25, 28-29 JANUARY TASKING RE CURRENT CRISES (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002500130013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: January 29, 1980
• Content Type: MFR

SECRET
Approved For Ree 2004/04/01 : CI B00401 800130013-0
29 January 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 80-6061/4
SUBJECT: 25, 28-29 January Tasking re Current Crises I
1. During the 25 January debrief, the Director recapped events at
the several meetings held on the 24th as well as the regular meeting of
the 25th and asked the following be undertaken:
a. He asked that the Administration's current six-point
approach (for dealing with Iran re the hostage issue--
designed to be more forthcoming and offer opportunities
for "movement" in the negotiation/bargaining) be
reviewed and any ideas regarding either it (changes,
additions, deletions, etc.) or how the Administration
should approach the new government in Iran be passed
to him. (Action: Anyone with any ideas provide DCI/DDCI
directly, providing copies to Iran Task Force)
b. Noting that at the SCC on the 25th David Aaron tasked
State (Hal Saunders) for a paper addressing the question
1What is State doing to define/analyze US objectives in
Afghanistan," the Director asked that we add our own paper
to the general treatment of this subject, from our
perspective. He expressed interest in defining the
range of alternatives of what we could push for/hope
for regarding the Afghan situation. The Director noted
two possible options the Soviets might have. (in near
future make significant reduction of forces, call it a
"victory," have a "MAAG" and accept control only of
government; or really put in significantly more force
and subjugate the country) and discussed these with
those present. Finally he asked that these types of
questions with answers be pulled together (including
treatment of what options the Soviets and the US have?
What is achievable by the Soviets? by the insurgents?)
(Action: Afghan Task Force with NIO/USSR-EE, due COB
30 January)
c. The Director asked that special attention be paid to
any signs of movement of additional Soviets into
Afghanistan and that he be kept informed (with our
assessment of what such movement means) and that we
cover in a timely way in PDB/NID. (Action: Afghan
Task Force, continuing item)
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/04/g1C-W.RDP81 00
25X
 Approved For Reee 2004/04W1CR9A'%P81 B00401 RQ&00130013-0
d. The Director also asked that we summarize what we know
about possible Soviet use of CW in Afghanistan in the
NID/PDB (noting that the HASC had questioned him
extensively on this, based on DIA testimony, on the
24th). (Action: Afghan Task Force, by 29 January)
2. During the debrief on the 28th the Director asked for the
following inputs:
a. Noting that we will be consulting with our Allies re
possible abrogation of the US-Soviet Maritime Agreement;
and noting that while the current agreement specifically
names 40 US ports the Soviets can enter without special
permission (and they have asked and received permission
to enter 20 more); and noting that the US currently only
uses 5 (of theoretical limit of 40) Soviet ports; the
Director asked if anyone could see any reason for US
to push for getting into other 35 Soviet ports (for
intelligence reasons). (Action: DD/CT, DDO, NFAC,
provide inputs directly to DCI/DDCI)
b. The Director indicated there was no clear sense (by SCC)
as to why the Soviets were sending increasing numbers
of senior military officers into Afghanistan. This was
discussed around the table, but some pulling together
and treatment in, say, PDB/NID might be worthwhile.
(Action: Afghan Task Force, to coordinate with NI0/USSR)
25X1
c. Re Bani-Sadr and recent election, the Director wants
to ensure full treatment of what his success may mean to
us (and the hostages), and how we mi ht best deal with
him. (Action: Iran Task Force and due
30 January) II
3. During the DD/NFA debrief on the 29th. (the DCI was. on the Hill
and did not attend the SCC), the following actions were requested:
a. Noting the SCC directed DoD to be helpful (-quickly) to
Tunisian requests for military equipment following
28 January Libyan-backed commando raid, DD/NFA asked
that we be especially attentive to events in Tunisia.
(Action: OPA)
-2-
Approved For Release 2004/04fttRECIAtRD'P8I$00401 R002500130013-0
25X1
25X1A
25X1
25X1
 SECRET NOFORN
Approved For Re*e 2004/04/01 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R*00130013-0
c. The DD/NFA described the concern for treatment of the
activity (possible exercise) involving the Soviet
Brigade in Cuba. He noted that this was to be the
subject of a meeting of the group; that 25X1A
steps were being taken to develop the position with
respect to events in Cuba; that all agencies were to
refrain from reporting in their general distribution
publications (e.g. NID, not PDB); that an SR-71 flight
was being considered, both to get information and to
send a message. He asked that all the facts re ardin
this activity be pulled together and provided 25X6
and himself. (Action: OSR, due COB 29 January)
d. Noting that he had advised SCC of reporting of Soviets
rounding up and machine-gunning Afghans in an unnamed
town in northeastern Afghanistan, DD/NFA asked that
the analysis of this report (source, language used, etc.),
be available for Wednesday (30 January) SCC meeting.
(Action: Afghan Task Force, due COB 29 January) II 25X1
4. Please advise PB/NSC when required actions completed. II 25X1
25X1A
cc: DCI
DDCI
DD/NFA
DDO
GC
LC
D/ PA
Ch/NIC
DD/CT
ES
Approved For Release 20041041916F& 0401 R002500130013-0 25X1