SOVIET/CUBAN OPTIONS IN RHODESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002400040022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: August 29, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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"GRET
2 9 AUG 1578
MEMORANDUM FOR: Presidential Briefing Coordinator
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet/Cuban Options in Rhodesia
I like your work on the "Soviet/Cuban Options in Rhodesia" paper.
I'd like, however, to go back and give the Cuban manpower situation as a
separate briefing just a little bit expanded from what you have here
under the George Ball heading. (Basically, I don't feel too comfortable
with using George Ball and Colin Legum although it's perfectly logical.)
I'd like a couple of statistical numbers in the briefing. I'll then
move into the Rhodesian briefing simply by saying we've taken a look at
what options the Cubans have either to employ their increasing military
manpower or their withdrawals of manpower from Ethiopia and Angola
(if they make them) with respect to Rhodesia. We've looked at both the
political and military constraints on them to see whether a repetition
in particular of the Ethiopian or even the Angolan experience is a likely
option for them.
a. We conclude that it is not because the military dimensions
are considerably different and because the motivations of the
African players are enough different from either Angola or Ethiopia,
but there will likely be some curbs on their willingness to count
on this sizeable Soviet and/or Cuban involvement.
b. We would then go on to paragraph II.A.l., though it seems
to me we could add to it a point from-your prefatory paper on crucial
points on Soviet/Cuban options, but these conditions apply as long
as the Patriotic Front and frontline states continue to see them-
selves as winning. It would take a substantial increase in their
sense of danger to offset their inhibitions on Soviet/Cuban presence.
This could happen but not likely at the present.
c. Then we would pick up with the Soviets and the Cubans; both
have some concern for their Third World image also, though again, if
the internal settlement were appearing to succeed and particularly
if it were going to come out as in paragraph 2.b. and 2.c., everybody
might look on the situation differently.
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d. We would then go on to the military side and on to the
other options. I didn't quite understand whether IV and V should
be merged. They seem to duplicate some. Other than that, it's
great. I think we're finally there though I think it would be
better to use the chart of Rhodesia and all the leaders as the
opener, then the Africa map, then the road map with the changes I
noted on the copy here, eliminating the roads inside Rhodesia.
What we're trying to emphasize is how you'd get to Rhodesia and
extending the map over across Angola to show that difficulty.
I frankly think then that the map you had for the first one which
centered on Rhodesia is probably better than the one for cross-
country movement. I want to bring out the Zambezi River problem;
maybe we'll use them both, one after the other, since the other one
doesn't bring out well that access is good from southern Mozambique
and from South Africa. I don't really think we need the one on
Soviet/Cuban military efforts. That goes back to the older briefing.
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