SPACEFLIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000400090039-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: July 1, 1978
• Content Type: BOOK

 Approved For Release 2004/08[ 9L:, CIA-RDP.81.M40980R000400.0.90.03-.7
U.S. RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE
Introduction
For the last decade and a half the United States and the
Soviet Union have been keeping watch on each other from
space, using reconnaissance satellites to observe ballistic
missile sites, weapons testing and deployment, military
exercises, factory and shipyard construction, and a whole
host of other "interesting" activities. This may seem like an
aggressive and unwarranted intrusion into each other's
security, but it is in fact a vital part of the balance of power
which has maintained peace and restrained the arms race.
The great importance of these reconnaissance satellites and
their findings has been implicitly acknowledged by the in-
clusion in the SALT agreements of clauses specifically pro-
hibiting interference with the other party's "national techni-
cal means of verification."
A considerable proportion of the satellites launched by
both the United States and the Soviet Union have been
related to reconnaissance, but they have teceived very little
publicity. Indeed, it is probably the only topic in the whole
space exploration field that accounts of Soviet activities are
more readily available to the public than accounts of
American ones; for a description of Soviet reconnaissance
programmes the reader is referred to [ 1 ] . It is the aim of
this article to provide an overview of American programmes
involved in satellite reconnaissance, and to give an indication
of their capabilities.
The Beginnings of Surveillance
At the end of the Second World War several hundred
German workers who had been involved with the V-2 pro-
ject were taken to work in the Soviet Union. By 1952 most
of them had been allowed to return to Germany, and they
brought back with them stories of Soviet developments in
the missile field, stories that sounded ominous to Western
military experts. Their real significance was brought home
by the explosion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb on
12 August 1953, only nine months after America's first [2].
To an America steadily cnttiirg back its military strength,
the prospect of the Russians having a nuclear armed inter-
continental missile was not a pleasant one. It thus became
of the greatest importance for the US to find out just how
far Russian developments had progressed, and this meant
surveillance of Soviet missile tests. A radar station was set
up at Samsun in Turkey, which gave ample coverage of the
tests conducted from Kapustin Yar, 1,550 km to the north-
east [ 3]. However, it soon became clear that these missiles,
with their impacts 1,500 km away in the Kyzyl Kum Desert,
were only IRBM's and that the ICBM tests were to be
carried out from another launch site, much deeper inside
Soviet territory, and out of range of foreign radars. To
monitor the ICBM tests the U-2 aircraft was developed, and
flights over the Soviet Union began in June 1956. By the
spring of 1957 the new cosmodrome at Tyuratam had been
discovered, and by the middle of the year a U-2 flying out of
Peshawar in Pakistan had brought back photographs of it
[4, 5]. As the need for information grew, the flights became
longer and longer, until it was decided to make one way
trips across the Soviet Union from Peshawar to Bodo in
northern Norway. During the first of these, the great dis-
advantage of the U-2 came to light: on 1 May 1960 Gary
Powers was shot down by a ground-to-air missile near
Sverdlovsk, and in the uproar that followed all further U-2
flights over the Soviet Union were cancelled.
PROGRAMMES
Fig. 1. A Titan 3B blasts off from Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California. Rockets of this type have been used exteosivtc4t to
launch close-orbit reconnaissance missions (see Table 3).
As far as the public was concerned, this seemed to be the
end of American surveillance of the Soviet Union, but it
fact it was just the beginning. For some time the USAF had
been working on a new approach --- observation front un-
manned satellites. Studies of these started soon after World
War 11, and as far hack as 2 May 1916 Project R.Atil1T (soon
to become the RAND Corporation) produced a report dis-
cussing the technical aspects of a satellite vehicle. In April
1951 they produced a report entitled Utility of a Satellite
Vehicle for Reconnaissance [6]. On 16 March 1955, four
months before the United Stares was to announce plans to
launch a scientific satellite during International Geophysical
Year (IGY), the USAF, under the sponsorship of the CL\.
issued a formal request for proposals for a "Strategic
Satellite System," to be designated WS-117L. On 311 June
1956 the contract was awarded to Lockheed, and the
satellite vehicle they developed. the Agena, is still in service
today [7],
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Fig. 2. Launch sequence of a USAF
Discoverer polar orbiting satellite at
Vandenberg AI'D. The Discoverer
had a lun list of `firms' to its credit:
the first polar orbiting satellite, the
first satellite to be stabilised in space
on all three axes, the first to be
manoeuvred in space, the first satel-
hte capsule to be recovered tram
orbit, the first aerial recovery of a
space capsule by the sir-snatch
technique. These qualities est-
ablished the success of America's
first operational reconnaissance
satellite system.
Weapons System 117L
The first question to he resolved was what type of camera
system to use. An obvious choice was television, but this
was rejected in August 1957 after study by RCA had shown
that the resolution would be very poor. Instead, it was de-
cided to develop a film scanning technique (by Eastman
Kodak, Philco and CBS Laboratories) in which a convention-
al camera is used to photograph the scene; the film is then
developed on board and. scanned by a fine light beam. The
resulting signal is transmitted to a receiving station on the
ground, where it is used to build up a picture. Obviously the
scanning process would degrade the picture quality to some
extent, but it was expected to be far better than TV, and
he other alterna"ive, physical recovery of the film, still
seemed a long way off. It must be remembered that at this
time the art of building vehicles which could survive
atmospheric re-entry was in its infancy, and the weight
penalties for such systems were very high. It was decided,
however, to develop a recoverable system as soon as the
technology allowed [7].
The launch of Sputnik I in October 1957 demonstrated
just how advanced Soviet rocketry was, and on '15 November
Lockheed's budget for WS-117L was quadrupled [8]. In the
meantime, the RAND Corporation had been carrying out
further studies on satellite reconnaissance: in a report dated
June 1956 entitled Physical Recovery of Satellite Payloads:
A Preliminary Investigation, it suggested that a modified
ICBM nosecone could be used to return camera film to
Earth. while the November 1957 report A Family of Recover-
able Reconnaissance Satellites held out great hopes for a
physical recovery system. In January 1958 it was decided
that such a system should be developed as soon as possible
[ 71 , and General Electric was contracted to produce the
recoverable capsule [81. That November the Department of
Defense revealed that WS-1 17L. now consisted of three
elements: Discoverer, which would he used as a test bed for
developing systems and concepts, Sentry (later to be renamed
Santos} which would be the operational reconnaissance
system. and Midas, which would he an early warning system
to detect missile launches and warn of an attack [9]. The
operational systems (Samos and Midas) were each to consist
of 8 to 12 satellites in polar orbit, and it was planned that
they should he on station by the mid-11960's.
The Agena Vehicle [ lo}
Lockheed's winning proposal for WS-t 17L consisted of a
second stage to be placed atop an ICBM first stage. The in-
struments would be placed in the forward section of the
vehicle, and on reaching orbit there would be no separation
of launch vehicle second stage and payload, as is the usual
case. This would allow the orbiting instruments to use the
same command, guidance and control equipment as the
second stagy, giving, it was hoped, a considerable savirg in
weight and added flexibility. The first Agena was delivered
to the USAF towards the end of 1958; it was 1.52 in in
diameter and 5.94 in long. Fully fuelled it weighed 3,850 kg,
while in orbit it weighed 770 kg. It was cylindrical, with a
conical nose at the forward end, and the thrust chamber of
the propulsion system protruding from the aft end. The
instruments were mounted in the conical section, which
carried as its apex the re-entry capsule. This was 84 cm in
diameter and 69 cm long, and weighed 135 kg. The stage's
rocket engine was the Bell Hustler, producing a thrust of
6,800 kg, and stabilisation was provided by two sets of cold
gas reaction jets.
On reaching orbit the vehicle was to, rotate through 180"
to point backwards along the orbital path. The recovery
sequence would be initiated by a command from the around:
first the nose of the craft would be pointed downwards at an
angle of 60", and then the capsule would be separated. It
would immediately be spun about its axis to provide stability.
and then a retrorocket would he tired to reduce its velocity
and start re-entry, which would occur at an altitude of about
1 10 km. At an altitude of about 15 knt the heat shield would
be jettisoned, and a parachute deployed. Although the cap-
sule would float, and it could be retrieved from the ocean,
the primary method of recovery was to he the ti-rid-air
snatch technique. In this aircraft (initially C-1 IWS, were used,
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NAIoiE
LAUNCH DATE
(Gal)
LAUNCH V 'hICLE
LIFE
(days)
IN(;
(deg)
PERIOD
(m?n)
PF'HI-APO
(km)^-.._
Discoverer
1
28
Feb
59
Thor-Agena A
89.7
96
163 - 968
Discoverer
2
13
Apr
59
Thor-Agena A
89.9
30.4
239-?346
Discoverer
3
3
Jun
59
Thor-Agena A
failed to orbit
Discoverer
4
25
Jun
59
Thor-Agena A
failed to orb
it
Discoverer
5
13
Aug
59
Thor-Agena t
80.0
94.19
217 - 73.9
Discoverer
6
1.9
Aug
59
Thor-agena A
84.0
95.27
E 212- 648
Discoverer
7
7
Nov
59
Thor-Agena A
81. 04
94.70
159-847
Discoverer
8
20
Nov
59
Thor-Agena A
00.o7
103.72
10 - 109
Discoverer
9
4
Feb
60
Thor-Agena A
faile
d to orb
it
Di-coverer
10
19
Feb
60
Thor-Agena A
faile
d to orb
it
Discoverer
11
15
Apr
60
Thor-Agena A
30.1
I ;2.16
170.589
Discoverer
12
29
Jun
60
Thor-Agena A
faLle
4 to orb
it
Discoverer
13
10
Aug
60
Thor-Agena A
1.11
82.8?
94.04
256- 683
Discoverer
14
18
Aug
60
Thor-Agena A
1.12
79.65
94.75
186 -c105
Discoverer
15
13
Sep
60
Thor-Agena A
60.90
34_23
199-761
Discoverer
16
26
Oct
60
Thor-Agena B
faile
d to orb
it
Discoverer
17
12
Nov
60
Thor-Agena B
2.08
81.70
96.45
190 - 984
Discoverer
18
7
Dec
60
Thor-Agena i3
3.12
81.50
93.66
243- 661
Discoverer
19
20
Dec
60
Thor-Agena B
83.40
33.00
209 - 631
Discoverer.
20
17
Feb
61
Thor-Agena B
60.91
95.41
288--786
Discoverer
21
18
Feb
61
Thor-Agena B
80.74
97.85
240- 1069
Discoverer
22
30
Mar
61
Thor-Agena B
faile
d to orbit
Discoverer
23
8
Apr
61
Thor-Agena B
82.31
1 94.09
295- 651
Discoverer
24
8
Jun
61
Thor-Agena B
failed to orbit
Discoverer
25
16
Jun
61
Thor-Agena B
2.08
82.11
I 90.87
1 222- 409
Discoverer
26
7
Jul
61
Thor-Agena 3
2.11
82.94
95.02
228- 808
Discoverer
27
21
Jul.
61
Thor-Agena B
failed to orbit
Discoverer
28
3
Aug
61
Thor-Agena B
failed to orbit
Discoverer
29
30
Aug
61
Thor-Agena B
2.10
82.14
91.51
152- 542
Discoverer
30
12
Sep
61
Thor-Agena B
2.12
82.66
92.40
235- 546
Discoverer
31
17
Sep
61
Thor-Agena B
82.70
90.86
235- 396
Discoverer
32
13
Oct
61
Thor-Agena B
1.14
81.69
90.84
234- 395
Discoverer
33
23
Oct
61
Thor-Agena B
failed to orbit
Discoverer
34
5
Nov
61
Thor-Agena 3
02.52
97.12
227-1011
Discoverer
35
15
Nov
61
Thor-Agena B
1.12
81.63
89.7
238- 278
Discoverer
36
12
Dec
61
Thor-Agena B
4.08
61.21
91.82
241- 484
Discoverer
37
13
Jan
62
Thor-Agena B
failed to orbit
Discoverer
38
27
Feb
62
T hor-~gena B
4.06
82.23
{ 90.04
208--341
1. This table lists all satellites launched in the Discoverer Programme.
2. The lifetimes refer to the recoverable capsules. Lifetimes are quoted for those capsules which were recovered.
3. All launches were made from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
but these were replaced in 1961 by C-130's) trailing large
trapeze-like devices would try to snag the capsule as it made
its parachute descent. The aircraft would cross the capsule's
path just above it, so that the cables of the recovery device,
trailing behind and below *he aircraft, would evsnpre the
parachute lines. If all went well the parachute would collapse
and fold over, allowing capsule,parachute and recovery
device to be hauled into the aircraft.
The Discoverer Programme [ 8, 11 ]
All launches in the Discoverer programme (see Table 1)
were made from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California,
using Thor rockets as their first stages. The plan was to place
the satellites in near polar orbits, which would take them
over virtually the whole of the Earth's surface. By placing
them in orbits with periods of 90 to'95 minutes they could
be recovered over the Pacific Ocean after one day on their
seventeenth or eighteenth orbits, after two days on their
thirty-second or ihi.rty-third orbits, after three days on their
forty-eighth or forty-ninth orbits, and so on.
The first launch took place on 28 February 1959 and the
Agena went into an orbit with a perigee of 163 km and. an
apogee of 968 km. It carried no recoverable capsule, but was
intended as a test of the Agena and its systems. Unfortunately
a fault in the stabilisation system caused the craft to tumble
violently in orbit. The second launch, on 13 April, was
successful, and all seemed to be going well until a human
error caused the re-entry sequence to be initiated too early,
and the capsule descended far away from the recovery
forces, over northern Norway. Ironically, all the mechanical.
systems appeared to have worked correctly, and there were
reports of sightings of the descending capsule, hut a search
party was unable to locate it.
After a very promising start the Discoverer programme
now entered a period of continuing frustration- lie next
two launches, on 3 and 25 June, failed to achieve orbit, and
when Discoverer 5 actually made it to orbit on 13 August,
improper orientation during retrofire sent the capsule into
a higher orbit rather than back to Earth. Flight number 6,
which was probably the first to carry photographic equip-
ment, seemed to be going very smoothly; a good orbit was
achieved on 19 August, and the retrofire and re-entry
sequence was carried out according to plan on the seven-
teenth orbit. During the parachute descent, however, no
homing signals were received from the capsule, and it and its
cargo were never found. Things then began to get worse;
Discoverer 7 could riot be stablised in orbit, and a launch
vehicle guidance error placed Discoverer 8 in an orbit with.
an apogee of 1.679 km. It was decided to try and recover
the capsule on the fifteenth orbit, but the parachute did not
seem to deploy correctly, and the capsule was not recovered.
The next two launches, on 4 and 19 February 1960,. did
not get into orbit, but on 15 April Discoverer I I seemed to
be working as planned. Re-entry was initiated on the
seventeenth orbit, but its descent could not be tracked and
it was lost. Discoverer l2 was another launch failure, but
with number 13 the programme's luck changed. On 10
August it was placed in a 258 km to 683 kip orbit, and
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Fig. 3. Agena spacecraft capsule re-entry sequence from polar orbit
begins near Alaska.
right on schedule on the seventeenth orbit the capsule was
ejected and its retrorocket fired. Radar based in Hawaii, 450
km south west of its path, tracked it on its way down, and
although heavy cloud precluded mid-air retrieval, it was soon
spotted floating in the ocean, and picked up by Navy frog-
men. This was the first object that had ever been recovered
from space, a considerable technical achievement.
A week'after the recovery, Discoverer 14 was launched.
Launch vehicle and spacecraft performed perfectly,
achieving a good orbit and ejecting their capsule on the
seventeenth pass as planned. As it dropped through the
2,600 in altitude mark it was caught by a C-119 and hauled
on board. After 16 months of trying a completely successful
mission was accomplished, and whereas the USAF stressed
that Discoverer 13 carried "no sensor equipment,' no such
statement was made for this mission. It seems quite likely
that the US was analysing its first photographs of the Soviet
Union taken from space by the end of August 1960.
Although a successful mission had been completed, there
were still problems to be resolved. Discoverer 15, launched
on 13 September, ejected its capsule but it landed outside
the recovery area and was lost, while Discoverer 16 failed to
reach orbit. This flight marked the introduction of the new
.\gena B; lengthened to 8.08 in to carry more propellants
and with a new restartable engine it could place 950 kg in
orbit. The next two missions were both complete successes,
returning after two and three days in orbit respectively.
Discoverer 19 was orbited on 20 December, but carried no
recoverable capsule as it was a test of sensors for the Midas
project.
The New Year got off to a had start when Discoverer 20
could not he stabilised in orbit-following launch on 17
February, but the next day all went well for Discoverer 21,
another ,Midas test vehicle. The next three flighks did not
achieve their objectives, with numbers 2? end 24 failing to
reach orbit, and incorrect orientation causing Discoverer 23's
retrofire to send its capsule into a higher ('tbit instead of
back to Earth.
The first recoveries of 1961 carne with Discoverers 25
and 26, launched on l6 June and 7 July, each returning its
capsule after two days, but then the next two flights were
launch failures. This uneven record would continue through
to the end of the programme in the Spring of 1962., with
the next two flights (numbers 29 and 30) leading, to capsule
recoveries, followed by a flight on which the capsule could
not be ejected. and their auother success. The year ended
with a launch failure, an orbital failure, a ntid-air recovery
and a retrieval from the sea, the last after four days in space.
The final launches of the programme carne on 13 January
(a launch failure) and 27 February 1962 (a mid-air recovery
after four days). bringing the total number of launches to 38.
Of these 26 reached orbit, and of the 23 capsules they
carried, 8 were recovered in mid-air and four from the sea.
This record may riot sound very impressive today, but
fifteen years ago, when space vehicles were notoriously tin
reliable, it represented a considerable achievement. Most
important of all, the programme had shown that the recovery
of photographic fil.rrr from space was feasible, and the indica-
tions were that when the "bugs" had been worked out of
the system, it could he carried out on a routine basis.
Operational Reconnaissance System
The development oy the Discoverer programme of the
film recovery technique did not mean that the radio trans-
mission had been abandoned, for each system had its
advantages and disadvantages. The film recovery method
gave much better resolution, and showed more detail of
what was on the ground, but the weight penalty of carrying
a re-entry capsuta :gas high, and meant that only a small
quantity of fihit could be carried. Radio transmission, on
the other ha rid, produced poorer rr=solution, but many more
photographs could he taken on a mission. It also had the
advantage that its photographs could he analysed as soon as
they had been transmitted to the ground, probably within
a couple of hours of them actually being taken, whereas no
shots could be studied from a recovery mission until the
flight was complete, the capsule had been recovered and
the film flown to Washington.
There were three in .rrt tasks c,r reconna,saarice satellites
in the early 1960's;. the first was to get a detailed look at the
Soviet ICBM, the SS-6, which was thought to be deployed
in large numbers. By studying its ground handling, the
number of people required to service it, etc., a good estimate
could be made of how quickly an attack could be mounted,
and how vulnerable it might be to a first strike. Another
important question was how many missiles were deployed,
and was the "Missile Gap" really as bad as some people
claimed (it was nut!)_ To do this a survey of most of the
Soviet Union was required, but as the missiles were so big,
a launch site would show up learly, and good resolution
would not be required. The third application was to map
the whole of the Soviet Union, to provide targeting data
for US missiles (it was discovered when this was complete
that the positions of cities shown on Soviet wraps were
deliberately falsified, with their locations as much as 15 km
out 121). Again, good resolution was not as important as
the number of flights necessary to cover the t -round.
These factors led to the decision to develop both film
recovery and radio transmission satellites as two comple-
mentary programmes. Because of their applications, the
radio transmission vehicles are usually referred to as area
survey satellites, and the film recovery vehicles are referred
to as close look satellites.
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The Area Survey Satellites
At about the time of the early Discoverer launches, tests
were being carried out of the radio transmission system
from aircraft. This system was being developed by Eastman
Kodak (the camera) and CBS Laboratories (the film scanner),
and a close relation, built by the same companies, was to
find another application in Moon photography in the Lunar
Orbiter series of spacecraft in 1966 and 1967 [ 1 1 ] . The
ability to use aircraft as test vehicles, instead of the space
vehicles that the recovery system required, meant that these
tests could be carried out much more quickly and at far less
cost. As a consequence, the first operational area survey
satellite was ready for launch only two months after the
Discoverer programme had made its first recovery in August
1960. That two-month period saw several milestones in the
reconnaissance programme. In early September the pro-
gramme's name was changed from Sentry to Samos, an
acronym for Satellite and Missile Observation System, and
soon afterwards it was given a new priority under an Air
Force reorganisation. The programme was moved under the
direct control of the Secretary of the Air Force, an unprece-
dented move in the history of USAF developments [ 131 .
Following this, requests for proposals were issued for the
close-look satellite, code named E-6 (the area survey
satellites were code named E-5), with bids to be in by 13
October. The winning contractor was to deliver a prototype
nine months after the start of work, half the normal period
for such a complex system [ 141.
The first area survey satellite, Samos 1, was launched on
1 I October 1960, see Table 2. The Atlas-Agena A vehicle's
first stage performed as planned, but although the second
stage ignited the craft did not reach orbit. At the time the
USA was engaged in an all-out bid to close the "Missile Gap,"
and most of the rockets that came off the Atlas production
line were earmarked for deployment as ICBM's, so it was
three months until the next Samos launch, but this time a
success was recorded. On 31 January 1961 Samos 2 was
placed in an orbit with a perigee of 474 km and an apogee
of 557 km, giving it a period of very nearly 95 minutes. In
orbit it weighed 1,860 kg, of which about 150 kg were
instruments, and it operated in space for a month. The
success of this flight can be judged from the way US esti-
mates of Soviet ICBM strengths were reduced in the follow-
ing months, from the original 120 to 60 in June, and then
further to only 14 in September [ I 1 J , and the increased
confidence with which they were expressed. The next launch,
Samos 3 on 9 September, used the new Agena B upper stage,
but failed when the vehicle exploded on the pad.
With the success of the growing US reconnaissance effort,
the Soviet Union had been mounting a propaganda campaign
against American "militarisation of space," and it was pre-
sumably in response to this that the Department of Defense
decided to change its policy on the amount of information
made public about its launches. It was decided that the pro-
gramme under which a launch was made should not be
identified, and only an announcement of the launch vehicle
type and whether orbit had been achieved would be made.
However, tables of orbital parameters are issued by the
Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough, so even if the
USAF does not give these details (as it sometimes doesn't)
they are always available to the public. Armed with these,
and a knowledge of the sort of orbit required for a given
mission and the type of launch vehicle used, it is possible to
identify those launches which form part of the reconnaissance
programmes with a good degree of certainty. Thus when the
first of these unidentified launches was made on 22 Novem-
ber 1961 using an Atlas-Agena B launch vehicle, it was fairly
clear that this was a Samos mission. This flight failed to reach
orbit, but the next one, launched a month later, was placed
in a 244 km to 702 km orbit. Before the advent of satellites
it had been expected that the minimum altitude that a
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RADIO BEACON FLASHING LIGHT
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INSTRUMENTATION PACKAGE
Fie. 4. The orbiting Agena stage upon which the U.S. Air Force
built the first family of reeonnaissance satellites. Camera equipment
and re-entry capsule were in the nose section (not shown here).
Below. 300 lb. (136 kg.) re-entry capsule.
Lockheed Missile and Space
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satellite could use which would not decay in a matter of hours
would be about 450 km, but the early spacecraft had shown
that the upper atmosphere was less dense than expected, and
altitudes as low as 150 km could be used for flights of a, few
weeks. This would, of course, benefit the reconnaissance
satellites, as reducing their altitude, would increase their
ground resolutions and allow their transmission systems to
use higher data rates. The launch of 22 December seems to
have been the first to test the lower altitudes. as the pro-
gramme progressed the perigee heights would average about
180 km and the apogees in the 300 kkin to 4Q0 ken range.
By the beginning of 1962 the weight of the photographic
system had been reduced enough to allow a change to the
Thor-Agena B launch vehicle [ 151, which could place about
1,000 kg in orbit. The first of these launches was made on
21 February, with the Agena going into a 167 km to 374 ken
orbit, typical of those that were to follow. All the succeed-
ing launches involved Thor-based vehicles, and the reliability
problems that plagued the Discoverer programme seemed
to have been cured,. for there were to be eighteen more
successful launches before the next failure.
As 1962 progressed a transition was made from the
Agena B to the Agena 1), with the first launch of the new
variant on 28 June and the last of the old on 24 November.
The new stago had a restartable engine which could be fired
'from time to time, to raise its orbit and prolong its life. [151.
The pace of launches built up in 1962. with eighteen
successes and no failures marked up by the end of the year,
indicating the maturity of the programme and the importance
attached to its results.
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 Approved For Release-2004/08/19 : C1A=RDP81-M00980R000400U90 -
NAME
LAUNCH DATE
(GMT)
LAUNCH VEHICLE
LIFE
(days)
I1`tCL.
(deg)
PERIOD
(min)
PERI-A.PQI
(lam)
Samos 1
11
Oct
60
Atlas-Agena A
failed to orbit
Samos 2
31
Jan
61
Atlas-Agena A
4646
97.40
1 94.97
474--557
Samos 3
9
Sep
61
Atlas-Agena B
failed to orbit
none
22
Nov
61
Atlas-Agena B
failed to orbit
1961-aA
22
Dec
61
Atlas-Agena B
235
89.6
94.1
244.702.
1962-8
21
Feb
62
Thor-Agena
B
16
81-97
90.0
167-374
1962-a
18
Apr
62
Thor-Agena
B
40
73.48
90.9
200- 441.
1962-p
28
Apr
62
Thor-Agena
a
28
73.11
91.1
180- 475
1.962-0
30
May
62
Thor-Agena
B
12
74.10
89.7
199-- 3I9
1962-X
2
Jun
62
Thor-Agena
B
26.9
74.26
90.5
211?-:185
1962-ap
23
Jun
62
Thor-Agena
B
14.7
75.09
69.58
213-293
1962-al
28
Jun
62
Thor-Agena
D
78.
76.04
93.6
2111-689
1962-arI
21
Jul
62
Thor-Agena
B
24
70.29
90.42
208-38:1
1962-a
28
Jul
62
Thor-Agena
B
27
71-09
90.64
225 - 386
1962-0(9
2
Aug
62
Thor-Agena
D
24
82.25
90.77
204-418
1962-aa
29
Aug
62
Thor-Agena
D
12
65.21
90.38
187-400
1962-aX
17
Sep
62
Thor-Agena
B
62.2
81.84
93.33
204-668
1962-0i0
29
Sep
62
Thor-Agena
D
14
65.40
90.30
203-376
1962-A6
9
Oct
62
Thor-Agena
B
37.3
81.96
90.96
213-427
1962-A?
5
Nov
62
Thor-Agena
B
27
74.98
90.71
2013-409
1962-HP
24
Nov
62
Thor-A Pena
B
18
65.14
89.92
204-3.37
1962-9'
4
Dec
62
Thor-Agena
D
3
65.1
-39.16
1.94-273
1962-00
14
Dec
62
Thor-Agena
D
25.0
70.97
90.46
1999-392
1963-02
7
Jan
63
Thor-Agena
D
16.3
82.23
90.54
205-399
none
28
Feb
63
TAT-Agena
D
failed to orbit
none
18
liar
63
TAT-Agena
D
failed, to orbit
1963-07
1
Apr
63
Thor-Agena
D
25.0
75.40
1 90.66
201- 408
none
26
Apr
63
Thor-Agena
D
failed to orbit
1963-16
18
May
63
TAP-Agena
D
8
74.54
91.12
153- 497
1963-19
13
Jun
63
TAT-Agena
D
29.1
81.87
90-67
192- 41.9
1963-25
27
Jun
63
TAT-Agena
D
29.7
81.6
90.5
1.96- 3,96
1963-29
19
Jul
63
Thor-Agena
D
25.8
82.86
90.44
194-337
1963-32
31
Jul
63
TAT'-agena
D
12.0
74.95
90.4
157- 411
1963-34
25
Aug
63
TAT-Agena
D
18.6
75-01
89.4
161-32G
*1963-35
29
Aug
63
Thor-Agena
D
69.7
81_89
90.80
292---324
1963-37
23
Sep
63
Ty'T-Agena
D
18.2
14.90
90.63
161-441
*1963-42
29
Oct
63
'TAT-Agena
D
83.51
89.90
90-84
279-345
none
9
Nov
63
Tbor-Agena
D
failed to orbit
1963-48
27
Nov
63
Thor-Agena
D
17.3
69.99
90.2
175- 386
*1963-55
21
Dec
63
TAT-Agena
D
18.0
64.94
89.96
1
176 -a55
1964-08
15
Feb
64
J A?i'-Agena
D
23.0
74.95
90.86
179 - 444
none
24
Liar
64
L'aT-Agena
D
failed to orbit
1964-22
27
Apr
64
TAT-Agena
D
28.19
79.93
90.77
178- 446
1964-27
4
Jun
64
T1/2-Agena
D
13.94
79-96
90-27
149- 429
1964-32
19
Jun
64
TAT-Agena
D
26.81
85.0
90.95
176 - 462
1964-37
10
Jul
64
TAT-Agena
D
26.52
84.98
91.00
180- 461
1964-43
5
Aug
64
TAT-Agena
D
26.0
79-96
90-71
182- 436
1964-56
14
Sep
64
2A's-Agena
D
21.7
84.96
90.88
172- 466
1964-61
5
Oct
64
TAT-Agena
D
20.50
79.91
90.75
182- 44G
1964-67
17
Oct
64
TAT-Agena
D
17.27
74.99
90.59
189- 416
1964-71
2
iiov
64
T.;T-Agena
D
25.33
79.95
90.70
180-4:48
1964-75
18
Nov
64
TAT-Agena
U
17.45
70.02
89.71
180--339
1964-85
19
Dec
64
TAT-agena
D
26.06
74-97
90.46
181-4101
1964-87
21
Dec
64
TAT-Agena
D
21.64
70.08
89.5
238 264
Early in the next year a second generation of area survey
satellites was introduced, with the first launch on 28 Feb-
ruary, By placing three solid propellant boosters on the Thor
first stage the payload could be increased to 1,500 kg, which
would allow the satellite to carry more film and consum-
ables for longer stays in orbit. The first launch of the new
vehicle, known as the TAT-Agena D (standing for Thrust
Augmented Thor-Agena D) failed, as did the second; but the
third attempt, on 18 May, was a success. Following this
flight the use of the older generation was phased out, with
its last launch on 27 November. The other development of
1963 was the introduction of subsatellites for electronic
intelligence ("ferret") missions. These small craft, weighing
about 60 kg, are carried into orbit attached to their main
payloads, but once in orbit they are separated and placed in
their own higher orbits (they will be described in more detail
in a later section). Three launches in 1963 carried these sub-
satellites, but then they were assigned to the close look
vehicles for the next three years. In all., seventeen launches
were made during the year, of which thirteen reached orbit-
By now operations had become routine,, with both, 19,64
and 1965 showing a record of thirteen successes and one.-
failure, but 1966 saw the introduction of a third generation.
launch vehicle and spacecraft- The new spacecraft carried
infra-red scanners in addition to its cameras, which allowed
photographs to be taken on night passes, and they were
equipped with the new Space-Ground Link System } 161 k
which used a 1.5 rn unfurlable antenna and enabled pictures
to be transmitted to the ground at a much higher rate F 17'},,
To boost this satellite a new launch vehicle was, introduced,.
the LTTAT-Agena D (for Long Tank Thrust Augmented
Thor-Agena LF). The propellant tanks of the'll'ltor? were
lengthened, and instead of tapering tawards the nose a. con-
stant diameter was maintained, giving it a payload capability
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 Approved For Release 2004/08/19: CIA-RDP81 M0098QR0004000900a9 7
U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programmes/contd.
1~tc
I0U F~SttI-APO
(
(min) (km )
.52 180-420
90?.
9e6.07 177- 377
89.06 180- 265
91-05 17?3- 473
89-71 198-331
84.84 170- 362
91.Qx 182-- 464
9U TTAT-Agena D. With the new vehicle came the reintroduc-
tion of ferret subsatetlites to the area survey programme, a
function that was to continue until the end of the programme.
A total of nine launches were made during the year, and
eight the next, the last of which carried a new type of sub-
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 " Approlied 'R a 0 1 f9 C-?IA P MAO98OROO04OOO9Q39z~7,_.~
U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programmes/contd.
satellite into orbit on 12 December. The first launch of 1969,
on 5 February, also carried one, and they both went into
high circular orbits, but their possible applications will be
discussed later. In 1969 the launch total dropped to six,
and the next year to four. The year of 1971 was noteworthy
for two reasons - the programme had its first launch failure
for nearly five years (and its last), and the appearance of Big
Bird. The latter was an entirely new generation of reconnais-
sance satellite, combining the area survey and close-look
functions in a single craft, and within a year of its first launch
in June 1971 the area survey programme had ended. In
thirteen years 109 launches had been made, and of these 98
succeeded in placing their payloads in orbit, giving a launch
reliability of 90%.
Close-Look Satellites
The recovery of Discoverer 13's capsule in August 1960
was the signal for the USAF to press ahead with the develop-
ment of the operational close-look system. Within three
months proposals from industry had been requested, received
and evaluated, with the result that contracts were awarded
to General Electric for the recoverable capsule and to
Eastman Kodak for the camera system [ 18]. This vehicle
would use the Atlas-Agena B combination and weigh around
2,000 kg in orbit, twice the weight of the later Discoverers.
It was reported in February 1962 that the first two
satellites had been delivered to the USAF, one for checkout
of booster compatibility and ground handling, and one for
launch [ 19]. It was placed in orbit on 7 March (see Table 3),
but in the absence of official announcements it is hard to
judge the degree of success that this flight achieved. Its orbit,
from 251 km to 676 km, was higher than subsequent
missions: this could have been intentional, if the first mission
was designed to perform extensive checks of the satellite's
systems, with photographic resolution sacrificed in favour of
longer life, or it could simply have been a launch vehicle
guidance error. The main spacecraft stayed in orbit for
fifteen months, but it is not clear from the public record if
a capsule was ejected or not. The Agena B vehicles followed
the design of the Discoverers, with the retro-rocket attached
to the capsule, so that its firing, which occurred after
separation of the capsule from the main spacecraft, would
not alter the orbit of the main vehicle, which would remain
in space until it decayed due to atmospheric drag.
The next two launches were made on 26 April and 17
June, but very few details of their orbits have ever been
made public. The, orbital lifetimes were twc days and one
day respectively, which line up with those of later flights, so
whatever the reasons for the 7 March flight's high orbit, it
was not repeated. Three more launches were made in the
year (for which full orbital details are available), but then
there was a break of eight months until 12 July 1963, when
the first of the second generation close-look vehicles was
launched. These used the Agena D stage, and the main change
from the older type was in the means of retrofire. The engine
of the Agena D is restartable and was used to carry out retro-
fire [ 1 S ] . which gave a significant weight saving over the
earlier configuration. It also meant that when the engine was
fired to initiate re-entry, the main spacecraft was also
decelerated and so the orbital lifetime quoted is also that of
the recoverable capsule.
Four close-look satellites were placed in orbit in the six
month period to the end of 1963, and this launch rate was
maintained through 1964 (nine successes out of ten attempts)
and 1965 (eight successes out of nine attempts). All these
flights had similar characteristics - a perigee of about 150
km, an ajogee of about 300 km, an inclination between 90?
and 1 10 , and a lifetime of about three to five days. In
addition, some of these satellites ejected ferret subsatellites
(two in 1964 and three in 1965), a,function that had pre-
viously been performed by the area survey programme.
0
In 1966 a third generation of close-look satellites was
introduced, using the new Titan 3B- Agena l0 launcher-
They weighed about 3,000 kg in orbit, and the extra cap-
acity was used to carry more film and consurnables, and a
new multi-spectral camera built by the Itek Corporation
[ 16 ] . As will be described later, the new camera was design-
ed to photograph the same scene in several wavebands
simultaneously and by comparing the different images it was
hoped that objects hidden by camouflage could be indenti-
fied. The last Atlas-Agena D satellite was launched, on 4
June 1967, and with the retirement of the old type of space-
craft the job of carrying ferret subsatellites was transferred
back to the area survey programme.
The orbit used by the third generation satellites. is slightly
different from that of the older type, with a perigee close to
135 km and an apogee in the region of 400 kin. Atmospheric
drag at altitudes like 135 km is quite marked and the satel-
lites must use their Agena engines often to stay in orbit.
Despite this, their lifetimes have increased over the years, as
can be seen from Fig. 5 and as a consequence the number of
launches per year has dropped. In each of the yew 1967 to
1972 there were close-look satellites in orbit for approxi-
mately ninety days but the number of launches needed to
achieve this dropped from nine in 1967 to three in 1972-
Unlike the area survey programme the launching of close-
look satellites did not end when the Big Bird system became
operational in mid-I 972. Figure 6 shows the flight histories
of close-look and Big Bird satellites for 1971 through 1:976,.
and it can be seen that most of the launches came in pairs;
the first is a Big Bird, and near the end of its life or sooty
after it decays a close-look vehicle is launched. From this it
would appear that most of the close-look craft are used to
fill in the gaps in coverage of Big Birds. One notable excep-
tion to this came in 1974. On 5 June a Titan 3R-Agena 0
was launched, just about halfway through the life of z? Big
Bird that had been launched on 10 April. The launch. failed,
but another was made the next day, and this was a:success.
Obviously the Air Force was very keen to observe some-
thing that June; possibly it was the results of the explosion
of India's first nuclear device on 18 May [20). The Big Bird
decayed on 28 July, and it was followed in the normal way
by a close-look satellite on 14 August. In contrast to this the
two launch failures of 20 May 1972 and 26. June 1;973 were
not followed up by new attempts; it is probable that rather
than make new Titan 3B-Agena D launches it was decided
to wait for the next Big Birds.
Carte othrr application that involved the Titan 3 !Agena
D type of satellite was in connection with the US Now r's.
ocean surveillance programme. In testimony before the
Senate in 1973 it was revealed that the Navy had been
using surveillance data supplied by the USAF since i9v7l
[ 211. The specific satellites were not identified, hut it. was
implied that they were modified versions of the third-genera-
tion close-look vehicles. The orbits used by the satellites
launched during this period all conformed very closely- to
the norm, so just which ones were involved in this project
remains unresolved.
At the time of writing the close-look programme is still
in progress, By the end of 1976, 93 launches had been made,
of which 92% were successful, placing 86 satellites in nrhit_
The `Big Bird' Programme
During the late 1960's, while the third generation area
survey and close-look satellites were in regnla.r service-, a new,
fourth generation reconnaissance vehicle was under develop-
ment that would perform both their functions- iiker its
,predecessors, it is built by Lockheed and based on the Agena,
but in a considerably modified and enlarged foray- Meas-urin
15 in long and 3 m in diameter, and weighing 13,000 k,- in
orbit [ 171, it has been given the unofficial (but widely used)
name `Big Bird.'
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 Approved For Release 2004/08/19: CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400090039-7
Approved
U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programmes/contd.
Table 3. Close-Look Satellites,
i1Ai4E
LAUNCH DATE
(G&;'l')
LAUNCH VEHICLE
LIFE
(days)
INCL.
(deg)
FEI3I01}
(win)
PERI-APO
(km)
1962-9
7
Liar
62
Atlas-Agena B
457.1
90.89
93.9
251- 676
1962-7T
26
Apr
62
Atlas-Agena B
2
74.1?
9O:?
?
1962-y'
17
Jun
62
A tlas-Agena. B
1
?
?
?
1962-et
18
Jul
62
Atlas-Agena 3
9.
96.12
88.73
184-
236
1962-ea
5
Aug
62
Atlas-Agena B
1
96.30
83.62
205-
205
1962 ,8
11
Nov
62
Atlas-Agena B
1
96.00
88.65
206-
206
1963-28
12
Jul
63
A alas-Agena D
5.2
95.37
67.80
164-
164
1963-36
6
Sep
63
Atlas-Agena D
7.05
94.37
84.06
168-
263
1963-41
25
Oct
63
At1as-Hgena D
4.0
99.05
88.99
144-
332
1963-51
18
Dec
63
Atlas-Agena D
1.28
97.89
88.48
122 -
266
1964-09
25
Feb
64
Atlas-Agena D
4
95.66
88.24
173-
190
1964-12
11
Mar
64
Atlas-Agena D
4.3
95.73
d8.2
163-
203
1964-20
23
Apr
64
Atlas-Agena D
5.2
103.56
89.40
150-
336
1964-24
19
May
64
Atlas-Agena D
2.9
101.12
89.69
141 -
380
*l964-36
6
Jul
64
Atlas-Agena D
2.0
92.89
89.20
121-
346
1964-45
14
Aug
64
Atlas-Agena D
8.8
95.52
89_0
149-
307
1964-58
23
Sep
64
Atlas-Agena D
4.78
92.91.
89.00
145 -
303
none
8
Oct
64
Atlas-Agena D
failed to orbit
*l964-68
23
Oct
64
Atlas-Agena D
5.06
95.55
68..6
139-
271
1964-79
4
Dec
64
Atlas-Agena D
1.2
97.02
89.69
158-
357
1965-05
23
Jan
65
Atlas-Agena D
5.2
102.5
88.85
146-
291
1965-19
12
Mar
65
Atlas-Agena D
4.98
107.69
88.51
155-
247
*l965-31
28
Apr
65
Atlas-Agena D
5.14
95.60
88.95
180--
259
1965-41
27
May
65
Atlas-Agena D
5.11
95.78
68.67
149-
267
*1965-50.
25
Jun
65
Atlas-Agena D
4.9
107.64
88-78
151-
283
none
12
Jul
65
Atlas-Agena D
failed to orbit
*1965-62
3
Aug
65
Atlas-Agana D
4.11
107.47
69.06
149-
307
1965-76
30
Sep
65
Atlas-Agana D
4.70
95.60
88..77
158-
264
1965-90
8
Nov
65
Atlas-Agena D
2.92
93..88
89..74
145-
277
1966-02
19
Jan
66
Atlas-Agena D
3.88
93.89
88.51
154-
246
1966-12
15
Feb
66
Atlas-Agena D
7.44
96.54
89.00
148-
293
1966-22
18
Idar
66
Atlas-Agena D
4.92
101.01
88.87
152-
284
1966-32
19
Apr
66
Atlas-Agena D
6
116.95
89.94
145-
398
*l966-39
14
May
66
Atlas-Agena D
6
11.0.55
89.40
133-
358
1966-48
3
Jun
66
Atlas-Agena D
6.17
87.01
88.87
143 -
288
1966-62
12
Jul
66
Atlas-Agena D
7
95.52
88.25
137.
236
1966-69
29
Jul
66
Titan 3B-Agena 1)
7
94.12
88.58
158-
250
*l966-74
16
Aug
66
Atlas-Agena D
7.5
93.24
89.58
146 -
358
*l966-83
16
Sep
66
Atlas-Agena D
6
93.98
89,37
148-
333
19o6-86
28
Sep
66
Titan 3B-Agena D
9.06
93.98
89.01.
151-
296
1966-90
12
Oct
66
Atlas-Agena D
8.46
90.88
88.99
181-
258
1966-98
2
Nov
66
Atlas-Agena D
7.2
90.96
89.20
159 -
305
1966-109
5
Dec
66
Atlas-Agena D
8.2
104.63
89.77
137 -
388
1966-113
14
Dec.
66
Titan 3B-Agena D
9
109.56
89..58
138--368
1967-07
2
Feb
67
Atlas-Agena D
9
102.96
89..47
136 -
357
1967-16
24
Feb
67
Titan 3B-Agena D
10.15
106.98,
90.02
135 -
414
none
26
Apr
67
Titan 3B-Agena D
fai
led to orbit
1967-50
22
iiay
67
Atlas-Agena D
6.18
91.49
88.82
135 -
293
1967-55
4
Jun
67
Atlas-Agena D
8.17
104.88
90..57
149-
456
1967-64
20
Jun
67
Titan 3B-Agena D
10.22
111.40
89.01
127 -
325
1967-79
16
Aug
67
Titan 3B-Agena 1)
13
111.88
90.43
1.42-449
The first hint of the existence of Big Bird, or Program
467 as it is officially known, came in June 1969 with the
cancellation of the USAF's Manned Orbital Laboratory
(MOL) project. The main aim ,of this programme had been
to provide an orbital platform from which men could direct
reconnaissance activities in real-time. It was thought that a
man in, a space station could use his discriminatory powers
to great advantage when carrying out an area survey type of
role, and when he spotted something of interest he could
direct the high resolution camera on board to photograph
the scene in detail. In this way, more *comprehensive
coverage than the current unmanned satellites gave could be
achieved, and there would be an added advantage. Once a
region requiring detailed photography has been identified
from an area survey flight, there is a delay before a close-
look mission can be set up and launched, but if both the
area survey and close-look missions are performed by the
same vehicle (as in MOL), the high resolution photography
can be made very soon after a target has been chosen. Plans
called for crews to make month-long stays on MOL, returning
the exposed films to Earth in capsules when necessary. The
Russians have a direct analogue of this in their Salyut station,
but while it was pushed through to operational (if somewhat
Limited) use, MOL's growing cost and the financial pressure
of the Vietnam war caused its cancellation. Considering the
great importance placed on strategic reconnaissance, trte
USAF must only have been willing to abandon MOL if they
had had an unmanned replacement well under way. When,
the first Big Bird was launched two years later, it was
obvious that this was it.
Big Bird satellites are the largest military spacecraft
developed by the United States, and their size dictates the
use of the Titan. 3D launcher. They carry two imaging
systems, one a giant high. resolution camera developed by
Perkin-Elmer Corporation for close-look photography. and
the other a development of Eastman Kodak's area survey
camera with a new film scanner 1221. It has also been
suggested that they may carry side-looking radar [ 161,
which produces far better resolution than conventional
radar but uses the same frequencies and thus has the same
cloud penetrating capabilities. Six recoverable capsules are
carried, and at regular intervals they are loaded with exposed
film and returned to Earth [?31. while the radio trans-
missions are handled by a 6 m unfurlable antenna [241.
.The first launch was planned for the end of 1970, but
problems with the camera system delayed it until 1S June
1971 [161. It was placed in an orbit with a perigee of I?84
km and an apogee 300 km (see Table 4), which is ty xicat of
area survey type missions. Its orbital inclination (96 ) was
chosen so that it covered the same areas each day at the
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 Approved For-Reease `47OWTT 'M-RDMI'I f0D980RON4
U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programmes/contd.
iiAME
LAUNCH DATE
(GMT)
LAUNCH VEHICLE
LIFE
(days)
INCL.
(deg)
PERIOD
(min)
PEitE ApFI
(km)
1967-90
1967-103
19
25
Sep
Oct
67
67
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
10.23
9
106.10
89.75
122.401
1967-121
5
Dec
67
Titan 3B-Agena D
11.18
111.57
109.55
90.15
90.16
136 - 429
137- 430
1968-05
1968-18
18
13
Jan
M
68
68
Titan 313-Agena D
T
t
17.13
111.52
89.91
138-404
1968-31
17
ar
Apr
68
i
an 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
11
12
99.87
111.51
89.87
90.10
128 - 407
'134 - 427
1968-47
1968-64
5
6
Jun
Aug
68
68
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
12.2
9
110.52
90.31
123 - 456
1968-74
10
Sep
68
Titan 3B-Agena D
15
110.00
106.06
89..85
89.82
142 - 395
125 - 404
1968-99
1968-108
6
4
Nov
Dec
68
68
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 33-Agena D
14
8
IOt.O
89.73
130 - 390
1969-07
22
Jan
69
Titan 3B-Agena D
12
106.24
106.15
93,30
97.04
136 - 736
142-1-09E1
1969-19
1969-39
4
15
Mar
Apr
69
69
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
14
15
92..00
108
76
90.50
89
96
134 -4Fr1
1969-50
1969-74
3
22
Jun
69
6
Titan 3B-Agena D
11.2
.
110.00
.
90.04
135.-41.0
1.37--414
1969-95
24
Aug
Oct
9
69
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
16
15
108.00
108
04
89.51
133- 366
1970-02
14
Jan
70
Titan 3E-Agena D
18
.
109.96
93.39
89.69
136 - 740
134 -3
83
1970-31
1970-48
15
25
Apr
Jun
70
70
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
21
11
110.97
108
87
89.70
.
130- 388
1970-61
18
Aug
70
Titan 3B-Agena D
16
.
110.95
89.70
89.67
125- 389
153
-x,365
1970-90
.23
Oct
70
Titan 3B-Agena D
19
111.06
89.83
.
135--396
1971-05
1971-33
21
22
Jan
Apr
71
71
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agana D
19
21
110.86
90.09
139-416.
1971-70
12
Aug
71
Titan 3B-Agena D
22
110.93
111.00
89.85
90.13
132- 401
137-424
1971-92
23
Oct
71
Titan 3B-Agena D
25
110.94
90.02
134.-4.1
6
none
1972-16
16
17
Feb
Mar
72
72
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
25
fai
110
96 1
.
led to orbit
89
91
1
none
20
May
72
Titan 3B-Agena D
.
fai
.
1
led to o
31-409
rbit
1972-68
1
Sep
72
Titan 3B-Agena D
29
110.50
89.71
140-380
1972-1.03
1973-28
21
16
Dec
May
72
73
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
33
28
110.45
89.68
139 - 378
none
26
Jun
73
Titan 3B-Agena D
110.49 89,39
failed to o
136 _ 352
rbit
1973-68
1974-07
27
13
Sep
Feb
73
74
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
32
32
110.48 1
11
89.67 1
131 - 385
none
5
Jun
74
Titan 33-Agena D
0.44 89.78 E
failed to o
134-393
rbit
1974-42
6
Jun
74
Titan 3B-Agena D
47
110.49
89.81
136- 394
1974-65
1975-32
14
18
Aug
Apr
74
75
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
46
48
110.51
1
89.89
135 - 402
1975-98
9
Oct
75
Titan 3b-Agena D
52
10.54
96.41
89.26
89.34
134-401
125 - 356
1976-27
1976-94
22 Mar
15 Sep
76
76
Titan 3B-Agena D
Titan 3B-Agena D
57
51
96.40
6
89.25
125 - 347"
9
.39
89,18
135 - 330
Table 3. Close-Look Satellites/contd.
Notes: I. This table lists all satellites with the characteristics of close-look missions, to 31 December 1976.
2. Those launches marked with an asterisk carried ferret subsatellites which were ejected into separate orbits_
3. All launches were made from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
same local time, its precession was synchronised with
the apparent yearly motion of the Sun. This meant that
lighting conditions at the target areas would be the same
each time the satellite passed overhead, which would make
picking out changes to the scene much easier.
On the second flight the perigee was lowered by nearly
30 km to a height more typical of a close-look mission (the
lower the altitude, the better the resolution), but the apogee
was raised by a similar amount, so the period remained the
same. Full operational status was attained with the third
launch on 7 July 1972, and from this point onwards (with
one exception, to be noted later) the flights all had perigees
near 160 km and apogees near 265 kni, but still retaining
the Sun-synchronous inclination. Their orbital lifetimes
quickly grew from two to four and then five months, with
a steady average of two flights a year.
Big Bird launches have carried many subsatellites into
orbit, starting with the second flight. Initially these were for
ferret missions, following the end of the area survey pro-
gramme in 1972, but two payloads for the Space Test
Program have been orbited recently, along with several un-
identified craft. In the future it is planned that UHF
communications subsatellites will be carried to provide
direct links from ground stations to SAC aircraft operating
in polar regions [23).
For some years there have been reports of a fifth genera-
tion reconnaissance satellite to be built by TRW and known
as Program 1010, which was to enter service: iai. 1976 or.
1977 [25). It will be a further advancement in. the state o?'
the reconnaissance art by providing images in real-time. To
accomplish this it is to carry television cameras, whose
technology has advanced a long way since their rejection
from WS-117L in 1957, and use data relay satellites. These
are to be placed in synchronous orbit, and the reconnaissance
vehicle's transmissions, instead of being sent to ground
stations around the world, will go aria the data relay satellites
direct to the National Photographic interpretation Center in
Washington, D.C. [ 161. A Big Bird was launched on 19
December 1976 into an unusually high orbit, from 247 km
to 533 km. Four days later this was raised to 341 kin to
535 km, more than double the altitude of the normal Big
Bird orbit, and then three months later the satellite was
again manoeuvred, resulting in a 264 km to 530 km orbit-
This new type of orbit may indicate that it was the first test
of a Program 1010 vehicle,
The Early Warning Satellites
In the late 1950's American projections of Soviet ICBM
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 Approved For Release. 2004/08/19: CIA-RDP81 M0,0980R000400090039.7.
OkRITAL
LIFE
ifl~,ys)
A First generation (Atlas-Agena B)
? second generation (Atlas-Agena D)
? Third generation (Titan 3B-Agene D)
ij62 t963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 IP69 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 k.476
deployments indicated that by the early 1960's the USSR
would have a substantial advantage over the USA, the so-
called "Missile Gap." To counter this a crash programme of
ICBM development was started, but it appeared that it
would be some years before the balance could be tipped in
favour of the United States. In the meantime, the main
defence would be provided by manned bombers, which
were far superior to their Russian counterparts. This policy
had one drawback - it took some time to get the bomber
force scrambled and in the air, and while they were still on
the ground they were very vulnerable to attack. To make
them into a credible defence force, a system had to be
provided which would warn of a missile attack in enough
time to get the bombers airborne. The Ballistic Missile
Early Warning System (BMEWS), composed of three radar
stations pointings towards the Soviet Union, was an attempt
to provide this, but because they were line-of-sight radars
they could only detect missiles after they rose above the
horizon, several minutes after launch. In all, they were
expected to give 15 minutes' warning, enough to get a fair
proportion of aircraft in the air, but not long enough to
get them all. The advent of Earth satellites brought a new
possibility - if the ICBM launches could be detected from
space in the first few seconds of flight, as much as 25 or
a11 11 11 +^+ 0 O ^+
30 minutes' warning could be given, enough to get all of
SAC's aircraft in the air. The Midas (for Missile Defence
Alarm System) segment of WS-I ilL was set up to do just
this.
The principle behind Midas was simple; when a rocket
engine fires it produces an exhaust plume of very hot gases.
Infra-red sensors on board satellites could detect these against
the background of the Earth, and so signal a launch in its..
early stages. A series of satellites in polar orbits with
precisely controlled spacing could, it was hoped, provide a
reliable warning system.. Unfortunately, although the princi-
ple was straightforward, in practice there were many diffi-
culties, and it was to be several years before the system:
could be considered operational (26).
The infra-red sensor for Midas, built by IT & T, had to. be
cooled to a low temperature in orbit, and designing such a.
system to work unattended in space p'-rsed malty (r.roylenis..
Its weight, plus the weight of the complex orbit-spacing
control system, pushed the total for the early models past
the 2,000 kg mark, too much for the Atlas: Agena A. to
place in the planned orbit. As they were to test the concepts
and hardware rather than be part of the operational network,
it was decided to aim for low near-equatorial orbits, which
were within the launcher's capabilities.
Cl ? o ? ? cJ L 1 J CI [ EJ EJc-
E_ 1911 -----+ - -- 1972
----4
Launch failures are denoted by +
Fie. 6. Orbital histories of the `close-look' bnd `Big Bird' satellites, 1971-76.
SPACEFLIGHT
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 Table 4. Big Bird Satellites.
NAi?IE
LAllijCH JAT,
(G'^T)
LAUNUtl Vi'HICLE
LIFE
(days)
INCL.
(deg)
PEttlVu
(main)
PEaIG3 -APOG11
(kilometres)
1971-56
*1972-02
15 Jun 71
20 Jan 72
Titan 3D
Titan 3D
52
0
96.41
89.38
184- 300
*1972-52
7 Jul 72
'Titan 3D
4
68
97.00
96.88
119.41
138
77
157- 331
*1972-79
1973-14
10 Got 72
0 liar 73
Titan 3D
i
90
96.47
.
88.93
174- 251
160- 2131
1973-46
13 Jul 73
i tan 3D
titan 3D
71
91
95.70
96.21
86.7.6
813
77
152- 270
*1973-88
*1974-20
10 r. ov 73
10 :,pr 74
Titan 3D
Ti
123
96.93
.
66.85
156- 269
159- 275
*1974-85
29 Oct 74
tan 3D
Titan 3D
109
141
94.52
98
69
88.91.
ttr6
8u
153- 285
*1975-51
1975-114
8 Jun 75
4 Dec 75
Titan 31)
15u
.
96..38
.
88.77
167 - 271
154- 269
1976-65
8 Jul 76
Titan 3D
Titan 3D
119
158
96.27
97.00
66.44
88
54
157- 234
1
1976-125
19 Dec 76
Titan all
96.95
.
32.37
59- 242
247- 533
Notes: I. This table lists all satellites with the characteristics of Big Bird missions, to 31 December 1976.
2. Those launches marked with an asterisk carried ferret subsatellites which were ejected into separate orbits.
3. All launches were made from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
Midas I was launched on 25 February 1960 (see Table 5), Midas up to that time, half had been wasted [32] .
but the vehicle exploded during second stage separation [ 27] . The first sins of success in the early warning programme
Three months later Midas 2 successfully entered a good orbit, came in President Johnson's report to Congr?esson aerospace
with a perigee of 484 km and an apogee of 511 km, giving it activities in the year 1963. He stated that "two flights were
a period of 94.4 minutes. All seemed to be going well until
r
1
false alarms. Meanwhile, the area survey satellites had shown a to evrsr'on system? [26]. The initial con-
tracts were to develop and test sensor techniques, using space-
that the "Missile Gap" did not exist, so the urgency of craft launched by Atlas-Agena D vehicles. If this was a success
Midas was reduced [261. These two factors led to the pro- the go-ahead would be given for the operational programme.
gramme being cut back in mid-1962 to a research and The first synchronous orbit early warning satellite was
development effort, renamed Program 461. launched from Cape Canaveral on 6 August 1968. Its orbit
The Air Force had been investigating the radiation signa- was inclined to the equator at an angle of 10?, so that it
tures of rocket exhausts during launches from Cape Canaveral traced out a figure-eight pattern over the Earth. The aim of
since March 1960 using two U-2 aircraft [31 ] , and this effort this was to improve coverage of the Soviet Union, whose
was stepped up in a search for sensors suitable for the early main landmass lies well away from the equator. The orbit
warning role. From these studies two programmes emerged; was not quite circular, with its apogee in the northern
the first one was to use simplified spacecraft in random hemisphere, so the satellite dwelled over this region. It was
orbits, and was hoped to provide an interim capability. This stationed over western Russia, and eight months later it was
was to be followed by a series of sophisticated spacecraft joined by a second satellite. By arranging their orbits so that
observing the Earth from synchronous orbit, built on the one was at its perigee when the other was at its apogee, there
technology developed in the earlier programme. An idea of would always be one satellite over the northern hemisphere,
how badly astray the Midas programme had gone can be in the best position to observe the Soviet Union. A third
gained from testimony before Congress by Dr. Harold Brown, spacecraft was launched on 19 June 1970, but a booster
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, released on failure left it stranded in its transfer orbit, so a back-up was
16 June 1 963. He said that of the $423 million spent on launched in. the following. September and was stationed
254 Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R0004000$0039-7
SPACEFLIGHT
g e weep rocket plumes and the reflec a to T RW
tion of the Sun off the tops of clouds, and si nalled many (system contractor), Aercrjet-General (for the infra-red sensors)
g and RCA (fa
th
poned until they had been cured. When Discoverer flights orbits with periods of about 165 mhic nutes, siimilardto Midas
were resumed later in the year two missions were dedicated craft. No more launches were made for three years, and then
to tests of sensors for the Midas programme. In the mean- two came in a space of seven weeks. It seems probable that
time, a change from batteries to solar panels [29] and a they were to test a new technique that was then under
general weight reduction effort had cut the Midas payload development involving televiysiort cameras on board the satel-
to 1,600 kg. This, coupled with the use of the new Agena B lites working in conjunction with the infra-red detectors. The
stage, meant that flights in the operational type of orbit idea was that when the infra-red detector signalled an alarm,
could now be attempted. Since these were to be near-polar, the television camera,. fitted with a telephoto lens, would
the launches were moved to Vandenberg Air Force Base, as focus on the region of interest, and its picture would be
range safety considerations precluded them from Cape transmitted to Earth, where a person watching the scene
Canaveral. could decide if this was a missile in flight or not [26).
On 12 July 1961 Midas 3 achieved an orbit close to the Very little information about the success or otherwise of
planned one, almost circular (from 3,358 km to 3,534 km) the interim programme has been made public, but the fact
with a period of 162 minutes. Midas 4 followed on 21 that development of the synchronous orbit system went
October, but although it was reported to have detected a aheai suggests that it achievea its goal. Early in 1966 requests
Titan launch 90 seconds after liftoff on 26 October [301, it for proposals were issued to industry under the code name of
was soon clear that the performance of the sensors was not Program 266. At the end of the year, by which time it had
living up to expectations. The main problem was that they been renamed Program 949, contracts were aw d d
could not distin uish b t
made of both liquid-fuelled and solid-fuelled ICBM launches"
time the Discoverer programme had been experiencing many [331, and he was obviously referring to the satellites launched
failures in its Agena stage, so the next Midas launch was ost- 9 M
the transmitter failed on the sixteenth orbit [281 B this conducted on which a number of in-space detections were
 Approved For Release 2004/08/19 CIA,-RDP8?
U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programmes/contd.
Table 5. Early Warning Satellites.
NAir;;;
LaU0iCH De-T6
(GIdi'T)
LAUNCH VEHIOLS
INCLINATION
(degrees)
P,.RI0kP
(min)=
p' IGr;E-AP05:biE
(kilou+etree)
i,,idas 1
26
Feb
60
Atlas-Agena
A
A
failed to orbit
-511
404
'
.
0 94 4
33
iiidas 2
uidas 3
24
12
i..ay
Jul
60
61
Atlas-Agena
Atlas-Agents
D
.
91.2
1al.
5~
'
35$
3
1534
,?,idas 4
21
Oct
of
Atlas-Agena
B
95.89
06
60
1ntx.U
0
153
3496-
2014 -
3756:
3382
1962-K
ne
9
17
pr
Dee
62
62
atlas-Agena
Atlas-Agena
B
B
.
.
failed to, orbit
no
19o3-14
9
iay
63
Atlas-Agena
B
87.42
1 1o 5
[ 3604 -
3680
none
12
Jun
63
Atlas-Agena
B
B
failed to orbit
41 160.0 3670-
38
3727
196J-30
1966-77
19
19
Jul
Aug
63
66
Atlas-Agena
Atlas-Agena
D
.
90.07
167.6
'
3680 -
3700
1966-89
5
Oct
66
Atlas-Agena
D
D
90.20
9
9
s
1v
7. E
1436
3682-
680 -
31
3702
060
39+
1968-63
1969-36
6
13
Aug
Apr
b$
69
Atlas-Agena
Atlas-Agena
D
.
9.9
1445
,
32,070-
,
39,270
1970-46
19
Jun
70
Atlas-Agena
D
28.21
176 -
580.9
33,68:5
1970-69
1
Sep
70
Atlas-Agena
D
10.3
7
8
. ,
14419 31 947-
39,$55
1970-93
1971-39
6
5
Nov
Iea,y
70
71
Titan 30
Titan 3C
.
0.87
1434-0 35,651-
35,d4Q
none
4
1
Dec
Oar
71
72
Atlas-Agena
Titan 3G
il
failed to orbit
0.2 1429~.9~ 35,416-
35,9262
1972-10
1972-101
20
Dec
72
Atlas-Agena
D
9.7
144?}.4 31, 412 -
40,72tt
1973-13
6
liar
73
Atlas-Agena
D
0.2
1435.1 35,679-
35,055
19(3-40
12
Jun
73
Titan 3C
0.3
1435-935,777 -
35 ,756
1975-55
18
Jun
75
Titan 3G
9.0
1422
30,200-
671
40,800
705
35
1975-118
14
Dec
75
Titan 30
3.0
1436
35
,
,
1976-59
26
Jun 76
Titan 3C
0.5
1433.3 35,620 -
35,06?1
1. This table lists all satellites with the characteristics of early warning missions, to 31 December 1976-
2. All launches into near-equatorial orbits were made from Cape Canaveral, and all launches into near-polar
orbits were made from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
over Singapore [ 34] . This appears to be the satellite that was
involved in the "laser blinding" controversy in 1975 [35] .
The contractors for the operational system, known as
Program 647, were the same as for the Atlas-Agena system,
but the spacecraft itself was much bigger and required the
Titan 3C to place it in orbit. The programme was divided
into two phases; four Phase 1 spacecraft were to be built,
three for flight and one for qualification and tests [36], and
if they were successful the more advanced Phase 2 would
follow. In addition to the missile early warning role, Program
647 vehicles carried sensors to detect nuclear explosions,
and were to replace the Vela nuclear test detection satellites.
Because of their dual function they are often referred to as
in',grated at, Mites.
The first Phase 1 spacecraft was launched on 6 November
1970, but a failure in the launch vehicle guidance system
stopped it being placed in the planned orbit. It was possible,
however, to adjust the orbit so that a limited amount of
sensor testing could be performed, but as a consequence
TRW was contracted to modify the non-flight spacecraft so
it could be launched as a replacement should either of the
next two flights fail. In fact, it was pever needed; the other
satellites were launched on 5 May 1971 and 1 March 1972,
and performed so well that they were declared operational
in 1972, and turned over to the Aerospace Defense Com-
mand, for whom the system was being developed. One was
positioned over the Indian Ocean to monitor Soviet and
Chinese missile tests and warn of attack by land-based
missiles, and the other was positioned over Panama to warn
of attack by submarine-launched missiles [ 361, and their
circular non-inclined orbits meant that only one satellite
was needed at each station. Ten years after the original
target date, and in a form very different from what had then
been envisaged, the United States now had an operational
early warning satellite system.
In December 1971, a year after Program 949 appeared to
have ended, an Atlas-Agena D was launched from Cape
Canaveral. It had all the signs of ~an early warning mission,
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but since it veered off course and was destroyed: by the
Range Safety Officer [S7j, we cannot be certain. A year
later, nearly ten months after the last. Program 647 Phase, I
launch, another Atlas-Agena D left the pad, and placed its
payload in synchronous orbit, as did a similar flight three
months later. There were reports at the time that the infra-
red sensors aboard Program 647 satellites were losing their
sensitivity for unknown reasons, which suggests that the
Atlas-Agena D flights may have been to test improvements
to the system [36]-
Deliveries to the USAF of Phase 2 spacecraft started in
February 1973? and the first launch was made on 12 June.
The satellite was positioned over the Indian Ocean, to
supplement the one already there, and since then there have
only been launches? to replace satellites wnitch slxr + c1 de~
graded performance or failed. Thirteen Program 647 space-
craft have been procured [381, and five remain in storage to
be launched as required.
Within the past few years, probably as a reflection of
the programme's operational status, the veil of secxe y that
covered it has been partially lifted. It has been referred to
explicitly in budget. requests (as the Defense Support
Program), and details of the design of the spacecraft have
been released. The central section of the satellite, where
most of its equipment and instruments are housed, is a
short cylinder, aligned in orbit with its axis. poitrting, to-
wards the Earth. The cylinder is 2.78 rn in diameter and
2.91 m long, and it is covered with solar cells. The output
from these is augmented by four solar panels mounted on
the end facing away from the Earth. At the other end?
looking down to the Earth, is the device which. actually
detects the missile launchings, an infra-red Schmidt telescope,
3.63 in long with an aperture of 0.91 in. The satellite's
orientation in orbit is maintained by spinning about the
cylinder's axis at 5 to 7 rpm; the telescopes axis is offset
from this by about 7Cz?, producing a conical scanning
pattern as the vehicle rotates. The infra-red sensor consists
of an array 2,00(1 lead sulphide cells at the telescope's focal
 Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400090039.-7
U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programmes/contd.
Table 6. Ferret Satellites.
F NAlY11 LAUNCH DATE
(G'I)
LAUNCH VEHICLE
INCLIN-TION
(degrees)
Pr Q3i
(grin)
Pi'HIGEE-APOGEE
(kilometres)
1962-o,
1962-w
15 May 62
18 Jun 62
Thor-Agena B
Thor-Agena B
82.33
82
14
94.02
305- 634
1962-e,
1 Sep 62
Thor-Agena B
.
82.82
92.4
94.42
370- 411
300- 669
1963-03
1963-27
16 Jan 63
29 Jun 63
Thar-Agena D
TAT-Agena B
81.89.
82
3
94.6t
5
459- 533
1964-11
28 Feb 64
TAT-Agena D
.
82.03
94.
4
94.74
484- 536
479- 520
1964-35
1964-72
3 Jul 64
4 Nov 64
TAT-Agena D
TAT-Agena D
82.09
82
00
94.94
501.529
1965-55
17 Jul 65
TAT-Agena D
.
70.18
95-05
94.46.
512- 526
471- 512
1966-09
1906-118
9 Feb 66
29 Dec 66
TAT-Agena D
PAT-Agena D
82.09
75
03
94.63
508 -512
1967-71
1968-04
25 Jul 67
1
J
TAT-Agena D
.
75.03:
94_41
94.30
486- 496
458- 513
1968-86
an 68
7
5 Oct 68
TAT-Agena D
LTTAT-Agena D
75.16
74
97
94.53
4
450.546
1969-65
31 Jul 69
LTTAT-Agena D
.
75.02
9
55
94.67
483- 511
462- 541
1970-66
1971-60
26 Aug 70
16 Jul 71
LTTAT-Agena D
LTTAT-Agena D
74.99
75
00
94.51
484- 504
.
94.59,
488--508
Notes: 1. This table lists all satellites with the characteristics of ferret missions.
2. All launches were made from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
plane, and from synchronous orbit each cell views a region
on the Earth less than 3 km across. The complete spacecraft
weighs about 1,100 kg in orbit [38].
The Electronic Reconnaissance (Ferret) Satellites
If the area survey and close-look satellites are the "eyes"
of reconnaissance, then the ferret satellites are the "ears."
More correctly known as electronic reconnaissance vehicles,
their mission is to pick up and record radio and radar trans-
missions while they are over foreign territory, for later re-
play back to ground stations at home for analysis. In this
way it is possible to locate the enemy's aircraft and missile
defence radars, and deduce a good deal about their character-
istics and performance, to eavesdrop on military and govern-
mental communications, including submarine-to-shore links,
and it has even been suggested that telephone conversations
can be monitored [ 39]. This knowledge gives a great insight
into the offensive and defensive threats posed by the
opposition, and to his strategy and future plans.
:Ie United Staten started its electronic reconnaissance
satellite programme at the beginning of the 1960's, but it
has always been regarded by the Department of Defense as
a very sensitive subject, and little information has been re-
leased about it. Although no ferret satellites have ever been
officially identified as such, it is possible to pick them out
by the type of orbit they use. For electronic reconnaissance,
long life in a stable orbit is more important than the resolu-
tion attainable, so that the useful life of the satellite is
determined by the reliability of its instruments rather than
when it decays. Since the Spring of .1962 there has been a
Iong series of spacecraft which have been placed in just this
type of orbit, circular at an altitude of about 500 km, with
a period of 94 to 95 minutes, from which they take four or
five years to decay. There seem to be little doubt that these
are ferret satellites.
Two types of vehicle have been used for ferret missions;
the first is a large spacecraft, requiring its own booster, and
the second is a small subsatellite, launched "piggy-back"
with another, larger satellite. For this second type, once the
pair of craft have been placed in orbit, the ferret,is ejected
and fired into its own higher orbit. The first ferret launched
by Thor-Agena B on 15 May 1962 (see Table 6), was one of
the large type, and it was followed a month later by another.
From then onwards launches have occurred at increasing
intervals, with a change to TAT-Agena U launcher in mid-
1963 (presumably to accommodate a second generation
spacecraft), and then to LTTAT-Agena D in the autumn of
1968 (presumably fora third generation). In the meantime,
small ferret subsateifites were being regularly orbited with
area survey and close-look launches, starting on 29 August
1963, see Table 7. It has been suggested that the two types
of craft perform complementary roles, with the small ones
carrying out search-and-find missions using low sensitivity
equipment, and the large ones carrying out detailed exam-
inations of selected targets using high sensitivity equipment
[40] . If this is so, then it appears that when subsatellite
launches were transferred to the Big Birds in January 1972,
a new variant was introduced which combined the two
functions in the same way that the Big Birds themselves.
combined the area survey and close-look functions for
photographic reconnaissance. This would explain why the
large type ferret launch of 16 July 1971 was the last of its
kind, and from then on the job of electronic reconnaissance
has ben left t:r the subsstell.ites,
In December 1969 a subsatellite was ejected from an area
survey flight into a new class of orbit, circular like the ferrets,
but much higher, at 1,400 km altitude. Two months later
this was repeated, but then the subsatellite launches reverted
to their normal 500 kris orbits- Philip Klass suggested in 1971
that these two flights might have been specifically designed
to probe Soviet. ABM radars, basing his reasoning on the
fact that the Galosh system around Moscow reached, opera-
tional status in the summer of 1969 [40] _ Since he made
this suggestion there: have been three more flights at 1,400
km, and they can alt be related to important periods in
Soviet ABM developments, adding weight to his argument.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ABM Treaty came into
force on 3 October 1972, and a week later a high orbit sub-
satellite was launched- Six months after this another was
orbited, and it is reasonable to conclude that they were
intended to police the agreement and check on possible
violations. The most recent launch of this type came on 8
June 1975, at just the time when there was a great deal of
activity at Sary Shagarr, Russia's ABM test centre. Two new
radar systems were undergoing tests then (411, and it is
likely that the latest: flight was planned to monitor them.
The current status of the electronic reconnaissance pro-
gramme is not at. all clear. It was reported in March 14)78
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 Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP81 MQ0980R00040009009-7
that Hughes Aircraft was working on a new generation of
heavy ferret vehicle under Program 711, to be launched by
Titan 3 into a highly elliptical orbit. It was stated that the
first launch was planned for late 1970 or early 1971, but no
such flights have taken place, and the old type spacecraft
orbited on 16 July 1971 was the last of the heavy ferrets.
As has been suggested above, it is possible that their mission
was carried out by the subsatellites launched with the Big
Birds -- indeed, it may be that plans for Program 711 were
changed, and this is it - but there have been none of these
since October 1974. It is hard to imagine that the electronic
reconnaissance programme, which appears to have been
successful in the past, should be suspended, but it will be
some time before the new generation of ferrets, built under
Program 980, come into service [421, so this does seem to
be the case.
The US Navy's Ocean Surveillance Programme
In 1968 the US Navy initiated studies to explore the
possibility of using surveillance radars in unmanned satellites
to monitor the movements of ships at sea [43]. They stem-
med from concern over the dramatic build-up in Soviet
naval power since Admiral Gorshkov became its Commander
in Chief in 1956, during which oceans and seas where the
USN had once held undisputed power had become more and
more the domain of ships from the Soviet Navy. The years
1967 and 1968 had been particularly impressive ones for the
Russians; the following types of new vessel came into service
in this period alone: Moskva class helicopter carriers, Kresta
class guided missile cruisers, Charlie class submarines carry-
ing the new SS-N-7 cruise missiles, Yankee class: submarines
carrying the new SS-N-6 ballistic missiles, and Victor class
attack submarines [441. In the past the USN had kept watch
on the Soviet fleet with aircraft, but the increasing numbers
of Soviet ships, and their vastly improved anti-aircraft
armaments, led it to consider other surveillance methods,
and satellites seemed an obvious choice.
The studies were to investigate the design and use of
radars, both side-looking and forward-looking, and their aim
was to develop a system which could measure the speed and
direction of travel of ships. During the next five years
several more contracts were issued to industrial teams for
studies under Program 749, concentrating on the design of
the satellite's sensors [451, but in 1973 it was announced
that the Navy's programme of spaceborne ocean surveillance
had been combined with a programme of very bpigli altitude
aircraft surveillance to form a "new and comprehensive
aerospace surveillance programme" [461- Its retrospect, it
would appear that the Navy's initial plans had not been
fulfilled, for five years of study is a long time, especially
when it is followed by a re-orientation, and it was to be
another three years before the first spacecraft was actually
launched. U-2 aircraft, in a modified version known as EM,
had been flying ocean surveillance sensom since February
1973, and it was confirmed that they were to be the aircraft
segment of the new programme, which was given the code
name Whitecloud [ 47, 481. Later in the year it was also re=
vealed that the Navy had been using imagery from USAF
reconnaissance satellites since 1971, as a further aid to its
studies [21 ].
NAI;LE
LAUNCH DATE
(Gl'dT)
LAWTCH VEHICLE
INCLINATION
(degrees)
PAD IOD
(min)
PEHIGEI:-A1'OGEb
(kilometres)
1963-35
29
Au7
63
Thor-Agena
D
81.89
92.07
310-
431
1963-42
29
Oct
63
TAT-Agena D
89.99
93.35
285 -
585
1963-55
21
Dec
63
TAT-Agena D
64.52
91.68
321-
388
1964-36
6
Jul
64
atlas-Agena
D
92.97
91.2
297-
377
1964-68
23
Oct
64
Atlas-At,ena
D
95.50
91.14
323-
336
1965-31
28
Anr
65
Atlas-Agena
D
95.26
95.16
490-
559
1965-50
25
Jun
65
Atlas-Agena
D
107.65
94.68
496-
510
1965-62
3
Aug
65
Atlas-Agena
D
107-36
94.78
501-
515
1966-39
14
1+1ay
66
Atlas-Agena
0
109.94
95.39
517--
559
1966-74
16
Aug
66
Atlas-Agena
D
93.17
94.99
510--
524
1966-83
16
Sep
66
Atlas-Agena
D
94.06
94.25
460-
501
1967-43
9
Fay
67
LTTAT-A ena
D
85.10
98.38
555-
809
1967-62
16
Jun
67
L'r'TAT-Agena
D
80.20
94.81
501-
517`
1967-109
2
Nov
67
LTTAT-Agena
D
81.68
94.41
455-
524
1968-08
24
Jan
68
LTTAT-Agena
D
81.65
94.75
473-
542
1968-20
14
War
68
LTTAT-Agena
D
83.09
94.66
481 -
523"
1968-52
20
Jun
68
L'TTA1'-Agena
D
85.18
94.15
437-
519
1968-78
18
Sep
68
LTTAT-Agena
D
83.22
94.75
500-
514
1968-112
12
Dec
68
LTTAT-Agena
D
80.33
114.45
1.391-
1468
1969-10
5
Feb
69
L'PTA'T-Agena
D
80.41
114.22
1396-
1441
1969-26
19
Mar
69
LTTAT-Agena
U
83.08
94.82
504-
513
1969-41
2
May
69
LTTAT-Agena
D
65.71
93.37
401-
473
1969-79
22
Sep
69
LTTAT-Agena
D
85.16
94.51
490-
496
1970-lb
4
Mar
70
LTTAT-Agena
D
88.14
94.16
442-
514
1970-40
20
May
70
L'1"sail'-Agena
D
83.12
94.59
491-
503
1970-98
18
Nov
70
LTTAT-Agena
D
83.18
94.63
487 -
511
1971-76
10
Sep
71
LTTAT-Agena
D
75.07
94.60
492-
507
1972-02
20
Jan
72
Titan 3D
96.59
94.86
472-
549
1972-52
7
Jul
72
Titan 3D
96.15
94.66
497-
504
1972-79
10
Oct
72
Titan 3D
95.62
114.79
1423-
1469
1973-88
10
idov
73
Titan 3D
96.33
96.93
94.59
1.14.64
486 -
1.419 -
508
1458
1974-20
10
Apr
74
Titan 3D
94.00
95.01
503-
531
1974-85
29
Oct
74
Titan 3D
96.06
95.22
520-
535
1975-51
8
Jun
75
Titan 3D
95.09
113.68
13~A9-
1401
1. This table lists all subsatellites with the characteristics of ferret missions.
2. These subsatellites result from the launches listed in Tables 2, 3 and 4 which are marked with an asterisk-
3. All launches were made from Vandenberg Air Force Base.
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 The years of research finally reached fruition on 30 April
1976 with the launch of the first ocean surveillance satellite.
It was placed in' 1,092 km to 1,128 km orbit, inclined at
63?, by an Atlas rocket. The Naval Research Laboratory.
had designed and built the spacecraft, with the assistance of
Fairchild Industries [49], and with the range of sensors it is
reported to have it appears to be a very sophisticated -
vehicle. It is believed to carry millimetre-wave radar, with
the capability of tracking surface ships in all weather condi-
tions, radio-frequency antennae for listening in on ship-
board radar and communications, and passive infra-red
detectors [50], possibly to plot the courses of submerged
nuclear submarines, which leave behind them a wake of
water that has been used to cool their reactors and is warmer
than the surrounding sea, or to track low-flying missiles.
Once in orbit it released three small subsatellites into similar
orbits to its own (see Table 8), and each of these is reported
to carry its own sensors. Their data is transmitted to the
parent satellite, where it undergoes preliminary processing
before being re-transmitted to Earth [ 51 ] .
Table 8. Ocean Surveillance Satellites
Inclination
(degrees)
Period
(min)
Perigee-Apogee
(kilometres)
Subsatellite 1
63.44
107.49
1093-1129
Subsatellite 2
63.43
107.50
1093-1130
Subsatellite 3
63.45
107.49
1083-1139
Now many details
,
includin
a
v
g
hi
c
e
a
bl
e reso
l
ut
i
on, focal
Votes: 1. This table lists the orbital parameters of the ocean length and altitude, have been published for some civilian
surveillance satellite and of the three subsatellites it satellite camera systems. If we can find details for a system
released in orbit. of comparable technology to a
2. All four elements were orbited as a single vehicle on and we know the reccxnnaissartce given
satellite's refocal length 30 April 1976 by Atlas booster from Vandenberg Air fecal gth and
Force Base. altitude, it is a simple matter to estimate its achievable
resolution. Consider the SI90A Multispeetral Photographic
The launch of 30 April 1976 is the only ocean surveillance Camera carried on the Skylab missions; it had a focal length
satellite to date, but the indications are that many more will of 15.24 cm, and at an altitude of 436 km its achievable
follow as the Navy increases its reliance on spaceborne ground resolution was 24 rrt [34). This gives a scale number
sensors to keep watch on the high seas. Although the of 2,860,000 and as the atmospheric resolution is so small
Navy's first reconnaissance satellite was launched 14 years compared with the achievable resolution, a camera resolu-
after the Air Force's first, the level of sophistication and tion of 24 m. Big Bird has been reported, to carry a camera
complexity that is claimed for it certainly matches that of with a focal length of "more than eight feet" [.171, so
its USAF contemporaries, taking a value of 2.5 in an:d an altitude or 160 km, a typical
perigee height, gives a scale number of 64,000, and assuming
Sensors - Types and Performance its level of technology is similar to Skylab's gives a camera
So far I have considered the types of satellites used for resolution of 55 cm, and thus an achievable resolution of
reconnaissance and surveillance, but now I shall turn to the about two thirds of a metre.
sensors they carry for their missions. Just what these satel- As was mentioned earlier, the photographic system
lites can detect is a well kept secret - no reconnaissance carried by the Lunar Orbiter spacecraft appears to be very
satellite picture has ever been released, and it is unlikely closely related to that carried on the early Samos area survey
that any will be in the foreseeable future - but it is possible satellites. Its focal length was 61 cm, and operating at an
to estimate the performance that the sensors should be able altitude of 46 km it had a resolution of 1 in [55). This
to achieve by examining the physical laws they must obey means a scale number of 75,400 and a camera resolution of
and the performance of civilian systems with similar levels I m, there being no atmospheric effects on the Moon- The
of technology. early Samos vehicles were claimed to have cameras with
All the information that reaches a satellite from the focal lengths "as large as 40 inches" [ 131. so taking a value
Earth comes in the form of electromagnetic radiation. of 1 m and an altitude of 180 km, typical of the perigees they
Although the atmosphere may seem transparent to its, it is used, gives a scale number of 180,000 and thus a camera
in fact opaque to most wavelengths, with only two resolution of 2.4 m, so we can estimate the achievable reso-
"windows" through which radiation can pass freely. One lution to be about two and a half metres.
`"window" covers wavelengths in the range from 0.3p up to It is interesting to compare these two estimates with
about I Op, which includes some near ultra-violet, visible some of the claims that have been made for reconnaissance
light, near infra-red and some far infra-red, and the other satellite capabilities- Philip Klass stated that early Samos
from 3 cm to 3 m, which includes radio and radar in the satellites should. have been able to resolve objects 20 feet
US military bands A through 1. Any satellite that is to across from 300 miles [ I l) - This scales to 2.3 m from 180
observe events on Earth must use sensors which operate at km, in very good agreement with the figure computed here.
these wavelengths. One would expect the cameras carried by U-2 aircraft, which
258 Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400090039-
S AE'EFl:.it1FIT
Cameras gperating in the visible. portion of the spectrum
were the first type of sensor to be used for reconnaissance,
and they are still the most common today. The reasons for
this are simple; camera design is a well-developed art, they
give the best resolution of any .wavelength range, and they
are the easiest for humans to interpret and understand. The
limiting resolution on the ground that a satellite camera
system can achieve can be considered as composed of two
components - the limiting resolution of the atmosphere
and the limiting resolution of the camera itself. These two
interact in a complex way to form the achievable resolution,
but a way of combining them has been suggested by Amrom
Katz [ 52] . If all resolutions are expressed in terms of the
smallest object discernable on the ground, then the achiev-
able limit is simply the sum of the component limits (it
should be stressed here that all the calculations which
follow are approximate to be more accurate would require
knowledge of a great many details of the satellite's design,
details which are highly classified). This rule has an import-
ant consequence; the achievable resolution will always be
worse that the worst of the component resolutions, so that
however good a satellite's design may be, its rlution will
always be at least as bad as that due to the atmosphere
.
It
also means that as the camera's resolution is improved more
and more, the law of diminishing returns will cut in - the
better the .-+-
ge
s
t
e
t..
ss
_
f fect
__
il
l. _
t
h
It is generally considered that the atmosphere's limiting
resolution is about 10 errs [53), which is independent of
the satellite's altitude.. All other things being equal- a
camera's resolution is dependent on the ratio ofitsattitude
to its focal length, a parameter known as the scale number.
 Approved For Release "2004/08/49- CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400090039-7
Fig. 7. One of the most revealing space photos of military interest yet released by the United States. Picture is an enlargement of a larger pher--
eraph obtained from the Skylab space station showing MacDill Air Force Base. Within the circle can be seen tour aircraft parked off the mails
runway. All photographs obtained by U.S. reconnaissance satellites are classified and this picture -Ives only a small indicat::on of the reustutiori
that can be obtained [201.
were contemporaries of the early Samos vehicles, to have
similar orslightly better performance (the weight considera-
tions would have been less constraining in an aircraft than
a. spacecraft). After the Gary Powers incident President
Eisenhower showed photos taken from a U-2 flying 21 km
over San Diego. They clearly showed the 10 cm wide lines
painted on a car park [ 56 ] . This would become a resolution
of 85 cm from 180 km altitude, somewhat better than our
Samos estimate, but considering the degredation due to the
area survey satellites' radio transmission system, and that
light coloured lines on a dark asphalt background would
make an ideal photographic target, the figures are quite
compatible.
The dimensions quoted for the smallest objects that can
he resolved generally refer to objects whose length and
width are of the same sort of order. It is well known, how
ever, that an object which is several orders of magnitude
longer than it is wide can be resolved when its width is well
below the limiting resolution. There is a good example of
this in [52 1 ; a photograph taken from a Viking rocket has
a computed resolution of 150 m, and yet it is possible to
pick out a railway line, which can be no more than one
twentieth of this wide, even including cuttings and embank-
ments. This would imply that it may be possible to pick out
extremely elongated objects from Big Birds which are as
small as two or three centimetres wide. An example of this
would be the high voltage cables of the National Qsrid, but
the claim [571 that individual telephone cables ld.iati otee
3 mm) can be detected does seem to be rather optimistic,
Certainly the report [581 that the buttons on a man's shirt
can be resolved should be regarded with considerable reser-
vations.
Resolution, however, is not the only consideration when
designing a sensor for reconnaissance. The maze concern is
to maximise the amount of information that can be extract-
ed from the data returned, and one aid to this is infra-red
photography. For wavelengths up to about lu photographic
emulsions have been developed which produce infra-red
"pictures" when they are used in conventional cameras. The
main advantage that they have over v!sible; light imagery is
that surfaces which may be indistinguishable in visible Light-
like for example, a patch of grass and a camouflaged missile
silo cover, look quite different in infra-red, because of their
different reflection characteristics- This capability to pene-
trate camouflage was first exploited in aerial recnnnaissanee
during the Second World War, and since then it hay= become
a well established technique. Unfortunately the resolution
obtainable with infra-red photography is not nearly as goad
as visible light photography - Skylab s S 190 \ camera's
infra-red resolution was 68 m compared to 24 in in the
visible band - so simultaneous photography in both regions
of the spectrum cane into use, talons advantage of the
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 Approved For Release 2004/08/19 : CIA-RDP81 M0098OR000400090039-7
good features of each while minimising the effects of the
bad ones. This in turn led to multi-spectral photography,
where images are made in several portions of the visible and
infra-red spectrum simultaneously. By careful choice of the
film/filter combinations, each image can be made to show
a different feature of the target, and comparisons between
the images can yield still more to the skilled photo-interpret.
When the new generation of close-look satellites came
into service in 1966 they carried multi-spectral cameras, but
it was not until 1969 that a similar instrument was flown on
a civilian mission, as experiment SO-65 on Apollo 9. This
consisted of four cameras rigidly mounted on a frame and
boresighted to view exactly the same area of the Earth.
Camera AA used an orange filter in combination with film
sensitive to wavelengths between 0.5lp and O.91?, giving
good differentiation between natural and man-made objects
by measuring plant reflectance. Camera BB used a green
filter and film sensitive to O.48? to 0.62?, which penetrated
shallow water to show the structure of river beds and coastal
seabeds. Camera CC used a very dark red filter and film
sensitive to 0.7p to 0.9p, which showed plant health, disease
and insect infestation. Camera DD used a red filter and film
sensitive to 0.59? to O.72p, which showed terrestrial struc-
tures in a form suitable for mapping and land usage studies
[591. obviously, the ability to obtain images which can
show such particular features would be of great use to
reconnaissance analysts.
At wavelengths beyond about lp it is not possible to use
photographic emulsions, and sensors composed of detector
elements which give an electrical output dependent on the
level of illumination must be used. The output signal can be
utilised to build up a photograph-like image, but the resolu-
tion attainable is considerably lower than with conventional
photography, This type of sensor does have one great
advantage though; because the radiation they detect is
thermal rather than reflected solar radiation, they operate
just as well at nighttime as daytime. A typical example is
the line-scanning radiometer carried by the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) vehicles. It has
two channels which operate in the 0.4u to 1.1 jt range, using
silicon diode sensing elements, and twoin the 8? to 13p
hand, using mercury cadmium telluride sensors. From an
altitude of 750 km the maximum resolution in the shorter
wavelength band 630 in, and maximum in the longer band
is 670 m [60]. Infra-red scanners were introduced into
satelli,c reconnaissance with the third generation of area
survey satellites in 1966; at the kind of altitude they used,
the resolution of the DMSP scanners would be 150 m and
160 in, certainly good enough to be of use in reconnaissance.
Sensors operating at radiation wavelengths produced at
the sort of temperatures experienced on Earth, such as
DMSP's mercury cadium telluride detectors, do have one
major drawback - they require cryogenic cooling, in
DMSP's case to IOOK. This, of course, increases the space-
craft's complexity considerably and makes the reliability
necessary for long life hard to attain. The Program 647
early warning satellites bypass this problem by making use
of the fact that as the temperature of the emitter increases,
the wavelength of its radiation decreases, and detectors
sensitive to the wavelengths emitted by the hot gases of a
rocket exhaust have a much higher working temperature.
The early warning satellites use lead sulphide cells which
have a peak response at 2.7p and operate at 193K and this
comparatively high temperature means that they can use
passive cooling [ 381. It does mean, however, that they can
only detect missiles while their motors are firing, and once
burnout is reached.and the short wavelength emissions stop
the ability to track them is lost.
Sensors which use the long wavelength atmospheric
``window" can be divided into two types, passive and active.
Passive sensors do not emit radio orradar signals, they
simply listen to whatever they can pick up, record it and
then when they are over home territory re-transmit it to a
receiving station for processing and analysis on the ground.
This type of sensor has been in use an the ferret satellites
since 1962, but like all. else to do with this prograntnte, their
performance is shrouded in secrecy-
Active sensors are those which transmit their own signals
and use the reflections to determine the presence of other
objects. For reconnaissance and surveillance purposes these
are mostly confined to radars operating at the middle of the
wavelength range, in what used to be called the L-band but
is now referred to as the D-band by United States rm,ilitary,
agencies (it covers the range of wavelengths from 15 cm to
30 cm, that is frequencies from I CU to 2 GHZ)_ Radars such
as these have one great advantage - their pertormce is
unaffected by weather conditions. However, they der have
one great disadvantage - to give anything like reasonable
resolution requires very large antennae. As an example of
this, the latest ground-based radar used to detect and track
re-entry vehicles and satellites, the USAF's Cobra Dane at
Shemya in the Aleutians, also operates in the .t1-band but
its phased array antenna is 29 m in diameter [611- Obviously,
such a size is out of the question for spaceborne applications
with present-day technology, and so active radars have
found very little application in satellite. reconnaissance.
This situation has changed recently with. the develop-
ment of a technique known as synthetic aperture side.4look-
ing radar. For this the vehicle transmits radar pulses in a
narrow fan at right angles to the direction of flight. As the
radar beam sweeps through the fan, the reflected signal is
converted into a fine light beam which is, scanned across a
photographic film. The forward motion of the vehicle, and
thus the radar fan, is translated into a motion of the photo-
graphic film, so that successive scans build up a picture in
much the same way as a television image is built up from a
set of lines. The vehicle's forward movement makes the
antenna "appear" much larger to objects on the ground,
and as the resolution of a radar is proportional to its
antenna size, a dramatic improvement in performance over
conventional radars can be realised. When NASA's Seasat is
launched in May 1971? it will carry a synthetic aperture
side-looking radar operating at 1.3 GHz which will have a
resolution of 25 in [35}. It has been suggested that the Big
Birds carry this type of radar, and although a: resolution of
25 in is far poorer than tlre?r achieve with tlt?ir optic,-.
devices, the capability to produce images in all weather
conditions and at any time of day would be of great value
in reconnaissance. The US Navy had also planned to use a,
side-looking radar in its ocean surveillance satellite, but
studies showed that the pitching and rolling movements of
a ship at sea would destroy the phase relationships necessary
for the technique to work, and so a conventional forward-
looking radar is used, although still operating in the 1?1-band
[621.
Future Developments
Since the days of the Discoverer programme satellite
reconnaissance has evolved from an experimental technique
to a reliable, regular, highly sophisticated technology. This
is not to say, however, that current capabilities cannot be
improved upon, and several programmes are being pursued
with this aim.
. For some years. the main effort in this field has been to
expand the missile tracking capabilities of the early warning
satellites to include the mid-course coast phase as well as
the boost phase. This requires sensors operating in the gong
wavelength infra-reds range ft to 14p), which in turn re-
quires the use of cryogenic cooling. Today's satellites were
designed at a time whert the most important consideration
was to provide a simple and reliable system, so the decision
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 U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite Programmes/contd.
A- DP$1MA0$0ORO004 90
Programme
1959 1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
"1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Total
Discoverer
8 11
17
2
38
Area Survey
1
4
18
17
14
14
9
9
- 8
6
4
3
2
09
Close-Look
6
4
10
9
15
10
8
6
5
4
5
3
4
2
2
93
Big Bird
1
3
3
2
2
2
13
Early Warning
2
2
2
3
2
1
1
3
2
2
2
2
1
25
Ferret
3
2
3
1
2
1
2
1
1
. 1
17
Ocean Survey
1
1
Total
8 14
23
31
26
27
24
28
20
19
14
13
11
12
8
6
6
6
296
was made to use short wavelength sensors, but now the .
technology of space vehicle design has reached a stage where
long wavelength infra-red sensors are becoming a practical
proposition for long-term space applications..
As far back as 1969 research was under way in this field
[63] , and in June 1971 a sensor of this type was flown as
Space Test Program payload P70-1 to provide background
measurements in support of this work [64, 65 1. Following
on is the Satellite Infra-Red Experiment (SIRE) which aims
to demonstrate the ability of long wavelength sensors to
detect space vehicles against the cool space background,
culminating in a subsatellite launch in 1980 or 1981. Hughes
Aircraft has been contracted to build the sensor and its
associated cooling system, and the spacecraft contractor is
to be chosen soon [66].
The SIRE payload will be part of a package of DoD
experiments in its Space Test Program that mark the first
military use of the Space Shuttle. Another payload planned
for this mission is from the Teal Ruby programme to investi-
gate the possibility of detecting aircraft from surveillance
satellites. Jet engines produce relatively intense infra-red
radiation, but discriminating it from the background of the
Earth, with all its other radiations, presents considerable
difficulties. The key to the solution lies in a new type of
sensor called a mosaic focal plane array. A mosaic array is
a two-dimensional array of batch-processed detectors
mounted integrally with charge coupled devices on a single
chip, with as .navy as several thousand on one chip. Fy
integrating the charge coupled devices, which amplify and
process the detector signals, on the same chip as the detec-
tors most of the costly hand-wired interconnections re-
quired on an array of the type used by the Program 647
satellites can be replaced by thin film connections, greatly
reducing the electrical heating produced during operation,
and so allowing smaller cooling units to be used. The high
detector densities and anticipated low costs mean that focal
plane arrays of hundreds of thousands of channels can be
constructed - Teal Ruby's will use a quarter of a million
[ 671 - compared to the 2,000 used in today's satellites. They
will be operated in a"staring" mode, with each detector
observing the same region continuously and the signal pro-
cessing logic programmed to respond to changes in illumina-
tion levels [68, 69].
Looking further into the future, the Air Force is develop-
ing in its High Altitude Large Optics (HALO) programme a
multiple threat warning and observation satellite as a re-
placement for current systems in the 1990's. As it is current-
ly envisaged, a HALO vehicle would be assembled from
components orbited in six Space Shuttle flights, and would
include adaptive optics using a structure up to 30 m in
diameter, mosaic infra-red arrays and high resolution tele-
vision [ 70, 71 ] .
Satellite Reconnaissance - The Biggest Payoff of the Space
Programme?
Table 9 gives a year-by-year and programme-by-programme
breakdown of reconnaissance satellite launches, and it shows
that by the end of 1976 there had been 296. Of these 262
succeeded in placing their payloads in orbit, which amounts
to 43% of all United States launches to orbit and beyond.
This represents a considerable investment in men and
resources, and the question naturally arises, has it been.
worth it? The answer seems to be a very definite "yes,"
although it is hard to substantiate it in detail because the
benefits of satellite reconnaissance are only apparent to the
public in indirect ways.
A military organisation must arm itself to counter all the
attacks that it percieves an enemy might be able to launch.
If it knows in detail just what weapons the enemy has, how
they are deployed and what their capabilities are, it can do
this with a reasonable level of funding and a good degree of
confidence, but if its knowledge is sketchy or incomplete,
then it is obliged to develop a whole range of weapons
"just in case." This inflates military budgets and, by the
interaction of each side trying to match the other, sends the
arms race spiralling up. The role of reconnaissance satellites
has been to provide this knowledge, and the benefits they
have brought are measured in terms of the weapons pro-
jects which have not been pursued, but which in the absence
of this knowledge would have fallen into the "just in case"
category, and w ould havebaen pushed throuz,h to deploy-
ment.
A clue to the scale of these savings was given in a briefing
by President Johnson on 16 March 1967. While commenting
on the amount of money spent on the space programme, he
said "....and if nothing else has come out Of it except the
knowledge we've gained from space photography, it would
be worth tens times what the whole programme cost-" [ 72 1.
By 30 June 1967 the United States had spent $38.7G billion
on its space programme [73, 741, and so the President's
figure would imply that the savings were of the order of
several hundred billion dollars. Of that ,$3830 billion,
J$10.79 billion had been spent by the DoD, so the cost of
the whole reconnaissance satellite effort. must have been less
than $10 billion, making it not only a very beneficial. pro-
gramme but also a. very cost-effective one. There seems no
reason to believe that the utility of reconnaissance satellites
has been any less since 1967, so extrapolating President
Johnson's figure suggests that by now the savings must be in
the region of a staggering thousand billion dollars-
Sources of Data Used in Compiling the Tables
The data concerning the successful launches was taken
from the RAE'S Table of Earth Satellites (Volume 1: 1957-
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 U.S. Reconnaissance Satellite programmes/contd.
1968, Volume 2: 1969-1973, and Volume 3, Parts 1, 2 & 3:
1974-1976), although in a few cases the identification of
the launch vehicle was taken from TRW Space Log (publish-
ed by the Public Relations staff of TRW Systems), the
United Nations Public Registry, or the references cited be-
low. Data concerning the launch failures was drawn from
TRW Space Log, Table of Earth Satellite and Space Vehicle
Failures, 1957-1973. (published privately by J. A. Pilkington,
1974), and NASA's annual compilation Astronautics and
Aeronautics.
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1. C. S. Sheldon et al? Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75: Volume
I (Washington, D.C.: Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, 1976).
2. World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1974
(Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
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3. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 October 1957.
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House, 1971), Chapter 4.
5. V. Marchetti and J. D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence (London: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1974).
6. Klass, op. cit., Chapter 6.
7. Klass, op. cit., Chapter 9.
8. Klass, op. cit., Chapter 10.
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10. K. W. Gatland, Astronautics in the. Sixties (London: Iliffe
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11. Klass, op. cit., Chapter 11.
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16. Klass, op. cit., Chapter 17.
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SHUTTLE VIBRATION TESTS
Ground vibration tests of the Space Shuttle began last
May in a tail test tower at the Mar. hall Space gbt Center
in Huntsville, Alabama. The Orbiter and its Expendable Tank
were `soft-mounted' inside the stand using a system of air
bags and cables to suspend the vehicles from a large overhead
truss installed like a crossbeam between two test stand walls.
In the tests a computerized Shuttle Model Test and
Analysis System (SMTAS) provides required vibrational
cycles and force inputs and acquires response data from the
vehicle. The term `vibration' may be misleading.. It is not in
any way a shake test to find the strength of the vehicle.
Engineers simply apply vibrations to its exterior with
exciters powered by amplifiers similar to those found on
home stereo sets. Sensor`s record the characteristics of the
vibrations as they pass from one area of the vehicle to
another.
The information allows engineers to verify the system,
design and mathematical models that predict how the
Shuttle's control system will react to the much more severe
vibrations expected during launch and flight into orbit.
Ground vibration tests with the `Enterprise prototype
will continue for most of the year with pauses only to
change the test configuration of the Space Shuttle.
First flight into orbit from Cape Canaveral by vehicle
OFT-1 is now scheduled for mid-079. The test crew will be
John W. Young, commander, and Robert L. Crippen, pilot.
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