ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET TO DDCI FROM LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R002300070143-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 143
• Content Type: FORM

'i red Fort) ie UQ 6/08/09 : CIA-R DP810099061H664143-2
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
E
0 USEE PREVIOUS DTIO S ^ SECRET El CONFIDENTIAL ^ INTE ONLY ^ UNCLASSIFIED
61
Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002300070143-2
Attached for your signature
are letters to Senators
Bumpers and Morgan regarding
their requests for compart-
mented clearances for their
personal staff aides. Senator
Bumpers sent you an informa-
tion copy of his letter to
the Vice President on this
subject. We advised the
Vice President's staff that
we would attempt to deal
directly with the Senator
on the issue.
The letters explain the
rationale behind the Guide-
lines and Procedures which
you issued in July. The
letters also point out to
Senators Bumpers and Morgan
that a legislative provision
exists which would allow
them to have their personal
staff men appointed to the
relevant committee staff,
and that this would make the
individuals eligible for
compartmented clearances.
I doubt that these letters
will placate either Senator,
but they are the most that
can be done for them while
maintaining the integrity of
the Guidelines and Procedures.
 lie 1./{fC(iOi (I l.(~IlitiIlllll4~..kc, i ry+-i
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1 2 SEP 197f1
Honorable Dale L. Bumpers
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 2,0510
Dear Senator Bumpers:
I have received a copy of your letter to the President of the
Senate dated 31 July 1978 concerning access to sensdtive cozrpart.m.ented
intelligence by personal staff of Members of Congress. I am cognizant
of the vital role played by Congressional staff aides such as your staff
,a sistant, Leonard Parkinson. Let m.e assure you that I have no
intention of impeding the work of any Senator, and I believe your
requirements for sensitive compartmented information can be met
within the framework of the Guidelines and Procedures for the issuance
of compartmented clearances to the Legislative Branch, which I issued
on 21 July.
As you know, I am charged by statute with responsibility for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods. It was in this connection
that 1 became concerned about the proliferation of access to sensitive
intelligence maintained within systems of compartmentation. In July 1977,
therefore, I initiated a program to restrain and where possible to reduce
the number of compartmented access approvals within the Executive Branch.
President Carter recently expressed strong concern to the Senai:e
and House Leadership about the number of Legislative Branch employees
with access to sensitive intelligence information. I share this concern, and
the new Guidelines and Procedures for the granting of compartmented access
approvals to employees of the Legislative Branch are designed to provide
a centralized management control mechanism that will assure strict, uniform
application of need--to-know and personnel security criteria. A copy of the
Guidelines and Procedures is enclosed.
Section D does confirm. the general thrust of previous policy by
specifying that only key staff member in the offices of the Leadership
pprove orLL e ease4 F6w+
 Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP81 M00980R002300070143-2
of the Congress and permanent committee staff de: i_gnuiced by co:nnd:ittcc: or
subcommittee chairmen are e].if ii>le for co,n par%rncnted clearances. ].
recognize that the reasons, for drawing; a line between committee staff
and personal staff may not be read;i.:ly apparent, but 1 ca:.l assure you that
the distinction is based on valid, significant security grounds. Committiee
staffers are subject to standardized security procedure.,:; and discipline, for
controlling classified information which are not applicable to personal
staff. I believe it necessary to make this distinction given the urgent
need to halt the proliferation of access to sensitive compartmented
intelligence on the part of Congressional staff.
.1 am aware that con:iparttnented access approvals granted by some
]executive Branch agencies prior to the effective date of the Guidelines and
Procedures have created several anomalous situations with regard to
particular personal staff aides. I intend to ensure that the Gtiiidefines and
Procedures are appliedai.rly and consistently , and this may well necessitate
the withdrawal of some outstanding clearances.
I must hasten to add that Section 1) should not be read to
exclude from eligibility for Compartmented clearances individuals
who become associated with committee or >ubconn-mittee staffs under
the provisions of Section 111(1_,)(2) of the Legislative Branch Appropriation
Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-94, 91 Stat. 6519)). Section 11.1 codifies Section 705
of Senate Resolution 4, 95th Congress. Of course, decisions concerning
the use of Sections lll(b)(`?.) and 111(c) must be made by each Senator
in consultation with the appropriate committee or subcommittee chairm.an.
The key distinction between the two statutory provisions as far as
Guidelines and Procedures for coinpartmented clearances are concerned
is that under 111(b)(2) an individual is actually appointed to the committee
or subcommittee staff "for the purpose of assisting [a particular Senator]
solely and directly in his duties as a member... ," while Section ]i1(c)
pertains to a Senator's designation of employees "in his office" to assist
him with committee work. Should h1r. Parkinson, for example, become
associated with the staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee under
Section 111(b)(2) we would be pleased to consider a request for compartmented
clearances made in accordance with Section D of the Guidelines and
Procedures.
It is my belief that in the vast majority of cases it is possible to
meet requirements for substantive intelligence without disclosing ;sources
or methods of acquisition. We are always prepared to brief per sonaal staff
with appropriate security clearances and a demonstrable need-to-know
on a non-compartmented basis . Where this is inadequate to rn.eet time particular
Congressional need we stand ready to fully brief Members of Congress
personally.
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I hope that this explanation of the Guidelines and Procedures and
the rationale behind them will be helpful to you. Again, let me stress
that it is not my intention to interfere with the work of any Senator. I
believe the Guidelines and l:'rocedures constitute a reasonable response to
a situation that was on the verge of becoming a serious threat to the
security of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. 'While son-re sacrifice
and inconvenience may he necessary on the part of both the Intelligence
Community and the Legislative Branch, I am sure that the needs of all
Members of Congress can be accommodated.
If you wish to discuss this natter further my Legislative Counsel,
Frederick Hitz, will be happy to be of assistance.
Yours sincerely,
/a/ Stenefield Tuxnel'
STANSIOIEI_.D TURNER,
Distribution:
Original -- Addressee w/encl.
I - DCI w/encl.
I -- DDCI w/encl.
I - Ell w/encl.
I - OIL Subject w/encl.
1 - OLC Chrono w/o encl.
OLC:GMC:baa (22 Aug 1978)
Retyped CMC:mlg (5 Sept: 1978)
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withC)ut clip;(:loti;zlxf, the ;Ollr C:f or method o ,-
evEez y Effort will be xrmacle to satisfy C.oxt= r it)xt t rc ttlti.r. t~rrl.c)I.t>: iC))
information by providing" OY
does not reveal. the m anrnE:r of collection or acquisi.t.i.cin.. !?i.re-c.f: acc:ess
to compa1rtine-nted in ormatic)rt will not be approved t).rilt ss sctniLirv
lion or the provision of nox).cc)r.111:,z; trrlE rltecl information i.:.:sl~a.' n i:c) be
inadequate to zr_cet the Congressional. requirement.-
E . A.ccess approvals -gill be valid only s>o idng as they arc: nece sort
and approvals granted for particular z equiz cment. , iJl. be ter rr)-S atccl when
those requirements have been mete All aapproval.s will be a.lxc_lude c ir). "we-
ce:ntral data base maintained by the Special. Security Center ulxrler the
direction of the OCS's Director of Security.
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G.. All persons, excluding Member of Cc11. f z c-.ss F" granted ace e s s i-o
compartmented intelligence information shall have been the :subject of
prior $nrestigation meeting the criteria set forth in.DCII) 1/111: ?` Security
investigations of Congressional staff persons may be conducted under
agreed upon arrange-rnerts with chairmen of committees ox sut_1c--ommit-to es
as appropriate. Investigations generally will. be conducted by the
of Defense, the 1"BI, or the Civil Service Con-maission, depending upon.
the particular ~trrangemvnts made. The agency or clcpartmeni .f)on:;oni)l f;
the clearance will assume re'.~E;ponsibil.ity' for assuring the- conduct of cll"1.
appropriate-e investigation . Security determinations made by spozlsoring
a f,c rlcies or depax i zr eats will be? reviewed by the DCl':s I?irect.or of .`_~rzc:it): i t~?
fo assure the- proper uniform application of secu it ? cx i.i:rx i-cr_ under 1)(:t?_) 1/14..
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