CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY OF STATE, 2 SEPTEMBER 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002300400002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 3, 1980
• Content Type: MFR

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3 September 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of State, 2 September 1980
1. We had a discussion on Poland but mainly comparing Soviet
incentives and intentions in Poland with those in Iran. The Secretary
was disinclined to think the Soviets were preparing for any military
action in Poland. He felt they had handled the Polish situation in a
very low-key and restrained manner. I gave him a copy of our memo on
the options of Soviet military forces for Poland. He asked if we had
seen any actions in this regard. I said the two divisions in Poland
had improved their readiness some, but we had not seen any movement with
the divisions in either East Germany or the western Soviet Union. We
talked about some of the comparisons betwe u lish situation and
25X1 that in other eastern European countries.
2. We spent a lot of time on Iran (the Secretary mentioned to me
afterwards he thought we were handling our position and presentations on
25 Iran in the SCC well). I and I both expressed our concern at
the possibility of trials for the hostages. The Secretary made a con-
siderable argument that he thou ht there were more favorable signs that
would mitigate against that.
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He feels the situation in Iran is,different today because a
governmental apparatus is evolving and through it the position of the
militants is weakening. Behesti has adroitly accumulated power and now
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he's talking in terms of resolving the hostage situation. It remains to
be seen whether he will exercise his power to do that. But the situation
is generically different than it has been over the past 10 months.
I responded that I still didn't think there was a critical mass
of power in Iran; that Khomeini really didn't want to make a decision on
the hostages for fear of losing his constituencies; that the Majlis would
not make a decision without Khomeini's approval; and that hostage trials
were an easy delaying and escape tactic for the Majlis. I further reiterated
my feeling that Khomeini wanted to bring down President Carter and would
move toward trials or other ways to embarrass the President between now
25X1 and the elections.,;.
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4. He asked me about Af hanistan.
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insurgency was beginning to fade. I said we did not believe so.
5. He asked me about Jamaica. I gave him my view that we still thought
the election would take place at the end of October and Seaga would win. We
41 had concerns at a Manley effort to thwart the elections but didn't think
even the Cubans were advising him to take such action. Even if Seaga won,
6 he'd have-tremendous economic problems ahead of him.
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6. He asked what I thought was going on in Somalia and Ethiopia. I
gave him a sense of concern that the Ethiopian offensive into Tigre and
Eritrea might be about to happen though it had be?n much delayed. I expressed
concern both at the use of helicopters and that additional Soviet planning and
support would perhaps make a difference--I noted that that would better permit
the Ethiopians to concentrate forces against Somalia. I expressed my feeling
that the Soviets would go to the anti-Siad forces in the Ogaden or to the
Ethiopians to create the border skirmish with Somalia that we saw last week.
The idea would be to keep enough of this up to make it apparent that it wasn't
.a good idea to make agreements with the United States. We discussed the fact
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11. He asked me about Nicaragua. I explained our position and delivered
a copy of the paper I'd given to David Aaron the week before. I tried to
25X1 point out that this did not attempt to make a judgment on whether the
Congressional mandate had been violated, but it also tried to lay out all
the evidence that we had as explicitly as possible.
12. He raised the question of the Caribbean in general. I said I
thought that in the Caribbean there were some signs of relative improvement,
though Jamaica, Surinam and Grenada were still problems. There was also
a further discussion on Central America with El Salvador and Guatemala
in particular.
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