PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING ITEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002400190013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 17, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, NFAC
VIA Production. Board
SUBJECT Presidential Briefing Items
1. I propose the following subjects for major Presidential
briefing items:
18 October: LDC Development, five countries (working).
1 November:
Discuss Western European dependence on
imports from Africa and US/USSR
Strategic Forces NIE 11-3-8.
Nuclear proliferation status of all
countries President ?;ill. visit in
November.
8 November: India Estimat-e
to this date)._
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15 November: Brazil Estimate
working to this
21 November-:
or first brief
after President's
trip: Tactical Air Balance in Europe.
2. Attached is a concept paper and outline for a Tactical
Air Balance paper. This is a crude example of what I think you
should Dive the Director 4-5 weeks before each briefing.
25X1A
Attachments:
As Stated Above
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CONCEPT PAPER ON THE TACTICAL AIR BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE
NATO's tactical air forces have been regarded as a major
obstacle to a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany. NATO's
qualitative lead in aircraft was judged to more than balance
the Pact's greater numbers. But the Pact has been pushing
modernization for the last ten years so the qualitative
gap is narrowing.
Illuminating- the implications of this change will be a
major purpose of. the briefing. There are several different views
on the issue and our understanding of what aspects are important
in determining the balance is imperfect. One goal of the
briefing, therefore, is to show the President clearly the degree
of our knowledge and the range of perceptions that exist.
We can offer a unique intelligence insight into the balance
question because we know how the Soviets evaluate our and their
aircraft. This allows us to say, "At least crudely, here is
how the balance probably looks to the Russians over time." We
can also project future air forces (e.g. use SECDEF's FYDP and
the JSOP for US forces and our estimates of Allied and Pact
forces) to give insight into how the balance will look in the
future.
Our analysis may conclude-that the Soviets view the air
picture as having changed to one that favors the Pact. But
they are probably also concerned-about the prospect of a.
major qualitative leap forward by NATO if the US allies, who
constitute the bulk of NATO's air forces, replace obsolescent
aircraft with aircraft like F-15s and F-16s. The Soviets regard
these aircraft as superior to any Pact aircraft. Further, we
see nothing under development in the USSR which would match
them qualitatively.
Attached is the outline of the paper which would be
prepared to be given to the President at the briefing.
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Pie
Briefing Outline
I. Role of Tactical Air Power in the Context of
The Overall Military Balance in Central Europe
II. Size and Composition of NATO and Pact Tactical
Air Forces Intended for Use in Central Europe
.III. Nature of Pact Modernization
-- Priorities
Motivations
IV. Effect of Modernization on Combat Effectiveness
-- Relative Pact-NATO Capabilities to Deliver
Ordnance (1970-80)
-- Relative Capabilities to Deliver Ordnance
in Adverse Weather (1970-80)
-- Soviet Perceptions of Relative. Combat Effective-
ness of NATO-Pact Air Forces
V. Continuing Qualitative Differences
-- Avionics
-- Training
-- Munitions
-- Flexibility of Employ rent
VI. Prospects for Further Changes,. 1980-85
-- Pact
-- NATO
--- Soviet Perceptions of Future Likely Changes
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