TNF BALANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002300010006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 20, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
NFAC 5057-79
20 September 1979
1. Per your discussion with the NIOs today, you may wish to mention
to SecDef tomorrow that:
a. Europeans are increasingly divided over TNF modernization,
and agreement on the modernization proposal by December
is in jeopardy (see draft NFAC memo, Inclosure 1);
b. They are likely to be exposed to diverse views on the
armament balance and the need for LRTNF modernization.
Etc., the IISS TNF balance assessment, which has the
Soviets holding only a narrow edge over NATO (1.1 to 1)--
hardly an inducement for modernization. (See inclosure 2);
c. U.S. efforts to provide data more authoritative and
supportive of modernization deserve continuing care lest
inconsistent numbers, differing counting methods, or
divergent terminology dilute our case.
2. In that connection, the DoD Red-Blue briefing based on a
NATO/IMS balance briefing needs to be reconciled with our ongoing work
on an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum designed to provide a common
data base on both Soviet and NATO Theater Nuclear Forces. While it may
be too late to influence the Red-Blue briefing beyond a caveat that data
therein will change as new information becomes available, we ought to be
careful henceforth to assure we all sing from the same sheet of music,
especially in advancing data to support appraisal of the armaments
25X1
25X1
25X1
REVIEW ON 31 Dec 85
DERIVED FROM 9c, 9d
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8/04
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CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
NFAC 5057-79
20 September 1979
3. Our having thus far linked LRTNF arms control to the SALT
process may, should prospects for SALT III diminsh, further jeopardize
LRTNF modernization. We will keep a weather eye on that linkage. 5X1
25X1A
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
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NFAC 5024-79
20 September 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
25X1 A FROM
National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces
SUBJECT : IISS on Europe's TNF Balance
1. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently
published its annual assessmentThe Military Balance 1979-1980. This year,
joining the blossoming public debate on Theater Nuclear Force (TNF)
modernization, IISS has included a section entitled "The Balance of Theater
Nuclear Forces in Europe." Following summary FYI:
2. IISS finds rough equivalence:
Wa
System**
rheads* Utility
WTO
2244
1209
NATO
1811
1065
Ratio WTO/NATO
1.24
1.14
*Calculated from assumptions excluding strategic systems, SAM, ABM, ADM,
WTO systems with Asian targets, and assessing materiel availability and
allocations for conventional missions.
**Number of warheads degraded by a numerical index which is a function of
survivabilit (ability to withstand attack), penetration (assurance of foiling
defenses), and flexibility (range, accuracy, responsiveness, retargeting ease).
3. I have asked OSR to critique the IISS numbers and to prepare its
own "balance assessment."
25X1A
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The Balance of Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe
In any attempt to make an objective analysis of the Perhaps the most questionable assumption is
balance of theatre nuclear systems in Europe the also the most important: it is that, with the excep-
definitions and assumptions made are critical. tion already noted, all `strategic' systems will be
Changes in these lead unerringly to very different withheld for the `strategic' mission and will be used
conclusions as to the state of the balance. There for nothing else. Such an assumption acknowledges
are two approaches to summation. The first is to implicitly that, if there were to be a nuclear war in
add together all the nuclear-capable theatre systems Europe, it would be quite distinct from a strategic
in the inventories of the super-powers and their nuclear exchange between the super-powers and
allies, regardless of whether all of these are in a that both the super-powers would not be inclined,
position to affect the equation - making thereby in the initial phase, to use any of their inter-
an assumption that all might be used in some future continental systems to affect the outcome of a con-
conflict. The second is to attempt to make a judg- flict confined at that time to Europe. This may be
ment as to the numbers that seem likely to be unreal and, at least in the Soviet case, an unwar-
employed against land targets in the European ranted distinction to make, but it is made here in
Theatre, excluding therefore many systems which the interests of clarity.
have a theoretical nuclear capability against land Next, no attempt has been made to include any
targets but whose primary missions lie elsewhere. system whose primary mission is believed to be
The first appears a rather crude method, embodying maritime. Excluded therefore are many Soviet
a significant number of distortions and leading, we submarine- and surface-launched nuclear cruise
? would argue, to conclusions which are at best missiles, nuclear depth-charges and Naval Air
ect and at worst extremely misleading. How- Force (NAF) aircraft. Similarly a decision has been
able
l
ear-cap
susp
ever, the second approach, which is used here, is taken to exclude most American nuc
heavily dependent on the validity of the detailed carrier-borne aircraft on the grounds that the
assumptions made. It is certainly possible to dis- primary mission of American carrier task forces
agree with a number of them and we shall be at will be sea control in areas distant from the Euro-
pains to make quite clear what those assumptions pean Theatre. Some will be included, presumed to
are before entering the analysis. On the other hand be those of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterran-
there are clear limits as to how far one can proceed ean. Nuclear-tipped SAM and ABM are not counted
in this direction, for it leads towards the postula- and nor are Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM).
tion of very specific scenarios which diverge The assumptions made as to serviceability (i.e.,
rapidly. It is therefore useful to set out first some the numbers of systems actually ready for use at
general assumptions which seem likely to hold good any moment) are as follows:
whatever the scenario. These will be followed by - Naval vessels: 70 per cent. A figure that allows
specific assumptions as to the constraints which for refit and maintenance of a kind to preclude
states will face in deciding what systems to deploy use in under one week. Where very small num-
to meet what threat. bers of ships or boats are deployed, numbers will
be rounded down rather than up. Britain for
General Assumptions example, can never expect to maintain more than
It must be made clear at the outset that this com- two submarines out of four on station. A lengthy
parison is not concerned with short-range or period of warning would push this figure up to
battlefield delivery systems such as nuclear artillery about 80 per cent.
or ssM with ranges of less than 100 miles. This is a - Aircraft: 80 per cent. This might be increased if
very arbitrary boundary, since aircraft can clearly there were prolonged warning, but major servic-
be used for the delivery of nuclear weapons on the ing and repair will decrease numbers in squadron
battlefield; however, an examination of the num- service.
bers of artillery pieces which can fire nuclear shells - Ballistic Missiles: 90 per cent. In the case of
is not particularly illuminating since the number of SLBM, this figure is compounded with the service-
shells in the stockpile will say more than the ability of the submarines where applicable.
number of guns. This examination is concerned Although it must be acknowledged that there will
with weapon systems of longer range up to, but not be some attrition of nuclear-capable systems before
including, those whose ranges entitle them to be nuclear release, no attempt has been made to
included in SALT. There is an important exception degrade figures on this account in the first assess-
to this rule: some US sLBM, which are included in ment. Because in most cases each side will wish to
SALT totals are assumed to be diverted from the retain a particular level of nuclear-capable systems
`strategic' dee+j a7Wu /21a time as nuclear release is given, they
first assessment is based on a count o sep ra a are t t r 44 QS IvQ83aQ0&: 0&
targetable warheads action in any conventional phase to reptace losses
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THE BALANCE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE
on the ground of those earmarked for nuclear
missions. And both will endeavour not to hazard
nuclear systems before release; they will be hard to
find and harder to attack.
No attempt has been made in the first balance to
assess system reliability or their assurance of
penetrating to their targets. Readers must make
their own judgments of the likelihood of an aircraft
surviving anti-aircraft fire and interceptor fighters,
and this will be a function of numbers, avionics,
weather, transit height and ECM. In the absence of
ballistic missile defences (BMD), ballistic missiles
can be presumed to penetrate, but their reliability
will be significantly less than 100 per cent. Mal-
functions will occur.
It has not been thought useful to assess total
yields, throw-weight or bomber payloads. Assump-
tions have been made as to the numbers of gravity
bombs or stand-off nuclear weapons that a particu-
lar type of aircraft can carry, but yields are vari-
able. Total deliverable megatonnage is not con-
sidered to be very significant. Nor has any attempt
been made to look at sortie rates or the reload
capability of the different systems. It must be
understood that some aircraft will surely survive to
rearm, and the Soviet SS-20 launcher in particular is
almost certain to be able to reload i n due course with
reserve missiles, as might the Western Pershing.
Even some naval vessels could replenish in the
unlikely event of a prolonged exchange. What then
begins to matter is not the number of delivery
systems deployed but the stockpile of nuclear
warheads, and there is great uncertainty as to the
numbers on hand on each side. It appears very
likely that there are rather more warheads
available to each side than there will be nuclear
targets. Although there is considerable nervousness
in Western Europe over the future reload capacity
of the SS-20 in particular, it must be acknowledged
that the number of Poseidon warheads allocated to
SACEUR is an entirely arbitrary figure which, given
the redundancy of American strategic second-strike
systems which is generally believed to exist, could
be raised to a substantially higher figure without
difficulty. We have therefore excluded SS-20
reloads for the time being since it seems unlikely
that these yet exist, as we have also excluded
additional Poseidon warheads. We are assuming
also that all warheads have been mated with their
delivery system, i.e., that nuclear outloading has
been completed.
Specific Assumptions
In the case of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact states, we assume that:
- No Soviet central systems are targeted against
Western Europe.
- One quarter of Soviet aviation and ballistic
missiles (less SLBM) will be allocated to the
Eastern Front and these are most unlikely, given
the present state of Sino-Soviet relations, to be
deployable westwards in the event of a war in
Europe.
- No NAF aircraft and seaborne cruise missiles
would be used against land targets.
- One half of medium bombers will be retained for
the nuclear role.
- One quarter of Fighter Ground Attack (FGA)
totals will be retained for the nuclear role. The
multi-role aircraft are listed separately to show
numbers assumed to have missions against ground
targets.
- A number of ageing diesel-powered ballistic
missile submarines (ssB) are assumed to be
deployed in the Baltic and to be targeted against
Western Europe.
- The long-range bomber force would be reserved
for intercontinental missions and thus does not
affect the theatre balance.
- A number of nuclear-capable non-Soviet Pact
aircraft are assumed to have a nuclear role. Some
SCUD B missiles are similarly counted for Pact
members.
It must be admitted that any one of these
assumptions could be invalid, or, if valid now,
changed at short notice. However, there are limits
in terms of overall flexibility. Systems designed for
a maritime mission are of peripheral value for other
missions; weapon characteristics are optimised for
the maritime mission and many rely on over-the-
horizon target acquisition and terminal guidance
for striking naval targets - techniques inapplicable
on land. Furthermore, nuclear missions require
special training and short-service aircrew cannot
switch easily from the non-nuclear to the nuclear
mission. Retention of a higher proportion of air-
craft for the nuclear role would begin to affect
conventional capabilities to a marked degree.
Finally, nuclear arming and release gear is pre-
sumed not to be scaled for every ground-attack
aircraft, so there will be a quite distinct upper limit
to the number of aircraft that could be re-roled at
short notice.
The assumptions applicable to Western forces
are of a rather different kind. We have already
noted that the United States would be in a position
to vary the commitment of her Central systems to
the defence of Europe. Furthermore, a substantial
number of strike aircraft are retained in the Con-
tinental United States. Some of these are formally
dual-based and can be presumed to reach Europe
as reinforcements; others are uncommitted but
some at least must be considered as being available
to NATO, although, as with the Soviet Union, it
seems highly probable that there will be limits to
crew training and nuclear arming and release gear
for these aircraft. The following specific assumptions
have been made:
- A total of 400 Poseidon warheads will be allo-
cated to SACEUR; this number will be assured
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from the much larger pool of missiles actually
available.
- The A-6E and A-7E aircraft of two carrier task
forces will be in range of Warsaw Pact or
Soviet territory, and half of them will be avail-
able for nuclear missions, the other half having
maritime missions.
- One French aircraft carrier could be in range of
Pact territory, and half its complement of
Etendard IVM aircraft would be retained for the
nuclear role.
- All French land- and sea-based nuclear forces
(less Pluton) must be counted, as must the whole
force of Mirage IVA aircraft.
- All British sea-based strategic nuclear forces are
counted as are the Vulcan bombers in toto.
- Half the British Buccaneer aircraft are presumed
to be reserved for nuclear strike.
- One third of all Western nuclear-capable fighter
ground-attack aircraft are listed as being
retained for the nuclear role.
- Half the US FB-111A are assumed to be in
reserve for nuclear strike.
Tables VII and VIII are compiled on the basis
of the foregoing assumptions. They list the sys-
tems, their numbers and the factors by which
gross numbers should be reduced, so as to arrive
at the system numbers that we believe should be
counted. The warheads that can be carried are then
multiplied by these numbers to arrive at a figure
for total deliverable warheads for each system.
These are then summed by general category and
overall in the column headed 'Total Number of
Warheads assumed available'.
Therefore a first refinement of the figures gives
a NATO total of 1,811 warheads available, and a WP
total of 2,244, and this might stand as the current
balance of usable warheads as opposed to the
unrefined balance of nuclear delivery vehicles
(Nnv) where the gross totals appear much less equal
2,045 against 5,364. Yet even these somewhat
refined figures are not entirely satisfactory, for it
must be unrealistic to equate a modern mobile
ballistic missile - such as the SS-20 - with a fighter
of limited range and doubtful penetrative powers.
It is necessary to try to say something about the
quality (and therefore utility) of each system under
discussion. We therefore intend to judge the use-
fulness of the systems based on the evaluation of a
number of factors. The three factors thought to be
significant are survivability, penetration and
flexibility, and each has been given equal weight
in the calculations. In specific scenarios this is
unlikely to be fair, for survivability and assured
penetration would tend more to deter a massive
theatre-nuclear strike, whereas in a slower escala-
tion, the value of flexibility (accuracy, selectivity
and the ability to retarget rapidly) will be relatively
more important. Nevertheless, there is value in
assessing quality, and these three factors are
generally assumed to be equally significant. This
second calculation allows a comparison to be made
between numbers and the usefulness of systems.
jvability is a relatively straightforward factor
to' assess. It is assessed as the ability of a system to
withstand conventional or nuclear attack, and this,
in turn, is a compound of hardness and conceal-
ment. If there is high expectation that a system can
never be found, it matters little that it has no
inherent protection. It follows that survivability is
to some extent a function of the range of the
system, since the greater the range, the larger the
area in which it can operate and the more difficult
it will be to find and, even if found, more difficult
to hit. A mobile system must be more difficult to
target than one which is static or tied to fixed
operating bases, such as an aircraft. Marking sur-
vivability against a maximum score of 0.33, this
analysis will use the following figures for the sur-
vivability of launch vehicles before use:
SsBN, Mobile MRBM: 0.3.
SSB: 0.25 (ssB are easier to detect and track than
SSBN because they are noisier).
SRBM: 0.2 (as they must operate in a relatively
confined area to stay in range).
Long-range aircraft, carrier-based aircraft and
fixed-base rrtBM : 0.15.
Tactical aircraft (land-based) with hardened
hangars : 0.1.
Tactical aircraft with no hardening: 0.05.
The second factor is penetration. In the absence
of anything other than skeleton ballistic missile
defences, there is a high degree of assurance that
a ballistic missile will penetrate to its target. There
is clearly no such assurance in the case of aircraft.
Yet it is necessary to differentiate between modern
high-performance aircraft with good ECM equip-
ment and low-level performance and more elderly
aircraft which can only fly high and have no means
of deflecting enemy radars and missiles. A stand-off
air-to-ground missile will also enhance the ability
of an aircraft to strike its target. What one cannot
assess is the effect of the attrition over time of
enemy air defences, but it can be argued that this
will be largely offset by the fact that attrition on the
ground will also be higher over time. This effect has
therefore been discounted in the figures which
follow (also marked against a theoretical maximum
of 0.33) :
Ballistic missiles: 0.3.
Modern strike aircraft with good ECM, good per-
formance at very low level or stand-off AsM:
0.2.
Aircraft with no terrain-following radar and no
ECM fit: 0.1.
Elderly aircraft forced to penetrate at high level:
0.05.
The final factor is by far the most difficult to
assess, for not only is the judgment likely to be the
most subjective but it will be a compound of several
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THE BALANCE OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE 117
the
the
ult
ed
his
sub-factors. Flexibility is clearly a most valuable
characteristic of any weapon system and it will
have something to do with its responsiveness, with
the ease with which it can be retargeted, range
(because the longer the range, the greater the
possible selection of targets) and accuracy. How-
ever, it would seem wrong to accord flexibility any
greater weight than either survivability or pene-
trability and it too is marked out of a theoretical
maximum of 0.33. We are aware that we have
assessed Western systems on the assumption that a
unified targeting plan exists and that there will not
be political disagreements which might detract from
the effectiveness of that plan. In the case of France,
this assumption cannot be made but French forces
have been counted against NATO totals and we have
not degraded them in the table. In making the judg-
ments which follow, it should be noted that it is not
easy to communicate with submarines that remain
submerged (and so it is not easy to redirect SLBM),
that retargeting of land-based missiles depends
upon communications that are resistant to interfer-
ence and upon sophisticated computers, and that
only aircraft with modem navigational aids have the
ability to deliver their weapons accurately by day
or night and in all conditions of visibility.
Modern strike aircraft: 0.15-0.3 (range depend-
ent).
Modem MRBM: 0.25 (assumes data buffer
MRBM, IRBM, sRBM: 0.1-0.2 (range dependent).
Sum: 0.10-0.15 (range and accuracy dependent).
In the tables, each of the three primary factors is
assessed for every delivery system and they are
considered to be additive, giving a highest possible
score of 1.0. Obviously no system is perfect, but its
general utility is measured by how nearly its
`quality index' approaches unity. This index is then
used to modify the figures for the total numbers of
deployable warheads in order to arrive at aggre-
gates which reflect more realistically the usefulness
of the nuclear systems in the inventories of NATO
and the Warsaw Pact.
This second approximation tends to narrow the
gap between the blocs. Whereas the first refinement
gave the Warsaw Pact an advantage of 2,244 to
1,811 (a ratio of 1.24 : 1), the `System Utility
Figures' shown in the tables give the Warsaw Pact
an assessment of 1,209 as against NATO's 1,065 - a
ratio of 1.13 : 1. Given that there are a substantial
number of variables, the errors inherent in the
calculations are at least of the order of ? 10 per
cent. We therefore conclude that something very
close to parity now exists between the Theatre
Nuclear Forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
although it is moving in favour of the Warsaw
Pact. It is important to stress that the Western
figures include US Poseidon warheads whereas the
Warsaw Pact figures do not include any Soviet
central systems. Without Poseidon, the ratios are
1.59 and 1.58 to one in the Pact's favour.
However, we are bound to note that certain
disturbances are likely to occur as a result of
modernization. On the Warsaw Pact side we note
that the deployment of something over 100 SS-20
missiles has already accounted for 17 per cent of
total system utility. If the Soviet Union were to
retire the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, our calculations
show that another 140 SS-20s would do the job
of the 590 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. Deployment
above that figure would clearly indicate a signifi-
cant enhancement of capability which would,
before long, move the overall balance clearly away
from parity. As we are as yet unaware of substantial
retirements of the older missiles, there exists a
danger that the balance might change by about 85
points per year, assuming an annual rate of intro-
duction for SS-20 from now on of some 50 missiles
In conclusion, it is necessary to reiterate the
subjective nature of this examination and to stress
that different assumptions will alter the balances
derived. However, it would certainly require some
very major displacements of the figures to show any
substantial imbalance in terms of overall system
utility. It is even doubtful in our view wh th r the
adverse ratio in terms of the total numbers ofwar-
heads assumed to be deliverable is sigjficant a
present, but one must acknowledge that the intro-
duction of new and more capable systems on the
Soviet side could, if unconstrained, begin to produce
a theatre nuclear advantage which will be used to
legitimate a NATO response. One must also ack-
nowledge that a substantial advantage, although
unquantifiable, may lie with the tightly controlled
Warsaw Pact when compared with the politically
diverse Western Alliance. Co-ordinating the nuclear
forces of many countries into an efficient strike
plan, using all the systems listed in an optimal way,
will present a major challenge to NATO.
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 ApptMd-FdeReleA9ib
Indices
Warheads
System
IRBM
SS-5 Skean
2,300
90
0.75
0.9
1
60
0.15
0.3
0.2
0.65
39
USSR
SS-20
3-4,000
120
0.75
0.9
3
243
0.3
0.3
0.25
0.85
206
USSR. Mobile, MIRY
MRBM
SS-4 Sandal
1,200
500
0.75
0.9
1
337
0.15
0.3
0.15
0.6
202
SS-N-4 Sark
300
27
1.0
0.7
1
16
0.25
0.3
0.1
0.65
10
USSR. On G-I-class sse. Assumed
SS-N-5 Serb
700
54
1.0
0.7
1
33
0.25
0.3
0.1
0.65
21
USSR. On G-II-, H-11-class ssB SSBN.
SS-N-8
4,800
6
1.0
0.7
1
5
0.25
0.3
0.15
0.7
3
Assumed deployed in Baltic only
USSR. On 1 H-111-class SSBN. Assumed
SRBM
Scud B
185
400
SS-12
500
ScuD B
185
16
1.0
0.9
1
14
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.6
8
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary
and Romania have Scud, but only GDR
Aircraft
Tu-22M
3,000+
50
0.37
0.8
5
74
0.15
0.2
0.3
0.65
48
believed to have Scud B
USSR. Long Range Air Force ac only
Backfire B
Tu-16 Badger
1,650
318
0.37
0.8
4
376
0.15
0.1
0.25
0.50
188
USNaval Air Force ac excluded)
Tu-22 Blinder
1,750
135
0.37
0.8
3
117
0.15
0.15
0.25
0.55
64
USSR
Su-19 Fencer
600
230
0.19
0.8
2
68
0.1
0.2
0.15
0.45
30
USSR
Su-17 Filter C/D
325
640
0.19
0.8
2
194
0.1
0.1
0.12
0.32
62
USSR
MiG-23/-27
450
1,400
0.19
0.8
1
212
0.1
0.2
0.15
0.45
95
USSR
Flogger B/D
MiG-21 Fishbed
350
1,000
0.19
0.8
1
152
J/K/L/N
Su-7 Fitter A{
275
220
0.19
0.8
1
33
0.1
0.1
0.12
0.32
10
USSR
275
115
0.25
0.8
1
23
0.1
0.1
0.12
0.32
7
Czechoslovakia, Poland
Su-20 Fitter C
325
35
0.25
0.8
2
14
0.1
0.1
0.12
0.32
4
Poland
11-28 Beagle 1,400
5
0.50
0.8
1
2
0.1
0.05
0.15
0.3
1
Poland
MiG-23 Flogger B 450
3
0.25
0.8
1
1
0.1
0.2
0.15
0.45
1
Czechoslovakia
Table VIII: NATO Long- and Medium-range Nuclear Systems for the European Theatre
ApprovleoJor Release 2004/10/21 : 4PeRDP81 B00401 F 9Q 00010006-3
 Approved or Release 2004/10/21 CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002300010006-3
Factors
Indices
Warheads
System
Category
and type
Range Utiliza-
(nm) Inventory tion
Service-
ability
No. of
warheads
assumed
available
Surviv- Pene-
ability tration
Flexi- Quality
bility index
utility
figure
Operating countries and Notes
SLBM
Polaris A-3
2,880
64a
1.0
0.450
1
28
0.25
0.3
0.1
0.65
18
Britain. utv counted as single warhead
M-20
3,000
64a
1.0
0.45a
28
0.25
0.3
0.1
0.65
18
France
IRBM
SSBS S-2
1,875
18
1.0
0.9
1
SRBM
Pershing
450
180
1.0
0.9
1
162
0.2
0.3
0.15
0.65
105
US, W. Germany
-
-
US inventory in Europe 108; German
72 (under dual US-German control)
232
150
Land-based aircraft
Vulcan B2
2,000
48
1.0
0.8
4
152
0.15
0.15
0.3
0.6
91
Britain. Range varies with flight profile
Buccaneer
500
50
0.5
0.8
2
40
0.15
0.15
0.3
0.6
24
Britain
Mirage IVA
2,000
33
1.0
0.8
3
78
0.15
0.15
0.3
0.6
46
France
F-4
1,400
175
0.33
0.8
2
92
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
36
W. Germany, Greece, Turkey
F-111 E/F
2,925
156
0.5
0.8
3
186
0.15
0.2
0.3
0.65
120
US. 156 known to be based in Europe
FB-IIIA
3,000
66
1.0
0.8
4
208
0.15
0.2
0.3
0.65
135
US. Assumes half US inventory moved to
F-4
1,400
324
0.33
0.8
2
170
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.4
68
Europe
US. European-based plus dual-based ac.
F-104
750
367
0.33
0.8
1
96
0.1
0.1
0.15
0.35
33
Belgium, W. Germany, Italy, Nether-
Jaguar
1,000
177
0.33
0.8
1
48
0.1
0.1
0.15
0.35
16
lands, Norway, Turkey
Britain, France
Mirage 5F
650
94
0.33
0.8
1
24
0.1
0.1
0.12
0.32
7
Belgium, France
Mirage IIIE
650
105
0.33
0.8
1
27
0.1
0.1
0.12
0.32
8
France
Carrier-based aircraft
A-6E
800
20
0.5
0.8
3
24
0.15
0.2
0.3
0.65
15
US. Assumes 2 carriers in range and half
A-7E
1,200
40
0.5
0.8
1
16
0.15
0.1
0.3
0.55
8
strike ac used in nuclear role
Etendard IVM
350
24
0.5
0.8
2
18
0.15
0.1
0.2
0.45
8
Assumes I out of 2 carriers in range
615
765
US central systems
Poseidon 2,800
(40)
(10)
400
0.3
0.3
0.15
0.75
300
Assumes 400 `central' US Poseidon war-
heads allocated to SACEUR Strike Plan
a Inventory figure of 64 represents sLBM complement of 4 SSBN. But no more than 2 SSBN are likely to be on patrol, and it is to their 32 SLBM that a 0.9 serviceability
factor is applied.
 STAT Approved For Release 2004/10/21 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002300010006-3
Approved For Release 2004/10/21 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002300010006-3