THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002700010004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/17: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002700010004-1
Secret
The Chinese Leadership
Secret
RPM 77-10242
September 1977
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I. The new Chinese leadership, chosen at the party congress in August,
is a relatively cohesive group that lacks the deep personal and
ideological cleavages that have characterized China's leading
groups in the last decade.
A. The shared experience of many of the leaders, who fought
together in the civil war, and their common desire to promote
steady economic growth may result, in the short term at least,
in a greater degree of stability than the Chinese have known
in over ten years.
B. Over the longer term, however, latent forces of instability
are likely to have considerable impact and could pull the
leadership in a variety of directions.
II. The Chinese must fill the authority vacuum created by the destruction
of the party in the mid-1960's, the rapid turnabout in the political
fortunes of its leaders (such as the twice purged and twice returned
Teng (DUNG)) and the deaths of prestigious figures like Mao and
Chou (JOE).
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A. In order to restore the party to its previous status as the
source of authority, there has been a major effort to build up
the image of newly-confirmed party chairman Hua Kuo-feng (HWA
GWO-FUNG).
B. Hua has failed to capture the imagination of the Chinese
people, however, and must share power with older leaders who
enjoy wider popularity and greater standing among the party
rank and file.
III. In this regard the rehabilitation of Teng has been a problem for
Hua. (HWA)
A. Teng has already stolen much of the limelight and exercises a
major influence over personnel and policy decisions.
B. Policy differences between the two men are slight and are more
a matter of degree than substantive difference.
1. Teng may put somewhat more emphasis on industry than
agriculture and seems more willing than the normally
cautious Hua to push the campaign against followers of
the leftists.
2. The real problem is that Hua will have difficulty es-
tablishing himself as number one on a long-term basis.
a. When the 79-year-old Defense Minister Yeh (YEH), who
is playing an important role as the guarantor of
Hua's power, leaves the scene, a potentially divisive
scramble for the party chairmanship could take
place.
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b. If Hua has not impressed provincial and central
party leaders with his leadership ability by this
time--a distinct possibility--others in the leadership
may feel that they are more qualified than he to run
the party.
IV. Hua was Mao's personal choice as his successor. But this is a
mixed blessing because today's leaders are somewhat embarrassed by
much of the Mao legacy.
A. They would like to preserve those portions that foster rational
political behavior and sound economic policy and discard those
ideas that lead to such disruptive events as the Cultural
Revolution.
B. The Mao legacy will be a continuing problem, and because the
leadership is drawing only selectively on the late chairman
for legitimacy, it is vulnerable to later charges of distorting
or ignoring his thinking.
V. The domination of the party's higher councils by veteran officials,
although it conveys an important message. that earlier attacks on
them were unwarranted, could create some resentment.
A. The party congress gave scarcely a nod to the need to groom
younger officials for positions of responsibility. This need
will become more pressing given the advanced age of many top
officials.
SAC eET
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VI. The leadership seems united in recognizing the magnitude of China's
economic problems and is determined to tackle them via an ambitious
program aimed at making China a major industrial nation by the end
of the century.
A. The success of this program will depend largely on ensuring a
greater degree of political stability than has thus far been
the case.
B. The leadership's calls for order and stability will be effective
only if lower level officials sense genuine unity in Peking.
1. It is especially hard to maintain an image of unity
during discussions over the allocation of resources, an
issue the Chinese admit results in dogfights.
2. This year's debate over military spending, for example,
is likely to be repeated whenever a new budget is being
drawn up.
VII. In fact, the potential for civilian/military conflict extends
beyond the defense spending issue into the general role of military
men in politics.
A. Since an alleged attempt at a military takeover in 1971 by
Mao's chosen heir, Defense Minister Lin Piao, civilians have
been wary of military participation in politics and have
steadily reduced that participation.
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B. The military stepped into civilian political jobs at all
levels to restore order after the Cultural Revolution of the
mid-1960's.
C. Some military men, having had their first taste of political
power, have been less willing than others to relinquish it.
D. The Chinese military traditionally has been more involved in
politics than has the Soviet military. Defining and limiting
its future role could be a major source of friction.
VIII. In its efforts to undo the impractical and unworkable policies
of the Cultural Revolution, the leadership is running the risk of
regenerating the same kinds of pressures and dissatisfaction at the
lower levels that enabled Mao to launch the Cultural Revolution in
the first place.
A. The leadership is returning to a highly-structured system in
which promotions are based on merit, admission to universities
is based on academic achievement rather than political reliability,
and party membership--the main road to advancement--is more
selective.
1. This-system will inevitably create an elite, privileged
group and will lessen opportunities for upward mobility.
2. As impractical as the policies of the now-discredited
leftists were, they had vast appeal precisely because
they promised opportunities for those who had previously
had none.
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3. The communist party, with its 35 million members,
still has a sizeable contingent of leftists who,
with a new spokesman, could become an important
force in the party again in the future.
IX. In the realm of foreign policy, we do not foresee any sharp departures.
A. One option open to the new leadership is a relaxation of
tensions with Moscow designed to give Peking more room for
maneuver within the Moscow-Washington-Peking triangle and more
leverage in dealing with the US.
1. In point of fact, the new leadership continues to reject
this option and has rebuffed a number of overtures from
Moscow since the death of Mao.
2. We are continuing to look closely for any signs of change
in this very important policy area. But right now, the
prospect seems to be for an indefinite continuation of
the policy of near total political and ideological confrontation
with the USSR and a continuation of China's opening to
the US with Peking attempting to use, as far as possible,
Washington's international influence and military potential
as a counterweight to the USSR globally.
3. As a matter of fact, Moscow itself now claims to see
little lessening of anti-Soviet feeling in the present
Chinese leadership and takes the view that there is
little or no hope of significant improvement in Sino-
Soviet relations until it is replaced.
SEm
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4. Peking and Moscow recently resolved some issues concerning
navigation on border rivers between the two countries.and
the Chinese have sent a new ambassador to Moscow after
the post had been vacant for more than a year. The
moves, however, do not indicate any general improvement
in~relations between the two countries, which remain
extremely strained over important political and ideological
issues.
Because this is a more unified leadership group, foreign
policy issues are less likely to be used as political weapons
in factional infighting.
1. A year ago, at a time when the now purged senior leftists
were still riding high in Peking, a relatively hard line
on Taiwan--one that emphasized the use of force to take
the island--emerged temporarily.
2. It could be that this sabre rattling reflected a sincere
effort by leftists to adopt a more aggressive position
vis-a-vis the US on Taiwan. It also could have been a
reflection of the very intense struggle for power that
was then underway within the leadership.
C. Whatever the case, the new leadership should find it easier to
stick to a more patient and less threatening line on the
Taiwan issue.
1. Peking, however, continues to make a sharp distinction
between patience regarding the eventual regaining of
Taiwan and its contention that the US is obligated to
move ahead pr Pekin 's three basic
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SMT
conditions for normalization of relations.
2. While Chinese officials continue to state their
preference for a peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue, they are careful not to rule out
the possibility that force eventually might be
needed to "liberate" the island.
D. With Teng in the saddle, we are beginning to see a
change in style if not in the substance of China's foreign
policy.
1. His recent comments to the visiting Associated Press
delegation on his conversations with Secretary Vance
are a good example.
2. He is not. the discreet diplomat that Chou En-Lai
was; he has a well-deserved reputation for bluntness,
and we can expect him to talk strongly or even
provocatively whenever he thinks it sums China's purpose.
R. On balance, we believe that the new Chinese leadership is likely to
view its recent exchange with the US through Secretary Vance in the
following terms:
A. While annoyed by US hesitation to come to grips
with the Taiwan problem, which Peking asserts is the only
real obstacle to normalization, the Chinese do not believe
recent developments have undercut the fundamental advantages
they derive from the connection with the US.
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B. The Chinese are determined to make clear publicly Peking's position
on the Taiwan issue, probably in hopes of generating
pressure in the US for more rapid movement toward
normalization.
C. The Chinese are still interested in improving trade with the US
and gaining better access to high-technology US products,
but until significant progress is made on normalization they
are likely to turn first to Europe and Japan.
.
D. The Chinese leaders remain concerned about the US's-,willingness
to deal forcefully with the USSR,, especially with Soviet
"expansionism" abroad.
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POLITBURO of the CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
STANDING COMMITTEE
(IN RANK ORDER)
Chaarean""CC`P.CC (1976); Vice ChairmanHICCP-CCG(1973);
Chairman, CCP CC Military Vice Chairmen, CCP-CC
Commission (1976); Military Commission (1966);
Premier ((976) Minister of National Defense (19]5);
Vice Chairman, CPPCC
C41 TENS-K'UEII
Istt Poliiticlal rCOmmi ssa r,
Peking .MP. (1974)
Vice Ccirman, CCP-CC (1977)
Vice Premier (1959)
Member, Politburo, 10th CCP-CC
+e Alternate Member, Politburo,
10th CCP.CC
M in position From January 1975
atil dis sad fro all pet
April 197615 m [s sn
Lommena:? Ail Force 1977 CH'ENnHSI-LIEN'
1st Secretary, CCP Committee, CCP-CC Mil itaryCOmmg Las iont11977);
Air Force (197]) Vice Premier (1975);
Commander, Peking MR (1974)
Commander, Canton MR (1973);
CCP Commlttee~tCanton MR
976)
Vice Premieer I(197 s)
Srd Secretary,-Shanghai Deputy eomm:`d?",?eay WEI KUO-CH'ING
Munic lpal CCP Committee (19]6); 1st Secretary, Shanghal91 ~) Vi letC Secretary,P gmengtung
Zrd Vic. to t -ix Shanghai MRC111976); MChairman,CShanghaitMRC (1976) Chairman- CC:1
t P RC RC 11975); 5
ltd Pallr lcel Comaa- r, lot Pol ll lcel Commaaser,
Nanking MP (1975) f n inn Ml) ((971)
Vice Chairmen, P-
Vice Premier, StatCeCCounCC;cil;
Vice Chairman, CCP - CC
Military Commission;
Chief of Staff, PIA
Vice Pees is el I
l. CAS (1977);
CAS CCP Committee a(1977)
Vice Chairman, NPC (1959)
Vice Chairman, NPC (1975);
Director, United Front Mork
Department, CCP-CC (1977)
and Sal) CHIN, PLeking
Municipal CCP Committee (1977);
Munic c
i P a I cep c mmittee n (1976);
1st Vice Chairman,
Shanghai -RC (1976)
Vice Chairman TENPC (1975);
Municipal SCC, Committeet(1')]]1;
Chairman, Peking Mlt(: 11'1)3)
HSU HS14NG-CH'IEN
Vice Chairman, CCP-CC
nu7itary Commission (1966)
NIEH JUNG-CHEN
vi cc h
MilitaryCOmmie sion P(1)6))
WANG TUNG-HSING +
Vice Chairman, CCP-CC (1977);
Diecto, General Office,
CCP'CC (1966)
YU CH'IU-LI 25X1
Vice Premier (1975);
PMan;nR r l:ommiss ion (1912)
Ist SrrA0t12y.YSNeih?an
cnn; ~nan, eSoenhaan PVC ( 9 6)
1st Political Commissar,
Ch'eng-to MR (19]6)
Min He?1 of uoAemic
Rc la [ions with 777)
Count ri e.c (1977)
Vice Chairman TIY1PC 11975);
1st Secretary, Sinkiang Province CCP Chairman, Sri nitt" kioeg (PRC 3 (19751;
1st Political Commissar
Sinkiang MR (1973),
Abbreviations:
CAS - Chinese Academy of Sciences
CCP - Chinese Communist Party
CCP-CC - Lh inese Communist Party Central
CPVCC - Chinese ."t.
ple's Political
Cmnsulta five Conference
IL) International Liaison Department
MR - Milita rv Region
MRC - 0inicipeI gevol utiona ry Committee
NPC - National People's Confine
PRC - Provincial RevolutionaryS Committee
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