COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000400040050-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: July 1, 1978
• Content Type: BULL

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COVERTACTION
INFORMATION
BULLETIN
PREMIER ISSUE JULY 1978
CONTENTS
WHO WE ARE
WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER, BY
PHILIP AGEE
THROWING A CASE: THE TRIAL OF
ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA
"RESEARCHING CONSUMERS": THE
MARKET FOR DESTABILIZATION
RECENT NEWS
NAMING NAMES
PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST
15
22
23
24
FREE
CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 1, July 1978, published by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit Cor-
poration, P.O. Box 50272, F Street Station, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone [phone]. All rights reserved; copyright ?1978, by Covert
Action Publications, Inc. Permission to reprint will be liberally granted. Typography by Art for People, Washington, DC.
Aj?li?Jreved Fer Release $OOA10710$ ? (-IA RnDRI nnnnQRQRnnn nnndOO 5O a
 DIRTY WORK
The CIA In Western Europe
Edited by Philip Agee and
Louis Wolf
SPECIAL OFFER
This startling and invaluable new expose of the CIA, just
published, lists for $24.95. If you order your copy through
the CovertAction Information Bulletin, and at the same
time subscribe to the Bulletin, we will give you a $10.00
discount from the cost of your subscription. Just send the
enclosed order form in along with your subscription blank.
For the past several years, beginning in 1974, new
"enemies" have haunted the Central Intelligence Agency
- journalists and ex-agents. These people are bent on
exposing the CIA's unscrupulous tactics so the American
public can see what the CIA has spawned and what is
being done under the deceptive cover of "national
security."
John Marks, Victor Marchetti, Morton H. Halperin
and especially Philip Agee have shown considerable
courage in informing the world about the seamy side of
American espionage. They have opened much of the
secret portfolio, ranging from the routine planting of
phony news stories to assassination attempts and the
overthrow of legitimate governments.
In this startling book a comprehensive picture of the
CIA emerges. More important, the authors explain the
simple way in which any competent researcher can
recognize the people behind the dirty work - thus
breaking the "cover" of thousands of CIA agents around
the world.
Dirty Work is a major expose of the CIA - what it
does and who does it - on a scale never before revealed.
PHILIP ACES, an ex-CIA operative, is the Agency's
number one nemesis and author of the best-selling Inside
The Company: CIA Diary. LOUIS WOLF is a journal-
ist who has done intensive research into the American
intelligence community.
DIRTY WORK: Order Form
Please send me a copy of Dirty Work. My check or
money order for $24.95 (U.S. funds, please), is en-
closed.
Name:
Mailing Address:
2 CovertAction e1 (July 1978)
Nu-her
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
WHO WE ARE
One and a half years ago the last issue of CounterSpy
Magazine appeared. Although the scope of coverage, the
depth of research, and the impact of CounterSpy around
the world were on the rise, personal and political disputes
coupled with CIA harassment led to an impasse among the
staff. Those of us who had been working most closely with
Phil Agee left the magazine to continue research, and others
stayed on, ostensibly to continue the magazine. They were
not successful.
We have felt, since the beginning, that there is an im-
portant and vital role to be played by the sort of exposes
for which CounterSpy had become world-famous. We
decided that the dissemination of such information must
resume. That CounterSpy and its uncovering of CIA per-
sonnel and operations around the world were so violently
hated by the Agency was our best endorsement. The com-
pliments and encouragement we received from progressive
people everywhere convinced us that we could not leave
this void in the mosaic of struggles against the U.S. intel-
ligence complex.
We begin modestly with a small Bulletin which we in-
tend to publish approximately bi-monthly. This first issue
is being distributed at no charge. We are confident that
there will be sufficient subscribers to make this publication
a permanent weapon in the fight against the CIA, the FBI,
military intelligence, and all the other instruments of U.S.
imperialist oppression throughout the world. We know that
the information and the research is there, crying out to
be published and disseminated.
We encourage everyone to keep in touch with us, to cor-
respond, to submit leads, tips, suggestions and articles. We
will try to track down all your leads. Most especially, we
will never stop exposing CIA personnel and operations
whenever and wherever we find them. We are particularly
anxious to receive, anonymously if you desire, copies of
U.S. diplomatic lists and U.S. embassy staff and/or tele-
phone directories, from any countries.
A major step in that battle has already been taken. Two
of our group, Phil Agee and Lou Wolf, have edited and pre-
pared a new book, Dirty Work, just published by Lyle
Stuart, Inc. This book describes in detail how to expose
CIA personnel, includes dozens of articles from many
countries which have done just that, and presents, in
Appendix form, detailed biographies of more than 700
undercover CIA and NSA personnel lurking in embassies
and military installations in virtually every country on earth.
We urge all our readers to study this book, and the simple
methodology it sets forth. And, of course, to let us know
the results of your own research.
The book, which is at present only in hardcover, is un-
fortunately expensive. While we recognize that the years of
research which went into it, and the expensive, complicated
and lengthy printing which it involved, justify such a cover
price, we have arranged for a special offer for our readers.
If you order a copy of the book through us-see the ad on
page 2-we will give a $10 rebate on all charter one-year
subscriptions to the CovertAction Information Bulletin.
If you are in the United States, this is the full price; if you
are overseas, you will only have to pay the postage.
One of our group was a CIA case officer for twelve
years; two others worked in finance and support for the
CIA for nine years; the rest of us have devoted much of the
past several years to direct research on U.S. intelligence
operations. We hope that we can put this experience to
valuable use through the pages of the CovertAction Infor-
mation Bulletin. We hope you will agree, and will support
us.
Phil Agee
Ellen Ray
Bill Schaap
Elsie Wilcott
Jim Wilcott
Lou Wolf
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WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER
by Philip Agee
Copyright ?1978 by C.I. Publications, Inc.
[This article is a slightly modified version of the intro-
duction to the book Dirty Work: The CIA in Western
Europe, by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, just published.
It expresses much of the philosophy of the
CovertAction Information Bulletin.]
Today the whole world knows, as never before, how the
U.S. government and U.S. corporations have been secretly
intervening in country after country to corrupt politicians
and to promote political repression. The avalanche of re-
velations in the mid-1970s, especially those concerning the
CIA, shows a policy of secret intervention that is highly
refined and consistently applied.
Former President Ford and leading government spokes-
men countered by stressing constantly the need for the CIA
to retain, and to use when necessary, the capability for
executing the kinds of operations that brought to power
the military regime in Chile. Ford even said in public that
he believed events in Chile had been "in the best interests
of the Chilean people." And even with President Carter's
human rights campaign there has been no indication that
the CIA has reduced or stopped its support of repressive
dictatorships in Iran, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, and
other bastions of "the free world."
The revelations, though, have not only exposed the
operations of the CIA, but also the individual identities-
the names, addresses, and secret histories-of many of the
people who actually do the CIA's work. Yet, with all the
newly available information, many people still seem to be-
lieve the myths used to justify this secret political police
force. Some of the myths are, of course, actively spread
by my former CIA colleagues; others come from their
liberal critics. But whatever the source, until we lay the
myths to rest, they will continue to confuse people and
permit the CIA-literally-to get away with murder.
Myth Number One: The CIA is primarily engaged in gather-
ing intelligence information against the Soviet Union.
This is perhaps the CIA's longest-playing myth, going
back to the creation of the Agency in 1947 and the choice
of the name "Central Intelligence Agency." As the Agency's
backers explained the idea to the American Congress,
afraid even in those early days of getting dragged into un-
wanted foreign adventures, the CIA was needed to find out
what a possible enemy was planning in order to protect the
United States from a surprise attack. Americans at the
time still shared a vivid memory of the unexpected Japanese
attack at Pearl Harbor, and with the likelihood that the new
enemy-the Soviet Union-would soon have atomic bombs,
no one could really doubt the need to know if and when an
attack might come.
The real success in watching the Soviets, however, came
from technological breakthroughs like the U-2 spy plane
and spy-in-the-sky satellites, and the job of strategic intel-
ligence fell increasingly to the technically sophisticated U.S.
National Security Agency. The CIA played a part, of course,
and it also provided centralized processing of information
and data storage. But in its operations the CIA tended to
put its emphasis on covert action-financing friendly poli-
ticians, murdering suspected foes, and staging coups d'etat.
This deeply involved the Agency in the internal politics
of countries throughout Western Europe, Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and Latin America, as well as in the Soviet
bloc. And even where CIA officers and agents did act as
spies, gathering intelligence information, they consistently
used that information to further their programs of action.
The CIA's operatives will argue that the ultimate goal of
discovering Soviet and other governments' intentions re-
quires live spies at work in places like the Kremlin-that the
Agency exists to recruit these spies and to keep them alive
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and working. A Penkovsky or two should be on the payroll
at all times to keep America safe from Russian adventures.
This argument may influence some people, because theo-
retically, spy satellites and other forms of monitoring only
give a few minutes' warning, whereas a person in the right
place can report on decisions as soon as they are made,
giving perhaps days or weeks of warling..Such a spy might
also be of great value for the normal conduct of relations-
whether in negotiations, cooperation, or confrontation.
Nevertheless, the vast CIA effort to recruit officials of
importance in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry,
KGB, and GRU has never had significant success. There
have indeed been defections, but these, I was told in the
CIA, had nothing to do with the elaborate traps and snares
laid out by the CIA around the world. They resulted from
varying motivations and psychological pressures operating
on the official who defected. In this respect, the CIA's
strengthening of repressive foreign security services, neces-
sary for laying out the snares (telephone tapping, travel
control, observation posts, surveillance teams, etc.), can
scarcely be justified by the nil recruitment record.
Today, notwithstanding recent "reforms," the CIA re-
mains primarily an action agency--doing and not just
snooping. Theirs is the grey area of interventionist action
between striped-pants diplomacy and invasion by the
Marines, and their targets in most countries remain largely
the same: governments, political parties, the military,
police, secret services, trade unions, youth and student
organizations, cultural and professional societies, and the
public information media. In each of these, the CIA con-
tinues to prop up its friends and beat down its enemies,
while its goal remains the furthering of U.S. hegemony so
that American multinational companies can intensify their
exploitation of the natural resources and labor of foreign
lands.
Of course this has little to do with strategic intelligence
or preventing another Pearl Harbor, while it has a lot to do
with the power of certain privileged groups within the
United States and their friends abroad. The CIA spreads the
myth of "intelligence gathering" in order to obscure the
meaning of what the Agency is really doing.
Myth Number Two: The major problem is lack of control;
that is, the CIA is a "rogue elephant. "
This myth comes not from the CIA, but from its liberal
critics, many of whom seem to believe that all would be
well if only Congress or the President would exercise tighter
control. Yet, for all the recent horror stories, one finds little
evidence that a majority in Congress want the responsibility
for control, while the executive branch continues to insist-
rightly-that the Agency's covert action operations have,
with very few exceptions, followed the orders of successive
presidents and their National Security Councils. As former
Secretary of State Kissinger told Representative Otis Pike's
Intelligence Investigating Committee, "Every operation is
personally approved by the President."
For its part the Pike committee concluded in its official
report, first published in "leaked" form by the Village
Voice, that "all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far
from being out of control has been utterly responsive to the
instructions of the President and the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs."
So the problem is said to be with the presidents-
Democratic and Republican-who, over the past 30 years,
CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
have given the green light to so many covert operations.
But why were the operations necessary? And why secret?
The operatiops had to be secret, whether they involved
political bribes, funding of anticommunist journals, or
fielding of small armies, because in every case they implied
either government control of supposedly non-governmental
institutions or violation of treaties and other agreements. In
other words, hypocrisy and corruption. If the government
was going to subvert free, democratic, and liberal institu-
tions, it would have to do so secretly.
There is, however, a more basic reason for the secrecy--
and for the CIA. Successive administrations-together with
American-based multinational corporations-have continu-
ally demanded the freest possible access to foreign markets,
labor, agricultural products, and raw materials. To give
muscle to this demand for the "open door," recent presi-
dents have taken increasingly to using the CIA to strengthen
those foreign groups who cooperate-and to destroy those
who do not. This has been especially clear in countries such
as Chile under Allende, or Iran 20 years earlier under
Mossadegh, where strong nationalist movements insisted on
some form of socialism to ensure national control of econ-
omic resources.
The CIA's covert action operations abroad are not sui
generis. They happen because they respond to internal
U.S. requirements. We cannot wish them away through
fantasies of some enlightened President or Congress who
would end American subversion of foreign peoples and
institutions by the wave of a wand. Not surprisingly, the
U.S. Senate rejected by a very wide margin a legislative
initiative that would have prohibited covert action pro-
grams by the CIA.
Only prior radical change within the U.S., change that
will eliminate the process of accumulating the value of
foreign labor and resources, will finally allow an end to
secret intervention abroad. Until then, we should expect
more intervention by the CIA and multinational corpora-
tions-not less. Increasingly important will be the repres-
sive capabilities of the Agency's "sister" services abroad.
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Myth Number Three: Weakening the CIA opens wider the
door for Soviet expansion and eventual world domination.
This myth is peddled especially hard at times when
liberation movements make serious gains. Former President
Ford and Dr. Kissinger used it frequently during the CIA's
ill-fated intervention in Angola, and we continue to hear it
again as liberation movements seek Soviet and Cuban help
in their struggles against the apartheid policies of the white
Rhodesians and South Africans.
The problem for America, however, is not "Soviet ex-
pansionism," despite all the anticommunism with which we
are indoctrinated practically from the cradle. The problem,
rather, is that the American government, preeminently the
CIA, continues to intervene on the side of "friends" whose
property and privilege rest on the remnants of archaic social
systems long since discredited. The political repression re-
quired to preserve the old order depends on American and
other Western support which quite naturally is turning
more and more people against the United States--more
effectively, for sure, than anything the KGB could ever
concoct.
As Senator Frank Church explained in an interview on
British television, "I'm apt to think that the Russians are
going to choose [sides] better than we will choose nine
times out of ten. After all we're two hundred years away
from our revolution-, we're a very conservative country."
Myth Number Four: Those who attack the CIA, especially
those who have worked in the intelligence community, arc
traitors, turncoats, or agents of the KGB.
This has been the Agency's chief attack on me personally,
and I'm certain that the fear of being tarred with the same
brush is keeping many CIA veterans from voicing their
own opposition. But as with earlier efforts to find the
"foreign hand" in the American antiwar movement, the
CIA has failed to produce a shred of evidence that any of
its major American (or European) critics are in the service
of any foreign power.
Would-be "reformers" of the CIA have also discovered
how the Agency reacts to criticism. According to Represen-
tative Pike, the CIA's Special Counsel threatened to destroy
Pike's political career. In a conversation with Pike's chief
investigative staff person, the Special Counsel was quoted
thus: "Pike will pay for this [directing the vote to approve
the committee report on the CIA] -you wait and see. I'm
serious. There will be political retaliation. Any political
ambitions in New York that Pike had are through. We will
destroy him for this."
CIA veterans must not be intimidated by the Agency's
false and unattributed slander. We have a special responsi-
biliry for weakening this organization. If put at the service
of those we once oppressed, our knowledge of how the CIA
really works could keep the CIA from ever really working
again. And though the CIA will brand us as "traitors,"
people all over the world, including the United States,
will respond, as they have already, with enthusiastic and
effective support.
Myth Number Five: Naming individual CIA officers does
little to change the Agency, and is done only to expose in-
nocent individuals to the threat of assassination.
Nothing in the anti-CIA effort has stirred up more anger
than the publishing of the names and addresses of CIA
officials in foreign countries, especially since the killing of
the CIA Station Chief in Athens, Richard Welch. CIA
spokesmen-and journals such as the Washington Post-
were quick to accuse me and CounterSpy magazine of
having "fingered" Welch for the "hit," charging that in
publishing his name, we were issuing "an open invitation
to kill him." The Agency also managed to exploit Welch's
death to discredit and weaken those liberals in Congress
who wanted only to curtail some of the Agency's more
obvious abuses. Subsequent research, noted in Dirty Work,
makes abundantly clear that CounterSpy had nothing to
do with the Welch killing.
The result of the Agency's manipulations isn't hard to
predict. The CIA, for all its sins, came out of the recent
investigations strengthened by the Ford "reforms," while
the Congress may attempt to pass an official secrets act
that will attempt to make it a crime for any present or
former government official ever again to blow the whistle
by making public classified information. No more Penta-
gon Papers. No more Watergate revelations. No more
CIA Diaries.
Nonetheless, the naming goes on. More and more CIA
people can now be held personally accountable for what
they and the Agency as an institution do--for the real :harm
they cause to real people. Their military coups, torture
chambers, and terrorism cause untold pain, and their backing
of multinational corporations and local elites helps push
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millions to the edge of starvation, and often beyond. They
are the Gestapo and SS of our time, and as in the Nuremberg
Trials and the war in Vietnam, they cannot shed their in-
dividual responsibility simply because they were following
a superior's orders.
But apart from the question of personal responsibility,
the CIA remains a secret political police, and the exposure
of its secret operations-and secret operatives-remains the
most effective way to reduce the suffering they cause. Al-
ready a handful of journalists and former intelligence of-
ficers have managed to reveal the names and addresses of
hundreds of CIA people, and even the Washington Post-
which condemns us for doing it-has admitted that our
efforts added greatly to the CIA's growing demoralization.
We also noticed from our own investigations that the Agency
was forced to step up its security precautions and to trans-
fer many of those named to other posts. All of this disrupts
and destabilizes the CIA, and makes it harder for them to
inflict harm on others.
Of course, some people will always raise the cry that we
are "trying to get someone killed." But, as it happens,
violence is not really needed. By removing the mask of
anonymity from CIA officers, we make it difficult for them
to remain at overseas posts. We hope that the CIA will have
the good sense to shift these people to the increasingly
smaller number of safe posts, preferably to a desk inside the
CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. In this way the CIA
will protect the operatives named-and also the lives of
their potential victims.
From the old song and dance of the "intelligence gather-
ing" to the claim that "those who expose are the murderers,"
these five myths won't simply vanish. The CIA-and its
allies-will continue to propagate them, and the CIA's
critics will have to respond. We must increasingly expose
these myths and the crimes they cover up.
But besides debating, there is much more that we can
do-especially in furthering the exposure of the Agency and
its secret operatives. The CIA probably has no more than
5,000 officers experienced in running clandestine opera-
tions and it should be possible to identify almost all of
those who have worked under diplomatic cover at any
time in their careers. Dirty Work lists mainly those named
as CIA operatives in Europe; we hope additional volumes
can be published on the CIA's people in other areas. All
that is required is a continuing effort-and a novel form of
international cooperation. Here's how:
1. In each country a team of interested people, in-
eluding journalists, should obtain a list of all the
Americans working in the official U.S. Mission: the
Embassy, consulates, AID offices, and other U.S.
installations. This list can be acquired through a
friend in the host Foreign Ministry, in the American
Embassy-or by other means.
2. The team should then get past editions of neces-
sary public documents-U.S. Foreign Service Lists
and Biographic Registers (both published by the
Department of State) from a local library, and the
Diplomatic List and Consular List published regularly
by every Foreign Ministry. The Diplomatic and
Consular Lists will contain the names and addresses
of the higher ranking members of the official mission,
including some of the CIA people.
3. Check the names as suggested in the various ar-
ticles in Dirty Work, especially John Marks' "How to
Spot a Spook." Watch carefully for persons carried
on the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic and Consular
Lists, but who are missing from the recent Bio-
graphic Registers and Foreign Service Lists. Most of
these will be CIA people purposely left off the State
Department lists.
4. After narrowing down the list of likely suspects,
check them with us and with other similarly oriented
groups. CovertAction Information will follow up on
all leads, and publish all the information it can con-
firm.
5. Once the list is fully checked, publish it. Then
organize public demonstrations against those named-
both at the American Embassy and at their homes-
and, where possible, bring pressure on the govern-
ment to throw them out. Peaceful protest will do the
job. And when it doesn't, those whom the CIA has
most oppressed will find other ways of fighting back.
Naturally, as new CIA people replace the old, it will be
necessary to repeat the process, perhaps every few months.
And as the campaign spreads, and the CIA learns to correct
the earlier and more obvious flaws in its use of State De-
partment cover, we will have to develop new ways to spot
them. Already the Agency has gotten the State Department
to restrict circulation of the all-important Biographic
Register, and it is likely that the Administration will in
future place more of its people under cover of the Depart-
ment of Defense (for example, in military bases, and in
Military Assistance Groups), the Drug Enforcement Agency,
and the multinational corporations.
In rare cases, the CIA may even attempt changing the
identities of certain operatives. Nonetheless, the CIA will
always need a secure base in embassies and consulates to
keep its files and communications facilities, and there are
many ways to identify the CIA people in these missions
without relying on public documents.
Within the United States, people can help this campaign
by supporting the groups struggling to stop covert inter-
vention abroad. There is also the need for continuing re-
search into current CIA operations, and new programs to
identify and keep track of all the FBI special agents and
informers, military intelligence personnel, and the Red
Squads and SWAT groups of local and state police depart-
ments.
Together, people of many nationalities and varying
political beliefs can cooperate to weaken the CIA and its
surrogate intelligence services, striking a blow at political
repression and economic injustice. The CIA can be defeated.
The proof can be seen from Vietnam to Angola, and in
all the other countries where liberation movements are
rapidly gaining strength.
We can all aid this struggle, together with the struggle for
socialism in the United States itself.
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THROWING A CASE:
THE TRIAL OF ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA
"The testimony will essentially be this. On approxi-
mately August 15th of 1977 at approximately
10:00 a.m., Special Agent oi' the United States
Customs Service went to the hot.se of Pedro Gil
at 52 Northwest 58th Avenue in Miami, Florida,
just a short ways off Flagler Street.
"At that location, which is a house, or a house that
is fairly close to the street, a single family dwelling,
there was a boat parked on a trailer in the driveway.
"The evidence will show that this is a 23 Formula
outboard boat.
"At the time the agents went there they met Mr.
Gil and after a brief conversation with Mr. Gil,
they boarded his boat and searched it.
"What they found on the boat then becomes the
subject of the evidence in this case.
"They found on the boat one 20 mm. cannon, one
.50 caliber machinegun, one .30 caliber machinegun,
two Browning rifles, five weapons that are commonly
known as AR-15 Colt rifles, two of which had been
converted to fully automatic.
"Approximately ninety rounds of 20 mm. ammuni-
tion and thousands of rounds of additional ammuni-
tion to fit these other weapons."1
Thus begins the prosecutor's opening statement in the
trial of four Cuban exiles charged with unlawful possession
of unregistered firearms. Never once did any of the four
deny that they possessed the weapons, or that they were
intended for an armed raid against the Republic of Cuba.
Four days later, on January 10, 1978, they were acquitted.
What happened, and why? CovertAction Information
Bulletin obtained the complete transcript of the trial, never
before available, and carefully studied it and the surrounding
events. The conclusion is inescapable that the acquittal was
foreordained, and that the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Department of Justice were responsible. What is also
clear is that the Carter Administration's alleged detente
with Cuba, well before the recent Shaba incident and
Brzezinski's ravings, was hypocritical at best, and, on some
]levels, a simple lie.
1 United States v. Pedro Gil, Armando Lopez Estrada, Juan
Raimundo Arce and Isidoro Pineiro Castineira, No. 77-481-Cr-JE,
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
Official Transcript (hereinafter "Transcript"), January 6, 1978,
Part I, pp. 5-6.
The CBS Documentary
The opening scene can be pinpointed. On June 10, 1977,
CBS-TV aired a Bill Moyers special: "CBS Reports-The
CIA's Secret Army." The show documented the paramili-
tary roles of certain segments of the Cuban exile com-
munity in the United States. It reviewed the preparation
and implementation of the CIA-directed invasion at the Bay
of Pigs in 1961, the ignominious defeat of the benighted
invaders, and the subsequent recruitment by the United
States government of the veterans and sympathizers of the
fiasco into bands of terrorists hell-bent on attacking Cuba
and overthrowing the government led by Fidel Castro.
The TV correspondent of the Miami Herald reported
this in his review of the show:
"The Kennedy vengeance began, reports Moyers,
as soon as the members of the Brigade 2506 captured
during the invasion were ransomed months later.
Bobby Kennedy gave top priority to the CIA's mus-
tering of a secret army, based in Miami, to start
covert sabotage operations against Castro and his
regime. It was called `Operation Mongoose.'
"A CIA agent, Grayston Lynch, was its recruiter.
An Army general, Edward Lansdale, was its military
director.
"The CIA virtually dropped `Operation Mongoose'
by 1972, but few involved were aware of that ....
Now . . . the onetime CIA soldiers are simply pro-
ceeding on their own, conducting their own war."2
The Moyers show had interviews with various members
of Brigade 2506, including Armando Lopez Estrada, the
"Chief of Military Operations" of the Brigade. It also ex-
posed to U.S. audiences some shocking scenes filmed in a
warehouse in Miami which was stacked floor to ceiling with
weapons. Two exiles-one of them as it turns out being
Lopez Estrada again-were filmed in the warehouse stand-
ing proudly in front of the weapons with sacks over their
heads to disguise their identities.
It was a difficult time, diplomatically, for such a show
to air. The U.S. and Cuban administrations were negoti-
ating the lessening of tensions, cultural exchanges, and the
mutual opening of Interest Sections in each other's country.
At the same time, right-wing forces within the United
States were decrying any improvement in relations, self-
interest notwithstanding. Ironically, the same day that the
CBS documentary was aired, Senator -Howard Baker was
2Miami Herald, June 10, 1977.
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quoted as saying, I thin is is he wors trme in i tory rman o Lopez stra a, uan armundo Arce, 37, and
to be cozying up to Cuba."3
Despite sentiments such as Baker's, it was clear that
something had to be done. The Cuban exiles had it, and
they were flaunting it: Warehouses full of weapons in
downtown Miami. Cuban exiles bragging about armed
attacks. Bombings and killings around the world. And
Brigade 2506 stage center, and proud of it. But, as we
shall see, what was done by the U.S. government was little
more than show.
Astonishingly, nothing ever happened to the warehouse
full of weapons. Presumably it is still there in Miami. CBS
was never questioned, never subpoenaed, nor were the
cameramen and still photographers from many newspapers,
all of whom saw the inside of the warehouse. Had the par-
ticipants been left-wing activists instead of right-wing
terrorists, one can imagine what would have happened.
Because of the public outcry, though, some kind of
investigation--surveilling and following leading Brigade
2506 members -was conducted, and as the Assistant
United States Attorney explained to the jury some months
later, on August 15, 1977, two months after the TV show,
the Customs agents searched Pedro Gil's boat. Thus began
the trial that, in the final analysis, might just as well never
have taken place.
Pedro Gil, 41, was immediately arrested. Shortly there-
after, based on fingerprint identifications and interrogations,
Isidoro Pineiro Castineira, 38, were also arrested. They were
all charged with possession of unregistered firearms and vio-
lation of the Neutrality Act. To this day, Pedro Gil has
never made any public statement about the case. The others,
however, from the day of the arrests, admitted that the
weapons were theirs, said they had been given to them by
the CIA, and proudly proclaimed that they were for use
against Cuba. The Miami Herald noted:
"Lopez Estrada confirmed that the boats and
weapons were part of a plan to attack Cuba. He said
one boat was to be used to transport the weapons to
a fourth `intermediary boat' somewhere outside the
U.S. limits. Lopez Estrada said that he didn't feel that
the group was doing anything wrong since the attack
was to be launched from outside the United States.
`If I take weapons outside the United States to be
used outside of the United States, is that wrong'?' he
asked."4
Following the arrests, Roberto Carballo, President of
Brigade 2506. called several meetings to gather support
for the defendants in the Cuban exile community and to
raise funds for their defense.
Brigade 2506
The Brigade, with perhaps 500 active members, is com-
prised of veterans of the Bay of Pigs and other sympathizers.
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They are a powerful force in the 0 4iami area, whet,, well
upwards of 100,000 Cuban exiles reside. A Miami city
Commissioner is a member, as is the state Democratic
Party Chairman. A few years ago, when the Brigade held
its "First Congress," Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre and U.S.
Representative Claude Pepper were featured speakers.
On the day of the arrest, the Miami Herald news story
pointed out that the Brigade was "well respected" in the
community. Ironically, the editorial in the same issue of
the Herald took a less-laudatory position:
"Until the mid 1960s, overthrowing Fidel Castro
seemed to be the official policy of the United States
government. Toward that purpose an agency of the
government armed and supported a group of exiles
in an abortive attempt to invade Cuba. Other efforts
were made to depose the Cuban dictator.
"But the policy gradually changed, and in recent
months the rate of change appears to have increased.
Most Cuban exilesmany of them now citizens of
the United Statesfind the changes in policy hard to
accept. Some merely grumble. Others take their
cues from the fiery oratory of demagogues who
promise to turn back the clock. And a few-a tiny
number, really -take the law into their own hands."5
They did more than take the law into their own hands,
though; they seemed to have ignored it with relative im-
punity. On June 29, 1976, there was a meeting at the New
England Oyster House in Coral Gables, Florida, involving,
as a recent Penthouse Magazine article put it, two Chileans,
two Cuban exiles, and an American 6 It now appears that
the participants included Hector Duran, Bernardo de
Torres and Armando Lopez Estrada, from the Brigade
2506; General Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the
notorious then-head of DINA, the Chilean secret police; and
Michael V. Townley, the American who conspired with
the fascist, paramilitary Patric v Libertad against the regime
This meeting, which was apparently conducted under
police and FBI surveillance, and which may have included
an informant, centered on the murder of Letelier and
several sabotage actions. No police action followed this
meeting.
What is more, it is public knowledge that Carballo and
Lopez Estrada were also present at the secret meeting in
July of 1976 in the Dominican Republic which organized
the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations
(CORU), which claimed credit for the heinous bombing of
a Cubana Airliner in October 1976.7
We will return to the terrorists-no "tiny number" by
the way-and to the Chilean connection, presently. But
what of the Miami trial? After so many years of openly
defiant and illegal behavior, Armando Lopez Estrada and
three of his colleagues were charged with possession of un-
registered weapons and violation of the Neutrality Act.
The Neutrality Act Charges
of Salvador Allende, became a DINA operative after the
coup, and was directly involved in the murder of Orlando
Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt in September of that year.
5 [bid.
61?rnest Volkman and John Cummings, "The Assassination of
Orlando Letelier," Penthouse, July 1978, p. 52, at p. 59.
was to begin, on the motion of the defense attorneys,
United States District Judge of the Southern District of
Florida Joe Eaton severed the Neutrality Act charges from
the case. The Neutrality Act count of the indictment charged
the defendants with planning, from the United States, to
attack Cuba, "a country with which the United States is at
peace." This particular phrase, essential to a Neutrality Act
charge, was at the heart not only of the defense motion to
sever, but of the entire trial as well. And this is because (as
the defense incessantly pointed out to the judge and jury)
of Public Law 87-733 passed by the Eighty-Seventh Con-
gress and signed by John F. Kennedy on October 3, 1962.
It reads:
"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Con-
gress assembled,
"That the United States is determined to prevent
by whatever means may be necessary including the
force of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba
from extending, by force or the threat of force, its
aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this
hemisphere.
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"To prevent in Cuba the creation o an externally
supported military capability endangering the security
of the United States, and
"To work with the Organization of American
States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support
the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-
determination."8
This Resolution-this Cold War Monroe Doctrine-is
still on the books despite three unsuccessful attempts to
repeal it. And because, Judge Eaton said, "it calls for the
overthrow of Fidel Castro," he withdrew the Neutrality
Act charges until the prosecution could prove to him that
Cuba was "a country with which the United States is at
peace." So far, there has been no disposition of those
charges. The case which went before the jury in Miami in
January did not include Neutrality Act charges. Neverthe-
less, the Act and this Resolution were constantly referred
to. Although the defendants were merely charged with
possession of unregistered weapons, the defense continu-
ally implied that the United States was at war with Cuba,
and that the defendants were simply well-meaning patriots.
The Trial
And so, Jerome Sanford, Assistant United States Attor-
ney for the Southern District of Florida, commenced his
prosecution of the four Cuban exiles for the knowing and
unlawful possession of unregistered firearms.
The prosecution's case was simple. Sanford proved that
the weapons and ammunition were found on Pedri Gil's
boat in front of his house; he proved that they were in
working order; and he proved that they were not registered.
He also proved that the fingerprints of the other three were
all over the weapons and the boat. He even demonstrated
that the defendants did not deny that they were their
weapons, and, in fact that they intended to use them to
attack Cuba.
Edward O'Donnell and his partner Donald Spain repre-
sented the defendants. Although they were well-known
Miami criminal lawyers, their entry into the case was some-
what unusual, because Spain had been an Assistant State's
Attorney who had prosecuted many Cuban exiles in the
local courts. But at present he is well-ensconced in the
exiles' legal defense teams, and is representing Guillermo
Novo Sampol, a key figure in the Letelier-Moffitt assas-
sinations, on a parole violation charge. He is also the lawyer
for Alvin Ross Diaz, like Novo one of the New Jersey
exile terrorists, charged with possession of explosives,
firearms and drugs.
O'Donnell presented the defense's argument in his
opening statement. He concentrated on Lopez Estrada.
He was trained, he told the jury, by the CIA for the Bay of
Pigs invasion. Afterwards, he was brought to the United
States to meet Robert F. Kennedy. "Armando Lopez
Estrada personally met with Robert F. Kennedy and was
asked if he wanted to continue his fight against Cuba, the
Castro Communist regime that was in existence in Cuba at
that time. His reply was in the affirmative."9 Then he even
met President John F. Kennedy, in addition to many CIA
agents who trained him in the use of various weapons.
8Transcript, January 6, 1978, Part 11, p. 99; January 9, 1978,
Part 1, pp. 87-88.
9Transcript, January 6, 1978, Part I, p. 95.
he took part
in dozens of invasions and attacks against Cuba. He also
spent several years in the early 1960s in the United States
Army, while receiving pay from the CIA. All this time,
O'Donnell pointed out, he handled many weapons and was
never, obviously, told that he had to register them.
Some time later, Lopez Estrada was given a map by a
member of the CIA which gave the location of an arms
cache on a small island in the Bahamas, not far from Cuba.
There he went with some friends, dug up the weapons, and
brought them to Miami for cleaning and for an attack
against Cuba to be launched from some place outside the
United States. Yes, the defense agreed, Lopez Estrada and
his friends had these weapons, but they never dreamed
they had to register them. They were still proceeding under
Bobby Kennedy's personal orders given seventeen years
before. And, yes, the defendants were familiar with Public
Law 87-733, and that, to them, was the law of the land,
regardless of any so-called detente in the late 1970s.
It was only because of the CBS-TV show that these
defendants-"scapegoats"-were before the court at all:
"That documentary did not go far towards ce-
menting relationships with Cuba. A good faith effort
towards the cementing of those relationships with
Cuba had to be shown.
"Armando Lopez Estrada, Mr. Pineiro, Mr. Arce
and Mr. Gil, the evidence will show you, are that
good faith effort to show Fidel Castro we mean
business.
"The arrests were applauded from the front
pages of the Miami Herald by Fidel Castro.
"He, in his own words, said this is a step in the
right direction towards cementing relationships be-
tween the United States and Cuba. That is why we
are here."10
Unfortunately, Fidel Castro had no idea how little
good faith there was. As a knowledgeable Miami reporter
put it to CovertAction, "The prosecutor was ordered to
bring the charges, but he sure wasn't ordered to get a
conviction."
The Peculiarities of the Trial
There are a number of instances in the trial which do
not ring true to an experienced criminal lawyer, or indeed
anyone familar with criminal law. In order to highlight
them, we give a brief overview of the proceeding. The
prosecution's case was uneventful. The defense first pre-
sented Lopez Estrada himself, the only defendant who took
the stand. He testified about his Bay of Pigs history and
subsequent meetings with high officials, his training in the
Army, and his twenty-six commando raids against Cuba.
But he also testified that his last payment from the CIA
was in 1965, and his last raid was in 1963. He did testify
that he had remained in contact with Grayston Lynch until
the present time, and was still in contact with him. (Lynch,
in fact, was present at court for the entire trial, and testi-
fied on behalf of the defendants.) Lopez Estrada also testi-
fied that he had received the map of the weapons cache in
1976 from a man he knew only as "Red Bob," whom he
had known in 1961 as a member of the CIA, and whom he
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 H
assumed still was. He said that th;: weapons "were very
dirty and in very bad situation because I think, if I recall
correctly, that the weapons were hidden in 1966."11
Finally, he mentioned in passing that he had been to the
White House in 1976 to meet with an aide of President
Ford.
What is important to remember is the following: except
for the alleged meeting with "Red Bob" in 1976, Lopez
Estrada testified to no substantive contacts with the CIA
since 1965; he also testified that the weapons had been
buried for 11 years, and were very dirty; and he men-
tioned, regarding 1976 simply that he had been to the
White House. All of these points figured prominently in
the subsequent crumbling of the government's case.
Grayston Lynch
The defense then called Grayston Lynch, CIA case
officer for the Bay of Pigs invasion and Brigade 2506.
Lynch testified about Lopez Estrada's training, particu-
larly with respect to weapons, pointing out that the weapons
provided to the Brigade by the CIA in the early 1960s were
not registered so they could not be traced. He also testified
that although some operations planned by the exiles re-
ceived express approval, and some express disapproval,
"there were sonic that we neither approved nor disapproved.
.." [11 1 f they didn't bother anything they just ignored
them
It was during Lynch's testimony that the first legal
puzzler arose. The following colloquy occurred during the
direct examination:
"Q. Could you indicate to the ladies and gentle-
men of the jury how these weapons are acquired by
the agency before distribution to the people that
work under you for training purposes?
"A. I don't think, I do not think I could answer
that.
"Q. Why would you be unable to answer that to
the ladies and gentlemen of the jury?
"A. I think it is classified information.
"Q. Have you taken a certain oath as a member of
the Central Intelligence Agency?
"A. Yes, I have.
"Q. All right. Does that oath preclude you from
commenting on matters affecting national security?
"A. Unless it has been brought out before.
"Q. The question that I have just asked you is a
matter that has been brought out before in which
there is some type of public record on it.
"A. Yes, but I could not comment on it, neither to
confirm nor deny it.
"Q. And you are restricted by your oath to the
United States Government from doing so?
"A. That's right."13
O'Donnell. conducting the defense, had already be-
labored Lynch's refusal to answer certain questions more
than he should have. And in any other trial the exchange
would have waved a red flag in front of the prosecutor.
There is a well-known legal doctrine that if a witness pre-
111bid., Part II, p. 23.
12Transcript, January 9, 1978, Part I, p. 94.
131bid., p. 85.
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sented by one side refuses to answer relevant questions put
by the other side, that side can move to strike the entire
testimony of the witness. A vigorous prosecutor, one would
think, would have taken that advantage. Yet the cross-
examination of Lynch was very brief, virtually insignificant,
and touched on no sensitive areas. It would seem obvious
that had the prosecutor gone to the heart of the matter of
the CIA's dealings with Lopez Estrada and the others, and
its providing them with weapons, he surely would have
hit on a number of areas where Lynch would have refused
to answer. And at that point he could have had his entire
testimony striken from the jury's consideration by the
judge-something which has a substantial impact on a. jury.
But the government passed up the opportunity.
The defense called only one other witness, Bay of Pigs
veteran and Brigade member Roberto Perez, who briefly
reiterated the same experiences as Lopez Estrada, particu-
larly the meetings with Bobby Kennedy and other high
officials in the 1960s. Perez didn't know "Red Bob," but
said he was always paid by "Grey Pete." Perez, much to
the chagrin of the defense no doubt, also testified that he
had not been involved in any raids since 1962, and didn't
know anything about any other raids.
At this point the defense rested. The prosecution was
now faced with a relatively simple credibility case which
should have hinged on several points: First, were these
weapons really given to Lopez Estrada by the CIA? If
not, did Lopez Estrada and the others really believe they
were? And even if they thought so, did that constitute a
legal excuse?
At this point, the prosecution was entitled to bring on
rebuttal witnesses, presumably to stress that the CIA., had
no involvement with the defendants, and had not planted
these weapons for them or provided a map to them. And
there was a further peculiarity here. Lopez Estrada showed
the map to the court, and insisted there were still explosives
on the island, and that he would lead anyone to it who
wanted to see them. There is, however, no indication that
any such cache really existed, nor any indication of any
communication with the government of the Bahamas to
check on this location, much less to warn them of live
explosives lying in a hole on an island. There were a number
of ways one might have proceeded to punch holes in the
defendants' story. The prosecutor, however, called Robert
Barteaux.
If there was a sandbag thrown in this case, Barteaux was
it. He took the stand as Edward Cohen, Assistant General
Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, joined the
prosecution table. He identified himself as follows: "1[ am
chief of the information processing group of the informa-
tion services staff of the Director of Operations of Central
Intelligence Agency."14 This was the first clinker. Know-
ledgeable journalists have indicated to CovertAction that
Barteaux was in fact an operations case officer, that there
was no such thing as the title he gave to the court, that it
was made up for the occasion. (Whether this would consti-
tute perjury is problematical.)
Barteaux stated, "My duties are to manage that part of
the organization which conducts name traces and handles
141bid., Part II, p. 29.
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 the records
for the ARPf"3 ved `FQ ft l tae 1 0,04EO7/08 : CIA-RM1 OR&)QQ4QO MOQ5?le9knows. Do
"Q. Upon request, sir, did you perform such a
name tracing to one Armando Lopez Estrada?
"A. I did.
"Q. Did you come across his name?
"A. I did.
"Q. And, did you determine from your records
whether there had been any contact between your
agency and Mr. Lopez Estrada in 1976?
"A. In May of 1976 Mr. Estrada called the agency,
Lopez Estrada, excuse me, called the agency on the
public phone, a published number, and refused to
give us any subject matter which he would like to
discuss and that, after considerable effort, the call
was terminated because we did not know what he
wanted to talk about."16
Here was the second clinker. Why on earth did the
prosecutor ask this question? All it did was establish that
Lopez Estrada had in fact been in touch with the Agency
as late as 1976, and open the door to embarrassing cross-
examination by the defense. In fact, as the defense attorney
correctly pointed out when he then succeeded in having
Lopez Estrada recalled to counter this testimony, "It is
not true rebuttal." 17
Barteaux was then asked if he had conducted a name
check for "Red Bob," and indicated that he had, and that
there were no records of any such name. This, and this
alone, would seem to be what he should have been called
for, if he were a legitimate witness. But his cross-examination
was mind-boggling. Consider O'Donnell's opening questions:
"Q. Sir, did you look for the name of Grayston
Lynch in your records?
"A. Grayston Lynch?
"Q. Yes.
"A. I don't believe so, no.
"Q. Do you know him to have been a former CIA
agent?
"A. No, I do not."18
Here we have the head records keeper for the CIA, who
knows all about Lopez Estrada. and, as we shall see, Pedro
Gil, and he doesn't know who Grayston Lynch is, the same
Grayston Lynch whom the entire world knows of as the
CIA man in charge of the Bay of Pigs. Technically,however,
employees of the CIA are case officers and members, and
"agents" applies to non-employees engaged by case officers
in various ways. It is likely that Barteaux was answering the
question literally, deliberately misleading the court -a
typical CIA practice.
In any event, Barteaux's concluding testimony on cross-
examination was perhaps the most damaging single item for
the prosecution in the entire trial. It follows:
"Q. Sir, as custodian for the Central Intelligence
Agency, are you aware that Mr. Pedro Gil was in the
employ of your agency until 1974?
"MR. SANFORD: Objection, Your Honor, beyond
the scope of the direct.
15Tbid.
16Jbid.
171bid., p. 40.
18Jbid., p. 31.
you know whether he was?
"THE WITNESS: Yes, I do know.
"Q. He was, was he not? You paid him right up to
1974, did you not?
"MR. SANFORD: Objection, again going beyond-
"THE COURT: Let's say that he is. We are going
to allow the question and the answer. You can
answer the question.
"THE WITNESS: What was it?
"THE COURT: You paid him
"THE WITNESS: He received
'74."19
up until 1974?
money through
Here is where the prosecution's case went down the
drain. Pedro Gil never took the stand. Up until this point
there was no testimony of contact between the defendants
and the CIA since at the latest 1965, except for Lopez
Estrada's poignant reunion with "Red Bob" fifteen years
after the Bay of Pigs. Robert Barteaux, records keeper,
just happens to know that Pedro Gil received payments
until 1974. It is as if the CIA and the Justice Department
dragged up, from the bowels of the building at Langley,
the one person who would put into evidence just what the
defense wanted to but couldn't. Contacts, actual payments
by the CIA to one of the defendants continuing for thirteen
years after the Bay of Pigs.
According to one observer at the trial, the CIA lawyer,
Edward Cohen, ostentatiously tensed in his chair and glared
at Barteaux when he testified about the payments. One
would think that the Assistant General Counsel of the CIA
would be more circumspect, unless, of course, he was
playing to the jury.
191bid., pp. 38-39.
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 The prose cuOp rauckfar rgeuleaste 2was 004/07t 08d:
around the implausibility of i,opcz Estrada's tc: tim.ony,
ridiculing the idea that instructions seventeen years before
about different weapons and operations and from different
people, could apply today. He made the argument; but it
hardly had the same impact when the defense reminded the
jury that Mr. Barteaux, the government's own witness,
the CIA big shot, had told them that Pedro Gil continued
in the pay of the CIA for so many, many years.20
The Weapons
There is another oddity in this trial which involves the
weapons. Lopez Estrada testified that they had been buried
since 1966 and that they were very dirty. But Joe Crank-
shaw, the Miami Herald reporter who covered the trial, was
in past years an infantry officer, and he looked at the
weapons closely. It was hard to believe, he told CovertAction,
that they could have been buried on a swampy Caribbean
island for eleven years. The bores were clean and unrusted,
with no pitting, and they were still covered with cosmoline,
the packing grease used for new, unused weapons. Yet there
was no testimony at the trial about the actual condition of
the weapons, or their apparent ages. It seems that no one
close to the case believes that there was a cache on that
island, or that these weapons carne from such a place.
An Analysis of the Trial
While the apparent decision not to press for a conviction
in this case cannot be viewed in a vacuum, the trial in many
ways speaks for itself. No one experienced in criminal law
can read that transcript without wondering. The most im-
portant testimony for the defense arose either in cross-
examination of defense witnesses by the prosecution, or
came from the mouth of the key prosecution rebuttal
witness. A shaky witness whose testimony could no doubt
have been stricken was left unscathed.
The CIA, which could have sealed the prosecution's
case, instead exploded it. Why was there never a prosecu-
tion witness called from the CIA to state, unequivocally,
no, these men are not in the employ of the CIA; no, we
have not given them weapons; and no, there was no "Red
Bob" or anyone else authorized to present Armando
Lopez Estrada with a map to a cache of weapons.
There are two glaring possibilities. Perhaps it is all true,
and despite the government's protestations to the contrary,
the CIA is still arming the Cuban exiles. Or, even if it is not
true, perhaps Lopez Estrada and his colleagues know too
much. Perhaps the CIA knew that if he were convicted,
he might talk, and if he talked, who knows what might have
20There is a complicated legal point here, which might be of inter-
est to lawyers. It relates to the position taken throughout the
trial by the defense that the defendants did not know they had
to register the weapons. The judge, the defense attorneys and the
prosecutor all agreed in the conference on instructions to the
jury that, although knowledge was an element insofar as the
possession must be knowing, and insofar as the items must be
known to be firearms, the government did not have to prove that
the defendants knew that firearms had to be registered. Trans-
cript, January 9, 1978, Part 11, pp. 53-54. Yet, when the instruc-
tions were actually given to the jury, they were led to believe,
over and over, that an honest mistake might be an excuse. Trans-
cript, January 10, 1978, pp. 14, 15, 16. According to one news
account, this was a major factor in the jury's decision to acquit.
Miami News, January 11, 1978.
CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
come out? Then, of course, there is the whole political
context.
Political Conclusions
In the final analysis, then, what is United States policy
towards Cuba, and what is being condoned under the eyes
of the government? The activities of the exiles have been
known for years. Except for the breaks in the Letelier case,
which are tentative at best, virtually nothing has been done.
Whether the prosecutions in the assassination case will lead
to more than a handful of convictions is doubtful. Brigade
2506 is alive and well. And, it seems, still being supplied.
It is possible, as they claim, that the CIA is not at present
supplying much in the way of arms or money to the exiles.
although one can never be sure. It was a shock to many
when Robert Barteaux testified that payments were being
made up through 1974. But, since 1973, there has been a
new factor in the equation: Chile.
It is no secret, even before the Townley link became
known, that the Chilean junta was amenable, even eager, to
use Cuban exiles for its dirty work, and to pay them in
weapons and funds for their troubles--weapons and funds
that they could use against Cuba with Pinochet's blessings.
From as early as 1974 it was clear that DINA was working
with Cuban exiles, handing out assignments and trans-
shipping weapons in payment.
One new development, in fact, has brought the Chilean
menace even closer to home. Over the past few years, the
incredibly repressive regime of Eric Gairy in Grenada has
become Chile's one friend in the Caribbean, the only country
that consistently votes with Chile in the OAS. And., more
importantly, the only place in the Caribbean where Chilean
naval vessels can, and do, dock with impunity. According to
leading opponents of the Gairy regime, in the latter half of
1977 Chilean Navy ships began docking at St. George's,
Grenada, and one such ship was observed, in the middle of
the night, offloading huge numbers of crates. The crates
were all marked "Medical Supplies," but they were all
long, narrow crates, the kind weapons come in. They were
taken away and hidden. Why medical supplies would be
offloaded in the middle of the night is a good question.
Why they would be hidden away and not appear in medical
facilities is an even better one. There is a real danger that
Chile is transshipping weapons to the Cuban exiles via
Grenada, close to both Venezuela and the Dominican
Republic, known exile centers.
The lessons to be drawn from trials such as these, and
from all the current developments, are complex but power-
ful. For one thing, one can never underestimate the evil
intentions of these forces. The much vaunted invasion of
Cuba is a will-o'-the-wisp; the Cuban homeland seems
secure. But the petty violence and the mindless bombing
and killing by the exiles are serious threats to world peace
unless and until the forces in a position to control and
crush this terrorism do so. The investigations which are
breaking-and those which have not yet done so-Hurst be
encouraged and pushed. North Americans, particularly,
must demand an end to the unchecked excesses of the
exile community in our midst, and the world at large must
unite against Chilean fascism. Si, se puede.
-WS
14 CovertAction Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R0004000400 AT&r 1 (July 1978)
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
"RESEARCHING CONSUMERS":
THE MARKET FOR DESTABILIZATION
In the fall of 1977, a select group of more than 450 resi-
dents of Kingston, Jamaica found on their doorsteps one
morning some young people armed with a new kind of wea-
pon in furtherance of the CIA/multinational-inspired war
against democratic socialist Prime Minister Michael Manley.
This time the weapon was not the guns and explosives
which had become commonplace during the well-known de-
stablization attempts against Manley's left-leaning govern-
ment, but a long, seemingly innocent questionnaire, which
on closer inspection proved equally chilling in its implica-
tions for the future of the economically plagued and
violence-torn island.
CovertAction Information Bulletin obtained a copy of
the questionnaire, ambiguously entitled "Consumer
Research Progect: A Study of Three Communities in
Kingston, Jamaica," and with the assistance of a former
CIA operations officer and an academic expert in social
science and opinion research, we have examined the docu-
ment in detail and cone to the conslusion that a new overt
ingredient has been added to the covert war against Jamaica.
It is highly likely that this project was conceptualized and
initiated as a method not only to recruit new CIA informers
and agents on the island, but also to poll various strata of
the island residents as to their willingness to accept or par-
ticipate in a foreign-inspired or supported coup.
Jamaica, as we reported in the Winter 1976 issue of
CounterSpy, had been subjected to a campaign of destabil-
ization similar to that which toppled the Allende govern-
ment in Chile, and this new method of operation may be
but a continuation of that policy. What follows is our study
of the questionnaire and some attempt to analyze its real
meaning.
been made in designing the questionnaire to ensure that
you can never be identified from your response."
Without any doubt, this statement is an outright lie. Not
only were the respondents, as the letter admits, "specially
chosen," but also each person answering the questionnaire
was given a "Questionnaire Number" by the interviewer to
write in the blank which was provided. This can only mean
that there exists a master list of respondents, and this num-
ber enables the answers to be recorded, correlated and ana-
lyzed with respect to their names and addresses. Even if
each person's name and answers were not to be printed in
one of Kingston's daily papers, the guarantee of anonymity
is patently false. We shall discuss the implications of this
later.
Additionally, the "Dear Respondent" letter indicates
that those who prepared the questions were well attuned to
the formidable political development and awareness of
Jamaican citizens today. Anticipating this, the letter
emphasizes rather defensively: "The project is in no way
connected with any government agency, neither will the
results be made available to such an agency or organization.
The results will be used for educational purposes only and
will better explain how people like you feel about many
products you buy and many of the social and economic
problems that all Jamaicans face. What you will tell us may
help lead to changes in these areas that will benefit people
across this wonderful land of ours."
It is implicit in the above statements that the govern-
ment referred to as having no involvement in the question-
naire is the Jamaican government. This is undoubtedly true.
But the letter does not even hint, nor would many of the
respondents be aware, that in fact governments of other
The Recipients
A "Dear Respondent" letter attached at the beginning of
the questionnaire thanks the recipients for their "willing
participation" in answering questions which are "the results
of years of research and much effort which has gone into
their preparation." The more than 450 subjects of the re-
search are assured in the letter: "In any event, your re-
sponse will be completely anonymous. Every effort has
countries-the U.S. government, the CIA, and the multina-
tional corporations they protect-have a great deal of
interest in the answers to the carefully prepared questions.
Who Is Behind The Questionnaire?
The project is ostensibly being directed by Lee Roy
Duffus, a 39-year-old Jamaican-born graduate of New York's
Pratt Institute, where he received a B.S. in Mechanical En-
CovertAction 15
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
gineering, and Purdue University, where he received an M.S.
in Industrial Administration. In 1971 Duffus began a Ph.D.
program in Operations Management, but after he completed
his coursework he returned to Jamaica to work with Exxon
Oil Company as chemicals manager at their Kingston re-
finery. Duffus cancelled his in absentia academic status in
January 1973 to continue with Exxon at least through
1975, and probably until mid-1977. After setting up the
questionnaire and supervising the initial interviewing of
respondents, he went to Nassau, Bahamas, for a few weeks
as a "consultant" in an undivulged field of work. He then
returned to Kingston for a short time to ch, ck the progress
of the project, and then on to Purdue, where, in early 1978,
he re-registered in the Ph.D. program. Duffus went back
once more to Kingston in late January for about two weeks,
apparently to pick up the completed questionnaires.
(b) Inclination to accept foreign aid and economic
guidance versus real Jamaican political and economic
independence.
(c) Inclination to accept foreign corporate investment,
profits, and imports, as well as foreign products as prefer-
able or superior to Jamaican products versus negative
feelings toward foreign imperialism.
Following are some of the questions and
analyze them:
In the interest of fairness to all, it would be bet-
ter to use foreign soldiers for police in this coun-
try in the event of internal disorder instead of
Jamaican soldiers or police.
An international police force ought to be the
only group in the world allowed to have weapons.
20. I don't see why it's sn imnnrtantthat+h;s
._..
u
be
d
free to
etermine wnicn system of
government it wants.
40. It is ridiculous to say that no other nation has a
right to tell Jamaica how to manage its own
affairs.
o~ p0
Taking into account both Duffus' academic training and
the technical nature of his employment with Exxon, it is
unlikely that this man was really in charge of such a large-
scale, politically sensitive project on his own. Clearly, a
research project of this magnitude, involving the design
and printing of the questionnaire, design of the computer
program, hiring and coordinating employees to conduct
the over 450 interviews, the required computer time, and
the correlation and analysis of the data, could not have
been paid for out of Mr. Duffus' pocket. Yet, when
reached by a New York Times reporter, one of Duffus'
academic advisors said that indeed Duffus was conducting
such a study as part of his Ph.D. thesis program, and that
he was paying for it entirely out of his own pocket.
The Questionnaire
The questionnaire contains 133 separate questions,
many of which include sub-parts, totalling 415 items re-
quiring answers. No small wonder the letter apologizes that
"unfortunately, all questions must be answered. . com-
pletely and honestly," reinforced further by a "please an-
swer all questions" printed at the top of each page.
The scope of the statements and questions contain such
a high degree of political content that even a layman under-
stands this is not the kind of "consumer research" Ralph
Nader, for example, might undertake. Part I contains 48
questions with a 9-point scale from "strongly agree" to
''strongly disagree." The gist of the questions, most of
which are suggestively phrased, is to place the respondent
on a scale measuring Jamaican nationalism versus accep-
tance or positive feelings about foreign political domina-
tion and foreign imperialism. The respondent's attitudes are
assessed in the following areas:
(a) Inclination to emigrate (especially
versus being firmly rooted in Jamaica.
to the U.S.)
The strength of feeling in the answers given to these
show how receptive the respondent would be in the event
of direct political, economic, or military intervention in
Jamaican affairs.
3. It is silly to love one's country more than any
other just because you were born there.
14. I don't feel patriotic because I see too many
flaws in my country.
16. I don't care which country I live in as long as
I am happy.
18. Our country is probably no better than any
other.
22. I don't know much about other countries,
but I am not satisfied with this one.
24. One should strive for loyalty to mankind before
considering loyalty to any particular country.
30. I don't feel any special pride in being identified
with Jamaica.
31. The high cost of living and other hardships far
exceed the benefits which Jamaica derives from
being an independent country.
42. It is unreasonable to ask Jamaicans to accept
economic hardships just to ensure that the coun-
try remains independent.
43. Jamaicans should be willing to accept any
sacrifice that ensures that the country remains
independent.
These statements are made to assess whether the "con-
sumer" (respondent) is nationalistic, loyal, proud of their
heritage and identity, or on the other hand, how anti-
Jamaica and anti-government they might be. It would be
difficult for the respondent to feel neutral toward these
statements, so they are effective in deriving the kind of
16 CovertAction Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
Number 1 (July 1978)
 PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS
Statement
11. Jamaica should have greater consultation
with more experienced nations in develop-
ing its Laws.
12. Jamaica was better-off before Independence.
13. Immigration should be controlled by on inter-
national organization rather than by each
country on its own.
14. 1 don't feel patriotic because I see too many
flaws in my country
15. All prices for exported or imported products
should be set by an international trade
committee.
16. 1 don't care which country I live in as long
as I am happy.
17. An international police force ought to be
the only group in the world allowed to
have weapons.
18. Our country is probably no better than
any other.
19. Everyone who loves his country has a duty
to serve it by cooperating with his fellow
citizen in building the country for the
benefit of all.
20. I don't see why it's so important that this
country should be free to determine which
system of government it wants.
21. 1 would prefer to be a citizen of the world
rather than of any particular country.
22. I don't know much about other countries,
but I am not satisfied with this one.
23. I would prefer to be an American rather
than a Jamaican citizen.
Strongly Strongly
Agree Disagree
1 2 3456789 (
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ( )
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9- ( )
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 ( )
9 ( )
Number 1 (July 14roved For Release4/~~BtheClX~u DP81 M0 0980R000400040050-9 CovertAction 17
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
information that obviously is being sought about his or corporations. Statement 41 is especially interesting because
her attitudes. it is difficult to answer either way and not be caught in the
Jamaica should have greater consultation with
more experienced nations in developing its
foreign policies.
Jamaican Art should be preserved at all costs.
I would never trade my Jamaican citizenship for
that of any other country.
The easiest route to economic development is
by imitating more developed countries.
Jamaica should have greater consultation with
more experienced nations in developing its laws.
25. An international committee on education should
have full control over what is taught in all
countries about history and politics.
These statements probe the respondents' views about
independence and national sovereignty as compared to the
virtues of outside direction in developing the laws, domestic
and foreign political-economic policies of the country, and
the virtue of imitating other countries' systems. Depending
on the rest of the answers given, this latter group could
then be interpreted as demonstrating a propensity either
toward free-enterprise capitalism or in favor of socialism.
23. I would prefer to be an American rather than a
Jamaican citizen.
28. If I could obtain a permanent visa to go to the
United States I would leave Jamaica as soon as
possible.
Answers to these two statements clearly will help the
project evaluators to determine the person's readiness to
leave Jamaica forever. Because the U.S. is specified in
statement 28, this is a surreptitious way of drawing out
political sympathies vis-a-vis the United States.
12. Jamaica was better-off before Independence.
32. Jamaica was better off before independence
from England.
These two statements take a reading of the respondent's
views about Jamaica's colonial relationship with the United
Kingdom. As with statement 28, this isolates the U.K.,
apparently with a similar intent in mind.
33. Any foreigner who sees an opportunity to invest
his money here and does so should be free to do
whatsover he likes with his profit, so long as he
obeys the Laws of Jamaica.
35. Since foreign companies invest a lot of money in
Jamaica it is only fair that they be allowed to
take their profit out of the country.
37. Non Jamaicans should be allowed to own land in
Jamaica if they desire to do so.
39. It is not important if any business is local or
foreign owned, since they both serve the country.
41. The need to develop local industry is not a strong
enough reason to deprive people of the variety of
products available through import.
Once again, the power of suggestion is employed. These
statements are designed for one purpose: to provide a gauge
of the respondent's acceptance and positive liking of or
opposition to active involvement in the Jamaican economy
by foreign investors, both by individuals and multinational
19. Everyone who loves his country has a duty to
serve it by cooperating with his fellow citizen in
building the country for the benefit of all.
26. No duty is more important than duty to one's
own country.
38. Loyalty to one's moral convictions is more im-
portant than loyalty to one's country.
48. If all Jamaicans are self reliant then the entire
nation will be self reliant.
Of the 48 statements in this part of the questionnaire,
these are practically the only ones which can be categorized
as being phrased in a positive tone. Yet, each of them has a
built-in yardstick of the person's attitude toward Jamaica.
Note that the first statement is as mild and non-controver-
sial as possible, but it is designed to get the respondent
warmed up to the heavy statements which follow.
34. Censorship can never be justified in a free country.
As with a number of other statements in the question-
naire, this one is deeper than it seems. The respondent's
sense of idealism is being tested against his or her willing-
ness to accept or promote an authoritarian approach. The
answer can in turn be correlated with the attitudes expressed
about the system of government in Jamaica today.
27. If I can help it I would not fight for any country.
This statement is not presented solely to discover
whether the respondent is a pacifist, or even a coward. It
could be expected to provide a small number of respondents
who might take up arms in military or paramilitary activity
(on behalf of a country other than Jamaica) if the oppor-
tunity arose, and who if acceptable on other levels, might
therefore be recruitable.
6. I am not happy with everything I see in Jamaica
and because of this I would consider leaving this
country to live in another that is more suitable.
10. Regardless of the benefits to the country, I am
unwilling to work in any capacity that is not in
my best interest.
29. I would like to go from country to country and
settle down where I am happiest.
These statements seek to evaluate the degree to which
the respondent is interested in personal gain and comfort.
As in the previous case, they can also be applied to gauge
the person's recruitability as a kind of mercenary (in a
military or other capacity).
36. In general, imported products are superior to
locally produced products.
44. There should be a greater variety of brands in
the products available at the supermarket.
18 CovertAction Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R00040004.1 (July 19178)
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
45. It is not necessary to sell more than one brand of
any product in a small country such as ours.
46. In general price is more important to me than
which country a product was made in.
47. It is better to buy Jamaican made products
whenever they are available than to buy im-
ported products.
These statements begin to look at the respondent's
orientation towards imported consumer goods or, put
more bluntly, their predisposition to be bribed by the
availability of such goods. The person's attitudes in this
area are also assessed in the latter parts of the question-
naire.
Class Analysis
Part II of the questionnaire draws from the "anony-
mous" respondent a wide range of hard data which can
be used to establish quite precisely their economic and
social class position in Jamaican society. Not only the nor-
mal questions like age, marital status, number and ages of
children, type of dwelling lived in, educational level attained,
and occupation are asked. It demands to know first the
combined weekly income of the respondent and his or her
spouse, and then three questions later, as if to cross-check
against the first answer, the respondent's annual income.
Question 26 asks, "In general, would you say that you
belong to the: 1) Lower lower class; 2) Lower class; 3) Mid-
dle class; 4) Upper middle class; 5) Upper class." This is not
just an idle question. It leaves us more than an inference as
to what is the fundamental underlying dynamic of this
self-proclaimed "consumer research project"-to force
"willing" and "anonymous" respondents to reveal what are,
in anybody's book, intimate details about their lives and
feelings.
The respondents are asked about their reading habits,
which newspapers and other publications they read, and
which parts of the newspapers they read (i.e., political
news, other local news, comics, international news, sports,
editorials, birth/death notices, society, horoscope, etc.),
measured on a scale from "extremely interested" to "not
interested." The respondent is asked to apply this same
scale and another "extremely informed" to "uninformed"
scale to their awareness of local and international political
and economic events.
Fifteen countries are listed (U.S., Ethiopia, Japan,
China, France, United Kingdom, Guyana, Soviet Union,
Mexico, Germany, Trinidad, Nigeria, Egypt, Brazil, and
Cuba), and the respondents are asked how many times (if
any) they have visited each. Then: "Given a choice of a two
week, all expense paid trip to any of the above listed coun-
tries, which would you prefer to visit? Why?" Another
esoteric question that yields the researcher considerable in-
sight into the respondent's political-cultural orientation and
sophistication.
Part III is the only part of the questionnaire that deals
with what traditionally might be called "consumer research"
(products, prices, quality, etc.). It is designed to measure
feelings about Jamaican vs. other products. It seeks out the
respondent's preferences (on a "Satisfactory"-"Unsatisfac-
tory" scale) of eight different consumer items (spray
deodorant, vitamins, mirrors, jewelry, toothpaste, canned
foods, ladies clothing, and portable electric fans) in terms
of five countries of manufacture (Jamaica, the U.S., United
Kingdom, Trinidad, and Japan). This particular section also
measures the person's honesty and consistency, first with
regard to Jamaican products (by asking the same questions
twice about products produced there), and then by making
the respondent answer the same question all over again for
all the products and all the countries, but this time slightly
re-phrased with a ranked 1 to 5 scale of "how favorable/
unfavorable they (the same five countries) appeal to you as
a source" of the products.
The final section of the questionnaire seeks the same
kind of information about the respondent's partiality toward
the U.S., United Kingdom, Japan, and Trinidad, as compared
to Jamaica. This time however, the range of variables is
made considerably wider than just the consumer products
of the respective countries. The intent of these queries is
to probe the attitudes and affinities felt by the respondent
toward rival imperialisms. Take the following for example:
Compared to Jamaica, would you say that in (the four
countries)-
(1) The Government is more/less/equally effective;
(2) Workers are more/less/equally reliable;
(3) People are more/less/equally self reliant;
(4) Life is not as hard/harder/just as hard;
(5) People are more/less/equally intelligent;
(6) The educational level is higher/lower/about the
same;
(7) People do not have to work as hard/work
harder/work just as hard;
(8) Life is more/less/just as relaxed;
(9) People are more/less/about as trustworthy;
1(10) People are more/less/just as interested in
helping each other.
The Big Question: Why?
To try to understand why a 39-year-old Jamaican who
worked until recently as a technician with one of America's
largest conglomerates was conducting an irrefutably political
"consumer research project" far afield from his own back-
ground or work in the fall of 1977 in Kingston, Jamaica, we
must give some brief indicators of the political climate pre-
vious to and during the period of the project.
Number I (July 1978) CovertAction 19
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
 In the pre-inde pxi-YejlF aWgtiggn~99f RENY : CI Pj-nFQFN81- L' QM 9 PP 9 Qng~the then Chief of
parties, Alexander Bustamente's Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) Station, Norman M. Descoteaux. Shortly after returning to
and Norman Washington Manley's Progressive National
Party (PNP), were much the same. Both were tied in with
the leading labor unions on the island, and advocated na-
tionalism and independence within the Commonwealth.
After independence in 1962, the JLP government proceeded
to maintain good relations with both Britain, with whom it
was tightly allied economically, and the United States,
whose tourists were a major source of income, and whose
aluminum companies, since World War II, had been essential
to the local economy. In 1972, when the government
switched to the PNP, and Norman Manley's son Michael,
also a union leader, became Prime Minister, little changes
were foreseen.
However, two years after entering office, Manley shocked
the conservative elements in the country by announcing the
new program of the PNP-"Democratic Socialism." From
1974, Manley has attempted to chart a moderately socialist
course, nationalizing portions of the aluminum industry,
banks, sugar cane plantations, and the like. Early on he
made what in the eyes of the U.S. government, and especi-
ally the CIA, was the cardinal sin. He became friendly with
Fidel Castro. Manley has visited Cuba, and Fidel has visited
Jamaica. There have been exchanges of technicians, edu-
cators, agronomists, doctors, etc.
By 1976 it was clear that neither U.S. nor British intelli-
gence were happy with developments, and during that year
a massive destabilization campaign was waged. Guns, thugs,
explosives and poisons were imported, and violence became
widespread. By June of 1976, Manley had to declare a
State of Emergency, and forbid completely the possession
of weapons. Within a short time the violence had abated,
although the damage done to the tourist industry has still
not been completely reversed. Destabilization in such a
blatant form had not worked. The example of Chile was
too fresh in the minds of the people, and some of the ham-
handed attempts at toppling the Manley government were
almost carbon copies of some of the tricks pulled in Chile.
In September 1976, Philip Agee went to Jamaica at the
invitation of the Jamaica Council for Human Rights, a legal,
civil rights organization. While there, Agee investigated and
exposed the intensive, CIA-backed destabilization campaign,
and publicly named nine CIA officers then operating in
Britain, where he and his family had lived since 1972, Agee
was served with a deportation order. After a protracted
eight-month struggle which affected a broad cross-section
of British public opinion, he was finally deported in June
1977. Coincidentally, at this same moment, the "Con-
sumer Research Project" was being readied.
It is clear that around this time in Jamaica, as the State
of Emergency was lifted, a new approach was underway:
extensive economic destabilization. Foreign loans became
more and more difficult; the importation of foreign prod-
ucts became harder; credit was cut off. And the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund made it known that it was willing
to consider loans to Jamaica only if certain preconditions
were filled. Meanwhile, the right-wing, which controlled
the JLP, and maintained a powerful minority in the PNP,
began to increase its attacks on the Manley government.
The local press, which was controlled entirely by the con-
servative, wealthy few families which dominated the local
economy, became nearly rabid in their condemnation of
democratic socialism.
The situation in Jamaica is still very fluid. Manley has
been forced to accept certain IMF loans to maintain inter-
national credit. The requirements laid down by the IMF
remain in large part secret. The forces on the island have
become more and more polarized, and pressures on the
government mount. The right has made it clear that it
would not be averse to drastic action whether an in-
ternal or an external coup--and Manley will not be able to
appease both wings of his party at the same time much
longer.
In the midst of this delicate situation, the significance
of this "consumer research" becomes clear.
While it is not possible to determine the personal motives
of Lee Roy Duffus (aside perhaps from getting a Ph.D.), it
is clear that this project could not be solely his own. Con-
sider the number of questions. Presuming that all of the
450-plus respondents followed instructions and answered
each and every one of the 415 questions/statements in the
questionnaire (which must have taken them an average of
two hours each-quite a chunk of interviewing time for a
simple "consumer research project"), there would be a
total of more than 188,750 responses on the completed
forms. For obvious statistical and analytical reasons (and
as Duffus confirms in his "Dear Respondent" letter), a
study with this volume of raw data to be tabulated, cor-
related and analyzed would require a sophisticated computer
program and sufficient computer time.
If the questions "are the results of years of research,"
had Duffus been working on these questions while on the
job, or during his lunch breaks, as Exxon's chemicals
manager since 1971? Moreover, a person like Duffus would
hardly have either the means or the training and background
to analyze properly the data, much less to apply it to what
Duffus calls "the social and economic problems that all
Jamaicans face." Such a program requires organization.
Since Purdue University has no known program of any kind
in Jamaica or related to Jamaica at its West Lafayette,
Indiana campus, and since the Jamaican government knew
nothing about this project until informed about it from a
number of the "specially chosen" respondents, we must
consider carefully whether an outside organization might
be behind the whole operation.
20 CovertAction Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040860ar 1 (July 1978)
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08
When a New York Times reporter spoke to Duffus about
the project, and asked him about the contents of his ques-
tionnaire, his funding, the degree of the Jamaican govern-
ment's knowledge and sanction of the project, etc., Duffus
seemed strangely naive and defensive. He refused any com-
ment on the source of funding or the relationship, if any,
of Exxon to the overall effort. He promised to call the
reporter back, but never did.
In exposing this covert Caribbean project, we are cog-
nizant of three important factors.
1. Duffus may or may not actually have been conscious
of the political implications of such a project, although as
both a Ph.D. candidate and a citizen of contemporary
Jamaica, such ignorance would seem inconceivable.
2. Exxon may or may not have been involved directly,
since it has not been established conclusively that Duffus
was an Exxon employee during the period the project was
being formulated and implemented. He was, however,
definitely employed by them in the recent past.
3. Exxon may or may not have been fronting for the
CIA if it was employing Duffus at the time. It is patently
obvious that the project is not a simple toothpaste consumer
survey, and that the project must involve a major financial
input. It is also curious that a Purdue University spokesperson
said Duffus was funding the project "entirely on his own."
Given the 450-plus sample, it seems likely that there
would emerge about 25 to 50 people that fit into the CIA's
desired mold, and who therefore would likely be recruitable
to do the CIA's bidding in whatever way is best suited to
their abilities, whether in Jamaica or elsewhere. In addition
to deriving a number of recruits there are strong indications
in the questionnaire of another, even more sinister objective.
Statements 5, 17, 20 and 40 suggest that Lee Roy Duffus
and friends were really asking what the respondent's stance
is toward a (hypothetical) foreign military intervention or
a (hypothetical) coup d'etat, directed at Jamaica. State-
ment 27 and to some extent statements 6, 10 and 29 are
looking for prospective first-line participants in such inter-
ventions in Jamaica's internal affairs.
What better research could an intelligence agency pos-
sibly want than the results of this research on Jamaica's
"consumers"?
The history of the CIA is replete with covert operations
of various sizes and shapes run under corporate cover. The
offer of $1 million to the CIA by ITT for direct application
against the presidential campaign of Salvador Allende, and
its subsequent participation with assistance from the CIA
and other companies in spending some $700,000 in the
3-year destabilization program is the most famous example.
There are also numerous other cases where private com-
panies have been active participants in CIA operations,
some of them initiated and entirely funded by the CIA,
which are known as "proprietaries."
The list is lengthy, but includes Fodor Travel Publi-
cations, J. Walter Thompson Company, Robert Mullen
Company, and as former State Department intelligence
man John Marks points out, Southern Capital and Manage-
ment Corporation, Southern Air Transport, Air America,
Africair, Pan African Airlines, United Business Associates,
Joseph Z. Taylor & Associates, and many more, including
those yet to be discovered.
Other companies, legitimate in their own right, have
provided cover to CIA personnel in various parts of the
U.S. and around the world. Some justify their actions by
reasons of patriotism, but most collaborate because it
helps their business. For example, Howard Hughes' former
lieutenant, Robert Maheu, testified that Hughes believed
that "if he ever became involved in any problem with the
government, it would be beneficial for him to be in a posi-
tion of being a front."
Obviously the CIA is just as interested in maintaining its
present cover arrangements and in forging new ones as
Howard Hughes was in fronting for them to serve his own
ends. A five-year plan of the CIA is strong evidence of the
Agency's fear of the vulnerabilities of its traditional cover
arrangements with the Department of State. Newsweek
quotes the document: "We
impediments by creating a
operations officers."
are dealing with our cover
truly clandestine corps of
With numerous similar "social science" surveys, many
created in the 1960s and 1970s by the Rand Corporation
in Southeast Asia and Latin America, as a precedent, the
so-called "consumer research project" of Lee Roy Duffus
could well be a signal of one small part of the changing
mode of operations undertaken by the CIA.
-LW
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RECENT NEWS
Whistleblowers' Conference
On the weekend of May 19-20, 1978, a Whistleblowers'
Conference was held in Washington, DC, under the auspices
of the Institute for Policy Studies. The lengthy conference
included talks by legislators, news reporters, and a number
of well-known whistleblowers. Among them were Daniel
Ellsberg of Pentagon Papers fame; John Stockwell, Donald
Jordan, and Frank Snepp, all formerly of the CIA; journalists
Daniel Schorr and Gloria Emerson; and Senator James
Abourezk. Participants from IPS included Saul Landau,
Robert Borosage, Marc Raskin, and Ralph Stavins, the
Director of the Government Accountability Project of IPS,
the organizer of the conference.
Plans for the publication of the proceedings of the con-
ference are underway, and persons interested in receiving
a copy should drop a line to Ralph Stavins, Institute for
Policy Studies, 1901 Q Street, NW, Washington, DC 20009.
Harvey Point CIA Base Exposed
A feature story in the June 25, 1978 Virginian-Pilot
and Ledger-Star, a Norfolk, Virginia newspaper, has exposed
the Defense Department Ordnance Testing Base at Harvey
Point, North Carolina, for what it really is: "a secret
Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary training base."
According to the article, which was picked up by news-
papers throughout the United States, "the base was acti-
vated in 1960 as an equipment staging area for the ill-
fated CIA-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.
Since then, the CIA has trained its officers, mercenaries,
and foreign troops there for operations in the Belgian
Congo, Cuba, and parts of Latin America and Southeast
Asia." This base appears to augment the better-known
facilities at Camp Peary, Virginia, where the CIA has con-
ducted espionage training for many years.
The base, and the air space over it, are off limits to
everyone, but local residents tell strange tales of hearing
explosions and seeing flashes of light, and seeing small
planes entering and leaving. But most chilling of all are
the stories about the cars. Every few days, Navy trucks
bring batches of new passenger cars onto the base, and
every few days demolished cars are brought out. Some,
according to neighbors, have their hoods blown off; others
are smashed flat. It seems clear that the CIA is still training
terrorists in passenger car demolition just like the training
which Michael V. Townley received and later put to use in
the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt.
This is not training to defend this or any other country.
This is training in brutal murder, no more, no less, and it
would be interesting to know by what theory the Defense
Department justifies such activity.
EXCHANGE SUBSCRIPTIONS WANTED
The CovertAction Information Bulletin is anxious to enter into exchange subscriptions with all other progressive
publications. If you will drop us a note indicating that you have entered a subscription for us, we will immediately
enter one for you. If you have a publication you believe would be worth our describing in our Publications of
Interest section, please send us appropriate details.
Number 1 (July 1978)
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
NAMING NAMES
A regular feature of the CovertAction Information Bulletin.
We do not believe that one can separate the dirty work
of the CIA from the people who perform it. The exposure
of past operations is valuable, but it is only half the job.
How many times have we all heard the CIA, the FBI and
others say, whenever a particularly nasty covert operation
has been exposed, "Oh yes, but we don't do that any more."
We believe that they do, and that the same people are often
involved.
As a service to our readers, and to progressive people
around the world, we will continue to expose high-ranking
CIA officials whenever and wherever we find them. This
column, we hope, will usually be longer. In preparing the
premier issue, we have been unable to conduct much of
our regular research, and have one item -for our readers:
The new CIA Chief of Station in JAMAICA is Dean J:
Almy, Jr. Almy replaces Norman Descoteaux, who was
exposed by Philip Agee in late 1976, during the Manley
reelection campaign. Almy was born December 18, 1926,
in New Jersey. From 1951 to 1955 he was a "political
analyst" for the Department of the Army-a dead giveaway
for early CIA activity. From 1956 to 1958 he was apolitical
officer at the Medan, Indonesia consulate; from 1960 to
1962 he was a political officer at the Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia embassy; from 1962 to 1965 he was a political
officer -at the Manila, Philippines embassy; and from 1973
till recently he was a political liaison officer at the Madrid,
Spain embassy. During his tenure in Spain, his CIA con-
nections were exposed in the Madrid magazine, Cambio 16.
CovertAction Information Bulletin will appear approximately five to seven times per year. Subscriptions are for
six consecutive issues. All payments must be by check or money order in U.S. funds, payable to Covert Action
Publications.
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Mail to: CovertAction, P.O. Box 50272, F St. Station, Washington, DC 20004.
Number 1 (July 1978) CovertAction 23
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 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81 M00980R000400040050-9
PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST
Some Interesting New Publications
Howard M. Wachtel, The New Gnomes: Multinational
Banks in the Third World, 60 pp., $3.00, plus $.25 postage,
from Transnational Institute, 1901 Q Street, NW, Washing-
ton, DC 20009; or 20 Paulus Potterstraat, Amsterdam
1007, Holland.
Michael T. Klare, Supplying Repression, 56 pp., $2.50,
from The Field Foundation, 100 E. 85th St., New York,
NY 10028. (A detailed look at U.S. military and private
aid to human rights violators around the world.)
Some Worthwhile Periodicals
First Principles, the newsletter of the Center for National
Security Studies, 10 issues/year, $15 ($10/students) from
CNSS, 122 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002.
(An excellent review of the abuses of the U.S. intelligence
community, with a comprehensive bibliography in each
issue.)
NACLA Report on the Americas, bi-monthly journal of
the North American Congress on Latin America, $11/year
(for air, add: U.S. & Canada, $4; Mexico, C. Am., Carib.,
$6; S. Am., Eur., $8; rest, $9), from NACLA, P.O. Box 57,
Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10025. (Well-researched
reports on the political economy of the Americas, with
particular attention to the role of U.S. imperialism.)
Organizing Notes, the newsletter of the Campaign to
Stop Government Spying, available by request to the Cam-
paign, 201 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Room 112, Wash-
ington, DC 20002. (It is suggested that foreign requests
include a contribution to cover airmail postage.) (A review
of activities in the U.S. involving the surveillance practices
of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies.)
State Research, from the United Kingdom, newsletter of
a group of independent security apparatus researchers,
E3/year, U.K. and Europe; $8, elsewhere, individuals;
$16, institutions, from State Research, 9 Poland Street,
London, W1, United Kingdom. (Research notes from a
group of counterspies in the U.K., with much information,
especially about British intelligence, hard to come by
elsewhere.)
CovertAction Information Bulletin
Covert Action Publications, Inc.
P.O. Box 50272
F Street Station
Washington, DC 20004
24 CovertAction r 1 (July 1978)
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