GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81M00980R000200030006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 23, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Collection Tasking
Deputy Director for Resource Management
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
Comptroller
FROM : I !l Special Assistant to the
Director of entra Intel igence
SUBJECT : Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Director would appreciate your comments on the attached
paper prepared by Graham Allison, Dean, JFK School, Harvard University.
Attachments:
as stated
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GUIDELINES FOR CIA
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
The r ort that follows is organized as an outline of talking
points. I land I discussed this format and agreed that it STAT
will serve to highlight the major points. After discussion and
revision, I can translate this directly and quickly into a briefing
paper or a long memorandum or whatever. The form will depend on how
you might want to use it.
The major ideas in this report have been summarized in the cover
memo. Here they are presented in a more logical and ordered form.
This report is organized as follows:
I. THE SETTING
-- why should the United States engage in any clan-
destine activity that clearly violates other
nation's laws?
-- can any action the U.S. takes against non-U.S.
citizens abroad harm important U.S. values and
objectives?
II. A CODE OF ETHICS
-- the importance of guidelines
-- the possibility of useful guidelines
-- the role of guidelines and a code of ethics
-- should the intelligence community be defensive
about guidelines and a code of ethics?
III. ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEM OF GUIDELINES
IV. RULES
-- general principles
-- specific guidelines
V. A PROCESS FOR APPLYING THE RULES
VI. A PROCESS FOR ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES
VII. A PROCESS FOR OVERSEEING PRACTICE IN RULE-WRITING,
APPLICATION, AND ENFORCEMENT
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I. THE SETTING
For any broader presentation of these issues to Congress,
the public, or even within the Agency, one needs a short
preamble that puts the problem in context. A concise, all-purpose
preamble is very hard to do well. People come to this issue with
such varied backgrounds and prejudices:
-- some wonder why the U.S. should engage in any
clandestine action at all;
-- others are skeptical about any restrictions
whatever on U.S. clandestine actions abroad;
-- still others are confused: offended by Soviet
electronic eavesdropping on U.S. citizens' phone
calls or Korean payments to U.S. Congressmen, but
uncomfortable about the basis for their outrage
if CIA engages in equivalent practices in the
Soviet Union and Korea.
A good preamble should establish a common frame of reference
within which to address specific issues. For most interested parties,
it can serve as a reminder of the scope of the problem and some
widely-accepted conclusions. For people who are thinking about these
issues for the first time, it should serve as a general introduction
to major dimensions of the problem. Among the key points to be made
are the following.
A. The U.S. government engages daily in clandestine
activity abroad that is not acknowledged, that violates the
laws of nations against whom it is taken, and that would, if
taken against U.S. citizens, constitute a violation of
American's rights and U.S. law. Some clandestine activity
involves satellites taking pictures of missile silos or wheat
fields; some involves electronic devices plucking from the
air phone calls or other communications; some is just good
old-fashioned espionage where a spy gives the U.S. documents
containing a foreign government's secrets or a double-agent
passes false documents to officials of a foreign government
in the hope of deceiving that government about U.S. inten-
tions or actions.
This activity poses two fundamental questions:
(1) Why should the U.S. engage in any clandestine
activity?
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(2) Can any action the U.S. takes against non-U.S.
citizens harm important U.S. values and
objectives?
B. Why should the United States engage in any clandestine
activity that clearly violates other nation's laws? Because
actions taken by foreign governments in secret can do major and
sometimes irreparable harm to U.S. national secure ty. Because
some nations, especially closed societies like the Soviet Union,
engage in massive efforts to hide from outside view actions that
harm U.S. interests. Because U.S. interests can be advanced by
acquiring information that others do not want us to have--so
long as they do not know that we have collected it. Because U.S.
interests can sometimes be served by influencing events in other
countries by instruments other than di omary or war, and without
acknowledging our role. The recent orgy of revelations has
focused on failures, rather than successes. But it has provided
a number of examples that make the point:
-- without the development of highly sophisticated
and reliable clandestine capabilities, the SALT
Treaties limiting U.S. and Soviet strategic arms
These treaties
otiated
could never have been ne
.
g
commit the Soviet Union not to undertake certain
actions, for example, not to build an ABM system.
Given the closed nature of Soviet society and the
Soviet's unwillingness to allow on-site inspections,
U the U.S. could not have confidence that the Soviets
were adhering to the agreement--except for what
"
national means of veri-
the treaty refers to as
fication." Effective clandestine collection
capabilities are an even more essential prerequisite
of any successful conclusion of current SALT
negotiations.
-- when Black September tArrtr hijacked an Air
France 707 with 100 Israelis aboard, took the plane
to Uganda's Entebbe Airport, and threatened to kill
the hostages unless an equivalent number of Arab
prisoners in Israeli jails were released, what
alternatives to clandestine action existed?
President Amin and the terrorists would not permit
"legal" surveillance of the situation. Actions that
observed local Ugandian law were not likely to free
the hostages. Should the U.S. deny itself a capability
for covert action like the Israeli raid on Entebbe?
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-- if terrorists were diverting plutonium or enriched
uranium from a nuclear reactor in any of a large
number of countries, U.S. security and interests
could require a covert capability to identify the
fact and, if necessary, to take action.
C. Can any action the U.S. takes against non-U.S. citizens
abroad harm important U.S. values and objectives? This is the
other extreme. I have been surprised to discover how many
people are candidly skeptical of any restriction on U.S. intelli-
gence agency's covert actions abroad--beyond the traditional
calculation of whether the value of ,produrt ntitwai qhc the rnct c_
and ricks My reflection on this question has identified at least
three ways in which U.S. intelligence action against non-U.S.
citizens abroad can harm important American values and objectives:
-- The power of the U.S. exam 1 is greatly under-
estimated by most Americans. George Washington's
contention that the force of our example is our
most powerful instrument abroad overstates the
point. But the opposite view is even less tenable.
As the most open society in the world, the U.S. is
most vulnerable to international lawlessness:
terrorist activities, terrorist technologies like
plastique, and even assassination. Weak as it is,
one of our strongest defenses against such action
is to be found in international legal and moral
taboos. Our nation's role in weakening rather than
strengthening such restraint on political assassina-
tion will, I believe, stand as one of the blackest
marks on our record of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
-- Foreign intelligence activities can contravene and
even undermine U.S. freign policy biectives. U.S.
foreign policy objectives are a multi-faceted and
often not entirely compatible amalgam. Because the
instruments of American foreign policy include many
large organizations, it is not possible to achieve
a finely-tuned consistency. But where an agency
engaging in covert actions is given wide discretion,
the likelihood of actions contrary to the prevailing
thrust of American foreign policy increases. The
most celebrated recent example--Chile--in fact
illustrates just the opposite. There, CIA actions
were consistent with direct Presidential order.
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Productive discussion of a "code of ethics" requires a
similar preamble that clears away-anumber of unhelpful pre-
conceptions:
-- the widespread view at the Agency and elsewhere
that it is not possible to devise useful guide-
lines for intelligence activities abroad;
-- the view--prevalent in Congress and the intelli-
gence community--that the overriding purpose of
guidelines and a code of ethics is to tie down
a rogue elephant so as to prevent abuses;
-- the suspicion--in the Agency and elsewhere--that
anyone who advocates a code of ethics must be a
naive moralist with unrealistic expectations about
the effect of such codes on the actual behavior of
members of an organization.
II. A CODE OF ETHICS
Among the points to be made here are:
A. The Importance of Guidelines. The special importance
of guidelines for intelligence professionals abroad and at
home emerges from the juxtaposition of two irreducible facts:.
(1) the necessity for clandestine activity to guarantee U.S.
national security and advance important foreign policy .objectives;
and (2) the likelihood that clandestine activity will violate
important U.S. values and interests.
tiJa
-- While the U.S. Bill of Rights does not apply to
non-U.S. citizens, the U.S. government has always
asserted the concept of "human rights." President
Carter has made this a higher priority in our foreign
policy and penalized governments that regularly
and systematically violate their own citizens' human
rights. If U.S. intelligence activities were to
engage in regular, systematic violation of the ri hts
of those same individuals, our position wou not
only be inconsistent, our actions would belie the
very values that the President's policy proclaims.
Moreover, revelations that the U.S. has engaged in
certain categories of action, e.g., political assassi-
nations, raise deep questions in many Americans'
mind about t/heir own gov rnment.
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The inherent conflict between the important values
that can be served by clandestine activity and the important
values that can be violated by clandestine activity must be
addressed by a system of guidelines that determines how competing
values are to be weighed in specific cases.
The purpose of a code of ethics (or system of guide-
lines) is to motivate, shape, and constrain the behavior of
professionals in the intelligence community in ways that will
restore public confidence in lawful intelligence and give intel-
ligence officers pride in their profession. More specifically,
the purpose of a co e of ethics is twofold:
-- positively, to inspire intelligence professionals
to courage, inventiveness, and effectiveness in
performing one of the most important and critical
functions of American government;
-- negatively, to restrain behavior from infringing
basic rights and other important values.
The positive and the negative are two sides of the same coin.
B. The Possibility of Useful Guidelines. In talking
to people at CIA and elsewhere, I've been surprised to dis-
cover how many people believe that it is not possible to
devise useful guidelines for CIA. Some base this conclusion
on little more than the conviction th&t if +ho egenc.. hangs
to - _b this wave of reform will e- entualiv - But a
number of more thoughtful individuals come to this conclusion
after hard thought about the extraordinary diversity of
circumstance in which clandestine action may be taken, and
the inherent ethical ambiguity of activity of this sort.
This view was stated pointedly by Ambassador Harlan Cleveland
in a speech at the Agency last year when he said: "A written
code of ethics can never be comprehensive enough or subtle
enough to be a satisfactory guide to personal behavior as a
public servant. General prescriptions, whether in the form
of dos or don'ts, are bound to be so general as to be useless
or so specific as to be unworkable."
Having walked around this problem more times than
I like to admit, I can give you an ambiguous answer to at
least one question. Ambassador Cleveland and other who argue
that it is not possible to devise useful guidelines for the
intelligence community's activities abroad are incorrect.
Those who answer "no" to the central question have been misled
by too narrow a conception of the problem.
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Y 9 P Y
devising useful guidelines for CIA are quite simple and clear:
such pi~P~;~P~ nnw Pxist. Though nowhere stated as such, or
assembled in precisely that form, the body of law, executive
orders, internal regulations, and informal mores governing
CIA do constitute a network of guidelines. These guidelines
. Nonetheless, in the
day-to-day operation of the Agency, these guidelines provide
important, useful direction to, and restrictions on Agency
activity. For example, why does the Agency not target U.S.
citizens for clandestine collection within the U.S. (or when
it does so, stand in clear violation)? Because the legisla-
tive charter embodied in the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, states "the Agency shall have no police, supoena,
law enforcement powers, or internal security functions." Why
do station chiefs not use missionaries in foreign countries
for cover? Because a DDO log notice declares missionaries
off limits. Why do case officers not enter into contractual
relations with working members of the media? Because you and
your predecessor issued internal regulations prohibiting this.
Why are case officers so protective of their agents? Because
of their conception of their professional obl-igation and
personal relationship of trust with another individual whose
life they have compromised.
C. The Role of Guidelines and a Code of Ethics. Any
effort to write guidelines will contain a list of dos and
don'ts. But that list of dos and don'ts, whether embodied
in internal regulations like DDO log notices, or perhaps even a
formal code of conduct for intelligence professionals, will not
stand alone. In fact, it will be but one element in a "system of
guidelines." This system of guidelines includes not only a clear
statement of rules, but also a process for applying the rules to
hard cases, a process for enforcing compliance, and an independent
process for overseeing the community's practices.
This concept of a system of guidelines serves as
the organizing principle for the discussion:
-- Rules (from general principles to specific
guidelines, and perhaps even a formal code
of conduct);
-- A Process for Applying the Rules;
-- A Process for Enforcing Compliance with the
Rules;
-- A Process for Overseeing Practice in Rule-
writing, Application, and Enforcement.
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As part of this package, one may want to assemble
a working group of intelligence officers and ask them to try
to formulate a formal code of conduct. Such a code might
articulate a half dozen central values for intelligence profes-
sionals and then provide some illustrative examples of hard cases
with suggestions about how competing values should be weighed and
traded off in these specific instances. While the larger system
of guidelines will include many specific dos and don'ts of an
ethical nature--laws that say no assassination; executive orders;
internal regulations; DDO log notices; etc.--this system of rules
cannot be specified to the level of detail of a tax code.
Because situations and circumstances differ, the intelligence
professional must exercise discretion in applying rules to
hard cases. The virtue of the rules is to distinguish between
easy and hard cases and to provide some guidance in attempting to
weigh the multiple and competing considerations that bear on hard
cases.
D. Should the Intelligence Community Be Defensive About
Guidelines and a Code of Ethics? The ethos of the community is
to take a low profile and be defensive. I believe, however, that
a strong case can be made for taking the nffective on this front.
-- As the accused--and an agency evidently guilty
of some serious abuses--the Agency is the target
of many reformers, especially in Congress.
Defensiveness usually encourages critics.
-- In fact, the system of guidelines the Agency has
been developing, particularly over the last
several years--when tidied up and thoughtfully
presented--can be shown to be as thorough,
thoughtful, and effective a system of guidance
as there is for any major agency in Washington--
including especially the Congress. If the Agency
took the offensive and was a ressive inneexxlorin
the hard dilemmas, in making the case for the essen-
tial role of intelligence, specifically lawful
intelligence in a free society, and in arguing the
case that the emerging system of guidelines will
guarantee lawful intelligence, it might both restore
the standing of the community externally and the
morale of its members internally.
-- Today the intelligence community labors under the
shadow of revelations of abuse and scandal. Indeed,
as Monday-morning quarterbacks, we can now see
/ clearly that the intelligence community's posture,in
J n open democratic society was, through the
essentially anomalous. You have moved vigorously to
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a posture of greater openness necessary for pu is
support. A complementary and aaaressively offensive
e 1 uidelines y (as
an example for all major agencies of government)
should at least be explored.
III. ELEMENTS OF A SYSTEM OF GUIDELINES
The organizing principle for this discussion is a "system of
guidelines." The key elements of this system are:
A. Rules
-- General Principles
-- Specific Guidelines
B. A Process for Applying the Rules
C. A Process for Enforcing Compliance with the Rules
D. A Process for Overseeing Practice in Rule-Writing,
Application, and Enforcement *
IV. RULES
A. General Principles.
Rules for the intelligence community consist of both
general principles and specific guidelines. Most important
are the general principles that establish the context for more
specific argument. While it is possible to multiply principles,
I have tried to formulate the minimum number that could serve
to establish a working context.
*Recall this system of guidelines is one part of a much larger
"narsnnnal man~no " that includes recruitment, selection
socialization, and training through assignment, career development,
continuing education, rewards and punishments, to exit. This entire
system shapes, motivates, and restrains the behavior of members of
the organization.
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1. Espionage is an extraordinary remedy: because
of the danger of abuse and violation of important American
values and interests, clandestine action should be under-
taken only as an extraordinary remedy, and where the benefits
of the clandestine action, and the advantage of pursuing the
objective through clandestine means rather than overt means,
have been clearly identified.
CC)VNec 1P~j Thi s principle establishes a presumption aaa imt
cinn; - e ar.tinn. It puts the burden of proof on those
advocating clandestine action.
(Contrary to the impression created by recent
revelations, clandestine activity has mainly been considered
and authorized as an extraordinary act. The most dramatic
indicator is budget. Even Marchetti and Marks, whose thesis
is that American intelligence is dominated by covert action,
estimate the budget for covert action in '75 to be only $750
million. In discussing this subject, I've found that many
seeming lyinformed New York Times readers, and even some
writers, believe that the covert action budget must be many
billions.)
2. The most fundamental principle is that the President
(and government) should not undertake actions in secret t a
could not in principle be defended to the American public
and meet the test of political viability. There is a view
that the American people are not sophisticated enough to
appreciate the need for covert action, don't understand the
exigencies of state, and are naive about the dangers inherent
in the world. While there is considerable evidence to
support this view, the U.S. government is constructed on a
quite different presumption. That presumption is that, on
balance, anduye Lime, a process that forces the President
and the government to seek and win the support of the
American people to sustain a chosen course of action is
preferable to any other process yet invented for selecting
and sustaining public policy. The record is mixed. But on
balance, and overall, this democratic presumption has a better
batting average than any competitor. (Recall Churchill's
remark: democracy is the worst form of government--except
for all the others.)*
*NOTE: Political viability is not measured by a direct poll of
public opinion. In our system of government, political
viability is determined by an amalgam of views of the
President, Congress, courts, and citizens.
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What does this principle imply for clandestine
activity, that is, covert action (the effort of the U.S.
to influence events in foreign countries without being
known that we are the influencing agent) and clandestine
collection (the effort to collect information that others
do not want us to have and without anyone knowing that
we have collected it)? In the abstract, the implication
is clear: the U.S. government should not undertake actions
that could not j o principle win the, up,-rt of th, Q?
people (if it were possible to have a full._frank public
,discussinn_) The practical dilemma is that clandestine
activity must by definition be secret and cannot therefore
be subjected to the full, open processes of public debate to
determine whether it meets the test of political viability.
This dilemma poses the institutional challenge: to devise
an annropriate ciirrnaatP prncfSS. That's the point of
principle 3.
3. Because clandestine activity cannot be subjected
to the normal test of open public debate, it must be
authorized and overseen by an appropriate surrogate process:
a process that engages surrogates for the interests that
would participate in full public discussion; involves
them in a serious, disciplined private review of proposed
and ongoing covert actions; and requires their support in
ways substantially equivalent to the normal democratic test
of political viability. No easy task.
The present process for authorizing clandestine
activity, for overseeing the process, and for checking
abuses represents at least one attempt to meet this prin-
ciple. The question is how well current procedures meet
this test and how they can be improved.
Two slightly more specific implications of this
principle are:
(1) that cl ndestine activity must be consistent
with openly announced substantive policies and objec-
s a have been established by the normal open
process of government; and
(2) that the President and Director of CIA
j should be prepared to defend in public the broad
categories of clandestine activity in which the U.S.
engages, though not the specific actions themselves.
This is clearly controversial; and contrary to the
practice of the past. According to this principle, if
the U.S. is going to provide clandestine support
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for democratic parties in countries where the opposi-
tion parties are being funded by other nations, this
general class of action should be defended in public
debate. This does not mean, however, that the U.S.
government's action in funding any particular party
should at the time have to meet the test of public
debate (since it will not be possible to make public
all the information on the basis of which a full and
open debate could take place).
It has sometimes been proposed that we add a
fourth principle of publicity,sometimes stated as follows:
if a particular clandestine activity were made public, would
you be proud of your action? I find this proposed principle
unsatisfactory. It is both too loose and too tight.
On the one hand, the principle is too loose: individuals'
notions of pride differ. Gordon Liddy would be proud to
have made public many actions that most Americans find
offensive. On the other hand, the principle is too tight
and restrictive in that clandestine action is by its nature
secret and unacknowledged. The grounds for the decision to
engage in clandestine activity in a particular case, and
the circumstances that surround that decision, encompass
many facts and factors that cannot be made public. Conse-
quently, it is not possible to present the full case in
public for any particular action. Absent that full case,
the public does not have full grounds for judgment. Con-
sequently, the public test of support and "pride" is not
appropriate. That's the point addressed by the surrogate
process above.
B. Specific Guidelines
Each class of clandestine activity presents a juicy
target for endless juridical argument--both pro and con. You
will recall the lengthy debate about the Harvard CIA guideline
requiring professors to inform their dean about any paid work
they do for CIA.
As an academic, I find it difficult to resist joining
such arguments, for instance, about whether the intelligence
community should be permitted to try to overthrow democratically-
elected governments, and if so, under what circumstances.
I have lengthy notes on both sides of proposed guidelines about
a half dozen major classes of clandestine activity.
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For the purpose of a broad view of the forest, however,
it seems more appropriate to limit myself to identifying the
major issues to be weighed in choosing any specific guidelines,
and to offer some general criteria that should be applied in
choosing specific guidelines. The major issues to be weighed in
devising specific guidelines are four:
(1) the pros and cons of statute v. executive
order v. internal regulation;
(2) the relative merits of flat prohibitips
v. prohibitions subject to w is ver;
(3) the advantages and disadvantages of engaging
more external surrogates (courts and Congress) at
successive levels of specificity; and
(4) the impact of each guideline in con-
straining abuse, encouraging undue timidity, and
motivating professionals in the intelligence community
to the desired mix of initiative, inventiveness,
and restraint.
Each of these issues invites lengthy argument. None
is easy to weigh in specific cases. But for the sake of brevity,
I will propose three general criteria for choosing specific
guidelines--criteria that should, I believe, be widely acceptable.
1. The necessity for flexibility. The appro-
priate course of action will vary substantially with cir-
cumstances. For example, measures that should not be
undertaken in peacetime or against a democratic state,
should be permitted during actual or threatened hostilities
or against a totalitarian regime. Circumstances change.
Guidelines must therefore preserve flexibility to adjust
to circumstances and to modify rules and procedures as
conditions change. (This criterion has strong implications
for the balance between legislative statute and executive
order subject to Congressional veto.)
2. Guidelines should express rnra I~ in ways
that establish strong presumptions against violation of
those values. Clandestine activity runs a constant risk
of violating important American values. Guidelines should
therefore state these values as clearly as feasible in
order to affirm the values and to place the burden of
proof on whoever proposes to risk harming the value.
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circumstances. Recognizing that values compete, the govern-
ment should establish a process that allows appropriate
individuals to balance one set of values against another and
thus make exceptions to the guidelines in extraordinary
situations.
The specific guidelines proposed in the Senate Select
Committee's charter legislation include flat legislative prohi-
bitions on:
-- assassination of foreign officials;
-- special activity that has as its objective or is
likely to result in:
-- the support of international terrorist
activities
-- the mass destruction of property
-- the creation of food or water shortages
or floods
-- the creation of epidemics or diseases
-- the use of chemicals biological, or other
weapons in vio ation of treaties
-- the violent vert c
country
-- the torture of individuals
-- the support of any action, which violates
W=an rinh+6, conducted by the police,
foreign intelligence, or internal security
forces of any foreign country;
-- the use for certain intelligence activities of U.S.
persons who follow a full-time on or
who travel to a foreign country under sponsorship and
su nment as part of a U.S.
government program designed to promote education or
the arts hi~mani t i Ps nr rii1 tiiral affairs;
-- the use for certain intelligence activities of
joU-ialists-accredited to any U.S. media organization.
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In my view, each of these prohibitions does reflect some
important American value--however ill expressed. These prohibi-
tions also appropriately leave to the Executive the task of
writing specific implementing regulations.
The chief probl ~m with these guidelines is their form.
If stated as presumptiods rather than flat prohibitions, and
accompanied by an appropriate process fnr Atithnri7ingP_xce tp ions..
a reformulated (and, one hopes, more felicitious formulation
of the values) should be acceptable.
Though the draft charter does not state prohibitions
or presumptions relating to collecti.p.- you mi4ht want to propose_
everal presumptions:-"FTr -examT ple:
-- 1 s intrusive means of collect'
red to more ink r~sivP m s (thus gathering informa-
tion rom unwitting individuals is preferred to
unobtrusive electronic surveillance whi9h is preferred
to breaking and entering
A final point may 'We m6re relevant for internal Agency
purposes. If one takes each class of clandestine activity, for
example, "propoganda" or "economic warfare," and asks what
specific guidelines now exist, one quickly discovers an elaborate
network of guidelines from charter legislation to NSIDs to DCIDs
to DDO Log Notices. For each class of clandestine activity, one
could array these guidelines. They could then be explicitly
reviewed and refined with careful attention to the major issues
identified above.
V. A PROCESS FOR APPLYING THE RULES
The process for authorizing special activities, special
collections and counterintelligence is spelled out in Executive
Order 12036. A brief sketch of that process and of the sur-
rogates involved at each stage could be provided.
VI. A PROCESS FOR ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES
The Inspector General, the General Counsel, and the IOB.
VII. A PROCESS FOR OVERSEEING PRACTICE IN RULE-WRITING, APPLICATION,
AND ENFORCEMENT
The Senate and House Intelligence Oversight Committees,
especially if they would get their acts together.
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Sections V, VI, and VII can be filled out whenever you like.
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ADDITIONS TO ALLISON CONCEPT
Section on public as an oversight process
Policy of openness
Acknowledgement of limitations on sharing with public
Limits on FOIA
Sanctions against disclosure
II Section on rewards
Acknowledgement of special role and sacrifice of
intelligence professionals
System of incentives
Medals
Retraining program for retirement
Retirement program
III Section on domestic activities
FBI-CIA jurisdiction
Special concerns for rights of Americans
Relations with American institutions
Press
Peace Corps
Cover
Electronic surveillance - domestic
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2
IV Section on liaision
Limited to intelligence, not security
Need to respect privacy ,
22 May 1978
cc : STAT
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 5/23/78
TO: Legislative Counsel
ROOM NO.
7D49
BUILDING
H s.
REMARKS:
FROM:
0/ DC I
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
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