REPLY TO SENATOR PERCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R001000090046-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: January 18, 1978
• Content Type: MF

Ut'.----- 9 "6 /
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18 January 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office 1
Attn:
THROUGH . Director, National Foreign Assessment
Center
FROM : Chief, Congressional Support Staff, NFAC
SUBJECT : Reply to Senator Percy
1. Attached is a classified response to Senator
Percy?s 6 January letter requesting CIA comments on a
1975 article by Melvin Laird. Percy, apparently wants this
as a background for discussions with a group of Soviet par-
liamentarians.
2. I believe it does what the Senator wants without
taking head-on issue with Laird.
Attachment: a/s
cc: D/NFAC
OLC
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 AR'R.1NA)J RIPH:OIP. CO".. CHAIRMAN
JOHN L. M1 CLELLAN. ARK. CHARLES N. rERGY. ILL.
NU- ' M JACY{?Ary WASH. JACOB N. JAVITS. t4-V-
WOMUND
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MKT
G~F. MONT. ~.L
?IH OMAS P. EAOLETTON. MO. CHARLES MCC. MATN1A4y JR?MD. / 'i1 ir_!I- ~ 0-I !'4' O
LAWTON CHILES. FLA. JOHN C. DANIORTH. M
SAM NVNN. CA. H. JOHN HEINZ IN. PM
J'.?I+N GLENN. ONTO
JIM SAHEEN. TENN.
RICHARD A. W IGMAN
CHIEi? COIINAKI,, AND SVAIF DIRECTOR
STAT
STAT`
January 6, 1978
0111ce o. egas a ave Liaison
Centra74.-Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
-~ I-
Dear
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASF6IwGTON. D.G. 2x510
When I was in the Soviet Union in 1975 for the U.S. Senate
delegation meetings with the Supreme Soviet, Georgi Arbatov
and Georgi Zhukov were incensed by the article "Is This
Detente" by Mel Laird in the July 1975 issue of 'Reader's
Digest. They were so concerned that they wrote a response
wwhich they handed to me.
Enclosed is a copy of the Laird article and the Arbatov-
Zhukov response.. Before we meet with the Supreme Soviet
delegation here on January 22, I would like to have for my
information an objective evaluation from the Agency of the
six numbered points made by Laird in his article. It could
be done on plain paper and I would not attribute any of the
information to the Agency.
I would very much appreciate it if I could have this analysis
by January 19 when I will be back from Panama. When it is
ready, please call Scott Cohen.
All best wishes for-the New Year.
Charles H. Percy
United States Senator
CHP:scp
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 All over the world, the Soviet Union is
callously and consistently ignoring agreements
with the United States that were designed
to reduce tensions. Here is
the sobering scorecard
IS THIS DETENTE;?
vER THE past several years, openly-has repeatedly committed
the United States has made deliberate acts that mock detente
major concessions and nu- and threaten the free world. Let's
merous gestures of goodwill to in- look at six deeply troubling actions:
duce the Soviet 'Union to help 1. The U.S.S.R. has violated agree-
defuse world powder kegs that ments to limit strategic weapons.
could explode into war. We still On May 26, 1972, the United
hope that such efforts will eventual- States and the Soviet Union con-
ly succeed. Certainly, everyone hopes cluded two important arms agree-
to avoid renewal of Cold War con- ments. One treaty strictly limits both
frontations. But it would be danger- countries in their future develop-
ously foolish to confuse hope with ment of anti-ballistic-missile systems.
reality. Therefore, I am now per. A vital component- of any such sys-
suaded that the American people tem is powerful, sophisticated radar
ought to be told some unpleasant that tracks incoming missiles. Arti-
facts about the true status of detente, cle VI of that treaty explicitly forbids
so that they can intelligently judge testing any radar for Ash( use. Yet
the Kremlin's current intentions, our government now possesses
The facts are that, in recent evidence that the Russians have con-
months, the U.S.S.R.-secretly and ducted radar tests specifically for-
MELVIN R. LAIRD, former Congressman
from Wisconsin (1953-1969) and Secretary
of Defense (1969-1973), is The Reader's Di-
gest's Counsellor for National and Interna-
tional Affairs.
bidden by the treaty. The Russians
have not disputed our intelligence,
but have insisted that the tests were
for "safety or instrumentation" pur-
poses only. The disingenuousness
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THE READERS DIGEST
of this reply cannot conceal the fact spect South Vietnam's right to deter-
that the Russians have cheated on
the treaty and may be developing
an ABM system that would endow
them with a significant strategic'
advantage.
The second accord limits the
United States and the Soviet Union
.to approximately the same number
.of nuclear delivery systems. Critical
to this SALT I agreement was the
clear American understanding that
neither side would appreciably in-
crease the size of its intercontinental
ballistic missiles-for larger missiles
could carry more warheads and ren-
der the limitation on numbers
meaningless. Now reconnaissance
and other reliable sources have pro-
vided incontrovertible proof that the
Soviets have cheated tin this under-
standing. In some 5o silos?they have
installed new missiles called the
SS19, 50-percent bigger than most
of their previous rockets. De-
ployed in large numbers, the SS19
will give the Soviet Union the ca-
pability to destroy our land-based
missiles and bombers in a surprise
attack. Six, years ago, we and
the Russians could deliver nuclear
warheads of about the same destruc-
tive force. Today the Soviets can
outfire us in destructive power by
two-to-one.
2. The Soviet Union actively as-
sisted North Vietnam in making a
shambles of the Paris peace accords
and overrunning South Vietnam.
At Paris in January 1973, the
North Vietnamese pledged to re-
mine its own political future. They
pledged not'to send more troops and
arms into South Vietnam. Both
pledges were promptly broken. The
Russians, by continuing to supply
North Vietnam with offensive war
materiel beyond prescribed limita-
tions, played a direct role in the
treaty's sabotage. (We sent less ma-
teriel to South Vietnam than the
treaty allowed, and all of it was de-
monstrably for defense.)
After the ceasefire, the Russians
and Chinese poured into North
Vietnam aid conservatively valued
at $2.5 billion. Among Soviet ship-
ments: 115 modern tanks and ar-
mored vehicles, 300 tactical missiles,
1100 big military trucks. Such equip.
ment was for one purpose only: re-'
newed military attacks in violation
of the Paris accords. And when the
North's offensive began in the spring
of 1974, Soviet tanks spearheaded it.
3. The Soviet Union has reneged
on its promise to guarantee unim-
peded civilian access to West Berlin.
Ever since the Cold War began
with the Berlin blockade in 1948, the
Russians have employed stratagem
after stratagem to strangle West Ber-
lin economically, isolate it politically
and capture it for 'themselves, In
June 1972, we signed a pact with the
Russians to ease the situation there.
With Britain and France, we agreed
to allow the Russians to establish a
consulate in West Berlin and, at
about the same time, to support
United Nations membership for
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 THE READER'S DIGEST
East Germany. The Soviets in turn Through this strait pass 17 million
pledged to ensure that the flow of barrels of petroleum daily; bound
people and goods through East Ger- for Japan and Western Europe. At
many to West Berlin would not be. camps maintained in neighboring
obstructed.: South' Yemen, Russians supervise.,
However, : once the-consulate guerrilla training of Omani tribes
opened and East. Germany was in men. Armed with Soviet weapons,
the U.N, the Russians broke-their the tribesmen raid the countryside-
word. From July, to October :last:_'-their avowed aim (despite almost.
year, the communists : deliberately ; total lack of support among the peo-
-and repeatedly-stalled cars and plc of Oman) being to win a "war
trucks en route through East Ger- .of national liberation" in support of
many. The latest treaty notwith- Soviet policy. Such control would
standing, the Russians still seem to enable Russia to cut at will half of
look upon .West Berlin as a hostage. Western Europe's supply of oil and
4. The Soviet Union is abetting three fourths of Japan's.
terrorism and guerrilla warfare in 5. In. Portugal, the Soviet Union
the Middle East. :'is -sponsoring a massive campaign
In Syria, East. Germany and the ' to impose a communist regime sub-
Soviet Union itself, communist . servient to the Kremlin.
agents are training hundreds The strategic. location of Portugal
young Arabs in the techniques of makes it a key member of NATO. In
terror. The Russians have supplied 'April 1974, a coup ousted Portugal's
to Libya's dictator, Muammar el- right-wing dictator, >farcello Cae-
Qaddafi, deadly SA-7 heat-seeking tano, and hope arose that the country
missiles that can home in on the jet might peacefully transform itself
engines of commercial airliners. Pre- . into a democracy. However, with
dictably, Qaddafi has turned these . the coup, the communists sprang out
portable weapons over. to terrorists, of hiding as the country's best-organ-
allowing some to be shipped in . ized and richest political party, even
diplomatic pouches. In . September though the recent advisory election
1973, Italian police captured five ter- indicated that they had the backing
rorists armed with SA-7s on gn of only about 13 percent of the peo-
apartment balcony near Rome's air- ple. But they did have the backing
port, poised to shoot down a Boeing of the Soviet Union, which, in the.
747. But the attempts go on. past 12 months, has clandestinely
And Russia. continues to sustain a provided them with at least $40 mil-
little-noticed but sinister guerrilla ? lion to pay party workers and hire
war on the strategic Arabian -penin- street demonstrators to intimidate
sula. The immediate Soviet target is the opposition. With secret Soviet
the Sultanate of Oman, perched on ' aid, the communist minority has
the narrow Strait, of Hormuz. gained control of the national labor
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1S THIS DETENTEr
Reprints of this article are available.
Prices, postpaid to one address: 10-50t;
50-32; 100-33.50; 500-312.50; 1000-
320. Address Reprint Editor, Reader's
D eat, Pleasantville, N.Y.10510
to subversion, cost NATO indispens. so that it can a ord to mount an
able -bases in the Azores, open up enormous arms buildup. For exam-
the Atlantic to Soviet submarines, pie, American engineers and money
and fundamentally alter the world help, construct in Russia the world's.
balance of power: # largest truck factory --and the Krem-
6..The Soviet Union has engaged lin ships trucks to North Vietnam to
in a relentless effort. to attain mili- help crush South Vietnam.
Lary supremacy.. Clearly, we must shed any linger-
In the last six years, the United. ing illusions we .may, have that
States has reduced its armed forces detente means the Russians have
by 1.4 million men-and women, cut .:.abandoned their determination to
th Arm in half and lowered the undermine Western democracy and
federation and is exploiting the press Russians long-term unsecured loans
to spread. virulent anti-American at interest rates below what the
propaganda. Opponents to, commu- American home buyer, farmer, busi-
nism are still being purged from key nessman or government must pay.
government and military posts, to be ? And the Soviets continue to seek.
replaced by communists and their . further credit, technology and other
sympathizers, help from us. This adds up to a situ
Absorption of Portugal into the atic n in which we subsidize the
Soviet empire would expose Spain. U.S.S.R: s faltering civilian economy
e y
number of Navy combat ships to the 'impose their system upon the world.
ate to the Rus-
i
c
level of the year 1939. In constant We must commun
dollars, we have slashed our military sians that the only alternative to mu-
spending by 34 percent. This year, . tual ?arms reduction is an American
the defense budget will consume rearmament that would doom them
i
f
ty. .
erior
only 5.8 percent of the gross national to permanent military in
product-the smallest percentage ?.We must show them that we will no
since z95o. r longer tolerate the use of detente as
Yet our disarmament overtures a Russian one-way street. .
have brought. an increase in Soviet
military allocations. Although the In forthcoming issues, The Reader's
Russian. economy has less than half Digest will examine strategic trouble
our productive capacity, the Soviets spots and discuss further how to deal
are currently outspending us by 20 with the Russian . challenge.
to 25 percent in every significant
defense category. Their 4.a million
troops now outnumber our forces by
more than.'two-to-one. ' _ ;_
?1973 THE READERS 01GEST ASSOCIATION, INC. PLEASANTVILLE, N. Y. 10570 PRINTED IN U.S.A.
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Those in the Soviet Union who follow the American press are well
aware of discussion that has developed in the United States over the
concept of detente and its basic problems. We also see differing motives
on the part of those xho hpve 'doubts, vho are puzzled by one or another
problem, trho question this or that event or circumstance. But there are
no differing motives.. Mr. LaiWd?s recent article in the Reader's Digest
"Is This Detente?". in confined to one_ single point of'viesv in the sense that
Its. author does not like the relaxation of tensions which marked the'.de-'
velopme nt of Soviet American relations in recent years and he in quite
frank about It.
We know that. Mr. Laird in not alone in taking this ttand, though'
we know that judging from recent public opinion polls, this negative
position is not shared by the majority of the American public.
This is why vs ' felt vs ' should' respond to his article..
We sho.11 not enumerate the basic points of this article. Let r_4
look into its general idea. The idea is that the U.S.A. allegedly made
major concessioiis to the Soviet Union in the :process of detente and,
received nothing in return. Moreover, it alleges that detente is used
by the Soviet .Union ini a most dishonest way to the detriment of Amrice"n
--~ and we have -all. grounds to, speak ,about the Soviet. Government Is
official point of view 'and of the unanitcus conviction of Soviet public
opinion radically disagree with such an interpretation.
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We think that positive changes which have taken place were to the
benefit of both sides.
Firstly, they were to the benefit in the sense that we have stepped
away from the fatal brink beyond whhich the nuclear catastrophe could
break out.
We have benefited also in the sense that both Americans and we can
now concentrate more efforts, attention, and resources on the solution
of our own internal problems, which exist in the Soviet Union And -in the
United States, of America.
And our main gain is in the
couraging road which we are sure
sense that we have embarked on an en-
=!By lend us to ever more radical changes
in international relations capable of creating reliable guarantees of
peace, to put an end to the arms race,. to help us use our influence for
improving the overall international -atmosphere 'and move an to wide-scale,
mutually. advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all
spheres,-- trade, science, technology, culture, etc.
Mr. Laird has formulated six points which in his opinion prove that
the Soviet Union has allegedly "repeatedly committed deliberate acts that
mock detente and threaten the free world. "
With ful.1 responsibility we state. that all six points are wrong,
and are dangerous in that. they can mislead the American public. Even if
the.American side had some doubts about facts cited by 'Laird. (he refers
to someone.vho detected "testing" of new types of radard subject to agree--
rents and the "replacement" of several dozen Missiles), there exists a
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specially set up body for their clarificatiori, the Permanent Consultative
Co=nission. But it was an official Pentagon spokesman who publicly
declared recently that the United States had no claims whatsoever on the
Soviet Union's implementation of signed agreements on the limitation of
strategic armaments. This was also confirmed recently by the President of
the United. States at his press conference.. Mr. Laird's claims, that the
Soviet Union had, in violation of agreements, attained "military supremacy"
over the United States are in absolute disagreement with reality, and
official American data.
The second point of Laird's ' article accuses the Soviet Union of.
actively assisting North Vietnam in l reaking down the Paris peace accordsr.
Specific mention is made of 115 tanks, 1,100 trucks and other types of
Soviet equipment which, according to Laird, were shipped. to Vietnam and
ensured the military success of the opponents' to the Thieu regime.. It in
our opinion that only the most naive people with no 'knowledge of the matte:-
cant . believe that the reason for the defeat of the.Thieu regime is these
tanks and trucks. . l n if we take as correct the figures given by Mr. Laird,
then the volume of help given . to ' Vietnam _by the Soviet Union ' and gather
countries in bast years will amount to 2.5 Belli on dollars, while the
United States spent all in'al...l, some 130-billion dollars to help Thieu.
These are incomparable sums. The 'Thieu regime ices given the possibility
to create one of the beat equipped armies in the world today." . Never-.
theless, it was impossible to preserve- that regime. It .was impossible
to save it because it had rotted to the core, and could rely only on,a,
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500,000--atrong,American army and, as soon as the latter was vithdravn
from Vietnam, it was clear to every person with common ser se that its
daya. Were numbered. A change -in the political situationsrxith.in South
Vietnam was envisaged in the Paris'peace accords. And if this mart
stipulation of the Paris agreements has not been carried out, .'the fault
certainly. does not rest with the Soviet Union. We think that something
different has happened. Following the cease-fire in Vietnam no efforts
had been exerted to, eliminate the root of the civil war connected `
precisely with. the 'eaeistence in that country of a ' corrupt , terrorist
regiac and it id -precisely this that made this result "so inevitable.
Laird's assertion with regard to Nest Berlin is completely inconsis-
tent with reality. It suffices to read a recent statement on this
question by such a competent individual as former Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman of the Social - Democratic Party
of Germany, Willy Brandt, to see thin.
The sane vbould be said about the fourth point of the article about
the allegations that the Soviet Union supports terrorism, in the Middle
Fast. We are against terrorism. Even, ifyyou admit. that some terrorists
had Soviet weapons, it is not the Soviet Union which is to be blamed.
There are plenty of weapons of the most' varied origin ii this area of the
world,, .including weapons supplied by the United States, France and other
countries. These weapons could Just as easily have fallen into the hands
of terrorists.., Laird obviously reads newspapers aszd he could acquaint,
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himself with many authoritative statements by the Soviet side published
in them, which resolutely condemn terror in all, its manifestations.
Mr. Laird's statement about Portugal is really surprising. What
-etas happened in Portugal is in no way the work of Communist conspirators."
.This is a legitimate result of the situation in which the country found
that. it; was anti-Commun st , as. well, as hopeless colonial wars which
itself following in the course of the policy of NATO- We haveiin mind
its poverty and economic bahkwardness, its terrorist fascist regimr
which enjoyed the support of "western democracies" for the solo reason
Portugal. had waged Tor so many years
an explosion there was inevitable
and neither the Soviet Union nor detente are the causes of it. The
allegation that the Soviet Union finances the activity of Portuguese
Compuuaisty is preposterous and, by the way, it is not Original. Such
tales about "Soviet gold" had been spread even in the 20's Putthey
vanished like smoke
avian then. when little was known about the Soviet
system this can prenums that they have even less chance now for success.
but this to a great degree depends on the course of detente.
And, finally, the sixth point that, contrary to the principle of
equal, security written down in the agreements, the USSR. allegedly tries
to attain "military. superiority" over the United States. This also,
does not correspond with reality and. is based on nothing. The military
budget in .the Soviet. Union is not increasing. In. recent years it ham
been reduced; although on ,& small scale. We wanted it to be cut further,
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We set aide Laird'ra speculations about trade and credits due
to its insigiificant voluae: and mainly because the development of
trade (and in all Countries this is based on the provision of credit)
is of equal benefit bo both aides. Our economy, despite Laird's
assertions, is developing quite successful ty and we wouldn't advise
him, contrary to the facts., to assert the opposite (having also in. mind
the well. known, British proverb, irhicb says that "Those who live in
glass houses shouldn't throw 'stones"'.
Our *trade with the United States last year amounted to s modest
figure of TOO million rubles and the ? United States was .only in the
seventh place in volume of trade among other Soviet trade partners. of
the developed countries of the capitalistic world and was behind not.
only West Germany and Japan but even Italy and -FinAA d...
We vill. mention in passing that the defensive might of the Soviet
Union Mrs Laird complains about was built up in the condition of almost
complete . absence of trade with the West. We 'would like to add also
another point.. . he trade with the *So-iiet Union is not some kind of,
charity on the part of the United States. It develops only in areas
and to the extent where it is advantageous to Aneriaane since, it opens
up new jobs,. gives the United States a.chance to obtain many kinds of,
essential, goods (including goods that the United States considers
strategic such as diamonds, titanium, eta.) and also to improve the
American balance of payments.
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But the cnncluding pact of,Laird's article evokes the greatest
objections; where he proposes to tell the Russians that the United.
States should give the U.S.S.R. an ultimatum: either do as Washington
wants or the United States will step up the arms race and in this way
dorm the U.S.S.R. to "=114tary inferiority." We would like to tell
Mr. Laird that this is not a new proposal. This is just the road
which the United States had followed for many decades.' Where it has
? led is well known - of course, it brought nothing good to the Soviet
Union but it eirso seriously damaged the United States. It was precisely
after the' United States began to realize the fruitlessness of the previous
course that- the shift toward- detente began. In which direction does
Mr. Laird sin the United States again?
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January 1978
MEMORANDUM
1. Under Article VI(a) of the ABM Treaty, the parties
undertook "not to give missiles, launchers, or radars,
other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM
radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles
or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them
in an ABM mode."
During the negotiations, agreement could not be reached
on the definition of "tested in an ABM mode" for any ABM
component. The US on April 7, 1972, made a unilateral state-
ment which, inter alia, stated that we would consider a radar
to have been "tested in an ABM mode" if it makes measurements
on a cooperative target vehicle which has a flight trajectory
with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight
trajectory during the re-entry portion of the trajectory.
Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumen-
tation would be exempt from application of these criteria..
In 1974 the Intelligence Community reported that a
Soviet non-ABM radar was being used to track strategic bal-
listic missiles in flight trajectory. The issue was raised
with the Soviets early in 1975, and subsequently this activ-
ity stopped and has not'been resumed. The Soviets claimed
that this activity was for purposes of range safety and not
a violation of the Treaty.
Article II of the Interim Agreement states: "The
parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for
light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to
1964, into land based launchers'for heavy ICBMs of types
displayed after that time."
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While it was clear which existing Soviet missiles were
"light" and which were "heavy" at the time the Interim
Agreement was signed, the US was unable to obtain Soviet
agreement to criteria which clearly delineated a "light"
from a "heavy." Consequently, the US delegation made the
following unilateral statement on May 26, 1972: "The US
delegation regrets that the Soviet delegation has not been
willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile.
Under these circumstances, the US delegation believes it
necessary to state the following: The United States would
consider any ICBM having a volume. significantly greater than
that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either
side to be a heavy ICBM. The US proceeds on the premise.that
the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."
At the time the agreement was signed,. the principal
Soviet land-based ICBM systems were the SS-9 and the SS--II.
The SS-9 was considered a heavy missile, while the SS-11
was the heaviest light missile on either side. Subsequently
the Soviets tested and began deploying the SS-19 which,
while less than 50 percent the volume of the SS-9, exceeds
the volume of the' SS-l.1 by some 50 percent. Deployment of
this system is continuing. The SS-19 does have a significant.
capability against hardened targets, such as Minuteman silos.
2. The Soviets continued to deliver aid to the North
Vietnamese up to the fall of Saigon. They also were willing
to meet nearly all of Hanoi's demands with regard to military
assistance.
3. The USSR has not reneged on its promise to guarantee.
unimpeded civilian access to West Berlin. The Soviets have
observed the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and re-
cent Soviet commentaries have stressed the importance of
continued observance.
Civilian access is under the control of the East Germans
as provided under the transit agreement between East and West
Germany in 1972. Individual civilians are occasionally de-
tained for brief intervals at East German checkpoints and
East German guards have recently interfered with commercial
shipments in their search for exfiltrators.
No major East German move that affects the Berlin issue
could be undertaken without Soviet permission, but it cannot
be assumed that specific individual acts by East German
authorities have had Soviet endorsement. It is clear, how-
ever, that Moscow does set limits to East German provocations
against Allied interests.
_2_
SECRET
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4. The Soviet attitude toward terrorism and guerrilla
warfare in the Middle East is ambivalent. On the one hand,
they disavow terror as a technique and criticize it as an
ineffective and counterproductive tool of revolutionary
struggle. On the other hand, they indirectly provide sup-
port to terrorist groups..
The Soviets have offered military training in the USSR
to Arabs belonging to so-called national liberation groups,
some of whom subsequently became involved in terrorist organi-
zations. Training on Soviet weapons has been given to members
of terrorist groups in Libya, and the Libyans themselves have
provided direct assistance to terrorists.
The Soviets have channeled aid to the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) through South Yemen since the
late 1960s. This assistance reached its peak several years.
ago and included military and financial assistance as well as
training for guerrilla groups. The PFLO's efforts in south-
ern Oman were ended in 1975 and the group has been quiet since
that time. Soviet assistance probably sustains the PFLO camp
in South Yemen, and another effort to subvert Oman cannot be
excluded in the future.
5. In 1975 the strongly pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist
Party did make a determined effort to impose its rule on
Portugal. Soviet support was expressed in covert financial
aid but--given the modest needs of 'a communist party operat-
ing in a small country--it is doubtful that Soviet aid was
as high as $40 million. The evidence suggests, however, that
Moscow was in fact torn between the urge to support an ideo-
logically-kindred party and the conviction that a Communist
regime in Portugal could not survive the hostility of its
neighbors and NATO allies. The Soviets were also sensitive
to the damage that a communist coup d'etat in West Europe
would do to Soviet relations with the US and major European
states without any assurance of compensatory gain. Moscow's
reservations were revealed in its repeated attempts to urge
a policy of caution on the reckless Portuguese communists, and
in its ultimate acquiescence in their defeat in 1976.
6. In recent statements Brezhnev and Soviet commentators
have denied that the Soviets are seeking military superiority.
The Soviets, however, have steadily improved their war-fighting
and war-survival capabilities in recent years.
Detailed information on defense expenditures is not
publicly released by the Soviet Union. A single-line entry
for "defense" in the published state budget is uninformative
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because its scope is not clearly defined and its size appears
to be manipulated to suit Soviet political purposes. (Changes
in the announced defense figure do not appear to reflect the
changes we have observed in the level of military activities.)
Our estimate of Soviet ruble expenditures for defense activ-
ities is almost three times the announced 1970 figure, grows
at an average annual rate of 4 to 5 percent, and accounts for
11 to 13 percent of Soviet GNP.
4.-
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 TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT 19 January 1978
TO: onoral le~B l C Fig" 2005/04/22
P8~ - ounsel
United States Senate
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Response to Senator Percy's 6 January letter
1978
requesting CIA comments on a 1975 article
by Melvin Laird "Ig This Detente" (Memorandura-
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