIA SUSPECTED WAS ON PRESIDENT NIXON'S
CAMPAIGN STAFF WAS 114VOLVED IN ATTEMPTING TO NEGOTIATE A
SECRET FOREIGN AID GRANT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF KOREA
WHICH WAS TO BE HANDLED OUTSIDE ORDINARY CONGRESSIONAL CHAN-
NELLS, AND FOR WHICH U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WOULD RE-
CEIVE "KICKBACKS".'
REPORTS CONTAINING THE INFORMATION DESCRIBED IN THE FIRST
PARAGRAPH ABOVE WERE SENT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL
AND DR. KISSINGER. REPORTS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED "KICK-
BACK" NEGOTIATIONS WERE SENT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL
AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT C. MARDIAN, NEITHER
OF THE REPORTS vvAS INVESTIGATED, AND NONE OF THE INFORMATION
WAS FURNISHED TO THE FBI'S INVESTIGATORS WHO WERE THEN
CONDUCTING THE INQUIRY WHICH HAD BEEN INITIATED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. EACH OF THE REPORTS CONTAINED FBI
DIRECTOR HOOVER'S REPRESENTATION THAT THE BUREAU WAS 'PRE-
CLUDED FROM INSTITUTING INVESTIGATION BASED SOLELY ON
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 08893.45 PAGE S Z ci NC 0889345
PIa TOR: 2310012 JUN 78
INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM SUCH SENSITIVE SOURCES.' NO
ONE REVIEWED THAT DECISION AND, ALTHOUGH DR- KISSINGER RE-
CALLED THAT HE RECEIVED THE REPORT ABOUT THE CONGRESSMAN,
HE ASSUMED THAT SUCH A MATTER WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, WHO, HE WAS AWARE, HAD RECEIVED A
DUPLICATE COPY OF THE REPORT. MR. MITCHELL DOES NOT RECALL
SEEING EITHER 07 THE REPORTS. BOTH ATTORNEY GENERAL MIT-
CHELL AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MARDIAN HAVE DENIED
THAT ANY OF THEIR DECISIONS IN THE KOREA CASE WERE PROMPTED
BY A CONCERN THAT AN: INVESTIGATION OF ANY KOREAN MATTER
WOULD NECESSARILY ALSO REQUIRE AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
ALLEGED KICKBACK NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING A PURPORTED NIXON
CAMPAIGN AIDE.
11.SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ABOUT IMPROPER
KOREAN LOBBYING WAS REPORTED IN 1972. MUCH OF THIS INFOR-
MATION WAS REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUT NONE
OF IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE FBI. AFTER THE
F13I'S INVESTIGATION v+AS CLOSED IN EARLY 1972, U.S. INTEL-
LIGENCE CONTINUED TO REPORT DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT
WHAT THE KOREANS WERE DOING. THAT INFORMATION WAS CURRENT
AND REFLECTED A VARIETY OF PLANS, STRATIGIES, AND ACTIVI-
TIES DESIGNED TO AFFECT U.S. POLICY. FOR EXAMPLE, INTELLI-
GENCE REPORTING IN THE SPRING OF 1972 DESCRIBED TONGSUN
PARK AS PRESIDENT PAK'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN ARRANG-
ING RICE DEALS, IDENTIFIED THE KCIA DIRECTOR AS PERSONALLY
HANDLING THE RICE TRANSACTIONS, AND CONFIRMED EARLIER RE-
PORTS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE ARRANGEMENT WAS TO RAISE
FUNDS FOR THE KCIA. MOREOVER, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AT THIS
TIME NOT ONLY CORROBORATED EARLIER REPORTS THAT THE KOREAN
GOVERNMENT HAD COi0RIBUTED HEAVILY TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
IN 1968, BUT ALSO REFLECTED THAT THE KROEAN GOVERNMENT HAD
NOw DECIDED THAT THEY SHOULD BE SUPPORTING THE REPUBLICAN
?PARTY.
BY LATE 1972, U.S. INTELLIGENCE BECAME AWARE OF THE NAMES
OF A NUMBER OF CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS THAT THE KOREAN
GOVERNMENT BELIEVED COULD BE INFLUENCED. IN ADDITION, IN-
TELLIGENCE REPORTS WHICH WERE SENT TO DR. KISSINGER AND TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISCUSSED A MAJOR, NEW KOREAN LOB-
BYING EFFORT WHICH WAS TO BE FINANCED BY THE KCIA FOR THE
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 088935- PAGE @65 36 NC 0889345
TOR: 231001Z JUN 78
a s s s w a e s e- w s w w e w a w e e w a w a s- a a e a a w a e a s e a s- - e e e a a s w a a e s a e ---- w a w a a s w w a w s w w w a s e?
PURPOSE OF INFLUENCING CONGRESS, THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE
MEDIA, AND KOREAN RESIDENTS. THE REPORTS ALSO REFLECTED
THAT TONGSUN PARK HAD BEEN DIRECTED BY THE KCIA TO ARRANGE
FOR PARTICULAR NAMED CONGRESSMEN TO VISIT SEOUL, WHERE THEY
WOULD BE INTERVIEWED AND KOREAN NEWSPAPERS WOULD REPORT
THEIR PRO-KOREAN VIEK'S. AT ABOUT THIS TIME, U.S. INTELLI-
GENCE ALSO REPORTED THAT THE KCIA DIRECTOR AND OTHER
KOREAN OFFICIALS WERE STUDYING A PROPOSAL WHICH A NAMED
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES HAD MADE TO PRESIDENT
PAK THAT A KOREAN-AMERICAN CIVILIAN COORDINATING COUNCIL BE
ESTABLISHED AND THAT IT BE MANAGED BY TONGSUN PARK
NONE OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION
OF THE FBI.
12. BECAUSE THERE WAS NO INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT LEVIED
FOR INFORMATION ABOUT KOREAN LOBBYING, THE REPORTING PRO-
CESS WAS ON OCCASION IMCUMPLETE AND OFTEN WITHOUT FOCUS.
SOME INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WERE SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, SOME TO THE FBI, SOME TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUN-
CIL, AND SOME TO VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF THESE COMPONENTS.
ON ONE OCCASION, A DECISION WAS MADE THAT SIGNIFICANT IN-
FORMATION SHOULD NOT BE REPORTED TO U.S, OFFICIALS WHO
MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TAKE RESPONSIBLE ACTION. IN 1971,
OVERSEAS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS INFORMED THEIR HEADQUARTERS
THAT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN ASKING FOR SPECIFIC
INFORMATION ABOUT SOUTH KOREAN LOBBYING ACTIVITIES. THE
OFFICERS HAD PRECISELY THAT KIND OF INFORMATION IN THEIR
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,4, , , ,
78. 088935-&
PAGE o o+- 31
TOR: 231002Z JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/11 1740959
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECS1ATE WASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0170
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0581
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PKIOkITY 0528
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 11 OF 15 STATE 159962
POSSESSION, NAMELY PRESIDENT PAK'S APPROVAL OF.A PARTICULAR
CONGRESSMAN'S PROPOSAL THAT TONGSUN PARK BE PERMITTED TO
HANDLE KOREAN LOBBYING, ANTICIPATED USE OF PARK'S RICE SALE
COMMISSION TO FINANCE THE LOBBYING EFFORT, AND THE CONGRESS-
MAN'S PERSONAL SOLICITATION OF CAMPAIGN FUNDS FROM PRESI-
DENT PAK. ACCOR?GINGLY, THE OFFICERS SOUGHT HEADQUARTERS'
PERMISSION TO BRIEF THE AMBASSADOR AND TO ASSURE HIM THAT
ALL INFORMATION WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO HEADQUARTERS WAS
BEING PASSED ON TO HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS AT THE'DEPARTMENT
OF STATE. HEADQUARTERS REPLIED THAT THE INFORMATION IN
QUESTION WAS NOT BEING PASSED ON TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFI-
CIALS, AND FURTHER, THAT THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD NOT BE
BRIEFED.
SOME OF THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION WAS NOT REPORTED TO HEAD-
QUARTERS BY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND WAS NOT DISCOVERED
UNTIL A SEARCH OF OVERSEAS INTELLIGENCE OFFICES WAS CON-
DUCTED AS THE RESULT OF CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS.
OTHER INFORMATION, WHILE FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON, WAS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WHICH WERE PREPARED
FOR DISSEMINATION. ON ONE OCCASION, INFORMATION WHICH
WAS HANDLED IN THIS MANNER AND WHICH IDENTIFIED TONGSUN
PARK AS BEING COMPLETELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR
KCIA OFFICER WAS SENT IN BY THE FIELD AS '(A)N INTERESTING
SIDELIGHT NOT INCLUDED IN THE INTELLIGENCE REPORT.'
13.ALTHOUGH, OVER A SPAN OF SEVERAL YEARS, MUCH OF THE IN-
FORMATION ABOUT KOREAN ACTIVITIES WAS FORWARDED TO THE AN-
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 08893.5.6- PAGE 8-@'t 3 2- NC 0889350
a~- TOR: 231002Z JUN 78
r--?w-w-r--r-----rrr--r---w--wrr-w---w?w-w-r---r--ww~--www~www-w----w-a-s-w--rr
ALYTIC COMPONENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, NO ANALYSIS
OF THE INFORMATION WAS EVER DONE AND NONE WAS EVER SOUGHT
BY U.S. POLICYMAKERS.
THE ABSENCE OF ANY THOROUGH ANALYSIS OR CUMPLIATI0N OF ALL
AVAILABLE INFORMATION MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE FACT THAT NO
REQUIREMENT WAS EVER ISSUED FOR INFORMATION ABOUT KOREAN
LOBBYING. ONE OVERSEAS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER INFORMED THE
COMMITTEE STAFF THAT HE COULD RECALL NO OTHER CASE WHERE
THE INFORMATION HE WAS REPORTING HAD MET WITH SUCH DEAFENING
SILENCE AT HEADQUARTERS. ALTHOUGH ON ONE OCCASION IN 1971
THE DIRECTOR OF KOREAN AFFAIRS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN TO INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ABOUT 'THE
ENTIRE ROKG LOBBY EFFORTS HERE VIA TONGSUN PARK, RADIO
FREE ASIA, THE CULTURAL AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION' AND EX-
PRESSED 'A NEED TO GATHER INFORMATION ON...THE ENTIRE ROKG
LOBBY HERE, THROUGH INVESTIGATION,' THIS EXPRESSION WAS NOT
CONSIDERED 10 CONSTITUTE A 'REQUIREMENT' BECAUSE OF THE
LEVEL AT WHICH IT WAS COMMUNICATED, AND AT ANY RATE, WAS
CONSIDERED TO BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FBI RATHER THAN
A TASK FOR THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
MOREOVER, AS INDICATED EARLIER, EVEN ON THE SINGLE OCCASION
WHEN A DOCUMENT WHICH WAS CALLED AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
WAS PREPARED -- IN 1971 WHEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT URGED
AN FBI INVESTIGATION OF TONGSUN PARK AND RADIO OF FREE ASIA
-- THE ONLY DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE SUMMARIZED WERE THOSE WHICH
HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPLIED TO THE DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE BY OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, AND EVEN
SOME OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OWN INFORMATION WAS NOT IN-
CLUDED; NO FILE SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED TO PULL TOGETHER
OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION; AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ON THE
SAME SUBJECT WAS NOT INCLUDED, BUT WAS FORWARDED TO FBI
HEADQUARTERS AS SEPARATE INDEPENDENT ITEMS. THOSE SEPARATE
ITEMS WERE NEVER FORWARDED TO THE FBI'S OWN INVESTIGATORS
WHO WERE HANDLING THE CASE.
14. EVEN THOUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WAS NEVER PROVIDED
WITH AN ANALYSIS OR SUMMARY OF WHAT THE KCIA, TONGSUN PARK,
AND THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WERE DOING, OFFICIALS OF THE
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 08893154 PAGE -003 3 NC 0889350
TOR: 231002Z JUN 78
STATE DEPARTMENT DID RECEIVE INDIVIDUAL INTELLIGENCE RE-
PORTS ABOUT SOME OF THE LOBBYING PLANS DURING 1970-1972.
SEVERAL COMPLAINTS riERE MADE BY OFFICALS OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE TO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT IN LATE 1970 AND EARLY
1971 ABOUT KOREAN LOBBYING. THOSE PROTESTS DID NOT ADDRESS
THE FACT THAT THE ACTIVITIES WERE BEING DIRECTED BY SOUTH
KOREA'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, AND THERE IS NO RECORD THAT
ANY DEFINITVE ACTION WAS TAKEN TO HALT THE INTENSIFIED EF-
FORTS NHICH w,ERE REPORTED IN 1972.
IN OCTOBER OF 1970, THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH KOREA,
WILLIAM PORTER, DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT OF 'KOREAN LOBBYING
IN WASHINGTON' WITH THE KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND WITH
THE KOREAN PRIME MINISTER. HE TOLD THE LATTER ABOUT THE
'CIRCULAR NOTE' WHICH WAS THEN BEING DRAFTED BY THE DEPART-
MENT OF STATE ON THE SUBJECT WOULD URGE ALL FOREIGN EMBAS-
SIES IN WASHINGTON TO 'STAY WITHIN BOUNDS.' PORTER ALSO
TOLD THEPRIME MINISTER THAT 'THE BEST THING FOR THE KOREANS
IS TO RIDE ALONG ON THE RESIDUAL GOOD WILL IN WASHINGTON
TOWARD THE ROKS AND STOP SENDING AMATEURS TO LOBBY ON BE-
HALF OF THAT ORGANISM HERE.' PORTER SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED
TONGSUN PARK AS ONE OF THE PEOPLE, AMONG OTHERS, HE HAD IN
MIND AND ADDED THAT 'PEOPLE INVOLVED IN SUCH ACTIVITY OUT-
SIDE THE EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ARE AMATEURS AND HARMING THE
ROK CAUSE.' THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S DIRECTOR OF KOREAN AF-
FAIRS ALSO MET SEVERAL DAYS LATER WITH THE POLITICAL COUN-
SELOR FROM THE KOREAN EMBASSY AND EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN
ABOUT KOREAN LOBBYING IN THE UNITED STATES. RANARD ALSO
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,4, , , ,
ACTION: NONE INFO: UDPS-S, RF, FILE, (2/w)
78 088935 PAGE O'9'rt' 3'- NC 0889358
~~1Z TOR: 231004Z JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/12 1741000
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE VASHCC
TO RUAKOHA/AN;EMbASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0171
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF vYASHDC PRIORITY 0582
RUEAIIA/ CIA vvASHDC PRIORITY 0529
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 12 OF 15 STATE 1599622
MENTIONED THE PROPOSED CIRCULAR NOTE AND EXPRESSED HIS PAR-
TICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF RADIO OF FREE ASIA.
IN NOVEMBER OF 1970, AMBASSADOR PORTER AGAIN RAISED THE SUB-
JECT, THIS TIME tITH PRESIDENT PAK, IN AN EFFORT TO 'EN-
LIST (PRESIDENT PAK'S).SUPPORT IN RESTRAINING KOREAN LOBBY-
ISTS IN NNASHINGTON' WHICH PORTER DESCRIBED AS 'CREATING IR-
RITATION' AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. A FEN MONTHS LATER POR-
TER ALSO ASKED THE KCIA DIRECTOR TO TRY TO RESTRAIN TONG-
SUN PARK, BUT REPORTED THAT IT HAD APPARENTLY 'NOT HAD EF-
FECT.'
UNILATERAL ACTION vgITH RESPECT TO TONGSUN PARK WAS TAKEN
BY PHILIP HABIB WHEN THE LATTER SUCCEEDED WILLIAM PORTER
AS AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH KOREA. PARK'S FREE-WHEELING ACTI-
VITIES INCLUDING HIS ARRANGING FOR CONGRESSIONAL VISITS
TO SOUTH KOREA (MEETINGS WERE OFTEN ARRANGED FOR THE CON-
GRESSMEN WITH KOREAN OFFICIALS WITHOUT U.S. EMBASSY IN-
VOLVEMENT), HAD LONG BEEN A SOURCE OF IRRITATION TO SEVERAL
OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. ONE SUCH OFFICIAL
ONCE EVEN URGED ARRANGING FOR PARK'S 'RECALL TO KOREA';
PROPHESYING THAT PARK'S ACTIVITIES 'SOONER OR LATER ARE
BOUND TO GET HIM AND THE ROKG INTO SERIOUS TROUBLE, AND
WOULD JEOPARDIZE ALL wE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO ACCOMPLISH
WITH CONGRESS.' AMBASSADOR HABIB SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED
ALL MEMBERS OF THE U.S. EMBASSY STAFF TO HAVE ABSOLUTELY
15.A FULL-SCALE INVESTIGATION WAS FINALLY UNDERTAKEN IN
1975 WHEN THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 08893- PAGE 49- 3c NC 0889358
~-a7 TOR: 231004Z JUN 78
TO DELIVER A COLLECTION OF NEW INFORMATION TO THE THEN
ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND AN INVESTIGATION WAS BEGUN BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. IN FEBRUARY 1975, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE HABIB BROUGHT TO DR. KISSINGER'S AT-
TENTION NE" INFORMATION WHICH HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY U.S.
INTELLIGENCE REFLECTING 'EXTRA-LEGAL' KOREAN EFFORTS TO
INFLUENCE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
DR. KISSINGER CONSULTED NuITH PRESIDENT FORD, AND ASKED HA-
BIB FOR MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT. IN LATE
OCTOBER 1975, MR, HABIB RECEIVED AND PROVIDED DR. KISSINGER
MORE PRECISE INFORMATION ON THE SAME SUBJECT. DR. KISSIN-
GER AGAIN CONSULTED AITH THE PRESIDENT, wHU DIRECTED THAT
THE INFORMATION BE. TRANSMITTED TO THE ACTING ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL. IT WAS SO TRANSMITTED IN MID-NOVERMBER 1975.
16.THE COMMITTEE HAS DISCOVERED NO EVIDENCE THAT TONGSUN
PARK'S RELATIONSHIP W11H U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OR
OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS AFFECTED THE COLLECTION OR
REPORTING PROCESS OR RESULTED IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S
FAILURE TO HALT THE ACTIVITIES OF PARK OR THE KCIA.
THE COMMITTEE HAS EXAMINED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TONGSUIN
PARK EVER HAD A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFI-
CIALS THAT MIGHT HAVE AFFECTED THEIR ACTIONS IN THIS CASE.
PARK HAD MET DR. KISSINGER, ATTORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL,
ATTORNEY GENERAL SAXBE, CIA DIRECTOR HELMS AND DEFENSE
SECRETARY MELVIN LAIRD ON SOCIAL OCCASIONS. ON ONE OCCA-
SION HE HAD LUNCH WITH FBI DIRECTOR HOOVER IN THE OFFICE
OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN ROONEY, AND ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION HE
MET SECRETAPY LAIRD IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. HOWEVER, THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY OF THESE CONTACTS HAD ANY BEARING
UPON ANY ACTION TAKEN OR NOT TAKEN BY ANY OF THESE OFFICIALS
WITH RESPECT TO KOREAN LOBBYING IN THE UNITED STATES.
MR. PARK ALSO KNEW FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL RICHARD KLEIN-
DIENST AND MET WITH HIM IN KLEINDIENST'S OFFICE ON ONE OR
TWO OCCASIONS; HO EVER, THEIR DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED SUBSE-
QUENT TO THE TIME WHEN MR. KLEINDIENST AUTHORIZED THE
CLOSING OF THE INVESTIGATIONS OF PARK AND RADIO OF FREE
ASIA AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THOSE DISCUSSIONS INVOLVED
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
STATE
78 0889315-6 PAGE -Ot NC 0889358
TOR: 231004Z JUN 78
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTI01Q WITH RESPECT TO PARK'S ACTIVITIES
ON BEHALF OF SOUTH KOREA.
THE COMMITTEE HAS ALSO EXAMINED WHETHER TONGSUN PARK HAD A
RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
THAT WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND RE-
PORTING, OR RESULTANT GOVERNMENT ACTION. THE COMMITTEE HAS
DETERMINED THAT ALTHOUGH PARK DID HAVE SOME LIMITED CONTACT
WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, HE WAS NEVER CONSIDERED
BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO HAVE BEEN AN ASSET, AND
HE NEVER HAD ANY FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THOSE
AGENCIES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT PARK'S
LIMITED CONTACTS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS EVER HAD
AN EFFECT UPON THE PERFORMANCE OF THESE OFFICERS OR THE
AGENCIES THEY REPRESENTED.
BEGINNING IN 1959 AND FOR SEVERAL YEARS THEREAFTER, U.S.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS MET WITH PARK ON OCCASION TO OBTAIN
INFORMATION AND/OR TO ASSESS HIM AS A PROSPECTIVE ASSET.
IN 19b2, THERE WAS ALSO INTELLIGENCE INTEREST IN THE POS-
SIBILITY OF PARK'S HEADING UP A NEW YORK CITY PLACEMENT
SERVICE FOR KOREAN STUDENTS STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES
WHO DESIRED EMPLOYMENT IN THEIR HOMELAND. ALTHOUGH THIS
PARTIC'LAR ORGANIZATION WAS NEVER CREATED, PARK WAS INVOLVED
IN SOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH RESULTED IN A $1,500
ASIA FOUNDATION GRANT TO AN ORGANIZATION IN KOREA WHICH WAS
ALSO INVOLVED IN STUDENT PLACEMENT OPPORTUNITIES. PARK
HAS TESTIFIED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE AT THE TIME THAT THE ASIA
'Es - ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,4, , , ,
78 08893EH PAGE 944- 37 NC 0889360
TOR: 231005Z JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC p9962/13 1741002
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE tASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEME3ASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0172
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0583
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHOC PRIORITY 0530
b T
UNCLAS SECTION 13 OF 15 STATE 159962
FOUNDATION AS IN ANY WAY CONNECTED v4ITH THE CIA, AND
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO REFUTE HIS CLAIM.
IN 1967. WASHINGTON INTELLIGENCE OFFICALS WERE TOLD BY
THEIR OVERSEAS OFFICERS THA; PARK WAS THOROUGHLY 'WORTHY
OF CULTIVATION' AND PARK HIMSELF WAS APPARENTLY TOLD THAT A
HEADQUARTERS OFFICIAL WOULD BE CALLING ON HIM ANU MIGHT
WANT TO SEE HIM OCCASIONALLY. THE SUGGESTION WAS MADE THAT
PARK MIGHT BE OF INTEREST ,ECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE RELATIONS
WITH KEY KOREAN OFFICIALS. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN IN-
TELLIGENCE FILES THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS EVER ACTED UPON,
ALTHOUGH TWO YEARS LATER AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO HAD
JUST RETIRED DID IN FACT CONTACT PARK AND ARRANGED A PRI
VATE DINNER GATHERING WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY TWO OTHER IN-
TELLIGENCE OFFICIALS. IT WAS PARK'S RECOLLECTION THAT THE
DINNER WAS ARRANGED 0 AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO HAD BEEN
ASKED 'TO LOOK ME UP.' THERE IS CONFLIC,ING EVIDENCE
WHETHER THE DINNER TOOK PLACE IN PARK'S HOME OR IN A WASH-
INGTON RESTAURANT. IT WAS APPARENTLY FOLLOWED BY A 'TOUR'
OF THE GEORGETOWN CLUB. THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
ASCERTAIN WHY THE DINNER WAS ARRANGED, AND THERE ARE NO RE-
CORDS ON THE SUBJECT IN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FILES. ONE OF
THE OFFICERS WHO WAS AT THE DINNER WAS ENROUTE TO A NEW
ASSIGNMENT IN SAIGON AND ASKED PARK TO LET HIM KNOW IF HE
LEARNED OF ANY CONGRESSMEN WHOMMIGHT BE COMING TO VISIT
THERE. INTELLIGENCE FILES REFLECT PARK'S SUBSEQUENT EF-
FORTS TO CONTACT ONE OF THE OFFICERS CONCERNED, BUT, AC-
CORDING TO THE UFFICEk, 'I NEVER RETURNED HIS CALLS.'
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 088934o.4 PAGE t-" NC 0889360
I P TOR: 231005Z JUN 78
w e n s w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w- w w- ilw w w w w w w ww w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w wlw w w ww w w
ADDITIONAL INTEREST IN PARK WAS EXPRESSED BY ANOTHER IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCY WHICH, IN 1968, WAS APPARENTLY CONSIDER-
ING RECRUITING PARK AS A 'SPOTTER ASSESSOR' TO BE USED TO
RECRUIT AND ASSESS POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PARK WAS ACT-
UALLY USED IN THAT CAPACITY.
DURING THE PERIOD 1970-71, PARK APPARENTLY-HAD NUMEROUS
CONTACTS KITH THE CIA STATION CHIEF IN SEOUL, ALTHOUGH
THEIR RECOLLECTIONS DIFFER AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THEIR RE-
LATIONSHIP. PARK CONSIDERED THE STATION CHIEF TO HAVE
BEEN A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND AND HE CLAIMS THAT THEY EX-
CHANGED CONSIDERABLE SUBSTANTIVE INFORMATION ABOUT KOREAN
POLITICS AND POLITICAL FIGURES. THE STATION CHIEF RECALLS
THEIR MEETINGS TO HAVE BEEN OF A PURELY SOCIAL NATURE RA-
THER THAN SUBSTANTIVE. THERE ARE NO RECORDS IN INTELLI-
GENCE FILES REFLECTING WHAT TRANSPIRED BETWEEN THEM. PARKoel*
RECALLS RECEIVING A CASE OF A LIQUOR FROM THE STATION
CHIEF ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION.
PARK'S ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES FIRST CAME TO THE
ATTENTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN 1962 WHEN ONE OF
THE DOMESTIC COMPONENTS REPORTED THAT PARK AND HIS GEORGE-
TOWN ROOMMATE, DOUGLAS CADDY, WERE FORMING 'A NEW AND
HOPEFULLY POTENT INTERNATIONAL ANTI-COMMUNIST YOUTH OR-
GANIZATION,' CALLED THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE
YOUTH. THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO REPORTED THIS INFORMA-
TION NOTED THAT HIS SOURCE, A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF PARK, HAD
NOT ASKED FOR SUPPORT OR GUIDANCE, BUT HAD PASSED THE IN-
FORMATION ALONG BECAUSE U.S. INTELLIGENCE 'SHOULD BE IN-
FORMED OF THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY FROM THE BEGINNING.' AL-
THOUGH THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TOLD HIS SUPERIORS HE WOULD
'APPRECIATE AN EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN PURSUING THE DE-
VELOPMENT,' THERE IS NO INDICATION IN INTELLIGENCE FILES
THAT ANY FURTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN. ALTHOUGH U.S. INTELLI-
GENCE FUNDED VARIOUS STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS-DURING THE
1960'S, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THIS PARTICULAR ORGAN-
IZATION 44 AS EVER UTILIZED IN ANY FASHION BY U.S, INTELLI-
GENCE. MOREOVER, RELEVANT INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS HAVE
INFORMED THE COMMITTEE THAT THEY HAVE NEVER HAD ANY RELA-
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 088936-E- PAGE-06317 NC 0889360
TOR: 231005Z JUN 78
w-----w-----w-wwlwwlwi----w--i-wwwiwwww!!lwwwilwwwwiwiwwwiwiiwwwi!lwww-iwwiii
THE SAKE INTELLIGENCE SOURCE WHICH PROVIDED INFORMATION
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE YOUTH WAS QUES-
TIONED SEVERAL YEARS LATER ABOUT THE GEORGETOWN CLUB AND
PARK'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE CLUEi. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF
WHAT GENERATED THIS LATER INTELLIGENCE INTEREST IN THAT SUB-
JECT, NOR IS THERE EVIDENCE OF AMY RESPONSE TO THE INTELLI-
GENCE OFFICER'S REQUEST TO BE NOTIFIED BY HIS SUPERIORS IF
THERE V~ERE INTEREST IN ACCESS TO PARK THROUGH THE SOURCE.
INTELLIGENCE FILES DO REFLECT THAT AT ABOUT THIS TIME A
PROPOSAL VAS MADE, BUT REJECTED, TO UTILIZE THE GEORGETOWN
CLUB AS AN OPERATIONAL BASE.
THE COMMITTEE HAS ALSO ASCERTAINED-THAT TWO FORMER INTELLI-
GENCE OFFICERS HAD BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARK, ONE
WHILE HE WAS STILL EMPLOYED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND IN
FACT IN HIS 'COVER' CAPACITY. NEVERTHELESS THERE IS NO IN-
DICATION THAT PARKrWAS AWARE THAT THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
WERE OR HAD BEEN SO EMPLOYED, AND NO EVIDENCE THAT THEIR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARK HAD ANY EFFECT UPON THE INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCIES' PERFORMANCE RELATED TO KOREA,
IN HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE ETHICS COMMITTEE, PARK
READILY ADMITTED TO KNOWING SEVERAL FORMER INTELLIGENCE OF-
FICIALS BUT THE COMMITTEE HAS DISCOVERED NO EVIDENCE THAT
ANY OF THOSE RELATIONSHIPS AFFECTED THE HANDLING OF THE
KOREA CASE.
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP; , ,
78 0S89.3r PAGE Oet Hb NC 0889364
;? - TOP: 231006Z JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #99622/14 1741003
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUAKOHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0173
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF ~%ASHDC PRIORITY 0584
RUEAIIA/ CIA vASHDC PRIORITY 0531
ET
UNCLAS SECTION 14 OF 15 STATE 159962
DESPITE. THE CONTACTS, BOTH WITTING AND UNWITTING, THAT PARK
HAD WITH INTELLIGENCE'AGENTS FROM TIME TO TIME, THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS EVER ASKED (OR THAT ANY INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS WHO WERE IN TOUCH WITH HIM WERE EVER TASKED TO
FIND OUT ABOUT) THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF HIS ACTIVITIES ON
BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH KOREA.
(1)THERE SHOULD BE A STANDING REQUIREMENT FOR OVERSEAS NA-
TIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES TO AT-
TEMPT TO ASCERTAIN THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF ALL FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE SERVICE ACTIVITIES IN THIS COUNTRY.
(2)TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE FBI SHOULD BE KEPT
FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED ABOUT THE IDENTITIES AND AS-
SIGNMENTS OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO
THE UNITED STATES.
(3)THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SHOULD ESTABLISH POLICY GUIDANCE
WHICH INSURES ADEQUATE COVERAGE OF 'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE OFFICERS STATIONED IN THE UNITED STATES, CONSIS-
TENT WITH FBI AUTHORITY AND WITH RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.
THE COMMITTEE IS AWARE FROM THE KOREA CASE THAT FO-
REIGN GOVERNMENTS MIGHT ALSO SEEK TO IMPROPERLY INFLUENCE
U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THROUGH THE UTILIZATION OF 'A-
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
STATE
www-w-w-ww-----------wwwww-w---w----www-ww--ww~sww-w..s fir .r-..wr~ww.lw~.+w ----wwlw w^
78 08693 r PAGE fi-f NC 0889364
~LA ).._ TOR: 231006Z JUN 78
?-wsws---------w--------w-------- w-w-w-w----- sw---ww----w---w----w-w-w---?w--~
GENTS' WHO MIGHT NOT ALWAYS BE SPECIFICALLY OR EASILY IDEN-
TIFIABLE AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUCH
'AGENTS' VHO MIGHT BE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
WHOSE ACTIVITIES DO NOT VIOLATE UNITED STATES LAN POSE
SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. THE COMMITTEE IS NOT
RECOMMENDING THE INVESTIGATIVE TARGETING OF SUCH INDIVI-
DUALS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS CLEAR THAT CONSIDERABLY MORE
ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO THIS PROBLEM BY BOTH THE EXECU-
TIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS TO DEVISE A MEANS TO INSURE
THAT THE USE OF NON-INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL BY FOREIGN GOV-
ERNMENTS IS CAREFULLY CONTROLLED.
(L4)THE FBI SHOULD DEVOTE GREATER RESOURCES TO THEIR COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO COUNTER THE
THREATS POSED BY BOTH HOSTILE AND 'FRIENDLY' FOREIGN INTEL-
LIGENCE SERVICES.
(5)THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SHOULD INSURE THAT
ALL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH IS RECEIVED CONCERNING
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES IS
ANALYZED, ASSESSED, AND TRANSMITTED PROMPTLY TO THE FBI, THE
SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESI-
DENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS.
(6)THE FBI AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD CLARIFY THEIR
RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES,
(7)THE DCI AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHOULD CONTINUE THE RE-
CENTLY INITIATED PRACTICE OF NOTIFYING THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS IN THE EVENT MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OR THE SENATE OR THEIR STAFFS HAVE BEEN TAR-
GETED BY A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.
(8)UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE RE-
PUBLIC OF KOREA ARE NOT BASED UPON ANY AGREEMENTS WHICH
WOULD HAVE PERMITTED THE OBJECTIONABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH THE
KCIA CONDUCTED IN THE UNITED STATES. MOREOVER, WHEN THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO LEARN OF SUCH ACTIVI-
TIES, IT HAS THE OPTION TO THWART THEM, ALBEIT AT SOME RISK
TO OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS.
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
78 0889' #-, PAGE $-63 (/ 2-' NC 0889364
TOR; 2310062 JUN 78
w w w w w w w w w w w w w w w?- w r w w- r w w-- w w w- ft--W w w w-------- wCase Ca r r- w w r- w w w w w w w? w- w-- r- w w w^
THE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
SHOULD APPRECIATE THE FULL RANGE OF ACTIONS OPEN TO THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS RAISED
BY ACTIVITIES OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
THE COMMITTEE IS ALSO CONCERNED THAT WHATEVER MAY HAVE
PROMPTED KOREAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS TO BELIEVE THAT THEY
COULD OPERATE WITH IMPUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES IS PROBAB-
LY NO DIFFERENT FROM CONCEPTIONS -- OR MISCONCEPTIONS --
WHICH SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR EVERY NATION'S INTELLIGENCE
ACITIVITIES ALL OVER THE NORLU. VJE CANNOT ADDRESS THIS
KIND OF CASE MERELY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF WHETHER FOR-
EIGN AGENTS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO BUY UNITED STATES FOR-
EIGN POLICY. THE ISSUE IS MUCH MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN THAT.
IT REQUIRES AWARENESS THAT THE KCIA VAS OPERATIONAL IN THIS
COUNTRY AS LONG AGO AS 1963 AND CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER
ANY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN LIAISON SHOULD HAVE BEEN, OR
SHOULD BEr ACCEPTABLE. AND THE COMPLEXITY OF RESOLVING
THAT ISSUE REQUIRES ACKNO-'LEDGEMENT OF OUR ON INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES VPHICH ARE OF GREAT BENEFIT TO THE UNITED
STATES.
IF WE VISH TO PREVENT FUTURE CASES OF IMPROPER ACTIVITIES
BY FRIENDLY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES, BUT CONCLUDE THAT AN OUTRIGHT BAN v4OULD UNDULY
RESTRICT OUR ON OPERATIONS ABROAD, THEN v+E SHOULD TRY TO
FASHION SOME METHOD OF GOVERNING THESE INTERNATIONAL PRAC-
AD!MIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY FRP: , , ,L, , , ,
78 0889"-C
PAGE e-B-'t`(.3 NC 0889370
TOR: 231006Z JUN 78
PP RUEAIIA
DE RUEHC #9962/15 1741.004
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230051Z JUN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUAKUHA/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0174
INFO RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 0585
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 0532
HT
UNCLAS FINAL SECTION OF 15 STATE 159962
TICES. THAT EFFORT HAS NEVER BEFORE BEEN MADE, AND IT
WOULD BE NAIVE TO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD
UNILATERALLY PROMULGATE STANDARDS FOR THE CONDUCT OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. IT IS THE COMMIT-
TEES'S JUDGMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, IN CON-
SULTATION WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, MIGHT WANT TO TRY
To ESTABLISH AGREED,-FORMAL OR INFORMAL LIMITS ON s 9:--IY21wi
OF ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED WITHIN EACH OTHEq=FRITORY,
ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS COULD NOT REASONABLY BE
EXPECTED TO BE. SECRET AND UNDETECTED, AT LEAST THERE IS
THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE POTENTIAL FOR POSSIBLE ABUSE COULD
BE LOWERED. IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
SHOULD CONSIDER THE SELECTIVE USE, IN CASES OF CLEARLY UN-
ACCEPTABLE ACTIVITIES, OF UNILATERAL ACTIONS WHICH WOULD
MAKE CLEAR THE LIMITS ON THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES BY FRIEND-
LY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH
rile, 6E TOLERATED BY THIS COUNTRY.
00000010
VANCE
ADMIN INTERNAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7
 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
SUSPENSE DATE: e
.2 /vwr=
of/0 -re 10/
ir' a,--
fa~,4
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
DD/RM
4
DD/N FA
5
DD/CT
6
DD/A
7
DD/O
8
DD/S&T
GC
10
L
G
12
Compt
13
PA
14
D/EEO
15
D/Pers
16
AO/DCI
17
C/IPS
18
DCI/SS
19
20
21
22
Approved For Release 2006/07/28: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002900020039-7