ZIMBABWE: A MILITARY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100080006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 1, 1978
• Content Type: IM

rgDlk4tp5IRelease 2004/10/21 : CIA-RDP81 B00 if 002
Central
Intelligence
Zimbabwe:
A Military Assessment
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
ZIMBABWE: A MILITARY ASSESSMENT
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NOTE
This paper focuses primarily on the capabilities of the Zimbabwe
guerrillas and the Rhodesian security forces to exert military power in
the current conflict. We have defined capabilities, however, in a broad
sense and sought to take into account some of the major political and
economic factors that affect the fighting elements on both sides.
This memorandum is the product of an informal interagency working
group; chaired by CIA, under the auspices of the Assistant National
Intelligence Officer for Africa. The memorandum has been coordinated
at the working level.
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CONTENTS
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KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................. vii
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 1
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1
A. Zimbabwe African People's Union .......................................................... 1
B. Zimbabwe African National Union .......................................................... 2
II. ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS .................................... 2
A. ZAPU's Military Arm, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
(ZIPRA) ..................................................................................................... 2
Strength Changes ....................................................................................... 2
Organization, Training, and Deployment .................................................. 2
Morale and Internal Problems .................................................................. 5
Foreign Support .......................................................................................... 5
Operations Inside Rhodesia ........................................................................ 6
B. ZANU's Military Arm, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation
Army (ZANLA) ..................................................................................... 7
Strength Changes ........................................................................................ 7
Organization and Training ........................................................................ 7
Foreign Support .......................................................................................... 7
Operations Inside Rhodesia ........................................................................ 8
III. THE RHODESIAN FACTOR .......................................................................... 8
A. The Military ................................................................................................ 8
Manpower ...................................................................................................... 8
Equipment .................................................................................................... 11
Foreign Support .......................................................................................... 11
B. Impact of the Economic Recession on Salisbury's Capacity To Wage
War .......................................................................................................... 11
Capacity To Wage War ............................................................................ 11
Military Impact on the Recession ............................................................ 12
C. Impact of the Internal Settlement on the Overall Character of Military
Operations ................................................................................................ 12
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KEY JUDGMENTS
? There is no immediate prospect for a change in the military balance
between the Rhodesian and guerrilla forces that would have a critical
impact on the current political situation.
-However, over a longer term, say six months, the Patriotic Front
and the Frontline States may feel compelled to find a way to
break the military stalemate-particularly if the internal
settlement appears to be holding.
-Among the measures they would consider would be to ask for
more Soviet military supplies and direct Cuban assistance to
defend their staging facilities and border camps inside
Mozambique and Zambia.
-An effective air and ground defensive umbrella around these
guerrilla camps would inhibit Rhodesian offensive capabilities
and make cross-border raids into Mozambique and Zambia
more costly for Salisbury. Further, improved security around
the border camps would enable the guerrillas better to organize
and execute their infiltration effort into Rhodesia.
-Such a Cuban and Soviet defensive role in support of the
guerrillas and the Frontline States would certainly signal an
escalation in the conflict and would likely prompt South Africa
to consider increasing, in some similar measure, the level of its
support to Rhodesia.
? The two major black nationalist groups struggling for control of
Rhodesia continue to exhibit serious internal as well as military
weaknesses that limit their overall effectiveness. Despite this, the
guerrillas have been able to maintain pressure on the Salisbury
government. Thus far, the government has been at least able to cope
with the insurgency in a military sense, but the high costs of the
war-and the virtual certainty that they will continue to grow-mean
that a solution to the conflict is becoming more and more pressing for
the government.
? Serious tribal and ideological divisions have surfaced within both the
political and the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's
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Union (ZAPU). These frictions will continue to fester and will likely
serve as a steady drain on ZAPU's morale and military capability.
-ZIPRA, the military arm of ZAPU, has grown rapidly in the last
year and, with Soviet arms and Cuban assistance, is attempting
to form a conventional as well as a guerrilla army. ZIPRA
guerrilla infiltration will continue and can possibly be expected
to increase over the near term, but it will be quite some time
before ZIPRA is able to carry out conventional operations
effectively and to sustain them.
-ZIPRA has scored no significant military gains in Rhodesia and,
in fact, has fielded far fewer guerrillas than the ZANU
organization. Nevertheless, the continued presence of its large
Cuban/Soviet-supported force on the Zambian side of the
border remains a credible and psychological threat to Rhodesia.
? The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) also continues to
suffer from factional problems, with the real locus of power
apparently in the hands of the military commanders.
-ZANLA, the military arm of ZANU, is far more active than
ZIPRA and continues to bear the brunt of guerrilla operations.
ZANLA's recruitment successes have not kept pace with ZIPRA
over the past year, nor is ZANLA receiving the same quantity of
foreign equipment.
-ZANLA does not have the capability of mounting and sustaining
a major, coordinated military effort against Rhodesia in the near
term. Ethnic and personal frictions, equipment and food
shortages, and a continuing inability to defend the camps in
Mozambique have adversely affected morale as well as
ZANLA's overall military effectiveness.
? The Rhodesian security forces are trained and equipped primarily for
counterinsurgency and have been generally effective in countering
the guerrillas within Rhodesia, as well as in the Mozambique and
Zambian border areas. However, they are still finding it increasingly
difficult to contain the spread of guerrilla operations.
-Salisbury's military effort is a major cause of the current
economic recession in Rhodesia, along with the slump in
international demand for exports and an increased adherence to
UN sanctions. The dim prospect of immediate recovery not only
has dampened white morale, but also has increased pressure on
Smith to seek an end to the fighting and obtain an internal
settlement.
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-The Salisbury agreement has produced some change in the
context within which military operations are conducted.
Military operations henceforth will presumably take some
account of the wishes as well as political needs of Salisbury's
black leaders, but there is danger that, if this involves a
relaxation in the counterinsurgency effort, it will produce a
more favorable operational environment for the guerrillas.
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