LETTER TO DEAR COLLEAGUE FROM BOB SIKES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000700110105-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 105
• Publication Date: July 31, 1978
• Content Type: LETTER

ADM NIS 1 [ASSISTANT ongV t. of tje WIteb P"b" tate.
;~Y yASp-.oved For Release 2004$,5/0
DP81 M00980R000700110105-7
JOHN N.AL:-9N 0uZe 0 rprem;entatlbe
1asjington, D.C. 20515
July 31, 1978
Dear Colleague:
An article in the current issue of AIR FORCE
Magazine calls attention to the serious threat to our
national security which would result from passage of the
Administration's Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(H.R.7308).
I am attaching reprint:: of several pages from
this magazine and would draw your special attention to
page 13, "Tighter Senate Shackle:. for Intelligence."
In line with the editor's comments, I hope that
you will consider substantial amendments to the pending
legislation so as to eliminate the "special court" and
"judicial warrant" requirements for foreign intelligence
gathering. In the alternative, it is my recommendation
that you support the substitute bill, H.R. 13442, which
would impose strict Executive Branch responsibilities
without transferring such executive authority to the
Judiciary. t
With best wishes, I am
S/j t
SECRLTMIES,
MISS BETTS SPRACHER
MRs. JEAHNE TiMMoNs
MRS. HAZEL ALEXANDER
MRS. JESSICA Wn10M
MRS. MARY AHLFELD
MRs. DELANE MCHONE
Miss ELAINE DUDLEY
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000700110105-7
 PUBLISHED BYTHEAIR FORCEASSOCIATION aJ/~/E
In this preprint of AIR FORCE Magazine's
"In Focus . . ." column for the August 1978
issue, Senior Editor Edgar Ulsamer reports
on the damage to national. security that could
be done by the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978 as passed by the Senate, and
on proposed corrective action embodied in
H.R. 9745 --- reintroduced as H.R. 13442.
Your attention is called to the item headed
"Tighter Senate Shackles for Intelligence."
Reproduced by permission of AIR FORCE Magazine, published by the Air Force Association,
Washington, D.C.
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000700110105-7
 BY EDGAR ULSAMER, SENIOR EDITOR
Washington, D. C., July 5
New Space Policy
On May 11, 1978, President Jimmy
Carter committed the nation to a
new space policy by signing PDM
(Presidential Decision Memoran-
dum)-37. The policy statement
breaks new ground in projecting the
principle of sovereign rights-and
the right to defend them-into
space. Asserting that any nation's
space systems are "national prop-
erty" entitled to free passage and
unhampered operation, PDM-37
commits the nation to "activities in
space in support of its right of self-
defense and thereby strengthen na-
tional security, the deterrence of
attack, and arms control agree-
ments."
While seeking verifiable, compre-
hensive limits on antisatellite capa-
bilities and their use, the US, in the
absence of such an agreement, "will
vigorously pursue development of
its own capabilities. The US space
defense program shall include an
integrated attack warning, notifica-
tion, verification, and contingency
reaction capability which can effec-
tively detect and react to threats to
US space systems." Though US and
Soviet negotiators already have
spent a week discussing possible
approaches to a verifiable agree-
ment barring space weapons, this
column learned that realization of
such an accord should be consid-
ered a distant goal.
Most senior Administration offi-
cials feel that a treaty "freezing" the
US and the Soviet Union in their
present positions regarding anti-
satellite weapons (ASAT) is out of
the question. The Soviet Union has
an operational ASAT launch com-
plex and a fleet of ASATs in being.
While these weapons have exhibit-
ed some deficiencies during test
flights, such as occasionally failing
to destroy test targets, and altitude
limits below 600 miles,. they provide
the Soviet Union with a destabilizing
lead over the US, whose ASAT pro-
gram is not yet off the drawing
board. Most experts believe, there-
fore, that the US must draw abreast
military operations during national
emergencies. In the main, this
05/05: CIA-RDP81 M00980RUWM i9 rypting packages
of Soviet ASAT capabilities before a
treaty banning development and de-
ployment of space weapons can be
entered into.
The incipient US ASAT program
concurrently is developing a num-
ber of technological options, some
of which involve capabilities attain-
able only at great technological risk.
High-energy laser weapons, viewed
as the most versatile long-term ap-
proach, fall in this category. A tech-
nologically more "mature" US ASAT
design centers on a modified
SRAM-equipped with a miniature
homing device to be launched by
high-flying aircraft. The Army's HIT
(Homing Interceptor Technology)
program, developed originally for
ballistic missile defense, was trans-
ferred to USAF to serve as a fore-
runner of a miniature homing de-
vice. An aircraft-launched ASAT
would be limited to operation
against hostile spacecraft in low-
altitude orbits.
For that reason, another design
approach is being pursued, involv-
ing a missile booster that delivers a
warhead/homing device combina-
tion to higher orbital altitudes. This
basic concept is being explored in a
variety of ways to provide the capa-
bility of intercepting across a wide
range of altitudes and modes.
Lastly, advanced jamming and
other countermeasure technologies
to frustrate Soviet space weapons
are being studied under the ASAT
program. According to an Admin-
istration official who declined to be
named, "If we want an ASAT capa-
bility, we can achieve one that is
high quality, that is as good or bet-
ter than theirs." President Carter, as
yet, has not authorized go-ahead on
an operational ASAT system, even
though PDM-37 asserts that "the
United States finds itself under in-
creasing pressure to field an anti-
satellite capability of its own in re-
sponse to Soviet activities In this
area."
The new policy statement directs
the Secretary of Defense to set up
a space counterpart to the Civil Re-
serve Air Fleet (CRAF) through a
to important nonmilitary satellites to
prevent the Soviets "from taking
over these systems" 'in wartime.
For the moment, such militarily im-
portant systems as the civilian US
weather satellites are vulnerable to
acts of space piracy. The only alter-
native would be their destruction-by
commanding these spacecraf` to
spin out of control. PDM-37 seem-
ingly provides the option to place
military payloads on nonmilitary
satellites in "piggyback fashion," to
increase redundancy. Hardening
civilian satellites earmarked for mil-
itary use during crises Is also pro-
vided for.
While relaxing the limitation on
remote earth sensing for civilian
purposes by boosting permissible
pictorial resolution to ten meters-
compared to eighty meters at pres-
ent-the US government will super-
vise and control all such informa-
tion. The idea its to withhold such
military information as the location
of I IS or other naval forces from
third countries.
Possibly PDM-37's greatest sig-
nificance lies in a subtle change in
relationship between the intelli-
gence community, In near-absolute
control heretofore of space-based
intelliger ;e and saconnaissance In-
formation, such as that produced
by Lockheed's Big Bird satellites,
and the military services. Much of
this information has been so highly
classified by the CIA that it rarely
reached the, operational level of the
military. PDM-37 redresses this in-
congruity by reducing the classifi-
cation of such Information to assure
adequate support of military require-
ments, especially at the unit level.
USAF will continue to operate the
nation's secret spacecraft for the
CIA.
The Presidential directive sets up
an intragovernmental arbiter and
ombudsman, the National Security
Council Policy Review Committee,
to settle routine squabbles, or to
channel especially thorny issues to
the President for resolution. The
committee is chaired by the Direc-
tor of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Dr. Frank Press,
and includes representatives from
DoD, NASA, the CIA, and other gov-
ernment agencies concerned with
US space operations.
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP81 M00980ROOWI 'W yazine / August 1978
 Tighter Senate Shackles sties involving foreign powers and could not detect low-yield Soviet
for intelligence foreign agents. Appropriate safe- testing in the view of congressional
d
Appac ntly"fRg% figra e 2 lhldt M friBd pMfM IV II uuu pdtlt@,10&;p would have serve
?~_ __, :.:,,.
ous lack of congressional oversight
over US Intelligence operations, the
Senate recently passed legislation
that could have disastrous conse-
quences for national security.
Known as the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, it Is a
revolutionary approach to foreign
intelligence-gathering that would
transfer responsibility for authoriz-
Ing such actions from the Executive
Branch to a "Special Court." The
wisdom and constitutionality of the
new bill-now before relevant
House committees-seem to be
flawed on at least two counts: The
expertise of federal judges in con-
trolling foreign Intelligence is lack-
ing-and has never ' een sought;
also the power to authorize-or re-
fuse to authorize-foreign intelli-
gence-gathering activities tradition-
ally has been exercised by the
President and seems granted him
under the Constitution, which makes
him responsible for all decisions
regarding national security. To treat
decisions on foreign Intelligence as
anything other than integral issues
of national defense seems illogical.
As Congressman Robert McClory
(R-III.), a member of both the House
Judiciary Committee and the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, told this column: "To pass
the buck on such decision-making
to a special court might give an ap-
pearance of safeguarding Individual
rights or justifying Executive deci-
sion-making. However, It is inher-
ently dangerous to our national
security because of the delays and
frustrations which might result, and
it is an unjustified attempt to excuse
the President from a Constitutional
responsibility and accountability
which he should be required to as-
sume."
The stringent guidelines of Execu-
tive Order 11905, issued >~y Presi-
dent Ford in the wake of Watergate
to preclude abuses by the Intelli-
gence community, and supplemental
instructions by President Carter, ac-
cording to comprehensive congres-
sional testimony, have proved fully
effective in controlling foreign intel-
ligence collection. On the strength
of this evidence, Representative Mc-
Clory has introduced a new bill,
quirement "for minimization or
elimination and destruction of in-
formation regarding American citi-
zens which might incidentally or
accidentally be included in an
electronic information-gathering op-
eration," according to Mr. McClory.
It would seem absurd to deny the
US the right to timely, secure sur-
veillance of foreign agents at a time
when the number and audacity of
Soviet operatives In the US are at
an all-time high.
The Test Ban Treaty
The Administration's policy on a
"zero yield" Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), ostensibly cast
in concrete when President Carter
signed PDM-38 on May 20, 1978,
without concurrence by either the
Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE), Is undergo-
ing an agonizing reappraisal.
Catalyst for reopening the case
was a high-powered White House
meeting in mid-June requested by
Energy Secretary James R. Schle-
singer. Billed as a fifteen-minute
meeting, it went to an hour and a
half and reportedly caused the
President to comment, "You gave
me a lot to think about."
Highly placed sources told this
column that several participants
reached the conclusion that essen-
tial information concerning the ef-
fects of halting all nuclear testing
had not reached the President, even
though that information had been
briefed to congressional committees
by Defense Department and DOE
witnesses, including the then-acting
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Gen. David C. Jones.
Specifically, the President did not
appear read in on why DOE and the
JCS consider a "zero-yield" test
ban or moratorium unverifiable.
Neither did he seem to be aware of
the fact that the Soviet negotiators
had rejected a central safeguard re-
quested by the US as unacceptably
intrusive. This would involve placing
some thirty teleseismic arrays on
Russian territory. The only monitor-
ing scheme acceptable to the So-
viets is sharing data from some five
or six Soviet-built seismic detectors,
to a cessation of testing.)
The persuasiveness of the evi-
dence presented by Dr. Schlesinger
and two DOE laboratory directors
appears to have caused changes in
the Administration's position on this
issue of pervasive importance to na-
tional defense. The White House-
at a Special Coordinating Commit-
tee (SCC) meeting late In June-
decided to limit any Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty to three rather than
five years, and decreed that renewal
thereafter would require the ap-
proval of both the Executive Brunch
and the Senate. The same cabinet-
level meeting also decided to insist
on the need of continued low-yield
"controlled" testing-at the level
of a few hundred pounds-even
tt'ough Paul Warnke, Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, reportedly had threatened
to resign if the Administration re-
neged on "zero yield."
Other proposed safeguards,
viewed by congressional experts as
of a more cosmetic than curative
nature, Include firm provisions for
maintaining US R&D and production
capabilities, and constant readiness
to resume testing. The latter safe-
guard is important; It took the US
more than a year to resume full-
scale testing after the Soviets re-
nounced the bilateral test morato-
rium in 1961.
Congressional opposition to a
CTBT appears formidable and grow-
ing, a fact that the AdministraJon
seems to recognize. During recent
congressional testimony, Defense
Secretary Harold Brown disclosed
that CTBT would not be concluded
until after SALT II. In addition to
questioning the wisdom of entering
into an essentially unverifiable ac-
cord (see p. 9, April '78 Issue), rele-
vant committees of the House and
Senate have urged that the Thresh-
old Test Ban Treaty and the
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
that went into effect more than two
years ago should be ratified before
the Senate considers CTBT, and
that weapon systems allowed under
SALT 11 should be tested adequately
before a CTBT goes into effect.
The Senati Armed Services Com-
H.R. 9745, that translates these an arrangement deemed wholly In- mittee, at the behest of Sen. Henry
guidelines into statutory form and adequate by most US experts. (Even M. Jackson (D-Was,r.), plans to hold
makes the Executive Branch re- the full complement of arrays hearings on the historic and tech-
sponsible for all Intelligence activ- _ coupled _with- on-site inspections___ nical aspects of test bans and nu-
-- --------------------- -
AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1978 13
 I II'IJIa, ,wU,n[y;4: tL)-N. H.) ano ben. are chary of this approach because
Jake Ga 0".
- % - :an), recommended it preempts the Defense Department
funding
dM& ;a relQimi%nary '~ A 14 007 j~ j'e s f its principal expertise,
S0ReIease 2QQ
Ong of US military capa-
clear weapons reliability and safety.
The purpose is to compile an
authoritative public record of the
grave consequences of plunging
headlong into a halt of nuclear test-
ing. There is widespread concern
that the Administration may bypass
the Senate's seemingly strong op-
position to a "zero-yield" test ban
treaty by seeking a trilateral mora-
torium with the Soviets and the
British. England's Prime Minister
James Callaghan, during a US visit
in June 1978, reportedly made clear
that his politically hard-pressed
labor government was keenly inter-
ested in going before the British
voters at the coming elections In the
role of a "peacemaker."
The PRC on Superpowers
The Foreign Minister of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, Mr. Huang,
unleashed a lengthy harangue
against the "superpowers" during
the recent United Nations' Special
Session on Disarmament. His po-
lemic was noteworthy since he re-
served his most scathing language
for the USSR, whose global strategy
he described as being "to control
and monopolize Europe, to weaken
and squeeze out the influence of the
other superpower [the US] in all
parts of the world, and ultimately to
supplant the other superpower and
establish its own hegemony over the
world. Facts show that this super-
power flaunting the label of social-
Ism is more aggressive and adven-
turous than the other superpower;
it is the most dangerous source of a
new world war and is sure to be its
chief instigator."
In another comment-one that
the US arms control lobby should
heed-the PRC's foreign minister
dissected SALT: "In the t-ght years
of SALT, the Soviet Union has
brought its once backward nuclear
arsenal up to par with that of the
other superpower." He held out no
hope that the next round of SALT
would slow "social-imperialism,"
(read the Soviet Union) In its rapid
expansion of "armaments of all
kinds with a view to achieving mil-
itary supremacy over its rival."
missile for theater forces. Alterna- bilities. Also, the new comparative
tives, according to the committee, assessments usually rely on optimis-
could "include modifications of cur- tic long-term planning documents-
rent Pershing, Patriot, and Minute- unencumbered by budgetary real-
man missiles, or the development of ities-for forecasting US capabil-
a new missile." Range of the pro- ities.
posed new theater ballistic missile ? A reportedly "very tough" let-
could be anywhere from 700 to ter by Defense Secretary Harold
1,500 miles. One of the candidate Brown has stiffened the Administra-
designs is a derivative of Minute- tion's stance regarding range lim-
man III, using its second and third itations for air-launched cruise
stages and guidance system. missiles (ALCMs) at the SALT nego-
Senator Garn sees a compelling tiations In Geneva. Dr. Brown per-
incentive for deploying MRBMs- suasively argued that the ;~o-called
which are not covered by SALT- "odometer" range of ALCMs must
because such weapons, he told this be pegged at forty percent above
column, "would significantly reduce the straight line limit of these
the risk of surprise attack, provide weapons. Reason is that cruise mis-
a theater ballistic missile compar- siles.must fly a zigzag path; in order
able to the Soviet camp's formid- to penetrate 2,500 kilometers-the
able SS-20 and older SS-4s and proposed SALT II protocol limit-
SS-5s, and provide the advantage their actual flying range must be at
of quick response and improved least forty percent greater.
penetrability overthe cruise missile." ? ACDA Director Paul Warnke's
The US Navy's Poseidon sub- campaign-supported by key State
marines assigned to the US Euro- Department figures to declare a
pean Command fall to provide "the moratorium on producing Special
combined advantage of accuracy Nuclear Materials (SNM-the prin-
and timeliness of a land-based cipal element of nuclear weapons)
mobile MRBM," according to Sen- has gone sour in light of forceful
ator Garn. Also, these submarines, opposition by technical experts.
he warned, "might encounter severe Crux Is that the half-life of some
communications problems in a com- SNMs is twelve years. As warheaf's
plex electronic environment, thus containing these SNMs reached 619
further reducing their effectiveness half-life point, weakening US deter-
to execute time-urgent attack on un- rence capabilities would invite nu-
planned targets, unless they risked clear proliferation by allied nations
detection and exposure by two-way and induce strategic Instability. The
radio communications. Moreover, FY'79 SNM budget request is about
the mobile land-based MRBM Is $904 million, compared . to about
highly controllable, far more flexible $675 million last year.
and survivable, and is less costly ? On May 18, 1978, a red-letter
than the SLBM." An in M h
h
Washington Observations
? Even though opposed by many
senior CIA analysts, Adm. Stansfield
Turner, Director of Central Intelli-
gence, is bringing a new approach
to the formulation of US intelligence
estimates and assessments. In the
past, the intelligence community
confined itself to presenting military
and other information pertaining to
the Soviet Union and other foreign
powers. These estimates served as
a basis for "net assessments" done
under the aegis of interagency
groups that evaluated US vs. Soviet
capabilities
Net assessments
.
now
A US MRBM? are being made under the direction
The ;crenate Armed Services Com- of the Director of Central Intelli-
mittee, at the initiative of Sen. gence. Old-line intelligence experts
App
14
y ig -energy p
ys-cs, the
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's
twenty-laser Shiva system trained
26,000,000 watts of optical power in
ninety-five trillionths of a second on
a "heavy" hydrogen target the size
of a grain of sand to achieve 7.5
billion fusions. The -historic experi-
ment points the way toward larger-
scale, economically viable duplica-
tion of the continuous thermonuclear
"burns" by which the sun and
other stars generate essenti elly un-
limited power. By the mid-1980s,
follow-on US systems-Livermore's
even larger Nova system and Los
Alamos Laboratory's carbon dioxide
laser-are expected to achieve a
"break even," by producing as
much fusion energy as the laser
focuses on the target. K
AIR FORCE Magazine / August 1978