CONVERSATION, 3 OCTOBER 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002800020046-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: October 4, 1978
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2001/09/03 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002800020046-3
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4 O CT 1978
SUBJECT: Conversation, 3 October 1978
1. I presented the briefing on the Soviet missile R&D complex.
There was considerable interest in this. I think the point that there
is a large continuing program which gives the Soviet leaders option,
but at the same time has a momentum which influences their positions
in SALT and other discussions, came through clearly. Also, I think the
point was made that there was a good probability that any constraints
from SALT or other reasons would lead to a reallocation of R&D assets
rather than a reduction in them.
a. Bill Perry took over and put this in fine
perspective from the US point of view. He pointed
out that the Soviets are trying by developing many
more systems than they will deploy to substitute for
the competitive process by which we develop something
closer to the number of systems which we are going to
deploy. Our process requires us to determine what
characteristics we need and then develop it rather
than develop several systems with different charac-
teristics and then select one--although we pointed
out the Soviets have frequently deployed some of the
"loser" systems also. The net result is that the
cost of Soviet systems by unit price is less than ours,
but ours are engineered to a higher degree of sophisti-
cation and reliability. He contended, however, that
the Soviet production costs were higher than ours because
of the number of systems they had to develop and abandon.
There is a high premium then on the overall debating
system we use with the Executive Branch, Congress, and
the public to be sure we don't buy the wrong system
since we don't develop many alternatives.
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b. He also pointed out that the chart of US land-
based system starts shows that there was a big impulse
from Sputnik in 1958. Since then, everything has almost
been downhill. The quality of the SLBM system, its mission
and the fact that a single contractor has handled it have
apparently kept it going at a rather steady level.
c. David Aaron commented afterwards that bringing in
Perry to throw in a contrast with the US was very helpful.
All too frequently it is difficult to put things in this
perspective. We should look for other opportunities to
do this.
2. I was asked how well we could estimate Soviet defense expenditures.
I told him in R&D we were weakest and probably accurate within 40%, but
that in procurement of hardware we are much more accurate--perhaps 10%.
Gromyko had apparently made a proposal that we reduce armaments by limiting
budgets. He had been told that with the Soviet budget secret, there was
no way we could verify this. Gromyko contended that the Soviets did publish
their budget and it was available to us.
The comment was made that Defense and CIA differ
largely on the size of the Soviet budget in rubles. I
said I didn't think that was the case but there had been
this major reestimating of the percentage of Gross National
Product consumed by the Soviet defense budget. 4 lik
to get aview from OSR on the accurac of the ruble estimat
of the Soviet defense budget.
3. I covered the Rhodesian situation with respect to possible Soviet/
Cuban involvement. The charts flowed very well after all of our efforts.
I think there was a great deal of attention to them, especially to the
overall chart with the routes of ingress and vulnerability points. I have
the feeling that there hadn't previously been much recognition of the
geographical issues. Bill Perry was present for this and commented after-
wards how clear he thought this presentation was.
a. I emphasized perhaps particularly the pressure
there would be on the South Africans to move quickly.
If they didn't, I felt that even the difficult crossing
points could probably be crossed if the Cubans had
enough armor and artillery.
b. When I mentioned the possibility that the
Ethiopians would participate in any force that was sent
to Central/South Africa, I emphasized that this would be
a token force to give it an African complex rather than
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the smaller items. Leave in the status and Neto's son.
ink we'll drop the Togolese President's letter. I briefed Aaron on
de Marenches---we can drop that one.
STANSFIELD TURNE
Director
cCi
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)
Routing Slip
1 Arrin1d I INFO L
5 DD/CT
6 DD/A
7 DD/0
8 DD/S&T
9 GC
10 LC
11 IG
1 DCI
2 DDCI
3 DD/RM
4 DD/NFA
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