PREPARATIONS FOR DCI/NIO MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002500050004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 20, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: All National Intelligence Officers
FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator
SUBJECT : Preparations for DCI/NIO Meeting
Attached for your perusal is a background paper for the
DCI/NIO meeting which is scheduled for 1400, Monday, 23 October,
in the DCI Conference Room.
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cc: DD/NFA
DD/NFAC
THIS MEMORANDUM IS DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN REMOVED FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT.
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PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
I. Today 13 countries in Latin America, excluding Cuba, with
a total population of over 200 million, are under some form of direct
or indirect military rule. The generals in most of these countries
ant
-- with the exception of the Stroes_sner dictatorship in Paraguay --
Ivw
or intend to remain in power indefinitely. A growing sentiment
throughout the hemisphere favors civilian rule, or at least broader
civilian participation in the governing process. Leaders in the area
know that the US and,to a lesser extent,governments in Western Europe
are uncomfortable dealing with military regimes. But developmental
problems and national security concerns, some real and some imagined,
will remain a serious roadblock to constitutional, democratically-elected
government.
Military rule has deep roots in Latin America, and is ',
legitimized to some extent in most constitutions which often grant the
military extraordinary authority to regulate elections, to preserve
order, and, in some cases, to perform quasi-judicial functions in
interpreting constitutional provisions. The fragmentation of political
parties and the relative weakness of civilian institutions sometimes
provide. no viable alternative to military rule. Some military takeovers
have been responses_to special historical or economic circumstances, such
as the takeover, of tin mines in Bolivia, the trend toward Marxism in-Brazil,
Ior the growth of the Peronist movement in
Argentina. The military regimes resulting from these patterns vary
greatly, reflecting the different conditions in each country and the
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great diversity within the region as a whole.
II. A few military governments, such as the Andean states of
Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, have set rough timetables for a transition
to civilian rule within the next two to three years. In Central
in El Salvador and Guatemala
America, military leaders/are faced with serious socio-economic
problems, spiraling violence, and the prospect of continuing instability
in neighboring Nicaragua. They will dig in their heels and try to
repress any form of opposition. Others, particularly those in the
Southern Cone, are determined to restructure the political fabric of
their societies and will want to maintain control well into the 1980s.
Because of Brazil's. preeminence in South America, the speed
and extent to which the high command there allows democratization to
proceed -- and the ultimate success or failure of the process -- will
have an important impact on its neighbors. The success of the "Brazilian
Model" which emerged after the armed forces takeover in 1964, has not
been lost on military planners and strategists in other countries. The
Brazilian generals' explicit commitment to eliminate subversion,
corruption and politics, and to foster rapid economic development under
an umbrella of order, is being echoed in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.
Southern Cone leaders, like their counterparts in Brazil,
believe that liberal democracy in the traditional' Western sense, is
outmoded. Moreover, on the international scene, they doubt liberal
democracy's ability to compete with totalitarian communism. The corrupt
and inept politicians spawned by.democratic, civilian governments are
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unable to formulate and sustain a development program. Underdevelopment
brings subversion, insurgency and ultimately revolution. They reason
political and
that the solution is a sweeping structural revision of existing/socio-
economic patterns. And this can be accomplished only during a prolonged
period of direct military rule.
Despite this perceived need to create new political institutions,
formulas are slow to emerge. New constitutions and national reorganization
plans have been written or are being prepared, but military rule today
functions on "decree laws" and "institutional acts" and depends over-
whelmingly on military power. On paper, at least, Chile has established
a tentative timetable for transition to a "new institutionality. It
undoubtedly will be changed and the process will vary significantly in
other countries. But the Chilean program gives a rough idea of the
direction toward which the generals in the Southern Cone, and perhaps
Brazil, are leaning.
A. The timetable is three-staged and characterized by
declining role for military and gradual increase of
civilian involvement.
B. Stage 1 - Recuperation: ending subversion, economic
recovery and growth, this stage should end
about 1980.
Stage 2 - Transition: military junta will continue to
govern but from 1980 to 1985, a parliamentary
body based on representatives of regions and
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appointed by the President will share
legislative authority with junta.
Stage 3 - Consolidation: in 1985, the electorate itself
will choose two-thirds of the members of Parliament
by methods "favoring the selection of the most
capable" and preventing political parties from
again becoming monopolistic. The other third
of Parliament'Wilil be appointed by the President.
In 1985 Parliament will approve a new constitution
and also "designate" a new President for a six-
year term.
III. Whatever timetable or formula the Southern Cone chooses, the
movement toward civilian, constitutional government will be at a glacial
pace. These most European of South American states (with the exception
of Paraguay) experienced two decades of economic, social, and political
in large part
disarray following World War II. Economic stagnation was brought on/by
a political stalemate among the various contenders for power, such as
large landowners, industrialists, the army, the church, the middle class,
intellectuals, and the labor unions. The political parties and govern-
ment bureaucracies, dominated by the largest and oldest middle class in
Latin America, proved unequal to the challenge of political and economic
reform. Society became increasingly fragmented and alienated as economic
stagnation was complicated by rampant inflation. In the mid-1960s, many
middle class youths,despairing of their future and unable to gain needed
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reform through legitimate political means, drifted into extremist groups.
The region was then rocked by rampant terrorism that was not brought under
control for more than a decade in Uruguay and not until 1976 in Argentina.
The climax came in late 1973 with revolutionary upheavals in
all three countries. In Argentina, former President Juan Peron returned
from an 18-year exile and regained power from a military regime that for
seven years had been unsuccessfully trying to cope with the country's
manifold problems. In Uruguay, terrorism precipitated the beginning of
a military dictatorship. In Chile, the armed forces ousted President
Allende after a three-year conflict between his Socialist-Communist
coalition and an anti-Marxist majority in the congress.
The experiences of the past three decades have convinced many
leaders in the region, military as well as civilian, that their societies
have survived a new kind of communist-inspired civil war and that
representative democracy is not an appropriate system for the foreseeable
IV. After 14 years of rule, the Brazilian armed forces appear-to-
have embarked on a course of extricating themselves from the active
exercise of power. The process will be gradual, however, and there
probably will be setbacks. Even if the military does return to the barracks,
the generals will retain a political role as overseer of the political
process.
A. President-elect Figueiredo, a military man himself, is
publicly committed to continuing the liberalization process begun by
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President Geisel. This process has included shelving the decree law
giving the regime sweeping dictatorial powers and the virtual cessation
of press censorship.
B. The plan to move.back toward a civilian-based government
is largely supported by the bulk of the armed forces, and reflects a
number of factors. Traditionally, the officers have not held power for
lengthy periods and have no institutional thirst to perpetuate themselves
in office. The military has become wary of the responsibility for the
full range of economic and political problems of this increasingly
complex country, and, to a large degree, the military sees their main
task, the establishment of the basis for sustained economic growth, as
having been accomplished.
C. Nonetheless, the transition is likely to be difficult and
could be threatened if Figueiredo provies unwilling or unable to deal
with the complexities and nuances of a period of change. The transition
could also be threatened if civilian groups press too hard and too fast
for immediate tangible progress or if an extremely grave economic crisis
occurs, causing the regime to reimpose stringent controls on society.
A further danger would be if military unity is endangered by the proselytizing
of a small but determined group of military conservatives who oppose any
substantial liberalization.
D. Even if liberalization fares well, the government will not
become as open as that of the US or other Western nations. In Brazil,
governments, whether civilian or military, have tended to concentrate
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a preponderance of power in the hands of the executive and even among
civilians, authoritarian and paternalistic institutions are strong. In
addition, the armed forces have traditionally acted as the moderators
of governments, and even out of power will retain the overseer role.
V. In the Andean region, there is likely to be instability and
uncertainty over the next few years as Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador attempt
to return to constitutional rule. The trend toward some form of
civilian and constitutional government is more pronounced in Ecuador
and Peru than in Bolivia, but all three. countries have timetables that
might accomplish this goal by the early 1980s. Most military and
civilian leaders want to see the process through. There may be temporary
delays and setbacks, however, as occurred recently in Bolivia (the coup
in September) and Ecuador (an attempt to abort the presidential elections).
A. The process of creating a genuine-democracy would be !
difficult under the best of circumstances in these societies that have
never developed stable political institutions or strong traditions of
elected government. Of the 30 million people who live in the three
countries, approximately 80 percent are either of pure Indian ancestry
or are of mixed Indian and Spanish stock. The majority of this group do
not participate in the political life of the nation. One-half of the
population is illiterate.
B. In Bolivia and Peru, democratization is further complicated
by severe economic and financial problems that could cause serious social
unrest during a period of intensified competition among political parties.
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Military leaders -- especially in Peru -- will want to see tangible
progress in resolving economic ills before they return to the barracks.
The Bolivian situation is further complicated by the fact that the
military government has been unwilling to undertake unpopular economic
reforms because of the fragility of military as well as civilian support.
C. The problem in Ecuador is not economic, but rather the
opposition by a decided minority of key military officers and the
Guayaquil oligarchy to leading presidential candidate, Jaime Roldos.
VI. Democratic governments predominate in the Caribbean Archipelago
(the Antilles plus the mainland countries of Guyana, Surinam, and French Guyana,
although they will probably become increasingly authoritarian over the
next few years. Most of the islands are going broke, with soaring
balance of payment shortfalls, high unemployment, heavy population
pressures and growing debt burdens. The trend in the Caribbean is, toward
state capitalism, nonalignment, and closer relations with Communist
Cuba. There is little chance, however, for the radical overthrow of
any established government.
A. In the Dominican Republic, democratization has increased
with! the election of President Guzman. Institutionalizing constitutional
rule will be extremely slow, however, because the new President is
threatened by ruling-party factionalism, the extreme left, and a suspicious
right-wing military establishment.
B. In Haiti, the Duvalier family will continue its cautious
policy of "liberalization" in response to US-sponsored human rights
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pressures, but the repressive dictatorship will make no
concessions that will actually lead to a democratically elected govern-
ment.
C. In Guyana, the corrupted parliament system will likely
remain under the thumb of Prime Minister Burnham. The Prime Minister
blatantly rigged a referendum in July that put off scheduled elections
and empowered his legislative majority -- the result of wholesale
fraud in the 1973 election -- to write a new constitution that almost
certainly will entrench his position. The leadership of socialist
Burnham and his Marxist archrival, opposition leader Cheddi Jagan, will
increasingly make Guyana a casualty among struggling regional democracies.
D. In Jamaica, strong democratic institutions will probably
survive despite the activities of Prime Minister Manley. The Prime
Minister, since his election in 1972, has tried to radicalize the
political system, but is now facing growing criticism from labor unions,
churches, the independent courts, the free press, professional groups,
,and parlimentary opposition. He could well lose the next election
required by 1981.
E. In other Caribbean developments, the five British
Associated States in the Eastern Caribbean (Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica) will almost certainly
become independent. Although pressed by leftist youth movements and
friendly overtures from Cuba, the new states will remain committed to _
parliamentary democracy and labor-based political parties. The Nether-
lands Antilles will probably follow the British Associated States into
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indephdence. Although facing similar political problems, generous
Dutch aid will likely alleviate the pressure.
VII. In Middle America (Mexico through Panama) major political
changes are slated for Panama and Mexico, whose one-party system can
best be described as bureaucratic authoritarianism, is taking steps to
widen political participation. Of the four military regimes in
Central America, only Honduras has definite plans for a return to
civilian rule.
A. In Panama, in conjunction with General Torrijos' decision
to relinquish his post as Chief of Government, the 505 member legislative
assembly will likely approve shortly a series of political reforms, including
legalization of political parties. The present legislative assembly will
continue to function but a smaller National Legislative Council will be
established, purportedly with real lawmaking powers. While one-third
of the new council will be directly elected in 1980, a comfortable two-
thirds majority will be drawn from the present Torrijos-dominated
legislative assembly. Direct presidential elections will be held in 1984,
following the six-year term of Torrijos' handpicked choice for president,
Aristides Royo, who was elected by the assembly this month without
opposition. In short, political change in Panama is occuring, but at the
rate Torrijos chooses.
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In Central America, prospects for democratic rule are bleak.
The instability in Nicaragua has alarmed the entrenched economic elites
who, through a _____ coalition with the armed forces, rule Guatemala
and El Salvador. Already faced with severe socio-economic problems
and growing domestic violence, military leaders will not want to trust a
civilian government as long as domestic and foreign insurgent groups are
a threat. In Honduras, despite the removal of Chief of State Melgar in
August by fellow officers, the three-man junta, recently reaffirmed its
commitment to hold presidential elections in 1980. The military trium-
virate and the 35-man group of Lieutenant Colonels who help set policy
have proceeded, with voter registration and other electoral plans
scheduled under Melgar, and have not yet given any indication that they
plan to renege on their commitment. There are severe potential
problems, however, including the situation in Nicaragua and the possibility
that military leaders cannot agree on acceptable candidates.
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