LETTER TO ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER FROM BIRCH BAYH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002800020080-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: August 11, 1978
• Content Type: LETTER

Ap,
PHCHDAYH. IND..prov,ed For Release 2006112115: CIA-RDP81 M0098OR002800020080-2
9ARRY(:OC:)WATER. ARIZ.. VICECNAInMAH
A~tJ.1 F. STEVENSON. ILL.
W:LLIAV D. HATY;SW,+. MAINE
WALTER D'HU:>.)LESTON. KY.
, QSLPN R. L'DS+I. in.. DEL.
;.03E.'. MOR4AN. N' C.
GARY HART. COLD.
DANIEL P.TRICK MOYNIHAN. N.Y.
DANIEL K. INCUYt. HAWAII
CLIFFORO P. CASE. N.J.
JAKE GANN. UTAH
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS. JR.. MD.
JAMES D. PEARSON. KANS.
JOHN H. CNAI.EE. R.1.
P.ICHARD G. LLK.AR. IND.
MALCOLV WALLOP. WYD.
ROBERT C. DY nD. W. VA.. EX OYFICIO
HOWARD H. BAKER. JR.. TENN.. EX OFFICIO
WILLIAM O. MILLER. STAMP DIPECTOR
EARL D. E15ENNOWZR. M)NORI'EY STAFF DIIZCTOA
2 5 AUG 197
Je Yifeb ctfLz Ize6ic4p,
Admiral Stansfield Turner
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(PURSUANT To S. HEY. iso. 94TH cONORESS)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Stan:
The Committee has just completed its review of the
report on Covert Action in Angola, 1975-1976. You will.
receive a copy of that report under cover of a separate
letter. The report takes into account the additional
documents made available-by the Executive Branch and is
the result of a thorough review of the total available
documentary record. I would like to take this occasion
to reflect on the lessons learned in the process of
writing the Angola report, and more importantly on the
relationships between this Committee and the intelli-
gence community in general.
The Angola covert action took place in another era,
under a different leadership, and in a time when the re-
lationships both formal and personal, were of a differ-
ent order, but were under severe criticism and were
clearly changing rapidly. Angola is an interesting case
for both of us to consider because it straddles the old
way of conducting relationships between the legislative
and Executive branches with regard to covert action, and
the present procedures. Although the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment was in effect, the performance of Congressional
oversight committees was uneven. Some were passive;
others did not want to go into any detail; while other
committees wanted every detail. The pattern of informing
Congress prior to the Angola period was that a small hand-
ful of legislators were informed in very general terms.
There was, for the most part, an implicitly close and
trusting relationship. Clearly the old oversight relation-
ship was inadequate in almost every respect. As I reflect on
vIORI/ : 'F Fades 1-:
 Approved For Release 2006/12/15: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002800020080-2
.Admiral Stansfield Turner
August 11, 1978
Page Two
the Angola experience; it is my view that the agency was
under intense pressures from both the Executive and.-the
Legislative branches. The leadership of the Executive
branch preferred a highly compartmented secretive ap-
proach, and the legislature was moving very rapidly from
one of passivity to aggressive detailed interest in all
matters concerning covert action. But looking at the
Angola experience overall, one cannot say that the
.Congress.,--through its appropriate-committees, was fully
and currently informed. Rather, what the Congress
learned was by dint of, extraordinary effort on its own
part; field investigations by. concerned Senators and
staff, and by extraordinary efforts to root out the
record.
a air, i may make comment,,those wtiose actions-- were
sonable to put a groupontothe question whic as no
direct connection. with these events._. In the Angola-
ngola
That-experience
That - experience is behind us=........ The Select Committee
on Intelligence and the intelligence commu yonder our
direcon have been working out close rustin bu ob-
jective relationshi . wou i e to reflect on some
gener princip es that could usefully pertain in studies
and.inquiries of this sort in the future.
First, there should be full and complete and prompt
access to all-information. If there is a problem with
any document or documents you should let Bill Miller or
me know immediately and we can jointly resolve the diffi-
culties that may be involved.
Second if the inquiry might call into question the
performance of a particular unit I would think it rea-
volve in Ft e interpretation o events o the time. I
response a ommittee or documents and were in-
un de c-rs rutiny, were? a so t ose o were p`r_e_p-4-r-i-n-g the
etter serve , and the om ittee would
be better served if an independent group could be appointed.
to carry out inquiries. Perhaps a unit from the Inspector
General's staff or from your own personal staff would be
appropriate for.this kind of task.
00980 R00280002-0080-2
 Approved For Release 2006/12/15: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002800020080-2
Admiral Stansfield Turner
August 11, 1978
Page Three
Third,-on the part of the Committee, I think it
eful, whenever possible, to review with you prior
performing under the-law and in accord with regulation.
We both know that from time to time there will be intel-
ligence failures, and there may be occasional illegali-
ties or improprieties that will require vigorous, in-
depth objective scrutiny. In my view, however, the major
contribution that we can make to.the process of strength-
ening our national intelligence system is to provide an
independent and I hope objective critique of various
aspects of the intelligence community's performance.. In
order to perform this necessary function well we both--
must work together to assure that the information that
is-necessary for the Committee to carry out this function,
whether documents, briefings or on the spot rev iews'is
provided promptly and is full and complete. I know this
has-.been your declared purpose and objective, and I write
these observations not in any criticism, but-with a view
to making some suggestions that will strengthen our
mutual efforts to.support the nation's intelligence
system.
as Chairman of this Committee and as - an individual
Senator, that under your leadership the agencies are
have arrivedat- This will generally be necessary be-
cause it is inevitable that document requests will not
be completely met because of a lack of understanding
with what is desired. No matter how much good will
there may be, misunderstandings can and do and will
arise, and these misunderstandings can lead to incom-
pleteness and possible distortion unless there is a
full and forthright exchange of views.
-I want you to know-that it is my firm belief both
o the issuance of any report such findings as we may
With kind regards,
 Approved For Release 2006/12/15: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002800020080-2
Approved For Release 2006/12/15: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002800020080-2