DOUBTS PERSIST ON '64 SOVIET DEFECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000600230070-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: April 24, 1978
• Content Type: NSPR

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,,O~roved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP8TM0098G'R000600230
S.5-`'l WASHINGTON POST- A
Dcithts Persist an'64 Soviet Defe~tOf'
By Robert G. Kaiser Security, the KGB. Epstein charges
Washington Post staff writer that after exhaustive investigation the
The Senate Intelligence Committee CIA and other U.S. agencies decided
has begun an inquiry into hotly dis- that they could not decide whether
puted assertions that the United Nosenko was legitimate or phony.
States was duped by a phony Soviet ! Later, Epstein contends, new execu-
defector who came to this country in tives In the CIA cleared Nosenko and
1964. declared him bonafide.
According to a new book, two The staff of the Intelligence Com-
branches of the Central Intelligence mittee is now investigating these
Agency concluded that the defector l events, according to a member of the
was probably a Soviet plant, but their , committee.
conclusion was overridden and the The Post's inquiry int,) Epstein's
defector is now actively employed as' allegations was hampered by the fact
a consultant to the CIA. that although sources who sympathized
An independent inquiry by The with his viewpoint were willing to
Washington Post has established that ! discuss the ' case, present or former
the book's account is essentially cor- officials involved in the decision to
rect, and that doubts about this de- clear Nosenko were not available for
fector sharply divided the U.S. Intel- questioning.
ligence community. The doubts are One former CIA official who was a
dismissed as unfounded by the FBI source for Epstein's book told The
and other CIA officials, including Post he had read the final CIA report
former director William E. Colby. on Nosenko that was the basis for
The Post has also found that some clearing him. ? This former ifficial
former high-ranking CIA. officials claimed that the report di l not
believe that acceptance of the defector respond to dozens of the questions
as legitimate has gravely compromised raised about Nosenko's reliabtli:v, but
some U.S. intelligence, and counter- merely concluded that he was self-
intelligence programs, perhaps even serving liar,. not a planted KGB .:gent.
rendering them useless in the secret The CIA refused to discuss the case,
cold war with the Soviet Union. except to say: "We are satisfied with
The defector in question is Yuri Nosenko's bona fides."
Nosenko, who defected to the United reliability came from to the e CIA's
States in February 1964, and claimed counterintelligence ndivision, then led
led
to have intimate personal knoN%ledge by James J. Angleton, and the Soviet
of Lee Harvey Oswald's two-year stay Russia Division, then led by David
is the Soviet Union before the as- Murphy 'and Tennant H. Baigley.
assination of President Kennedy: 'rate Angleton-who is well known for his
_efector said Soviet officials regarded suspicious view of defectors in general
Oswald as suspicious and had no and his great respect for KGB wiliness
substantive dealings with him. -was fired from the CIA by Colby.
CIA suspicions about Nosenko led Murphy and Bagley apparently both
to his being held virtually a prisoner resigned.
for about three years and subjected The Post's inquiry has established
to intense questioning. The Rocke- that senior U.S. intelligence officials,
feller Commission that reported on including at least some of those who
CIA activities in. X1976 described were fired or retired in various per-
Nosenko's handling' .without naming sonnel upheavals at the agency, fear
him: that the ultimate acceptance of
"For much of this time (three years] Nosenko has effectively destroyed the
the defector was held in solitary con- ability of U.S. intelligence to conduct
finement under extremely spartan a secret war against Soviet intelligence
living conditions. The defector was organs, and has seriously compromised
apparently not physically abused. The other U.S. intelligence organs.
justification given by the CIA for Some of these officials harbor fears
the lengthy confinement arose out of that the Soviet Union has effectively
a substantial concern regarding the penetrated the CIA, the FBI or both.
defector's bona fides... " At the same time, The Post has
According to author Edward Jay determined, other intelligence officals,
Epstein, whose new book "Legend" including those now in charge of U.S.
was published April 9, senior officials intelligence activities, dismiss these
in the CIA concluded that Nosenko dark views as unwarranted and per-
was sent to the United States with a haps paranoid.
reassuring message about Oswald by Epstein and informed sources
the Soviet Committee on State sympathetic to his viewpoint contend
that the Nosenko case is particularly
number of other controversial defector
or spy cases in which the United
States has put great faith.
Nosenko gave the'CIA information
about other spy cases and defectors
that may have seriously misled the
United States, his doubters believe,
allowing the Soviets to continue
other, more damaging intelligence
operations against this country.
One case cited by Nosenko's doubt-
ers involves the earlier testimony of
another Soviet defector whom the
CIA officials who doubted Nosenko
tended to believe. That earlier defec-
tor said there was a KGB "mole" in a
high post inside the CIA. Nosenko
said there was a mole, but then gave
evidence suggesting that it was a peri-
pheral, utterly unimportant figure,
Nosenko's doubters wonder if he
drew suspicion away from a much
more important "mole."
Another important' case involving
Nosenko'was that of "Fedora," a So-
viet official at the United Nations
who worked secretly for U.S. intelli-
gence for many years. Fedora staked
his credibility on a confirmation of
key elements in Nosenko's original
story to U.S. officials that Nosenko
himself later admitted were untrue,
according to Epstein and other
sources.
Some intelligence officials believe
this episode showed that Fedora-who
was given that code name by the FBI
-was acutally another Soviet plant.
But Fedora is still highly regarded in-
side the intelligence community, au-
thoritative sources told The Post.
Epstein disclosed the existence of
Fedora in his book, and cited ele-
ments of the case against his reli-
ability in the book and in an inter-
view with New York Magazine.
Fedora apparently has provided the
United States with extensive informa-
tion on Soviet intelligence activities
and government policy for years: He is
described by Epstein as a former offi-
cial at the United Nations.
Superficially, his career paralleled
that of Arkady Shevchenko, the So-
viet U.N. official who decided recently
that he would not return to the So-
viet Union because of unspecified dis-
agreements with his government. But
authoritative sources said Shevcheko
was not the same person as Fadora.
_ The possibility remains that Shev-
chenko's defection is somehow con-
nected to the Fedora case or the pub-
lication of Epstein's book revealing
the existence of Fedora.
The Nosenko story has filled thou-
sands of pages of CIA reports alreAdv.
and cannot be concisely sisro.n....::s
: ,:u..:cast because L. is a key to a o ficials who
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WASHINGTON POST
~vaTS IER5'S7
encouraged his skepticism about
`'osenko's legitimacy have noted
these aspects of the tale:
The timing of his defection and the
message he carried were both suspici-
ous. Nosenko first made contact with
the CIA in Geneva in 1962. At that
time he offered to spy for the United
States in Moscow, Americans who
dealt with him then were suspicious
of Nosenko. but waited to see what
would happen.
In January 1964, Nosenko reap-
peared in Geneva accompanying a So-
viet disarmament delegation. He
again made contact with the CIA, and
announced that he had personally
supervised Oswald's KGB file during
the period before Kennedy's assassina-
tion. Moreover, Nosenko claimed, he
had been assigned to review the Os-
wald file at the time of the assassina-
tion to satisfy senior Soviet officals
that there could be no connection be-
tween the shooting of Kennedy and
Oswald's sojourn in Russia.
Nosenko told the CIA that Oswald
had absolutely no connection with the
KGB during his stay in the Soviet
Union, and that he was not debriefed
or questioned by any official Soviet
agency.
At his 1962 meeting with the CIA,
Nosenko said he would spy for the
United States but would never defect.
(Why he wanted to do even spying of
this kind was never made clear, ac-
cording to a CIA official who took
part in the 1952 meeting.) But in 1964,
in the course of a series of clandestine
meetings with U.S. officials, Nosenko
said he had to defect at once because
he had received a cable from Moscow
recalling him. Nosenko said he feared
the KGB had learned of his contacts
with the CIA, at which point the
Americans agreed that he could defect.
CIA officials suspicious of Nosenko
faulted this story on several counts.
They doubted that an officer with
Nosenko's career history could have
served in all the capacities he
claimed. They doubted that the So-
viets would ignore a man like Oswald
who came to Russia after serving in
the U.S. Marines announcing his in-
tention to "defect" - they tradition-
ally at least question such "defect-
ors." And they were suspicious of the
fact that such a well-placed Soviet de-
fector would suddenly materialize at
the very moment the Warren Com-
mission in Washington was investigat-
ing Oswald's past, including his stay
in Russia.
In questioning of Nosenko, these
skeptical' CIA officials found what
they regarded as grave contradictions
in his story. A key break came when
the National Security Agency con-
cluded from its ability to at least
partially eavesdrop on Soviet diplo-
matic communications that there was
no telegram from Moscow to Geneva
recalling Nosenko, as he had claimed.
Confronted with this intelligence,
Nosenko admitted he had lied about
the telegram to make his plea to be
allowed to defect more persuasive.
(Fedora. the FBI's agent within the
Soviet apparatus at the United Na-
tions, had previously confirmed that
Nosenko did receive a recall telegram
in Geneva, though now Nosenko ad-
mitted he did not.)
Nosenko also admitted under
questioning that he was not a colonel
in the KGB, as he had claimed, but
a captain. He said he had lied to
exaggerate his importance in the
Americans' eyes.
Then why, the questioners, per-
sisted, did he bring with him a pur-
ported KGB travel document identify-
ing him as a colonel? Was this part of
a "legend" the KGB created for him
before his "defection"?
No, said. Nosenko, just a clerical
error.
These and other questions about
Nosenko were raised in a 900 pages of
report and analysis prepared on the
case by Bagley, deputy head of the
Soviet Russia Division. Bagley had
participated in the Nosenko case from
the time of his original 1962 contact
with the CIA through his prolonged
detention and interrogation. Because
Nosenko never "broke" under ques-
tioning, Bagley concluded that there
was no firm proof that he was a
KGB plant. But he compiled massive
circumstantial evidence which he,
Angleton and others felt pointed to-
ward that conclusion.
The officials involved In the
Nosenko case then agreed that they
could do no more than declare his
bona fides in doubt, give him a new
identity and money to live on, and
go about their business.
But later, according to Epstein's
book, the case was reopened. Another
CIA officer named Bruce Solie re-
examined the evidence and concluded
that Nosenko was legitimate. He was
rehabilitated and again became a con-
sultant to the CIA.
Reached by telephone, one former
CIA director, Richard Helms, said the
Nosenko case had indeed divided the
agency, and that many people in-
volved in the case were never satis.
fied about his credentials. Another
former director, William Colby, said:
"As I understand it, the Nosenko
thing was very carefully looked at by
the leadership of the agency and they
came down on the position that he
was basically reliable."
Epstein was astounded to discover
that the Soviet government apparent-
ly believed the same thing-or said ,
it did.
While researching his book, Epstein.
said in an interview, he wanted to
ask the Soviet government for per-'
mission to travel to Minsk, the Soviet
city where Oswald lived, to talk to
people who knew Oswald there. The
Readers Digest, which sponsored and
published Epstein's book, contacted
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dorbrynin,
and in time Epstein met with an of-
ficial named Igor Agu, who identi-
fied himself as a press attache in the
Soviet embassy in Washington.
Agu heard Epstein's request and
for a time they negotiated back and
forth. Finally Agu told the author
that it would not be possible for him
to go to Minsk.
Then he offered a suggestion, not-
ing at the time that perhaps he was.
exceeding his authority as a Soviet-
press attache, but recommending
nevertheless that there was one man
in America who knew all about
Oswald's life in Minsk: a defector
named Yuri Ndsenko.
Epstein said it seemed extraordi-
nary that a Soviet official would re-
commend that he talk to a defector
who was supposedly sentenced to
death In absentia by a Soviet court:
The Post made inquiries about Agu
and learned that he was never a press
attache in the Soviet embassy, but,
rather a junior diplomat with no ap-
parent duties-very possibly a KGB
agent, according to an official Ameri-
can source.
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