LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002800020075-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: October 31, 1978
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release-2001/09/03 CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
DCI Notes
31 Oct 78
0800
I. Past year & half signs moderation in Libya's international behaviour:
Terror; Soviet relations; support for regional dissidents
1. Starting 73/74 (falling out with Sadat) Qadhafi began direc
involvement in specific international terrorist events -
-Can link Libyan money to such events as attacks on Rome & Athens
airports & 3 hijackings 1973-74; 1975.~cskQPEC meeting
in Vienna; sabotage & bombings in Egypt " granted asylum,
e.g., Olympics 1972
2. Since your demarche March 1977 over threa- to Eilts
-Believe concerned over this tough attitude:
-Over possible US-Egyptian collaboration against him;
-Over fear that our intelligence had penetrated his
connections with terrorists
B. Distancing from Soviets somewhat & lessened stridency toward US
p I C Tvgr
(Arms Photo) 1. Mainly rhetorical - still buying arms from Soviets
(Arms Charts
25X18 face to face)
-1978 so far for Soviet arms
-$2.6B total for Soviet arms
-Increased 1500-1700 Soviet advisers since Egypt attack
July 1977 - doubled presence
-e.g., MMIG-25s delivered since July; 1st outside Bloc
2. But always distrustful Soviets
-Turned to them '73 when split with Sadat
-May be concerned at possible Soviet subversion of officer,
corps who increasingly disaffected with Qadhafi's treatment
of them.
-May be concerned that Soviet connection will induce another
Egyptian attack - Sadat rhetoric
-Significant - never acceded on naval bases
C. Diminished support for regional dissidence
1. Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Polisario
2. Less apparent in last year, but by no means gone
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-e.g., cQ s i_de.rable.evidence that he was linked to the coup
plotters in North Yemen this month
D. Why changes?
1. Probably related to growing estrangement with world around him
-Egyptians
-Palestinians - disillusioned
-Poor relations with most Arabs
2. Possibly related to: decl ininosit n__.a.t__home_.of..Qadhafd...
(Economic Activity A. No ecoD.o.mic-p.r.oblens - 1 product economy - (Charts)
:;l art. & Map face r ---
to face) Controversy over unorthodox domestic policies is recent.
Initial thrust of Qadhafi's dome tic policies garnered wide
4 internal support
1. 50% of revenues to development & social services
(a) Libyans in cases live well & have good schools, clinics
& housing
(b) Effort to distribute wealth
No poverty in cffies, but problems resulting from
- Nomads adjusting to city life - don't work, just let
government feed
- Government inefficiency
(c) Basically pushed too hard on modernization, especially
h i s t.uj?q_e__i!~eo Logy.
Qadhafi's frustration with Libyan's "inability" to
modernize habits prompted ambition to remake the
Libyan man.
(1) een books on Qadhafi alternative to communism &
cap itali~ m"
- Politically advocates elementary democracy
town hall type exercised by citizens
- Economically looks to individual austerity,
1, .ni tation_! nowners.bip, nationalization of
economic activity -
-Unpopular with i 1 affluent middle class
-Mainly don't understand
(2) When has expounded his own interpretation of Koran
even run into opposition of raii4ious__1__edders,
despite professed strong Islamic outlook
-Conflicts of preserving Islamic ways & modernization
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 S E C R E T
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II Still
A. Changes are more ofcaut_iqusness than reforming or maturin
B. Not by any roe na s,~a_man ,in?retreat, and han es are all in
areas of adhafi's uniRueNimpri~nt, e.g., support of
terrorists & issiaents, and relations with Soviets.
C. Imperatives of Libyan policy will go on:
1. Opposition to a1 et~?s.h .S.traiFe? i n midst Arab world -
-Highly
-Probably includes supporting terroris_m__jhece, e.g., 400 scuba suits
2. Practical steps toas5ure oil f10
40, _JU
55% of GDP
98% of exports
3. Preoccupation on bow to-?-l4ye-?wa,th-ZC3yp- & to some extent other
neighbors
-Historically uneasy - boundaries - tribes split
-Nes,i.y._o .dcc_o.mrgadtio,~?
-Qadhafi's first effort at accommodation was merger of Libya - Egypt
leading to single Arab nation
-Derived from concept of Nasser - triple cocentric world of
(3 circles maps Islam - hard core center - progressively less orthodox belts
face to face) around it
-Took Sadat by surprise - went along - never intended
D. Out of this would expect more signals and even roposalsto.n2rove
relations with.-US
One reason may come to US - E,_a acke_d. nce; may well know
Sadat talking another
1. dat's motive ma well t et Qadhafi know he's-thinking-of
it - as in ucement r6 duce pressure Sudan & C ad
-Sadat feels strongly - own view of importance of his role
~- ar--e-be~, ce-S-ovi-et?-infl-aence-
-lot--ga-ven--p v -r-i 9 ht-s
3. Do1.+ow what impact of Camp David results may have:
-One hand - free up Egyptian forces
-Other - difficult time for Sadat to further split Arab world
As long as Qadhafi remains, likely to be tension with Egypt _
- 3 -
S E C R E T
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
A. Qadhafi very y~y~l~rat~_~e -Estimate he has survived no fewer than att plpts la al several years-
-But has a a_tive_ly._f_i.1". L_grip on power
-Likely to be around for 4metime_
B. Reasons for recent moderation based largely on exnediency not a
real change in convics,ion and world view
-Nevertheless, experience, mostly failures, have taught some lessons
-Probably will act with greater caution for foreseeable future ,
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
Libya's Arms Inventory
(Major Weapons)
Estimated Value of Soviet-bloc Weapons Contracts
1974-1978-$2.6 billio
/251
Equipment
Number and Country of Origin
Medium Tanks
Armored Personnel Carriers
Artillery
Combat-Capable Aircraft
Surface-to-Air Missiles
Surface-to-Surface Missiles
Submarines
Frigates
Missile Patrol Boats
700 Soviet/800 Polish/
600 Czechoslovak
815 Soviet/165 Italian/
120 Czechoslovak
130 Soviet/50 Italian/30 US
205 Soviet/110 French
39 Battalions Soviet/
8 Batteries French
40 Launchers Soviet
3 Soviet
1 British
6 Soviet/3 British
_P1.
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
Comparison of Personnel and Equipment Levels
in Egypt and Libya
Egypt Libya
Armed Forces
Personnel
500,000 45,000
Key Weapons
Inventories
(In Units)
(In Units)
(in Storage)
Tanks
2,200
500
1,600
APCs
2,400
600
500
Artillery
1,250
210
0
Combat-Capable
Aircraft
505
100
215
SAM Battalions
135
17
22
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
Libya: Economic Activity
Marla at Burmah
AMAL
? S
DAHRA
It,
&
CZALTAN INTI~AR
---~JAL
FUELS
GI pipebn..
Od eld
Gas p,pr?hne
Ligaesied gas plant
Petrolec-n rehmng
AGRICULTURE AND FISHING
Intensive c~lovahon of irrigated coastal oasis
ceeas olives. vegetables dates. almonds)
---~ Shifting caitrvabon with -Stock lcr Teals
esparto g' ass sheep and gnats)
Gray n_
G
Oass cu L'waeon (dates. cereals, cd~cs Irwtst
Nonagnc altirat wits scattered nomadic herding
< Fsh ng
/ SARIR
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
Q :dhafi's Version of Nasser's Three Circle Theory
Muslim heartland
Muslim secondary circle
Larger Islamic community (includes those countries
with significant Muslim minority)
Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020075-1
C
Libya
GNP average annual growth rate, 1970-77
Literacy rate
Life expectancy at birth
Labor force, 19771
Libyans
Foreigners
Total Labor Force,
by Sector, 1976
GNP Per Capita
(US $)
1970-72
Average
1, Estimated
602779
3-5%
51 years
900,000
350,000
Foreigners in Libya
Exports
(Billion US S)
98% Petroleum
Trade
GNP by Sector,
1977
Construction
Manufacturing 3%
Agriculture 3%
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 Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81B00401 R002800020075-1
Qadhafi's Version of Nasser's Three Circle Theory
North
""?"~^? Atlantic
K