DCI PRE-BRIEF, 1430-1600, MONDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002400110014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 15, 1980
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For* lease 2055W1kNQL DP81 B0040002400110014 2
15 September 1980
NOTE FOR THE DCI
Subject: DCI Pre-Brief, 1430-1600, Monday, 15 September
1. Today's discussion session will cover four topics:
a. Nicaragua
b. El Salvador
c. Philippines
d. Iran
No papers, outlines, etc. have been prepared specifically for this meeting;
rather it will allow for a more general discussion of the current situation/
problems/prospects with regard to each country. are listed some
possible areas to explore with those present.
2. Nicaragua and El Salvador (1430-1500)
a. Nicaragua (OPA analysts will have briefed HPSCI staffers this a.m.)
(1) Explore differences in point of view re whether it is
FSLN or g overnment pohcx to export revolution.
(2) Our current state of knowledge on this issue.
(3) Current status of opposition within Nicaragua.
(4) Effect of government's announcement not to hold
elections for five years.
(5) Government's next move(s) against opposition.
(6) Cuban influence: nature/extent--growing/diminishing.
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(7) Relation with/roles of other key countries: I, Panama, 25X6
Venezuela, Costa Rica.
(8) Conflicts of policy between US and Europeans? US and others
in region?
(9) Outlook for US relations.
(10) What is economic outlook?
(11) Is our collection sufficient?
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b. El Salvador
(1) Effect of recent developments ( ransfe_r of _Maj~anos
supporters; failure of general strike) on relative
s rengt of different factions.
(2) Is level of violence the same/increasing/decreasing?
(3) Trends in source/level of outside support (for junta; for
guerrillas).
(4) Effect of US election campaign on situation.
(5) Effect of US policy to date.
(6) Collection effort sufficient? 25X1
3. Philippines (1500-1515) (Recall you had with on 25X1A
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(1) What constitutes the opposition? Any foreign hand?
(2) Why is the violence incrPasin ?
(3) Is the violence random or organized?
(4) If organized, does it reflect a change in tactics by
opposition? (NIE 56-1-80, March 1980, forecast that as
opposition elements' frustration with Marcus grew they
might resort to violence.)
(5) To what extent are r)oderales likely to cooperate with
radicals and program of violence?
(6) If recent violence random, to what attributable?
(7) How bad are current economic conditions?
(8) Economic prospects for short run?
(9) Has foreign capital influx been adversely affected?
(10) Are foreign exchange holdings adequate?
(11) Prospects for oil discoveries/revenues.
(12) What are Marcos' prospects?
(13) What alternatives exist for Philippines?
(14) Is US policy helping/hurting situation?
(15) Adequacy of collection effort.
II
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4. Iran (1515-1530)
(1) Real eff f Khomeini's statement re hostages.
(2) What next?
(3) Assess Iran-Iraq situation.
(4) Anything more on Khomein;'s health?
(Note:
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25X1A
SECRET/NOFORN
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