SOVIET/CUBAN OPTIONS IN RHODESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100070015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 18, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

SECRE1, 25X1 AF
'Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002100070015-9
25X1A
1 8 SEP 1978
25X1A
SOVIET/CUBAN OPTIONS IN RHODESIA
I. Conflicting reports re increased external involvement
25X1 A. Ethiopian Air Line$
'
to Mozambique..
to shuttle 10,000 Cubans/Ethiopians
25X1
no intention at this
B.
I
time" to send combat forces to mozaMDlque.
C. Probably just contingency planning at this point.
II. Nevertheless, we think
A. It is conceivable that we could see, in coming months,
a force or forces totalling several thousand Cubans
arriving in Mozambique, but we doubt they would have
the invasion of Rhqdesia as a mission!
B. It is pretty likely that there will be additional
Soviets or Cubans arriving in both Mozambique and Zambia,
together with more equipment for the guerrillas, but many
more in Mozambique than in Zambia;
C. It is almost certain that there-will be a general escalation
in the level of Soviet/Cuban interest and activity in
connection with Rhodesia and we suspect that the reporting
25X1 we are receiving s at
the very let a reflection of this general leaning-torward
posture).
The ultimate size of this force or forces could depend on circum-'
stances. Something between 2 and 10 thousand could do the job,
although the.smaller the figure the smaller the shock and the
political risks.
-- With the higher, more traumatic figure, the force could
.be fed in gradually, both for political cosmetics and to
ease logistic problems. -
SECRETI
25X1
 'LtkL 25X1
Approved ,For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002100070015-9
?
III. Pressures/Risks
A. Front Line leaders not eager to'bring in Soviets/Cubans
(.or Ethiopians) because:
1. They would rather have this an African victory. And,
like the guerrillas, would prefer to limit the role.of
.
"outside forces."
2. They do not trust Soviets/Cubans. The fewer, the better.
3. Sudden surge in Soviet/Cuban presence may prompt.South
Africa to join white Rhodesia. - ,.
B. As situation changes, each Front Line leader's desire to
end war -- or even protect his borders -- may outweigh the
negative aspects of Soviet/Cuban presence.
C. Nkomo needs early settlement despite militant rhetoric.
1. He fears that a longer campaign will give. his own
military leaders a voice larger than his, and he thinks
he may be moving toward the end of a long struggle.
2. He has been saving up his force for the.post-victory
contest with other nationalist leaders, but it is hard
to keep it tight and in reserve at the same time.
3. His host, President Kaunda,.is becoming restive and
facing some heat at home over using Zambia's resources
for the struggle.
D. Mugabe's forces have larger share of the struggle
.1. His guerrillas need more protection than they are getting
.from Rhodesian raids and other counter-guerrilla operations.
.2. The longer the war goes on, the more room there is for
the kind of behind-the-back negotiation that Nkomo has
been carrying on with Smith.
3. Mugabe, too, needs' something more at his side than a.
rag-tag guerrilla group'to contest power after Smith
gives in; the ZANU.people being trained in Ethiopia.may
.help here.
SEC.RE 25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002100070015-9
The Front Line, leaders becoming more frustrated, with,
situation and each other. While still confident that
Smith ultimately will go, they -- especially Kaunda and
Machel -- are concerned about the shape they and their
countries could be in when that happens.
1. Both Kaunda and Machel are anguishing over their.
inability to defend their territory against Rhodesian
operations and over the incapacity.of the guerrilla
forces to defend themselves. This may lead them to
adopt independent courses, with Machel taking the
more militant stand, closer to the Soviets.
1- N erere and probably Neto, want to see the Rhodesia
N
matters. Nyerere is incensed by the v-- m
talks, which-- he cannot control.
F. Soviets/Cubans may be willing to. accept risks of escalated
presence because of:
1. The opportunity afforded to increase their presence
in Mozambique and Zambia, as well as to. obtain a better
footing for their participation in a longer-term campaign
P
,v
y ,
problem moved along so that they can tend to other
k S ith
focused against South Africa.
2. Their conviction that they will be, once again, on the
historically winning side, even if there are foul-ups
and temporarly reverses.
3. A sense that the Rhodesian situation can be pushed in
a direction-that would be more favorable to Soviet
interests (e.g., Nkomo'.s forces march into.Salisbury
with Soviet help rather than sit down at a table to sign
yet another "agreement" under US/UK auspices.)
4. Confidenpe they have acquired in their technical expertise
in projecting Soviet military power overseas, as they have
done in'Angola and especially Ethiopia.
5. Possibly,. an incentive (arising out of political considera-
tions such as Third World image) to remove Cuban combat
troops from. Ethiopia combined with reluctance to send them
straight home.
 SECRE 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002100070015-9
G. The big risk would be South African r.eacti?on, and the
Soviets/Cubans would have to watch this closely.
1.
After all, while the Rhodesians have only;
--
12,000 troops, 6,000 mobilizable
--
No armor
--
Only 36 MIG-17 equivalent aircraft
2.
The.South Africans have:
-- 45,000 troops, trained to European standards
(250,000 mobilizable)
200+ tanks, and other armor
-- 200 jets
-- Not to mention a navy with 3 SSs, 3 DEs plus
minor combatants
?
IV. If force is sent, Soviets/Cubans are under no great compulsion
to predetermine mission.
A. Most likely mission would be a demonstration of "presence."
which would
Be a significant weight in the diplomatic balance
against Smith.
Afford deterrence against Rhodesian attacks on guerrilla
camps and Mozambique's borders.
B. Mission might also be to improve guerrilla effectiveness'
through training and advisory efforts.
C. Mission may be to defend against Rhodesian raids/incursions.
D. Least likely. mission is direct invasion of Rhodesia,* given
.present conditions. May become a more viable option as the
situation eludes settlement.
SECRETI
 -`.'\L II I 25X1
Approved For Release 2004/0.1/20 : CIA-RDP81 800401 R002100070015-9
-- Logistical consideration of the invasion option (if
unopposed by South Africa and/or the West)
1. We have no doubt about the Soviets' ability to
get people, equipment and material to debarkation.
ports and air fields in Mozambique, Zambia, Angola
and Tanzania. Their resupply efforts in the Mideast
('73), Angola and Ethiopia show they could handle
the long-haul logistics of a war against Rhodesia.
2. Considering the lines of communication (LOC) ins.
country, we note that the road, rail networks
roughly are comparable in Aggola, Ethiopia,.and-
Mozambique/Zambia to say that they-have demonstrated
.an-ability to move men and material in country
that,is adequate to support a campaign in Rhodesia.
3. Examining the suitability of the terrain in and
around Rhodesia for mechanized war.
For military thrusts from across Rhodesia's
borders with the FLS, there is only limited
ingress for invading forces, e.g., from:
(1) Zambia - there are basically three
entry points because of the Zambezi
gorge and escarpment and Lake Kariba
(2) Mozambique -'the border is spanned by
mountains and jungle except in the south
b. But once in Rhodesia?itself,.the terrain is
,generally suitable for mechanized conventional
warfare.
c. On the other hand, there would be free ingress
for any possible South African intervention.
V. Bottom Line
-- We doubt very much that we will. see a large Soviet/Cuban
(or Ethiopian) force arriving for the direct, premeditated
purpose of mounting a conventional invasion of Rhodesia
(although we would not rule this out completely if the
situation grinds on without a settlement)..
25X1
SECRET[
 We would not be surprised, however, to see a substantial increase
in Soviet/Cuban presence in the Rhodesia area; with most of
the increas in Mozambique where the welcome would be less
cool and, at this time, the direct need for defensive
support -- which this force would likely provide -- would
probably be greater than in Zambia.
How this would actually come about remains to be.seeq.
This is an unfolding situation in which the players them-
selves have. not made up.their minds just. how "far and fast?
to go" and are casting about for a variety of ways toward
a solution they can accept.
Approved For Release 2004/01/20 CIA-RDP81 B00401 R002100070015-9
SFrpF 25X1