3 AUGUST 1978 INTELLIGENCE CHARTER LEGISLATION HEARING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000700110049-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: August 16, 1978
• Content Type: MFR

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OLC 78-0399/109
16 August 1978
ME40RANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: 3 August 1978 Intelligence Charter Legislation Hearing
?KS .2;1e d
?&o Les
1. On 3 August 1978 the undersigned attended an intelligence charter
legislation (S. 2525) hearing at which the following individuals testified:
a. General Samuel Wilson, former Director, DIA
b. General Russel Dougherty, former Chief, Strategic Air
Command, and
c. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, fonner Chief of Naval Operations
Senator Goldwater (R., Ariz.), Vice Chairman of the Committee, presided.
Other Senators at the hearing were Senators Huddleston (D., Ky.), Chafee
(R., R. I.) and Wallop (R., Wyo.)
2. Overall, while Generals Wilson and Dougherty were supportive of
the legislation, urging the Committee to look further into the need for
improvements in the national-tactical intelligence arena, Admiral Zumwalt
was decidedly negative with regard to the very idea of intelligence charter
legislation.
3. General Wilson made the following points:
--With 30 years of intelligence experience behind us, intelligence
charter legislation at this time would be both timely and helpful.
--From the standpoint of cost and quality of intelligence, the
reporting requirements of S. 2525 must be reviewed with a view to
simplifying and trimming them down.
--The reporting requirements evoke security questions in view
of the proliferation of sensitive intelligence information that
will result therefrom.
--In addition extensive reporting requirements may tend to
"put Congress in the position of practically running the
intelligence as opposed to providing the legislative basis
and subsequent oversight."
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--Stressing that charter legislation is a very healthy
development, General Wilson urged that in order for intelligence
to.be able to respond to very real. and immediate problems and
threats to the national security, legislation should not in any
way "hamstring our flexibility to respond to the intelligence
requirements which emerge from the existence of these separate,
largely non-military problems."
4. General Dougherty, in turn, emphasized the following matters-
--Stressing what he called a "great contradiction" between.
constitutional privileges and guarantees, on the one hand, and
the "real world of intelligence collection, particularly covert
intelligence collection," General Dougherty complimented the
staff and Committee for synthesizing years of experience into
what he called a "workable. charter" and a "[proper balance of]
what must be done and the environment in whichit must be done with the
constraints that must be placed on us as American instrumentalities."
--General Dougherty stressed that based on his personal
experience there is in fact a very real operational side to
the issue of the interface between national-tactical intelligence;
in this regard he urged the Committee to seriously consider
giving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a "more
formalized role, a more institutionalized role" in the
intelligence process.
--While supportive of the congressional oversight role, he
opined that a joint committee might be better from "the point
of view of administration and military activities."
--In closing, General Dougherty cautioned that reporting
requirements not inhibit the essential production of intelligence,
particularly of a covert nature.
5. Admiral Zumwalt offered the following comments:
--Couching his comments in terms of the U.S. military decline
and increasing conventional and. nuclear superiority of the Russians
as well as their global misbehavior and the successes of the KGB
worldwide, Admiral Zumwalt characterized S. 2525 as a retroactive
reaction to Watergate and the transgressions of that era, which
legislation may well prevent the abuses of the past but which
makes it much likelier that the U.S. "will become engaged in a
war in the future."
--Admiral Zumwalt queried whether in view of Soviet military
and covert intelligence capabilities "this bill is germane to
the major problem which the U.S. faces."
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--Zumwalt was particularly critical of the Carter Administration's
strong dedication to Christian ethic and morality at the cost of not
being adequately attuned and perhaps somewhat naive to Soviet
misbehavior.
--While the Administration is now awakening to the problems,
in Admiral Zumwalt's view the only way, short of war, to come to
grips with Soviet misbehavior is to "put together a combination of
overt political and covert actions designed to stem this tide
while rearming to regain equality from which to negotiate more
balanced arrangements."
--In Admiral Zumwalt's view the best possible action for
the Senate to take vis-a-vis S. 2525 is "no action" with a view
toward allowing more time to debate the issue of "how badly
we are going to need the [intelligence] capability that [S. 2525]
proposes to exorcise."
--If on the other hand, the Senate decides to move forward
with the bill, Admiral Zumwalt made the following recommendations:
a. better care must be taken to protect the
sanctity of sources and techniques in the intelligence
arena;
b. the detailed reporting requirements negate covert
activity, which actively will be greatly needed in the
future; accordingly, no prohibition on specified covert
activities should be included in the bill;
c. the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense should be made members of the NSC
Special Coordinating Committee (SOC);
d. The Congress must provide in the legislation some
means of ensuring the accuracy of intelligence reporting to
prevent the misuse of intelligence analyses for purposes of
political improvements of an Administration's position.
6. The focus of the questioning by the Senators was as follows:
--Senator Huddleston indicated that the Committee has been
concerned with the question of the interplay between tactical and
national intelligence and asked if the witnesses in their tactical com-
mand roles ever felt shut off from national intelligence which
did not get to the commander because someone decided it was not
applicable to the tactical situation. General Wilson responded
that the process of getting national intelligence to the tactical
level could be reworked to better answer the needs of the commander
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at the Unified and Specified Command level and that enhancing the
DCI's budget and program control would be a positive step in the
right direction. General Dougherty indicated that in his opinion
as close---.to real time-unevaluated intelligence would be
helpful at the tactical level to the point that it would allow
the tactical commander to "posture his forces or to increase his
degree of readiness, not in a provocative sense, but in a prudent
sense, while he is waiting for the evaluation." (Admiral Zumwalt
was not present to respond; he arrived late.)
--Senator Huddleston, directing the next question to General
Wilson,asked ow the y-to-day operations of DIA would be
changed by the bill as it is. General Wilson said DIA is in
the precarious position of being tasked by both the Secretary
of Defense and the Chairman, JCS, on the one hand, and the DCI
or DNI on the other; according to General Wilson, if the
supervisory line of the DCI or DNI is strengthened the day-to-day
operations of DIA could be affected in that the DCI or DNI may collide
with the Secretary of Defense or JCS Chairman in their dealings
with DIA.
-.-Senator Goldwater began his questioning by commenting
on the latest Agee afal`r and by indicating that he was personally
writing to the Attorney General to see what steps can be taken
to deny Mr. Agee his U.S. citizenship.
--Senator Goldwater then asked at what. point in any crisis
situation intelligence agencies would turn things over directly
to the military and the military take over intelligence. In
responding, General Dougherty stated that he found subsection
133(c) of Title I somewhat restrictive and said that it might lead
to an unfortunate underutilization of military forces and
military intelligence activities. General Wilson said that
such a. decision is a Presidential responsibility but praised
former DCI Bush for his handling of two crises, evacuations of Americans
from Beirut and STAT
In each, DCI Bush placed people under the control of the Director,
DIA, to support a Pentagon task force at the point where the
situation became a military problem.
--Senator Chafee asked the views of the witnesses with regard
to the Team Team B concept. The Senator couched his question in
terms of the opinion of many who feel that the NIE's have under-
estimated Soviet strategic buildup. All three witnesses agreed
that the Team A/Team B concept is a serious and valuable exercise.
General Dougherty opined that S. 2525 could serve as a vehicle
for making Congress itself the "second Team" on intelligence
matters, especially "special activities." Senator Chafee reacted
to General Dougherty's comments by stating that, in his opinion,
such an arrangement would not be feasible, expressing doubts that
any secret in the Federal Government could be kept as the group
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--Senator Wallop began his questioning by commenting first
that he does not agree with the way the bill lists prohibitions
and secondly by stating that he agrees with Admiral Zumwalt
to the extent that Congress should "not act too hastily in
response to a series of unfortunate events and the abuse of
power that preceded them. In Senator Wallop's opinion the
congressional oversight process is working quite well to "take
care of the real abuses." The Senator then.asked.the three
witnesses to comment on "what appears to [be] a vast and
impressive move away from human collection." In response,
all three witnesses stressed the continued.need for Humint.
--Senator Chafee attempted to surmnarize the-witnesses
testimony vis-a-vis S. 2525. According to Senator Chafee:
Admiral Zumwalt would not proceed with this
legislation; Admiral Zumwalt added that he would
like to see similar hearings like this in another
year after the national debate has clarified our
alternatives.
General Dougherty indicated some satisfaction with
the legislation; General Dougherty added that in his
opinion the congressional oversight, while fraught
with security problems ,"will lend to the objectivity
of intelligence and to the accuracy of intelligence."
General Wilson added his own summary stating that
after 30 years guidelines are needed, but warned that
excessive reporting requirements as-well as a lengthy
list of proscriptions may be counterproductive.
--Senator Goldwater closed the hearing by stating that in
his opinion the crux of the problem has been the misuse of the
Intelligence Community by past Presidents; he advocated
"build[ing] some kind of fence around the President's ability"
to misuse intelligence.
Note: With this hearing the SSCI concluded its first series of hearings
on S. 2525. The SSCI, since April 1978, has held about a dozen hearings,
taking testimony from non-Government witnesses. The staff contemplates
no further hearings for the next six weeks; the staff hopes to begin
calling Administration witnesses sometime in the fall but to date no
witness list or dates have been developed. While no formal hearings
will be held in the immediate future, Agency discussions with SSCI
staff about particular provisions in the bill will continue. In addition
an SCC charter working-level group will continue to consider individual titles.
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ac-sistant Legislative ounse
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