EVIDENCE OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR KATANGAN INSURGENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100020011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 28, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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EVIDENCE OF. CUBAN SUPPORT FOR KATANGAN INSURGENTS
It is our judgment that the Cubans have been. involved
in training and advising the ex-Katangan exiles-- who
call-themselves the FNLC-'-at bases located in Angola
since 197 5 ; we do no bel ieve Zah ire }1 he~uai eovepnl;entl
paced In t h e fighting
clearly had foreknoiahedq e - of -,-the . attack C-u an I5resl3ent
el tstSection e, on May 17, stated thate HaChief of vana had treceived
Inntteressts
reports that the hethada"tiarned"pAngolan'Presidenthj~etontorsion
and claimed that prevent it.
Cuban advisers doubtless assisted the rebels in their
preparations for the-- incur.s.ion_:I iis---montli-has cell in= the
invasion of1977 he believe that the Cubans and Soviets
have supplied the FNLC with som_~~`-capons--and.-=e.qu ent, but
reporting on -this point is less conclusive as co?parea to that
on training. There have been several unconfirmed reports of
Cuban personnel accompanying the insurgents in the most recent
~rctays11 - Srmila-r---claims-during tlfe""1977 Yinvasion were never
proven.
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Virtually all of the
ther-forei
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credible evidence on t
n communist involvemen
he character
t has-been
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of Cuban an
provided
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N-elTertheless, the aide variety of sources as tine a
sistency of the reporting make a convincing case against Castro's
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denials of any direct or indirect involvement during the past
"two years.
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Castro's message to the US Government was that:
--There are no Cubans with the Katangan forces in Shaba,
--Cuba has had no participation either directly or -in-
directly in the Shaba affair,
--Cuba has provided no weapons or other material to the
KatanQan forces,
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--Cuba'has not trained the Katangan forces,
--Cuba has not had any contact with the Katangans for
at least two years.
In our view, only the first of these assertions is correct.
Cuba had been helpin
arms and training.
Ion 8 May, that Angola and
the insurgents. particularly with
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was told during extensive conversations
that two Cuban and six
Angolan advisers accompanied the rebels when they
started moving out of Angola in early May.
added that Katangan "political commissars", who had been
trained in Angola by Cubans and East Germans, were
assigned to each group of 50 rebels,
stated in early May 1T78 that Cuban, ovlet,
and as
German personnel
were engaged in the trainin
g of FNLC
rebels in Angola,
--In October 1977,
I - Ithat 1,500 FNLC recruits in
Angola. had just completed their training and were under
the con.trol of Cuban and East German instructors,
--In August 1977.1
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that the Cubans were training some 2,000 Katangans in
northeastern Angola.
There'is strong evidence from other reporting that Cuban
involvement with the FNLC preceded the first Shaba invasion.
--In May 1977, several Katangans i-ho took part in the
first Shaba incursion reported that the Angolan army
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 and its Cuban military advisers had helped train the
insurgents and had coordinated closely in the planning
of the invasion,
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--According-to
F_ I Fidel Castro told
meeting in Moscow in April 1977 that Cuba was
the Katangan nationalists because once Katanga
Zaire would fall like a house of cards,
--According to a February 1977 report
threat until 1975 when they were reequiped and reorganized
by Cuban advisers, _
I reported in May 1977
a is contacts had informed him that Cuban and East
German personnel were training the insurgents in 1976
and early 1977 and that the Cubans had controlled the
shipment of arms and equipment from Luanda to a rebel
training base in February 1977,
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Cuba would-train and support Zairian
forces opposed to President Mobutu. Castro reportedly
described the effort as an act of revenge for the
death of Patrice?Lunumba.
they were willing to take the risk that such wholly independent
operations might put them. at cross-purposes with the Cubans,
Soviets,-and Angolans.
quarters--including the Belgians and Portuguese in the early
1960's--and they would be capable of training their own
recruits and launching a one-shot operation independently if
an on Cuba and the USSR for. a continued supply of arms and
equipment, the FNLC probably has some freedom of action
regarding tactics and local objectives, and, to a degree,
the timing of specific operations. The Cubans, Soviets, and
Angolans certainly must have a veto over FNLC activities,-
however. The rebels have received support from a number of
Although the FNLC now depends on Angola for sanctuary
d
Once inside Shaba, the degree of Cuban/Soviet/Angolan
control over them would probably be much smaller. The FNLC
: r ReJe se dQ /o7/ A7RBPt$.I., 0401-
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the Katangans were not a significant
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can also draw on a large number of sympathizers and
guerrilla'sin place throughout the Shaba region to support
its operations once they are across the border. According
to the insurgents were given
suppor y the population of Kolwezi during the attack;
many townspeople willingly hid the rebels from French and
Zairian soldiers.
Evidence concerning the possible. presence of Cubans in
Zaire has been sparse. The Zairians claim however- that
Cuban- personnel are fighting with the-rebels
25X1 reported on May 24.that a citizen
trapped in Kolwezi told a member of the cooperation commission
that- he had been spared only after conversing in Spanish with
some Cubans. This is the most credible report to date that
Spanish-speakers, presumably Cubans, accompanied the rebels
into Zaire.
We believe Havana would not have wanted to risk having
Cubans involved in combat in Zaire, but we cannot rule out
the possibility that a.few Cubans did accompany the invaders
into the Shaba region-: We presume that the Cuban leadership
recognize that concrete proof of its involvement will be
difficult to, obtain as long as :Cuban nationals are not
captured in Zairian territory.
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Cuban advisers, however., probably did accompany the rebels
to the border. has said that the
on May 8 that
Cuban personnel were organizing the movement of a large
number of FNLC troops from northeastern 'Angola towards the
Zambian border.. 'According to this information, the Cubans
were accompanying this force as advisers, but there was no
confirmation that the Cubans actually entered Zaire. This
report. was'seeminp1y confirmed by the statements made by
the two rebels to last w,week.
Based-on a limited number of reports,
we believe that the FNLC has _received..._a.r-ms
and- equipment from the Soviets, Cubans and oss_.ibly_ _other
Comm"unist_Coiuntres. reported that two
"Cuban or Soviet" ships un.oade weapons--mostly small aims
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and ammunition--in Luanda harbor in early October 1977 that
were destined for the sole use of the FNLC.
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The, insurgents very probably also receive substantial
Communist material aid indirectly through the Angolan armed
forces and other- sources, including the open market. Weapons
captured from the rebels during the recent fighting reportedly
included Soviet AK-47 assault rifles, US M-16 rifles, French
rifles; and Belgian munitions. - --
According to Soviet
and East German advisers have been training FNLC guerrillas
for one year and possibly longer. Most of this instruction,
reportedly takes place in northeastern Angola near Saurimo
where large. Cuban and Angolan military camps are also located.
I I have reported
that prior to early 1977 Angolan President Neto was reluctant
to provide assistance- to -the FNLC.and on occasion was kept
unaware of the extent of Angolan and Cuban support for the
rebels. This could expl?in in part why he is unwilling to
acknowledge involvement with or responsibility for the
rebels' actions. Veto has promised to give refugees fleeing
the hostilities safe passage and to release any hostages
brought into Angola by the FNLC.
.On May 21
stating 77771 any cos ages arriving in Angola would
be.released and returned to their home country if. they so wished;
he asked in return for assurances from France and other countries
that their forces l would not invade Angola.
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~,-claiming Cuban
znvo vemen wlt the FNLC. Given the high probability of
bias in these claims, we have disc-ounted all reports from'
Zairian. sources in making our judgments on the, extent of
foreign involvement with the rebels.
The Zairians have also claimed that Algeria and Libya
have been providing support to the FNLC.
vigorously denied any involvement with the Katangans.~
were given a four month training course in Libya early this
year.-'It would be unusual to send Angolan government soldiers.
to Libya for training and the soldiers may have actually been
members of the FNLC or some other southern African liberation
group that has bases in Angola. The Libyans however have
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