ARRANGMENTS FOR WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00493R000100130009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 12, 1978
• Content Type: REQ

Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
Arrangements for Warning
12 May 1978
1. We proceed from the assumption that the current arrange-
ments for warning have been judged insufficient but that all the
necessary analytical ingredients are in place. They have just not
been properly energized. A separate group, as small as possible,
is needed to serve as a lightning rod to focus the attention of the
NFAC and the intelligence community as a whole on developments that
might adversely affect US security. To provide the necessary lead-
ership we would retain the position of Special Assistant to the
DCI for Strategic Warning, but broaden his responsibilities to
include all warning and change his title correspondingly. He would
report to the DCI through the DDCI.
2. A new high-level Warnin Control Group headed by the DDCI
would be created consisting of tap officials from State (INR), DIA
and NSA. This group would meet at the call of the DDCI to discuss
matters brought to his attention by the Special Assistant or by
any senior official in the community, in particular the responsible
NIO.
3. The Special Assistant for Warning would have two deputies;
one would deal with military matters. He would have a staff of
approximately 10 people (Staff A) located in the current Strategic
Warning Staff (SWS) space in the Pentagon, adjacent to the NMIC.
This staff would have responsibility for warning of the deployment
of military forces anywhere in the world that could ultimately
adversely affect the security of the US. (This would be an extension
of the charter of the SWS to include coverage of military movements
by non-Communist countries as well as Communist.)
4. A second deputy would also have a staff of approximately
10 people (Staff B) located in space adjacent to the CIA Operations
Center. This staff would have the responsibility for warning of
any non-military developments throughout the world that have the
CL by
0
Approved For Release 200410 tlF&ME IA/RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
25X1
 CONFIDENTIAL
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
potential of adversely affecting US security interests. The per-
sonnel of this staff; as in the case of the military staff, would
be drawn from the various components of the intelligence community.
(The Department of State (INR) and the Office of Naval Intelligence
currently do not participate in manning the SWS. It would be
imperative that they participate in the new staffs.) The Chief of
Staff A would serve as a defacto warning advisor to. the Chief of
Production, DIA. The Chief of Staff B would serve as a defacto
warning advisor to the Director, NFAC.
5. The two staffs would provide the second look to the first
look now taken by the various operations centers around town as
well as by the desk analysts in the various NFIB offices. The
staffs would be expected to prod existing NFIB offices and to challenge
thinking within those offices rather than to do extensive original
reporting. In no case would the line elements' responsibility for
warning be transferred to the new staffs. The two staffs would
function in parallel with the line units in order to provide insur-
ance that proper warning is indeed conveyed. The two staffs would
obviously have to work in close tandem using the most efficient
conferencing techniques at hand.
6. The new staffs would report directly to the Special Assistant
for Warning who in turn would relay concerns to the DDCI and
when feasible to the Warning Control Group.
7. When apprised of a potential problem area by the Special
Assistant for Warning, the DDCI (with or without the participation
of thajSteering Group) may, as he sees fit, direct the responsible
NIO or ana-lytic element to prepare an evaluation of the situation.
This procedure, in some cases, could lead to an-alert memorandum to
the DCI with the recommendation that he forward it to the President.
8. The dissemination of an alert memorandum would also be
directed downward into the community with whatever sanitization re-
quired. At the same time or even prior to completion of the report,
collection tasking would be initiated through whatever procedures
the NITC would have in being by that time.
9. There, obviously, are several other options which could be
pursued. One would be to include the whole warning mission (big W
and small w) within the framework of a greatly expanded SWS located
at the Pentagon; another would be to create a national intelligence
officer for warning; a third would be the establishment of a 24-hour national
warning center either at CIA, DIA, State or NSA; a fourth would be
the continuation of our present procedures with the SWS responsible
for large W and each NIO responsible for his particular share of
the small w.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
10. The above proposal is suggested as one least disruptive to
the intelligence community yet one involving all components in the
warning process without loss of influence or face.. At the same time
it establishes a focus on warning problems at the highest level with-
in the community. This type of warning mechanism would have the
potential for earning the respect of the policy-makers and the
cooperation of analytical elements of the community.
NFAC/ORPA C PS 12May78)
NFAC/CS/
Approved For Release 2004/08C/961 FANk81 B00493R000100130009-0
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
Arrangements for Warning
12 May 1978
1. We proceed from the assumption that the current arrange-
ments for warning have been judged insufficient but that all the
necessary analytical ingredients are in place. They have just not
been properly energized. A separate group, as small as possible,
is needed to serve as a lightning rod to focus the attention of the
NFAC arid the intelligence community as a whole on developments that
might adversely affect US security. To provide the necessary lead-
ership we would retain the position of Special Assistant to the
DCI for Strategic Warning, but broaden his responsibilities to
include all warning and change his title correspondingly. He would
report to the DCI through the DDCI.
2. A new high-level Warning Control Group headed by the DDCI
would be created consisting of top officials from State (INR), DIA
and NSA. This group would meet at the call of the DDCI to discuss
matters brought to his attention by the Special Assistant or by
any senior official in the community, in particular the responsible
NIO.
3. The Special Assistant for Warning would have two deputies;
one would deal with military matters. He would have a staff of
approximately 10 people (Staff A) located in the current Strategic
Warning Staff (SWS) space in the Pentagon, adjacent to the NMIC.
This staff would have responsibility for warning of the deployment
of military forces anywhere in the world that could ultimately
adversely affect the security of the US. (This would be an extension
of the charter of the SWS to include coverage of military movements
by non-Communist countries as well as Communist.)
4. A second deputy would also have a staff of approximately
10 people (Staff B) located in space adjacent to the CIA Operations
Center. This staff would have the responsibility for warning of
any non-military developments throughout the world that have the
CL by
0
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/08L lFC PRlDA181 B00493R000100130009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
potential of adversely affecting US security interests. The per-
sonnel of this staff, as in the case of the military staff, would
be drawn from the various components of the intelligence community.
(The Department of State (INR) and the Office of Naval Intelligence
currently do not participate in manning the SWS. It would be
imperative that they participate in the new staffs.) The Chief of
Staff A would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Chief of
Production, DIA. The Chief of Staff B would serve as a defacto
warning advisor to the Director, NFAC.
5. The two staffs would provide the second look to the first
look now taken by the various operations centers around town as
well as by the desk analysts in the various NFIB offices. The
staffs would be expected to prod existing NFIB offices and to challenge
thinking within those offices rather than to do extensive original
reporting. In no case would the line elements' responsibility for
warning be transferred to the new staffs. The two staffs would
function in parallel with the line units in order to provide insur-
ance that proper warning is indeed conveyed. The two staffs would
obviously have to work in close tandem using the most efficient
conferencing techniques at hand.
6. The new staffs would report directly to the Special Assistant
for Warning who in turn would relay concerns to the DDCI and
when feasible to the Warning Control Group.
7. When apprised of a potential problem area by the Special
Assistant for Warning, the DDCI (with or without the participation
of the Steering Group) may, as he sees fit, direct the responsible
NIO or analytic element to prepare an evaluation of the situation.
This procedure, in some cases, could lead to an-alert memorandum to
the DCI with the recommendation that he forward it to the President.
8. The dissemination of an alert memorandum would also be
directed downward into the community with whatever sanitization re-
quired. At the same time or even prior to completion of the report,
collection tasking would be initiated through whatever procedures
the NITC would have in being by that time.
9. There, obviously, are several other options which. could be
pursued. One would be to include the whole warning mission (big W
and small w) within the framework of a greatly expanded SWS located
at the Pentagon; another would be to create a national intelligence
officer for warning; a third would be the establishment of a 24-hour national
warning center either at CIA, DIA, State or NSA; a fourth would be
the continuation of our present procedures with the SWS responsible
for large W and each NIO responsible for his particular share of
the small w.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
10. The above proposal is suggested as one least disruptive to
the intelligence community yet one involving all components in the
warning process without loss of influence or face. At the same time
it establishes a focus on warning problems at the highest level with-
in the community. This type of warning mechanism would have the
potential for earning the respect of the policy-makers and the
cooperation of analytical elements of the community.
NFAC/ORPA/C/PS/ b(12May78)
NFAC/CS/0
Approved For Release 2004/08/?@NFG1k1 B00493R000100130009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
Arrangements for Warning
12 May 1978
1. We proceed from the assumption that the current arrange-
ments for warning have been judged insufficient but that all the
necessary analytical ingredients are in place. They have just not
been properly energized. A separate group, as small as possible,
is needed to serve as a lightning rod to focus the attention of the
NFAC and the intelligence community as a whole on developments that
might adversely affect US security. To provide the necessary lead-
ership we would retain the position of Special Assistant to the
DCI for Strategic Warning, but broaden his responsibilities to
include all warning and change his title correspondingly. He would
report to the DCI through the DDCI.
2. A new high-level Warning Control Group headed by the DDCI
would be created consisting of top officials from State (INR), DIA
and NSA. This group would meet at the call of the DDCI to discuss
matters brought to his attention by the Special Assistant or by
any senior official in the community, in particular the responsible
NIO.
3. The Special Assistant for Warning would have two deputies;
one would deal with military matters. He would have a staff of
approximately 10 people (Staff A) located in the current Strategic
Warning Staff (SWS) space in the Pentagon, adjacent to the NMIC.
This staff would have responsibility for warning of the deployment
of military forces anywhere in the world that could ultimately
adversely affect the security of the US. (This would be an extension
of the charter of the SWS to include coverage of military movements
by non-Communist countries as well as Communist.)
4. A second deputy would also have a staff of approximately
10 people (Staff B) located in space adjacent to the CIA Operations
Center. This staff would have the responsibility for warning of
any non-military developments throughout the world that have the
CL by
0
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/0Oi I @ ATF 1?1'81 B00493R000100130009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
potential of adversely affecting US security interests. The per-
sonnel of this staff, as in the case of the military staff, would
be drawn from the various components of the intelligence community.
(The Department of State (INR) and the Office of Naval Intelligence
currently do not participate in manning the SWS. It would be
imperative that they participate in the new staffs.) The Chief of
Staff A would serve as a defacto warning advisor to the Chief of
Production, DIA. The Chief of Staff B would serve as a defacto
warning advisor to the Director, NFAC.
5. The two staffs would provide the second look to the first
look now taken by the various operations centers around town as
well as by the desk analysts in the various NFIB offices. The
staffs would be expected to prod existing NFIB offices and to challenge
thinking within those offices rather than to do extensive original
reporting. In no case would the line elements' responsibility for
warning be transferred to the new staffs. The two staffs would
function in parallel with the line units in order to provide insur-
ance that proper warning is indeed conveyed. The two staffs would
obviously have to work in close tandem using the most efficient
conferencing techniques at hand.
6. The new staffs would report directly to the Special Assistant
for Warning who in turn would relay concerns to the DDCI and
when feasible to the Warning Control Group.
7. When apprised of a potential problem area by the Special
Assistant for Warning, the DDCI (with or without the participation
of the Steering Group) may, as he sees fit, direct the responsible
NIO or analytic element to prepare an evaluation of the situation.
This procedure, in some cases, could lead to an-alert memorandum to
the DCI with the recommendation that he forward it to the President.
8. The dissemination of an alert memorandum would also be
directed downward into the community with whatever sanitization re-
quired. At the same time or even prior to completion of the report,
collection tasking would be initiated through whatever procedures
the NITC would have in being by that time.
9. There, obviously, are several other options which could be
pursued. One would be to include the whole warning mission (big W
and small w) within the framework of a greatly expanded SWS located
at the Pentagon; another would be to create a national intelligence
officer for warning; a third would be the establishment of a 24-hour national
warning center either at CIA, DIA, State or NSA; a fourth would be
the continuation of our present procedures with the SWS responsible
for large W and each NIO responsible for his particular share of
the small w.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
 Approved For Release 2004/08/30 : CIA-RDP81 B00493R000100130009-0
10. The above proposal is suggested as one least disruptive to
the intelligence community yet one involving all components in the
warning process without loss of influence or face. At the same time
it establishes a focus on warning problems at the highest level with-
in the community. This type of warning mechanism would have the
potential for earning the respect of the policy-makers and the
cooperation of analytical elements of the community.
NFAC/ORP PS
NFAC/CS/
1(12May78)
Approved For Release 2004/08/S& ~F6I Ek 1 B00493R000100130009-0