DCI TESTIMONY BEFORE SSCI AND SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002400110043-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: February 21, 1980
• Content Type: MF

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21 February 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : PB/NSC Coordinator
SUBJECT . DCI Testimony before SSCI and Senate Budget
Committee (U)
1. You are scheduled for the following appearances:
a. SSCI: Monday, 25 February, 1400-1700
b. Senate Budget Committee: Tuesday, 26 February,
1400-1700 (U)
2. Approach. Your Worldwide Wrap-up, as previously given to the
HASC and HAC Defense Subcommittee, has been modified in two ways:
a. It has been updated.
OA
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b. Certain additions have been made which are tailored to
specific Committee interests. (Most of these additions
are in response to Budget Committee questions and these
have been noted by a blue line in the right hand margin.
You may want to skip these sections when briefing the
SSCI. There is one section--the last part of the Overview
--which pertains to the SSCI only, and this has been
noted by a green line in the right hand margin.)
It is felt that this would be the simplest, most direct way to prepare
for two different Committee hearings on successive days. (U)
3. Backup. Both of these hearings are, by comparison with
your previous appearances, for only a relatively short time (.2-3 hours),
and no second day has been schedulpd- ThPrP ore it is planned that only
and Bob Ames will accompany
you. will also go along and I believe will accompany
you,for ay is appearance before the Budget Committee.). Concur
Non-concur (U)
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4. Background. We have had both correspondence from these Committees 25X1
and some personal discussion with staffers.
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Re SSCI:
? Attached at TAB A is a copy of the letter from the
Committee. This letter describes both the intent
of Monday's overview session and Wednesday's NFIP
presentation before the Budget Subcommittee.
? The letter notes three points to be addressed at the
overview session: key trends; their significance; and
implications for investment.
- On the first two, your overview and the Soviet,
Strategic, GPF and Middle East briefings should
suffice.
- With respect to the lait item, after talking
with RMS, it was\dec'~ ed to address the point
briefly in the Ov r iew (this is the last section).
RMS felt that if a y further elaboration was
made it would gel nto the arena of your budget
presentation.
? As in the case of your previous Committee appearances,
OLC has met with SSCI staffers Miller and Eisenhower
to discuss your intentions at the hearing. They were
also provided a courtesy copy of your draft Overview
to share with the Co-Chairmen only.
b. Re Budget Committee:
? Attached at TAB B is the letter from Senator Muskie
requesting your appearance and specifying certain
items of interest.
- Since this briefing is a first, not only for this
Committee, but also for many members who are not
on any other major Committee we brief, we got
together personally with the two key staffers:
John Tillson, majority staffer, formerly of
OSD/PA&E where he wrote Defense Guidance; and
Bob Helms, staffer to Senator Bellmon.
- The request for your appearance was generated
by Senator Bellmon's interest in having some
benchmark against which to measure the Defense
budget.
- Tillson has subsequently become involved in a
major way by trying to get a DoD-type Soviet
Threat brief; but, since he doesn't trust DoD, he
wanted such an assessment by the DCI. His thrust
is clear when you read the questions in Senator
Muskie's letter.
-2-
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- Based on our meeting, however, he agreed to our
approach, understanding that we would address
his concerns in your briefing. This has been
done, and those parts that have been specifically
added for the Budget Committee are marked in
blue in the right hand margin.
? Attached at TAB C is an additional list of questions
that Tillson provided us today. Again you can see
where his focus is (some of these questions, if asked,
are more in the policy arena).
- Basically, most of the answers to their concerns
are addressed in the briefings as modified.
- However, tomorrow night we will forward to you
for review a complete set of Qs and As for both
TABs B and C. (C/NF)
5. Miscellaneous.
a. We learned that General Rogers, in briefing the SASC the
other day commented on the fact that the USSR had surpassed
the West in all types of conventional and nuclear weapons. a
He further noted that they had outproduced NATO 2-3:1 in
most major weapons over the last 15 years.
? Two members of the Budget Committee, Gary Hart and
Janus Exxon, and two members of the SSCI, Scoop Jackson
and Barry Goldwater, are on the SASC.
? We are therefore tr in to get copies of his testimony
and will have prepare answers in anticipation 25X1
of any questions. (This will be provided tomorrow also.)
b. The Senate Budget Committee does not plan on having any
briefings by DIA; however, you are only one witness
in a series who will address the world situation and
especially the Soviets. On Tuesday morning, before
your testimony, they will hold an open hearing with
George Kennan and Richard Pipes. F_ I will 25X1
attend this session to be better prepared for anything
you might be hit with as a result of the Kennan/Pipes
testimony.
c. Re Strategic Briefing: Immediately following the briefing
which you have given before (with certain revisions to
address Budget Committee questions) is a rewrite of the
last 4 pages. This rewrite represents a substantive 1J
change to what you have briefed before--it is based on
recent changes made to 11-3/8. New rough graphics which
would have to be made to accompany this version are also
attached.
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? Use revised briefing and new graphics
Use basic briefing
d. Notations have been made on the graphics as to which
are being revised. Also, each of the briefings has
been underlined and bracketed in red just as you had
before. (C/NF)
6. I think that, on balance, you can go with the revised briefings
as you have in the past. You don't have much time and there is no need
to give a distinctly different briefing to each Committee. Between the
material in the briefings and the preparation done by the NIOs based on
information received you should be in good shape to say what you want
and still address their concerns/questions. (U)
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 EDM JO S. MUSKA~1pIoVelease 2007/03/08-: CIA-RDP81 B0040~ 02400110043-0
DOME
WARREN G. MAGNUSON. WASH. Y BELLMON, OK
NI 1 N M
ETE V
C
.
--
ERNEST F. HOWNGS. S.C. P
LAWTON CHILES, FLA. BOB PACKWOOD. OREG. I
I
JOSEPH R. BIDEN. JR., DEL. WILLIAM L ARMSTRONG, COLO.
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON. u. NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, KANS. Crtirf eb ,~f of es ,~erraf e
JIM SASSER, TENN. RUDY BOSGHW H. MIN
GARY HART, COLO. ORRIN G. HATCH. IRAN
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM. OHIO LARRY PRESSLER. S. OAK.
DONALD W. RIEGLE. JR., MICH. COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, N.Y.
J. JAMES EXON, NEBR. WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
JOHN T. MC EVOY. STAFF DIRECTOR
-- ROBERT S. BOYD, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
January 29, 1980
6: jv
I'm looking forward to your testimony before the Senate
Budget Committee on Tuesday, February 26. We are particularly
anxious to hear your personal views on the imnact__of the threats
facing the United States on U.S. defense needs and priorities
since your testimony will provide the background for our review
of the defense budget request.
The Committee will be interested in several lines of inquiry
and I want to take this opportunity to inform you of them in
advance. I would appreciate it if you would be prepared to
address each of these issues in your statement. Since we are
always pressed for time and want to keep as much time as
possible for dialogue between you and the Committee Members,
I would appreciate it if you would limit your intro-
ductory remarks to no more than fifteen minutes.
The following issues will be of particular interest to the
Committee:
1. What are the Soviet goals in Afghanistan and in the area
of the Middle East and South Asia as a whole? What priorities
do the Soviets assign to these goals? What circumstances cou d
lead the Soviets to employ military force against Pakistan or
Iran? How do the Soviets view U.S. forces in tfie area?
2. What events or conditions could lead the Soviets to initiate
a war in the third world, with-N TO using conventional or theater
nuclear forces, or with-the United States using strategic nuclear
forces? How do the Soviets think'a war with the United States
might start? Under what conditions would the Soviets consider
:making a "bolt out of the blue" attack on U.S. strategic nuclear
.forces? How oul-- cracterize Soviet willingness totakee
steps that risk. war with the United States? ,.Do -Soviet -military
and political leaders express the same views on these issues?
3. If SALT II fails to, be.-ratified,, do --you -expect the .Soviets
to make a major increase in their strategic-:nuclear forces?
-there
iWhat kind of ;improvements .ar.:e -1-i?kely? = Ihat ?co'nstraints are
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January 29, 1980
Page 2.
to these improvements?
4. What considerations have prompted the continued Soviet
arms build-up in recent years? What do the Soviets consider to be
the major threats facing them? In what order of danger do they
view these threats?
5. How do the Soviets perceive U.S. intentions and capabili-
ties? What is their view of the capabilities of our strategic
nuclear forces? Do they fear a U.S. first strike? What is their
view of the role of U.S. general purpose forces and theater nuclear
forces in Europe? What is their likely response to our decision
to increase defense spending by 5%?
6. What missions and what priorities do the Soviets assign to
their ground forces, their air forces, and their naval forces?
In particular, what priority do they assign to attacking the sea
lines of communication between the United States and NATO during
a NATO war? What priority would they assign to naval operations
in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific?
7. How do NATO and Warsaw Pact defense spending levels
compare?_ Please provide comparisons of NATO and Warsaw Pact
spending for intercontinental strategic nuclear offensive
forces, for ground forces, tactical air forces, and naval
forces, and for Research and Development.
If there are questions about your appearance, please have
your staff contact Mr. John Tillson, 224-0553 or Mr. Bob Sneed,
224-9284 of the Budget Committee staff.
Edmund S. Muski;-_
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REPLY REQUESTED
DATE
21 February 1980
SPEED LETTER
LETTER NO.
YES
NO
TO : Deputy ! e^i sl a ti ve Counsel
FROM:
25
ATTN:
I saw John T i i l son this morni nn and he nave m - a list of questions which are
1.;, el to. be asked. th-? DCI when he annears be Fore the Se nate Cori ,tee on Budget on
2 Fehr iary (Attac I will be passing a copy to 0 also.
25
I also ran into Bob Helm. He passed me word that Senator Hatch (R., UT) plans
to as whether or not the trend of spending on Covert Action is coins up or down.
h n I noted the Senator might be too y -the MI that he cannot discuss such
sub ects, Bob replied that he personally was interested only in letting.re know
; a nuestion tioulcl be pug t0 t' e CCI and not in the DCI `s resoonse. I thanke t
h-i7 for the /!hea't's un'.
b
I also discussed the time the OCT might allot to his opening statement and
-there was agreement between Bob and John that 4+0 minutes seems about the right
(Covent: I note the questions, which will he passed out to the Majority
Seg. tors, deal al-most exclusively with the Soviets.)
25,
1Ac:
V
SIGNATURE
REPLY J
OATE
SICNATURj - ...... .... n..
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QUESTIONS FOR SOVIET HEARINGS
26 February 1980
Issue I: The Soviet View of Their Role in the World
WHAT IS THE LIKELY SOVIET RESPONSE TO A U.S. DECISION
TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING BY 5 PERCENT? a
WHAT IS THEIR-LIKELY RESPONSE TO A U.S. DECISION TO
INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING BY 10 PERCENT, OR MORE?
HOW SHOULD IL.._S. POLICY BE CHANGED TO R E C 0 G N I Z E THE
L ITY
F
RI SUPERIORITY? WILL THE SOVIETS ALLOW US TO REGAIN 7
SUPERIORITY? T
DEA
O
. SOVIET MILITARY EQUALITY? MUST WE REGAIN
WHAT MILITARY STEPS WOULD YOU TAKE IN RESPONSE TO THE
SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN?
WHERE IN THE WORLD WOULD YOU EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO
TAKE MILITARY INITIATIVES IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS? HOW
CAN THESE STEPS BE DETERRED? 0
Issue II: Soviet Goals in the'Persian Gulf and the
Third World
CONCERNS ABOUT CHINA HAVE HAD IN THE SOVIET DECISION TO 0
INVADE?
WHAT EVENTS, CONCERNS.AND OBJECTIVES LED TO THE SOVIET
INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN? WHAT-IMPACT MIGHT SOVIET
WHAT SHOULD THE U. S DO FORCE THE SOVIETS OUT OF /I
AFGHANISTAN? "~t, . _ _ - _ _ _ _ ,
WHAT ARE THE SOVIET GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA AS A WHOLE, AND WHAT PRIORITY DO THE SOVIETS
ASSIGN TO THESE GOALS IN LIGHT OF THEIR OTHER FOREIGN-
POLICY OBJECTIVES AROUND THE WORLD?
WHAT CAN THE U. S. DO TO DETER A SOVIET MILITARY MOVE
IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD?
WILL THE PRESIDENT'S PLEDGE TO USE U.S. FORCES TO
PROTECT U. S. INTERESTS ACTUALLY DETER THE SOVIETS?
w iFroli6d Fr(WERetebKE 121073MCIEE:TCIA Ik13004111)Rd024(>COa 1O RT OF
PAKISTAN AND THE AFGHAN REBELS?
 NN
rTov&cf F8 [201if1Y i3/b PCRTRl FPo B9 (Ii24l6r11'O 4 O TO
CH THE GOALS IN THIS AREA?
WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO EMPLOY
.MILITARY FORCE AGAINST PAKISTAN OR IRAN?
7
WOULD U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY HAVE DETERRED
THE SOVIETS FROM THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN?
WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN A MAJOR SOVIET SURPRISE ATTACK
/ OF IRAN. HAVE THESE FORCES DEMONSTRATED THE
C( CAPABILITYTO CONDUCT THE KIND OF MAJOR OPERATION
r THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN AN ATTACK TO SEIZE THE
PERSIAN GULF OIL FIELDS?
For Admiral Turner only:
IN THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIETS USED
FORCES THAT ARE NORMALLY DEPLOYED ALONG THE AFGHAN
}-- BORDER. THESE ARE THE SAME KINDS OF FORCES THAT
HOW LONG WOULD YOU ESTIMATE THAT IT WOULD TAKE THE
SOVIET UNION TO MOVE FORCES FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER
TO THE OIL FIELDS NEAR THE PERSIAN GULF WITHOUT ANY
U. S. OPPOSITION? HOW MUCH WOULD YOU EXPECT U. S.
TACTICAL AIR AND B-5 CONVENTIONAL STRIKES WOULD BE
ABLE HOSE SOVIET MOVEMENT TIMES?
WHAT THREAT DO SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN
.OCEAN POSE TO THE FORCES WE CURRENTLY.HAVE DEPLOYED
.].THERE?
Issue III: The Soviet Arms Buildup
WHY HAVE THE SOVIETS MADE SUCH.A MAJOR ARMS BUILDUP
IN RECENT YEARS?
NOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY WITH THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES, DO YOU EXPECT THE
SOVIETS TO CONTINUE THEIR BUILDUP IN LIGHT OF THE
DOMESTIC PROBLEMS THEY FACE? HOW WILL U. S. BEHAVIOR
AFFECT THEIR ACTIONS?
WHAT DO THE SOVIETS CONSIDER TO BE THE MAJOR THREATS
FACING THEM AND IN WHAT ORDER OF DANGER DO THEY VIEW
THESE THREATS?
Issue IV: The Possibility of War with the Soviet Union
WHAT EVENTS OR CONDITIONS COULD LEAD THE SOVIETS TO
INITIATE A WAR THAT COULD INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES?
HOW DO THE SOVIETS THINK A WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES
MIGHT START?
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UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD THE SOVIETS CONSIDER
MAKING A SURPRISE ATTACK ON OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
FORCES OR ON OUR FORCES i? NATO?
HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE SOVIET :?:ILLINGNESS TO TAKE
STEPS. THAT WOULD RISK WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES OR
WITH CHINA?
DO SOVIET MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS EXPRESS THE
SAME VIEW ON THESE ISSUES?
DO THE SOVIETS FEAR A U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SURPRISE
ATTACK?
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15 February 1980
1A
Xic
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM PB/NSC Coordination Staff
SUBJECT . Background Material for NFIB Discussion of the
Soviet Brigade (U)
1. At the end of the NFIB meeting scheduled for 29 February, you
will be discussing the paper prepared by NFAC in response to your
questions about the state of the Community's analytical efforts on the
brigade. The folder contains the material you wanted returned as
background for that discussion (lef side). I've also followpd un on
the two questions you posed for the
2. 0 and I have also been very concerned about the numbers that
NFAC has been using in connection with Soviets in Cuba. So we asked for
NFAC's current breakdown (civilian and military) and this is also
provided (following the DDO material). As the width of the ranges
suggests, these numbers (with the exception of the brigade) are--very
soft. We think a priority effort should be made either to improve our
confidence in these numbers or to make clear (via the PDB) that the best
we can do is estimate ranges, that it is unlikely we will be able to
come up with hard numbers over the next 6-8 months, that we expect
I
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