SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100070030-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Involvement in Africa
I, The USSR continues to act assertively in pursuing its
political, economic and strategic goals in sub-Saharan
`; Africa.
A. Politically, Moscow's goal is to increase its own
influence at the expense of the. West and the PRC _
Moscow is the predominant foreign influence in
Angola and Ethiopia.. The Soviets are also influ-
ential in Mozam'bique and several smaller .countries
in :sub-Saharan Africa.
B. On the economic side Moscow's success has been
less reriarkable.' The Soviet Union wants to.
insure its access to any African raw materials
it-may need and position itself to deny or
restrict western access should Soviet policy'
makers decidethis is necessary.
C. Strategically, Moscow wants access to port and
air facilities to support its Indian ocean fleet
and to facilitate monitoring of Western naval
activity in the Atlantic. Moscow has secured
access to facilities in Ethiopia and Angola but
these are not equal to those .lost in Somalia
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and restricted in Guinea.
II. African countries have presented many opportunities
to the Soviets in recent years because of their
political instability, economic backwardness and
lingering resentment toward Western colonial powers.
cOt~ had no hannd.in creating the race issue
Nos
in Africa, the fall of the Portuguese. 9overnmenz-
that brought about their departure-from-Angola
_n ".,.,a,nl^viaue and Gui.nea--Bi4ssau, or the Somali.
~tnvasign of Ethiopia- in each ease, +;~~~~?-
reacted decisively and always on.the side en
-41"" bread support among the African states.
italized on Cuba's
c
ap
Lave also
willingness to interverie in Africa and its
acceptability to Africans as a "non-'aliened;"
Third World state.
at--ility and .willingness to
nt to
supply large .amounts-?.of m li.tarr equipZ8
..
ga~,n access to"African countries. The supply
a L. 4- demonstrated i n Ethiopia and
Angola has impressed African states and raised
questions about* the West' s Will to resist Soviet
advances.
a brAad fXont in sub-Saharan
.- While Moscow is moving Qn
III
rica, ' .Soviet attention -i s focused primarily on Angola,
Af
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Ethiopia and Rhodesia.
A. In Angola, Moscow and Havana are concerned about
.went, but It is highly, disruptive, aggravates
the economic problems confronting Neto and his
foreign supporters and.is.taking an increasing
their inability to halt the UNITA insurgency.
UNITA is not able to bring down the Neto govern-
Moscow's intervention in the Ethiopia-Somali
toll among the Cubans.
the Ogaden and-the Eritrean insurgency remains
cessful. Nonetheless, insurgency continues in.
conflict over the Ogaden was sudden and suc-,
a military solution.
between Moscow and Addis Ababa. Moscow presently
favors a negotiated settlement but Mengistu wants.
-.a.serious problem and a source of contention
Moscow remains the major foreign backer of_the
Patriotic Front which conducts the insurgency,
against the Rhodesian interim government. :Moscow*
PP.'and the Frontline states (Angola, Botswana,'-
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) in dealing
'has to date carefully followed the lead of the
with the Rhodesian problem. but has spoken out
against the UK-US settlement plan-
1. Despite Soviet and Cuban efforts in training
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and supplying ZAPU--the PF faction Moscow,
is closest to--ZAPU forces are no match
for the Rhodesian security forces-
2. Moscow is concerned about this-and is taking
steps to try to improve ZAPU's military
capabilities-
. i ~ .
trip to London and Washington,
his
ILLEGI
B a his continued good relations with the
Moscow is increasingly concerned about the
concern stems from Zambia's serious economic
problems, Kaunda's reluctance to allow more
Soviets and Cubans to work with ZAPU and
depth of Zambian President Kaunda's com-
mitment to ZAPU and. the PF. Moscow's
IV. The Soviets. are confronted: with problems in Africa.as
a result of their growing presence and influence on
the continent.
A. Most African states continue to distrust Soviet
motives. This is true even in Angola'
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friction has developed between. the Sov1et5 and'
such as.Angola and to a lesser extent EthiOP:Lar
presence
C, in areas where there is a large Soviet ,.
performance in the economic development field
and the low level of Soviet economic aid.
B. African states also coxap a~,n abqut PPOr Soviet
4.,o , nr-Al nonulation.
DAfrican- nationalism maxi over the long term,
limits the extent o9 .Soviet influence.
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