TERRORISM IN 1977

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001400010012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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TERRORISM IN 1977
Trends
Developments relating to international terrorism in
1977 showed several major patterns and trends.
For the year as a whole, there was a decline in the
number of international incidents and their attendant
casualties (see figures 1 and 2). This decline was prob-
ably in large pert due to increased security measures
taken by previously victimized governments, coupled with
political developments fostering a wait-and-see attitude
on the part of terrorists. During the second half of
the year, however, the frequency of terrorist incidents
jumped to nearly the previous year's record levels.
Several spectacular acts--such as the Japanese Red Army
(JRA) and Lufthansa hijackings--and bombings protesting
the Baader-Meinhof suicides and the Sadat peace initiative
occurred toward the end of the year.
In geographic terms, terrorists continued to prefer
operations in the industrialized democracies of Western
Europe and North America. More than half of all incidents
were recorded in these regions (see figure 3).
There were fewer attacks than the previous year,
both in relative and absolute terms, on US citizens and
property (see table 1). Increasingly effective preven-
tive measures taken by police and by US Government and
business officials were probably the main reasons for
the decrease. American human rights advocacy may also
have played a part by making US citizens and installa-
tions a more ambiguous and less inviting target than in
previous years.
Terrorism in the Middle East stayed at relatively
high levels and again transcended the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. As in 1976, attacks on fellow Arabs constituted
the bulk of fedayeen-related international terrorism.
Bombings of Egyptian overseas facilities contributed to
an overall increase from 1976 in the number of fedayzeen-
related attacks.
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 UNCLASSIFIED
^ INTERNAL
USE ONLY
^ CONFIDENTIAL
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FROM:
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building)
STAT
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ORPA/IID - 5G32 Hqs
D/ORPA
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Please Hand Carry
Attached is an unclassified
statement on terrorism.
HPSCI plans to hand this out
following hearings on Augu
16. DDO is to provide
testimony which will be
classified. I
of ORPA will accompany e
DDO witness and provide
ackup if needed.
LlNICLASS1` 1
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While terrorist organizations at times carefully
planned and coordinated complex operations, the vast
majority of reported attacks continued to be low-risk
endeavors, such as bombings, arson, and murder (see
table 2). This was accompanied by a shift away from
well-protected targets to more remote ones not hereto-
fore subjected to attacks.. For example, US facilities
in isolated rural villages were attacked, while hijack-
ers used smaller airports as their embarkation points.
Terrorists continued to display a lack of inclina-
tion, or perhaps ability, to master and use sophisticated
weapons and teclnology. Terrorist acquisition of such
devices and training in their use is frequently reported
but this has not led to their operational deployment.
While the West German Red Army Faction threatened to
shoot down Lufthansa planes with SA-7 heat-seeking mis-
siles, so far it has not followed up its threat.
The behavior of hostage-takers suggested a height-
ened sensitivity to the tendency for sympathetic psycho-
logical bonds to form between captors and hostages over
time. For example, South Moluccans refused to talk to
their hostages; Japanese Red Army hijackers wore masks,
used numbers to refer to themselves, and initially in-
structed passengers not to look at them; the Lufthansa
hijackers deliberately mistreated passengers and killed
the pilot.
Implications for 1978
The 1977 experience with international terrorism,
compared with historical events, suggests two basic ob-
servations. First, relatively wide fluctuations in the
nature and intensity of violence remain evident. Second,
the number and character of the groups engaged in inter-
national terrorist activity have been constantly chang-
ing. Although terrorism has risen from the levels of
the 1960s, the 1970s seem to have produced a cyclical
pattern in terms of overall numbers of incidents. Most
terrorist campaigns do not appear to be sustainable for
more than a few months, as governments adapt to terror-
ist tactics, group leaders are arrested, and logistic
problems arise. In time, however, new terrorist recruits
appear and develop new methods--thus the cycle continues.
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These oscillations and uncertainties. in the pattern
and level of terrorist activity render predictions
hazardous, although it is clear that the threat will
persist. While the precise level and nature of inter-
national terrorist activity over the next six months or
so cannot be forecast, past experience suggests that:
--Regional patterns of victimization and location
of operations will remain unchanged. Repre-
sentatives of affluent countries, particularly
government officials and business executives,
will continue to be attractive targets. Eur-
ope, Latin America, and the Middle East will
be the pXimary arenas of attack. While US
official and corporate security will continue
to deter potential attackers overseas, Ameri-
can persons and property will continue to be
attractive targets.
--Terrorists will shift to alternative targets
rather than retreat from the scene, if their
primary goals are unattainable.
--Acts of terrorism related to the Palestinian
issue will almost certainly continue. Extrem-
ists will seek to demonstrate their rejection
of a political solution of the Arab-Israeli
dispute, even if this is accepted by the main-
stream of the Palestinian movement, the PLO.
Recent terrorist activities in the Middle East
have focused on President Sadat's overtures to
Israel, with Egyptian facilities becoming
prime targets. Developments seen by the Pales-
tinians as contrary to their interests could
induce even more moderate groups, such as
Fatah, to resume terrorist activity outside
of Israel.
--Developments in other areas, such as separatist
sentiments in Europe or apartheid in South
Africa, could motivate terrorist organizations
indigenous to the arena of conflict to carry
their battles abroad to gain increased inter-
national publicity for their cause.
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--Commemoration of radical martyrs--such as
Andreas Baader, Mayir Cayan, and Che Guevara--
through the use of violence will continue.
There are also likely to be incidents designed
to protest specific national or international
political developments.
--The development and implementation of more
effective-international countermeasures will
continue to be impeded by differing moral
perspectives among states, a broad resistance
to the perceived infringement of sovereignty
in any curtailment of the right to grant po-
litical *Asylum, and a natural reluctance on
the part of many states to commit themselves
to any course of action that might invite
retribution--either by terrorist groups or by
states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause..
The next six months or so are likely to be charac-
terized by some discontinuities and new developments as
well, including:
--The potential use of standoff weapons, such
as heat-seeking missiles, to avoid direct
confrontations with authorities. One or more
groups may overcome their present tactical
limitations and moral qualms to master and
employ s,;uch.technologies.
--A further upsurge in West European radical
activity. Although the original West German
anarchist leaders are dead, their organiza-
tions remain a major threat. Difficulties ex-
perienced by police in locating suspects in-
volved in major kidnapings and assassinations
have demonstrated the existence of well-orga-
nized support networks willing to aid such
individuals. The suicides of the Baader-
Meinhof leaders, as well as the deaths of the
Mogadiscio hijackers, have provided the radi-
cal left with a new group of martyrs whose
deaths may be avenged by future operations.
These may be primarily directed against the
governments that aided Bonn in arresting
radicals who had fled West Germany.
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in sum, the decline in the frequency of interna-
tional terrorist attacks is expected to level off and
may even be reversed. The many issues that have moti-
vated individual terrorists remain unresolved, and new
causes will arise. Although added security precautions
at sensitive facilities and the use of paramilitary
rescue squads may deter spectacular confrontational at-
tacks, these measures clearly cannot protect all poten-
tial targets from simple hit-and-run operations.
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Figure 1
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-77....
Killed Total: 1,652
[]
71
72
L
77
1. Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents, e.g., exclusion
of the Malaysian hijacking of 1977, which some reports credited to Asian terrorists, would subtract 100 deaths from that year's total.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Figure 2
international Terrorist Incidents,
1968-77
01 1 __1__.I-_ L---L__J I-_I
1968 70 72 74 76
Figure 3
Geographic Distribution of International
. Terrorist incidents, 1968-77
Total: 2,690
Sub-Saharan Africa
155
Transregional 4
Latin America
747
Middle East and
North Africa
Western Europe
964
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International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property,
1968-77, by Category of Target (U)
Target 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total'
US diplomatic officials
or property .................................... 12 17 52 51 22 19 12 12 12 21 230 (20.0)
US military officials
or property .................................... 4 2 38 36 11 12 12 9 33 10 167 (14.5)
Other US Government
officials or property ...................... 26 32 57 21 20 10 16 14 2 7 205 (17.9)
US business facilities I
or executives .................................. 6 35 24 40 44 51 86 42 52 33 413 (36.0)
US private citizens ............................ 3 7 , 17 5 12 10 13 27 26 13 133 (11.6)
Total .............................................. 51 93 188 153 109 102 139 104 125 84 1,148
' Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of target.
International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-77, by Category of Attack (U)
Kidnaping ..........................................
1
3
32
17
11
37
25
38
30
22
216
(8.0)
Barricade-hostage ..............................
0
0
5
1
3
8
9
14
4
5
49
(1.8)
Letter bombing ..................................
3
4
3
1
92
22
16
3
11
2
157
(5.8)
Incendiary bombing ..........................
12
22
53
30
15
31
37
20
91
57
368
(13.7)
Explosive bombing ............................
67
97
104
115
106
136
239
169
176
131
1,340
(49.8)
Armed attack ....................................
11
13
8
8
9
10
21
11
21
14
126
(4.7)
Hijacking ` ..........................................
3
11
21
9
14
6
8
4
6
8
90
(3.3)
Assassination ......................................
7
4
16
12
10
18
12
20
48
23
170
(6.3)
Theft, break-in ..................................
3
7
22
10
1
0
8
8
5
0
64
(2.4)
Sniping ................................................
3
2
7
3
4
3
3
9
14
6
54
(2.0)
Other actions' ..................................
1
3
11
10
4
4
4
1
7
11
56
(2.1)
,
11
Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.
Includes hijackings of modes of transportation for air, sea, or land, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.
' Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.
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