THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER AND THE WARNING PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00493R000100110006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONTROL AND 'OVER SHEET FOR TOP SE RET DOCUMENT i `
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I UP
THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
AND THE WARNING PROCESS (U)
Thomas G. Belden, Project Leader
July 1969
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION
I DA Log No.
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REPORT R-158
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This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage
Laws, Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 793 and 794. The
transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an
unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP-1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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REPORT R-158
THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
AND THE WARNING PROCESS (U)
Thomas G. Belden, Project Leader
Delbert D. Arnold
Edgar Boling
John B. Lawson
Laurence J. Legere
William C. Martin
Gary A. Massel
Alfred I. Schwartz
Wallace Sinaiko
July 1969
I DPI
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION
400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202
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STAT
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Although all members of the project participated in all
phases of the study, certain elements of the subject have be-
come the particular interest of individual analysts. To take
advantage of the wide diversity of backgrounds and interests
among project members, various sections of the report have been
done by the individual most interested in that area. No effort
has been made to make all sections conform to a standard,
impersonal committee-prose style, since it is felt that no
value, and possibly some damage, would result. The very
nature of the subject argues for diversity of point of view.
(U) The project members wish to thank the many people and
offices who have been generous with their time and help during
the course of this study and, in particular,
and his staff in the Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence, who have been helpful in making arrange-
ments for interviews and for access to information; and Mr.
Huntington Sheldon and the members of the USIB Watch Committee
and their agencies, who have helped us to learn about the flow
of information throughout the community. Especially, we want
to thank the management, analysts, watch officers, staff, and
Director of the NIC, who have been
patient in letting our project members work alongside them
while we were learning, and who have been unfailingly coopera-
tive and candid in helping us to understand their work. We
also wish to thank General Charles P. Cabell,
and Mr. J. J. Hitchcock, all of whom have been intimately
associated with the development and early operations of the
Watch Committee and the National Indications Center.
iii
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STAT
STAT
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I. SYNOPSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Origin of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Method of Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Current Mission Directives . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Current Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Major Problem Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Alternatives for Changes to the WC/NIC . . . . . 18
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
II. TRENDS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
(Delbert D. Arnold) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Patterns of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Warning and Response in the Current
Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
III. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE WATCH COMMITTEE
AND THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
(Laurence J. Legere) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
The Beginnings: Summer 1948 to December 1950 . . 40
G-2's Chairmanship of the Watch Committee
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee:
December 1950-May 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
The Sheldon Committee: October 1953-May 1954 . . 47
Major WC/NIC Developments Since 1954 . . . . . . 61
FIAB 1962 Initiative: A Case Summary . . . . . . 73
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IV. INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL I?DICATIONS
CENTER (John B. Lawson and A. I. Schwrrtz) . . . . 77
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Information for the NIC . . . . . . . . . . . 81
The Watch Alert Function . . . . . . . . . . 88
The Analysis Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The Product of the NIC . . . . . . . . . . . 97
V. THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS
CENTER (William C. Martin and T. G. B(Iden) . . . 105
Watch Centers in the Washington Arla . . . . . 105
Information Flow to the NIC . . . . . . . . . 106
Communications Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . 108
Areas for Improvement in NIC Communications . . 111
ANNEX A. SELECTED HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF TII, WARNING
PROCESS (Delbert D. Arnold)
ANNEX B. APPLICABILITY OF AUTOMATIC DATA PIOCESSING
TO NIC OPERATIONS (William C. Martin and
Gary Massel) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2,U 1
of Central Intelligence, agreed to undertake a study at the
National Indications Center (NIC). This study (a six-month
effort) is primarily one of defining the broad problems of
the NIC and its function within the government. The scope
includes study of the origin of the NIC, current operations,
and future functions.
In mid-January 1969 IDA, at the request of the Director
(S) The basic study questions agreed upon in the proposals
2E 1
0
? Study of and participation in the on-going activities
of the NIC for the purpose of understanding current
systems, operations, and techniques.
? Development of an understanding of information flow in
the NIC environment including internal flow, operating
procedures and indicator lists; and the role and rela-
tionship of the NIC within the intelligence, foreign
affairs, and military community.
? Study of existing message and incident analysis
techniques.
? Development of a perception of pertinence of computer
technology to the development of warning.
? Recommendations for Phase II of the study activity.
Other considerations which might be studied included
data processing, Community On-line Intelligence System (COINS)
'Proposed Study for the Director of Central Intelligence on
Operations and Procedures in the NIC, dated December 10, 1968,
from IDA to Director, CIA.
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utilization in NIC operations, new or modi'ed communication
systems, data formats, analytical technique and research
recommendations.
This study has had no access to inf~rmation at the
national policy level, nor have we been abl to conduct
interviews with current intelligence users _t that level.
Given these constraints our views are limit d to our observa-
tions below that level.
Our investigations began with exten.ed observations of
the operation of the NIC watch during both lay and hight duty
hours. The next step was to interview indi-idually each
analyst, and the director, deputy director, and chief of the
watch alert group in the NIC. We observed .,he Watch Com-
mittee proceedings during each of their regular weekly meetings
for a period of five months and attended s:,eral pre-watch
meetings of the NIC analysts.
I
those agencies which interface with the NIC, which included
standing watches at the major Watch Committ-e member agencies
(CIA, NSA, DIA, and State). (Some members )f the study were in
two watch centers the night of the EC-121 i.cident.) We also
interviewed analysts in each of these agencies. Again, our
observations were conducted both during the day and at night.
Other extensive interviews were conducted with people
who had knowledge of the NIC because of their relation to it
as originators, past directors, and users.- Policy makers and
other users of warning information were not interviewed.
Three previous studies of the NIC -_ Automation and the
NIC, Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge, Inc., Nov. 1', 1962, TOP SECRET;
Report on Strategic Warning, Benjamin R. Spite, Chairman, Feb.
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A special point was made to observe the watches of
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1967, TOP SECRET; and Intelligence Procedures and Crisis
Reporting, CIA, Oct. 15, 1968, TOP SECRET -- were also sur-
veyed by each member of the project. In the case of the Shute
report, we deliberately instituted a procedure for seven of the
nine project members not to read the report until after their
investigations were virtually completed so that our findings
would be less encumbered by preconceptions. The CIA Report
of October 1968 was also reviewed after our information collec-
tion was essentially completed.
Whenever feasible in this report, we offer a spectrum
of alternative solutions to specific problems. If we feel
competent to recommend any single alternative (or combination),
we do so. Where we believe we cannot make specific judgments
on alternatives without further study, we so indicate. We also
allow ourselves tentative conclusions which might be modified
by further study.
C. BACKGROUND
0
One of the most striking findings in our study was
the great variety of perceptions held in the intelligence and
national security community as to what the function of the
National Indications Center (NIC) is, whom it serves, and the
scope of its activity. This disparity in views is perhaps only
the symptom of a more serious problem: What is the warning
process? Who is in charge of what parts of it? What is its
scope in terms of world geography and type of conflict?
0
The official mission of the Watch Comm.te is
"To provide the United States Intelligence
Board with the earliest possible intelligence
warning of, and a continuing judgment on, Sino-
Soviet Bloc intentions to engage in aggressive
action by regular or irregular armed forces.i1
1DCIC No. 1/5, dated 23 April 1965, paragraph B.
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Two key words in the mission statement art warning and
intentions. In a problem definition stud,; of this type it
is important to describe our concepts of these terms as well
as the concept of indications. These concepts are broad and
not confined to the intelligence communitT What follows in
this section is not a description of how the NIC currently
operates but rather a way of thinking abott the warning-
indications function.
1. The Warning Process
where are wide variations in the use of the term
warning. We hear of such terms as strate?i.c warning, tactical
warning, military warning, political warn ag, and long-term
warning. For the purpose of this report, ,ve shall treat the
warning process as the collection of indie&tors of potential
hostile action, making an analysis from t? m, and promptly
alerting a decision-maker to consider taki.lg or withholding an
action. The warning process can be furthe? delineated in terms
of geographic scope, type of conflict, and time constants. In
addition the process must take into a.ccoun the echelons it
serves in government up to and including t
ing to the urgency and gravity of the situ
A narrower definition may be taken
e President, accord-
tion.
as the transmission
age to "look out or
this sense is little
g attached.
to a senior decision-maker of a simple mes
something can or will happen." Warning in
more than information with a timely red fl
0
Regardless of the variety of defin`tions, the timely
convergence of information is critical to "Ihe warning process.
The analysis of the information normally results in a judgment
that a prospective enemy does or does not lave the capability
and intention to take hostile actions, which may adversely
affect U.S. security and interests. Warnig judgments are
necessarily characterized by some degree o-' equivocality.
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More than one interpretation of the information available at
any given time is often analytically justified.
The analysis, or analyses, are next transmitted to the
decision-maker to alert him to choose a course of action from
many action alternatives usually furnished by his staff. His
choices usually include a scale of actions ranging from "drastic"
down to no action at all. There is a vital relation between the
scale of action and the equivocality of the warning judgment.
It is dangerous, for example, to take drastic action based on
highly equivocal analytical results.
0
Once an action is taken, it becomes a potential warning
indicator to the opponent. We sometimes desire our action to
be a form of communication to the opponent; at other times, we
want our actions to be perceived as ambiguously as possible.
In any case, the opponent is likely to take our action as an
indicator and to go through the same process to arrive at a
decision and a responding action.
Thus, the warning process is a cycle of indica-
tions to us and to our opponent. Its cyclical nature illus-
trates the importance to the intelligence analyst of knowing
about our own decisions and actions as well as those of our
opponent. The problem of converging such information is greater
than one might first suspect. The sources of relevant intelli-
gence and information about U.S. policy decisions and military
and intelligence operations are scattered throughout many
agencies, and interdepartmental communication is often faulty.
By convergence, we do not intend to imply that every piece of
information from all agencies of the intelligence and operations
community must continuously pass to a single point, but rather
to suggest that the timely and appropriate selection and
transmission of information to one point is critical to the
warning process. The warning agency should also be able to
seek information.
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At the level of actual operationE there is currently
considerable ambiguity about who is respor:3ible for which func-
tions in the warning process. The NationEJ Intelligence Esti-
mates are clearly the vehicle for long-rar=e estimates, but as
one moves toward a critical development or event, responsibili-
ties become more confused. What is the division of responsibility
between the indications function and the cirrent intelligence
function and between the intelligence and )perational communities?
What should the scope of the warning function be? What should
the scope of the NIC's responsibilities be, or those of a new
agency absorbing the present responsibilities of the NIC?
I
the NIC. It was interesting to observe du?ing the April 1969
North Korean incident involving the EC-121 aircraft that no one
was fully responsible for or cognizant of -.11 elements of the
situation, even though all the major Watch Committee agencies
(State, CIA, DIA, and NSA) were involved. In addition, the
National Military Command Center (NMCC) an Joint Reconnais-
sance Center in J-3 were also caught up in the matter. The
NIC had perhaps as great a variety of data bearing on the inci-
dent as any agency in Washington. As the ~_;esignated center
for converging warning indicators, it migh have seemed logical
to expect the NIC to have taken the lead assessing the
implications of the incident in the broade context of Soviet,
Chinese, and North Korean behavior. But, he NIC did not
assume that role. It assumed that the incident fell below the
threshold or fell outside the scope of the Watch Committee's
responsibilities and interests. Furthermo;e, it seems signifi-
cant that other elements of the national s'-curity community
did not make substantial demands on the NI~ for warning assess-
ments or any service of convergence.
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The confusion about responsibilit; is not confined to
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2. The Process of Indications Analysis
The process of deriving warning from an analysis of
indicators is difficult at best. Indicators consist of a
variety of both long- and short-term military, political,
economic, and other information which are expected to provide
clues as to what types of initiatives or actions an opponent
might take. At this point, we will examine what kind of
process he must go through to take an action and the problems
that the warning analyst faces in trying to determine the
options still open to the opponent at any given point.
I
selection of one out of several alternative courses of action.
In fact, a good decision-maker will try to reduce his alter-
natives gradually in a series of decisions and maintain as many
alternatives for as long as he can. This not only allows last
minute changes in a course of action but also leaves his op-
ponent confused as to which action might take place (the basic
ingredient of surprise). A classic example of this practice
was the Czech crisis in the summer of 1968. The Russians
decided to try a series of limited measures such as Army
maneuvers in Poland, movements toward the Czech border and
diplomatic meetings before resorting to invasion. If the
Czech leadership had yielded to Soviet pressures earlier, the
option of invasion might not have been exercised.
Warning analysts tend to arrive at judgments about an
opponent's intentions and capabilities by a process of elimina-
tion. They estimate whether or not his options have been
reduced to the single choice of initiating hostilities. Such
estimates are usually based on fragmentary and often ambiguous
information about an opponent's behavior and obviously involve
a substantial element of risk, even under ideal conditions.
0
A question naturally arises that involves the pivotal
relationship between capabilities and intentions: When in
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Making a decision is a process that includes the
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such a decision process is there a valid basis for concluding
that an opponent definitely intends to ini-fate specific hos-
tile actions, which he is capable of Lakin;?-? If he is still
at the stage of gradually narrowing the ra'a:ge of feasible
alternatives, it is questionable whether a unique intention
can be validly attributed to him until he %.as made his ultimate
decision. It will normally be the action'tself that reveals
his final decision and intent. Furthermor an enemy military
action may first become apparent at some pint of contact that
involves a relatively low echelon in the U.S. chain of command.
For this reason a warning system must be s nsitive to informa-
tion which might originate at the lowest 1 vels of command and
which might impose severe time constraints.
The preceding discussion has exam''ned the concepts of
the warning and indications processes. Th se concepts do not
necessarily describe how the function of w'.rning and indications
is currently carried out. The following s ction outlines both
the evolution and current practice of the'.C/NIC.
1. Scope of the NIC'
Over the past 15 years of the NIC's existence, the
scope of its activities has broadened. In 1955 the NIC's atten-
tion was supposed to be focused primaril,yn hostile intentions
of the Soviet Union; but, as other critic developments
occurred, the scope was changed in practic to include the
Soviet Bloc, China, Middle East and other ..reas.
Not only has the geographic scope changed, but the type
of conflict attracting the attention of th NIC has also changed.
The NIC has moved from its early concentra'ion on situations
which might lead to confrontations with ad;rersaries capable
'See Chapter II.
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of nuclear war to the inclusion of situations which might lead
to initiation or employment of other types of conflict.
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do not reflect these changes. Determination of the current scope
of the NIC's responsibilities would dispel the confusion of
perceptions as to what the scope of attention of the NIC really
is.1
The formal statements of the NIC's mission, however,
If it is determined that responsibility of the NIC
should be global in scope and that it should be interested in
all types of conflict which could have a bearing on U.S. policy,
then the mode of operation of the NIC might also change. If
a major disturbance is detected in some geographic area by the
NIC's worldwide coverage, then the NIC would mobilize the intel-
ligence community, focus on that particular event for as long
as necessary, and aggressively seek more detailed information
on that sector of disturbance.
Origin and Evolution2
The Watch Committee was formed in January 1951 shortly
after the Chinese intervention in Korea, replacing several more
limited warning groups in the agencies. The NIC was formed in
1954. The intent was to create a point of rapid convergence of
warning information in the intelligence community, which con-
sisted of several agencies in addition to the CIA. Figure 1
shows the growth of several more agencies since the founding of
the NIC. It would appear that if the NIC were justified as a
convergence point in 1954, the reason for its existence today
is increasingly justified. The figure does not show the rela-
tive sizes of the new organizations in comparison to the NIC.
While the other intelligence operations have generally grown
larger, the NIC has remained essentially constant in size. In
short, the trees of the forest around the NIC threaten to shade
it out of existence.
1See Section E in this Synopsis, which discusses NSAM 226 and
DCID 1/5, the basic documents establishing the NIC mission.
2See Chapter III.
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YEAR EVENTS
EC-121 CZECH
69 PUEBLO
68 TET
67
66
64 TONKIN GULF
63 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
62 CUBA BAY OF PIGS
61 U-2
60
59
58
57
56
55
5543 SHELDON COMMITTEE
52
51 CHINESE INTERVENTION
50 I N KOREA
49
48 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
47 PEARL HARBOR
46 INVESTIGATION
45
44
43
42 PEARL HARBOR
40
'{EAR EVENTS
FIGURE 1. (U) The Forest Around the NIC (U)
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3. Internal Operation of the NIC'
Physically the NIC is a small complex located in the
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Pentagon. It has a staff of 32 military and civilian personnel
and an annual expenditure (not including floor space) of about
$400,000, far less than most of the other operations centers we
have observed. Its equipment is meager and consists of some
secure telephones, some wire service printers, and a pneumatic
tube to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the relay point
for virtually all messages transmitted electrically to the
Pentagon for delivery to the NIC.
0
The primary function of the NIC staff is to prepare
the draft of the weekly Watch Committee Report. This function
absorbs most of its energies. On Friday the NIC delivers the
agenda of items of interest for the weekly report to the Watch
Committee agencies (i.e., CIA, State, DIA, FBI, and AEC), some
of which transmit it to the field. On Monday the NIC begins to
prepare the draft of the report which is distributed to members
of the Watch Committee for their comments (prepared on Tuesday).
On Wednesday morning the members of the Watch Committee meet at
the NIC and discuss the draft. Guided by their chairman, the
Watch Committee approves an agreed draft report which is sent to
the USIB for approval on Thursday. On Friday the USIB publishes
the document for the policy-level intelligence consumers and
the NIC prepares the agenda for the following week, thus start-
ing a new cycle.
0
Although special meetings of the Watch Committee are
called to consider particular events, we are aware of only two
such meetings since July 1968.
The weekly report of the Watch Committee is an "agreed"
position, which gives the impression of the unanimity in the
intelligence community that often, in fact, does not exist.
Although DCID No. 1/5 provides any member of the Watch Committee
1See Chapter IV.
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a mechanism for dissent (or "footnotes"), na.t has been used per-
haps as few as three times in the WC/NIC's15-year history.
4. The NIC's Relation to the National Security Environment'
0
The NIC's dependence on the DIA `or information is noted
above. The only other major inputs, besides telephone and the
news service teletype receivers, are through courier services
from other agencies. In the course of our visits to the other
watch centers, we observed that most were better equipped and
more extensively staffed than the NIC. M.st of them had exten-
sive communication networks of their own connecting them to
other 24-hour watch centers.
A watch center, as we are using :he term, is a 24-hour
operation which processes information. are not counting
duty officers or centers concerned solely with the technical
aspects of communications, such as those ;r.f the Defense Com-
munications Agency. So far we have ident.:fied nearly 100 watch
centers in the U.S. intelligence and mill' ary communities,
about a third of them in the Washington a:M?ea, and there are
probably many more. We have found no stu.y or list enumerating
all watch centers. Such a study would reveal the central
nervous system of the national security e?:tablishment and would
be critical to the assessment of the NIC"?n:.: place in the national
security environment.
E. CURRENT MISSION DIRECTIVES
The current documents which est fish the WC/NIC and
its position in the national security st ,icture are NSAM 226
(1963) and DCIC No. 1/5 (1965). These documents give adequate
general guidance and authority to implemit the WC/NIC although
1See Chapter V.
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they do not spell out in detail how the functions are to be
performed. Among other things these directives empower the
WC/NIC to:
(1) Have access to almost any source of information,
including "...all information and intelligence of
reasonable credibility pertinent to its mission..."
and "... [information on] significant diplomatic,
political, military or other courses of action by
the U.S..."
(2) Call on USIB agencies for immediate as well as
long-term analyses.2
(3) Request information from any USIB member agency or
other "appropriate departments and agencies of the
Government. .."3
(4) Formulate "intelligence collection requirements and
[recommend] priorities as necessary.114
(5) Review "the capability of the intelligence community
to provide warning information."5
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(6) Recommend "improvements in substantive analysis and
techniques" within USIB member agencies.6
Given the two directives the WC/NIC does not suffer
from a lack of authority to carry out a broad mission. The only
ambiguity which might arise from the directives lies in their
repeated reference to the "Sinn-Soviet Bloc." In practice,
1NSAM 226, February 27, 1963, Paragraph 1, a and b.
2DCID No. 1/5, April 23, 1965, Paragraphs E,3 and E,4.
3Ibid., Paragraph E,2.
4Ibid., Paragraph C,l.
5Ibid., Paragraph E,6.
61bid., Paragraph E,6.
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however, political realignments in the wort have been accom-
modated in WC/NIC by informal agreements.
F. CURRENT PRACTICES
SAM 226 and DCID 1/5 are adequate :o give the current
WC/NIC the authority to carry out the missi n specified in
these directives. In actual practice they ?.re not fully imple-
mented. For example, the information the N`C receives is incom-
plete. Currently the NIC does not receive!n a regular basis
U.S. diplomatic, policy and military operational information.
There is no formal systematic communication with the operational
staff of the JCS (J-3), including the NMCC .,,nd the JRC. There
is no provision for informing the NIC, on a regular basis, of
U.S. military operations which "might bring about military
reaction..."' While there is a designated -joint of contact
between the NIC and the National Photograph.c Interpretation
Center (NPIC), there is an inadequate flow -f information
between the centers. For the past eight years there has been
no representative of the State Department .i the NIC, which
creates information flow problems, particularly between the
NIC and the policy area of State. The NIC _s limited by pro-
cedures which inhibit its ability to seek information from
other agencies of the Government. This shd.?tcoming would
become particularly apparent in time of cri,.is.
While implementation of the preseni directives would
improve the current WC/NIC operations, it ; recognized that
new authorizing documents might be necessary if changes were
made in the national warning structure. A;ubsequent section
discusses some of these alternatives.
1NSAM 226, February 27, 1963, paragraph 1,1.
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G. MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS
Several major issues have emerged in the course of
this study which are of such a broad scope that they are dis-
cussed separately here.
precisely the warning function and to define its role in the
national security process. The convergence of information into
an analysis of the enemy's action alternatives cannot take place
without a clear understanding of, and agreement on, the entire
warning process. The choice of communications, data processing,
procedures, and organizational options all depend on what the
warning function is, or should be. The following problem areas
are related to the issue.
1. OThere is a need to redefine the mission and scope
of the national warning function.
The principal issue is the need to understand more
As discussed in considerable detail in Chapter II,
U.S. involvement and interests around the world have changed
considerably since the inception of the WC/NIC. The probability
of direct confrontation leading to nuclear conflict has lessened,
although the likelihood of localized nonnuclear conflicts has
increased as exemplified by Vietnam, Korea, and the Middle East.
The warning function should monitor a broader spectrum of criti-
cal developments, incidents, and crises (in terms of both
geography and time).
The National Indications Center is now something of an
anomaly among major intelligence and operations centers in
Washington. In concept, the centers of other agencies attempt
to support the national security process throughout the entire
period of any critical incident or crisis from initial detection
to termination. The focus of the NIC is limited to making a
warning judgment that an attack might be imminent. When an
attack begins, the NIC's mission terminates. Its procedures
do not provide for augmenting the current staff with the specific
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expertise required to make continuing assesnents throughout an
emerging situation that develops over time. Furthermore, it is
not equipped to support such an operation effectively.
I
separate responsibility, the mission and operation of the
WC/NIC must be geared to provide a series of warning judgments
throughout the entire period of crisis. In addition, DCID 1/5
directs the WC/NIC "to carry on a continuing analysis of infor-
mation and intelligence from all sources to identify develop-
ments, patterns and trends... n1 Thus, the yarning function may
be seen as extending across the full spectra from current
intelligence on one end to long-range estimE.,es on the other,
although the function may be shared among several agencies.
2.1 I No single center now is a point )f convergence for
all intelligence, military operation, and national policy
information necessary to the warning functicz.
If analysts do not have complete ac:,,ess to all rele-
vant information and do not fully understand the influence of
U.S. initiatives and actions on an adversary?s behavior, the
risk of invalid warning judgments is great. We have been
unable to identify any place in the Governmcct where informa-
tion from all sources relevant to the warnir_4 function
converges fully.
There are currently two major gaps in the information
input into the NIC. The most obvious is the lack of military
operational information. This should be prcvided, as NSAM 226
directs, but in fact it is not on the regul .r and timely basis
that is required. In addition, the NIC doew, not get detailed
information on policy matters from the State: Department. To
try to conduct indications intelligence wit.out knowledge of
U.S. plans and policies is to risk an unaccc-otable degree of
uncertainty.
1DCID No. 1/5, April 23, 1965, Paragraph C,.
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3. 0 The warning function must be made more responsive
to the needs of policy makers.
In the past 15 years the world situation has changed,
as have the primary concerns of U.S. policy makers. However,
it is not clear that the WC/NIC has adapted to these changes.
In part for this reason, the WC/NIC no longer plays as signifi-
cant a role in the national security process as some felt that
it did in the mid-1950s. The WC/NIC appears to have lost
contact with the ultimate consumers of its product and does
not receive the feedback from the policy levels that it requires
to be truly responsive.
4. 0 It is essential to determine the proper organiza-
tional location in the Government for the warning function.
II
Three reasons testify to the importance of positioning
the warning function at the proper level in the Government.
First, the product of warning analysis must be visible and
accessible to the policy makers if it is to be useful. The
policy makers must also understand the nature and limitations
of warning information and its interpretations. To separate
the source of warning from the policy level by many administra-
tive layers is detrimental to achieving these objectives.
Second, if the warning organization is to be responsive to the
policy makers, it must have access to all relevant information
and receive feedback from policy levels. It must be able to
draw on substantive knowledge of the intelligence and national
security communities and must levy collection requirements.
Third, if the function is vested in an existing single agency,
it could seriously bias the results. These considerations
suggest that the warning function should be independent of the
existing intelligence agencies, but able to draw on their
particular expertise.
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H. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGES TO THE WC/NIC
In previous sections we have examiied the basic docu-
ments which specify what the WC/NIC should he, and we have
discussed the present mode of operation an( its shortcomings.
We now examine alternatives for changing tl:~ WC/NIC in order
to overcome current limitations. Toward tl`;'.s end we considered
the full spectrum of major alternative actl'ns which might be
taken including the abolition of the funct )n, maintenance of
the status quo, changes in the relationship of the warning or-
ganization to the community, and steps whicl might be considered
regardless of organizational changes. Cho:es of major alter-
natives would, in most cases, require furthyr study, although
from our experience with the current system we felt that we
could recommend the rejection of several at this time. Within
most of the alternatives there are subalter.atives which can
be considered individually or in combinatia ; those discussed
here are illustrative and are not Intended -o be definitive.
It should be remembered that all of these a ternatives and sub-
alternatives are not being recommended but ather represent a
variety of options.
1. Negative Options
DAt one end of the spectrum of alternatives is the aboli-
tion of the centralized watch-indicator function" with the
options of eliminating the function entirely: or decentralizing
it into other agencies. Adopting this alteriative, particularly
if the function is entirely eliminated, is )ntrary to all crisis
experience from Pearl Harbor (and perhaps b("ore) to the present.
(Note that we are speaking of the function cid not who performs
it.) Decentralizing the function is also ccitrary to the basic
concept of the warning process which require3 the convergence
of a great variety of information (e.g., pol`_tical, military,
and intelligence). Unfortunately the actual trend has been
toward decentralization, largely because of ;he proliferation
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of national security organizations over the past two decades.
our assessment of the current requirement for such a function,
reenforced by our review of trends in the national security
environment, leads to the conclusion that this alternative be
rejected in any form.
Related to the first alternative would be the abolition
of the Watch Committee and/or the NIC and the absorption of the
function into another agency having primary functions other
than warning. This action would at least have the virtue of
clearing up the variety of conceptions of what the current
WC/NIC is supposed to be doing. Absorbing the WC/NIC function
into a constituent agency of the intelligence community would
not be impossible but could lead to a dominance by that agency
over the watch-indications area -- a dominance which could be
disruptive to the objective of community-wide convergence
and analysis of information. However, we conclude that some
type of independent centralized warning organization, at the
national level, is necessary.
2. Maintenance of the Status Quo
Another alternative would be to do nothing to the Watch
Committee and/or the NIC, with the options of retaining the
status quo in both groups or leaving one or the other in its
current form. We consider retaining the WC/NIC as it is to be
perhaps the most dangerous of all alternatives. It would per-
petuate the confusion that currently exists over the role of
the NIC. It would also freeze any development of the NIC to
meet the rapidly changing national security environment including
new techniques of information collection, collation,. and
analysis. We would recommend that this alternative be rejected.
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3. Reorganizational Alternatives
In the range of positive actions w'ich could be taken
to upgrade the WC/NIC function, we defined three alternatives
which might be considered: changes in the composition and
procedures of the WC/NIC; changes in its psition within the
Government; and the creation of a broader e:,_ganization in
which they would be subsumed. These alternatives, we believe,
are consonant with the intent of the exist:'ng directives of
the warning function although some could only be implemented
by decisions at the highest level of Goverr:nent.
I
A variety of options could be emplcyed to change the
WC/NIC composition and/or its procedures. ome of these are
listed below:
Composition:
?Upgrade the chairmanship and the rv.:zk of members of
the Watch Committee.
?Add J-3 and State policy represental-ives as major
members or senior advisors of the Witch Committee.
?Rotate the chairmanship of the Wati Committee on a
periodic basis.
?Make the major members of the Watch Committee a
permanent watch group devoting most of their time
to NIC matters.
? Add an NPIC representative to the Wtch Committee. ell' Procedures:
.Provide a workable mechanism for pr::senting alternatives
to be carried from the Watch Commit:ee to the USIB.
*De-emphasize the weekly cycle.
?Establish procedures for recommends=:g reviews of
the NIEs and SNIEs.
Have the Watch Committee reports in-,icate that they
have taken into account current U.S',. intelligence
and military operations, and change.: in U.S.
foreign policy.
Perhaps the most significant change would b generated by
making the members of the Watch Committee p rmanent, which
would have a considerable impact on the intf::rnal organization
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of the NIC. We believe that all of these options should be
considered, but cannot at this time recommend particular
selections.
Changes of the position of the warning organization in
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the Government were also considered. One we examined was hav-
ing the warning organization report to the National Security
Council. This would require major policy decisions and exten-
sive changes. The reason that this alternative was considered
is that the NSC is the first place in the Government at which
military operational, national policy and full intelligence
information formally converge. We feel that this alternative
should be considered, but have reached no firm conclusion.
Finally, at the other end of the spectrum of alterna-
tives, is the creation of a center for national warning.
This would involve absorbing the NIC/Watch Committee into a
broader organization which would include representation from
intelligence agencies, policy agencies, and military operations
centers. Consideration of this option would require extensive
study of the intelligence, policy, and military operations
environment, and choices could only be made at highest policy
levels. Under this alternative the current WC/NIC would cease
to exist. This alternative should be considered, but it would
take a major study effort before conclusions could be reached.
4. Immediate Internal Changes
Regardless of what decisions may be made on organiza-
tional changes in the national warning structure, there are
internal changes in the current organization which can and
should be made now. Some of our specific recommendations in
the areas of internal organization, operations, communications,
and data processing are included in Section J of this synopsis.
While we would urge that these measures be considered and feel
that they would substantially increase the capability and
flexibility of the WC/NIC, we do not believe they will solve
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the problems concerning the warning functio and the position
of that function within the Government. Th.:-se specific changes
should not, therefore, be considered a subs itute for actions
needed to resolve the broader problems.
The most important conclusion of t`is study is that
the mission and scope of the warning funct-n are not now well
understood and that responsibilities are it defined. Until
this understanding is reached, no significant improvements are
likely to be made in the warning process.
0
'There are currently a variety of a derstandings of the
missions and functions of the Watd~ Committee/
National Indications Center within the intelligence
and national security communities.
'There is now an even greater need ror a single point
of convergence for warning information than there was
when the National Indications Cent-::r was formed.
This central point, which does not now exist, must
have available all relevant intelligence and informa-
tion on national policy and U.S. m'litary operations.
'Abolition of the centralized watch--indicator function
would be contrary to the necessity for the convergence
of information relevant to the warning process.
'An independent centralized warning organization at
the national level is necessary.
'Absorption of the Watch Committee/rational Indications
Center into one of the agencies of the community could
result in the dominance of that a,ncy over the warn-
ing function.
'Retaining the Watch Committee/National Indications
Center as it is would perpetuate tle confusion that
currently exists over the role of the NIC. It would
freeze any development of the NICo meet the rapidly
changing national security environ!ent including new
techniques of information collecti:,n, collation, and
analysis.
'The uncertainty inherent in the an lysis of indica-
tions makes the expression of respnsible alternative
interpretations a necessary part o;" the warning
process.
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*Within the present context of the Watch Committee/
National Indications Center operations, automatic
data processing does not now offer significant aids
to the warning process.
J. RECOMMENDATIONS
0
The study recommends the following:
1. NSAM 226 and DCID 1/5 should be broadened to reflect
the current world situation and should be fully imple-
mented if the current WC/NIC structure is retained.
2. The warning function should monitor a broader
spectrum of critical developments, incidents
and crises (in terms of both geography and time).
3. A more formal requirements mechanism should be
created to assure continuous receipt of all relevant
information by the National Indications Center.
4. State Department representatives should be added to
the NIC.
5. Formal liaison should be established between the NIC
and the J-3, including the NMCC.
6. Studies should be conducted to assist in selecting
among the alternative organizational changes, for
example:
*An assessment of the needs of policy makers in
the warning process.
?A review of all information sources which might
contribute to warning.
*An examination of the national watch centers and
their communication networks.
*The development of formal procedures to assure
that increased capabilities made possible by
technological advances are fully exploited in
the warning process.
7. Internal changes should be made to increase the opera-
tional effectiveness of the National Indications
Center under its present charter, for example:
?A dedicated and secure voice conferencing net
should be established linking the National Indi-
cations Center with the watch centers of the
Watch Committee member agencies as well as to the
National Military Command Center.
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?Conferencing procedures should?;~;e established
for the above with the NIC as tHe conference
coordinator.
.A capability should be acquired for secure long-
distance electrical transmissio'i of written
materials and graphics.
-The National Indications Center should add a
research program on indications and warning.
8. Experiments should be conducted on he indications
process, for example:
.The reliability of the current :iltering process
should. be tested.
*The analytical process should examined by
comparing the results of differ;nt groups of
analysts working independently '!n the same
information.
.Information extraction technigLes should be
applied to information about pEst crises in
order to test the applicabilitl of data
processing.
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