EVIDENCE OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN TRAINING FNLC FORCES:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100020010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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EVIDENCE OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN TRAINING FNLC FORCES:
FNLC leader'Mbumba had stated)
that Angola and
Cuba had been helping the insurgents, particularly with
arms and training.
two Cuban and six Angolan advisers accompanied the
rebels when they started moving out of Angola in early May.
(Cuban, Soviet, and East German personnel
were engaged in the training of FNLC rebels in Angola.
military training
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for the Katangans was still going on with the active support
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I FNLC recruits in Angola had
just completed their training and were under the control of
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eastern Angola.
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the Cubans
had established guerrilla training bases
for the ex-Katangan gendarmes in the Angolan towns of
Cozambo, Luacano, Nova Chaves, Chicapa, Mariege, Chiluage,
and an area approximately 200 kilometers north of Cangumbe.
ICuban military advisers had helped train the
insurgents and had coordinated closely in the planning of
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German personnel were training the insurgents
the Cubans had controlled the shipment
of arms and equipment from Luanda to a rebel training
Training programs under Cuban direction
the Katangans at two camps in northeastern Angola.
the Katangans had agreed to help the
MPLA against UNITA in exchange for an MPLA promise to help
the Katangans liberate Shaba province in Zaire.
the Katangans were not a significant threat until
1975 when they were reequiped and reorganized by Cuban advisers.
Cuba would train and support Zairian forces
opposed to President Mobutu.
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Castro's Veracity
On balance Fidel Castro has had a fairly good track record
for veracity given the fact that he has ruled Cuba through almost
20 years of turbulent international involvement. To be sure
Castro has never been adverse to shading the truth and has fre-
quently resorted to legalistic hairsplitting and definitions
designed to obfuscate the reality of a situation. Nevertheless,
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as a general rule he has preferred silence on sensitive subjects
to avoid being placed in a situation where he could be caught
in an outright lie. This has not always been the case, however.
Latin America
Through at least the autumn of 1962, the Castro regime denied
that Cuba was providing material suppeot to anti-regime groups
outside Cuba. In several public statements CAstro claimed that
such assistance was unnecessary since the people of several
countries in Latin America, thanks to'Cuba's example, were
becoming aware of their revolutionary potential. In fact,
Cuba was supplying covert material assistance--primarily financial
aid--to guerrilla groups in Colombia, Equador, Guatemala,
Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Nicaragua, and Bolivia,
In addition, Cuba was providing training on the island
to a large number of would-be guerrillas from the rest of
Latin America.
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Angola
In his summary speech to the first Cuban Communist Party
congress on 22 December 1975, Fidel Castro intimated that Cuba
sent combat troops to Angola only in response to US complicity
in the South African invasion of Angola on 21 October 1975.
Moreover, at a Kingston press conference during his visit to
Jamaica in October 1977, in response to a journalist's question,
Castro said "...what is historical and what absolutely no one
can deny is that Cuban soldiers went to Angola at the request
of the Angolan Government when the fascist and racist troops
of South Africa, in a lightning war, imitating Hitler's divisions,
invaded Angola and were advancing at the rate of 78 kilometers
a day. It was at that time we gave our support..."
The Cuban decision to commit combat troops in Angola, in
fact, was made between mid-July and late August 1975. Some
Cuban troops reportedly entered combat on the side of the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
the Cuban airlift to Angola began, with
five Cuban planes carrying men and/or arms for Angola crossing
the Atlantic before November. By the end of October there
were probably at least 2,000 Cuban troops in Angola.
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Zaire - 1977
In May 1977, Castro publicly denied that Cuba had had any
involvement with the then ongoing Shaba conflict. Castro's
statement was made in an interview that was to be televised in
the US:
Question: Did Cuban advisers train troops to fight in
Zaire?
Castro: No. Absolutely not. We have had no contact,
(given) no training, no weapons. Something
else, we did not even know that those events
were going to take place. The CIA knows, the
US government knows, the French Government knows
and everyone knows that we Cubans have neither
trained, nor armed nor had anything to do with
that problem of Zaire, which is a strictly
internal affair. Everything else is a lie to
justify the intervention of France, Morocco,
Egypt and other countries, with the logistical
support of France, to Zaire. That is why we
have stopped the program of evacuation of
Cuban military personnel from Angola, because
we have more than justified reasons to believe
that behind all this could be an ulterior plan
of aggression against Angola.
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US-Bombing of Cuban Airliner
In an emotional speech on 15 October 1976, nine days after
a Cuban airliner crashed with the loss of 73 lives as a result
of a terrorist bomb, Fidel Castro charged that the US was
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n e
ombing.
however,
was directly involved.
the Cubans did not believe the US
ICastro's charge suggests that despite the
facts of the case he believed he needed a scapegoat against
which an enraged Cuban population could vent its wrath.
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Talking Points - The Cuban Presence in Angola
1. The President has been fully briefed concerning Cuban involvement
in training and planning the recent incursion by Katangan troops into
Shaba.
II. It seems incredible that the U.S. is placed in a position of having
to convince the media of its position vis-a-vis a communist dictator
whose past statements about Cuban involvement in similar situations
have been consistently false. For example:
A. Latin America: Until the fall of 1962, Castro consistently
denied supplying guerrillas outside Cuba, when in fact he was aiding,
mostly financially, guerrillas in Colombia, Equador, Guatemala, Venezuela,
Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Nicaragua and Bolivia. At the same time he was
making these statements he was in fact training Latin American revolu-
tionaries in the art of guerrilla warfare in Cuba.
B. Angola: In a press conference in Kingston, Jamaica in October of
1977, Castro said, "Cuban soldiers went to Angola at the request of
the Angolan government when the fascists and racist troops of South Africa
invaded Angola and were advancing-.it was at that time we gave our support."
In fact, the South African invasion began on 21 October 1975. The first
troop ship left Cuba for Angola the first week of September 1975. The
Cuban airlift to Angola began on 30 September 1975. There were at least
2,000 Cuban troops in Angola by mid-October 1975, i.e., at least a week
before the invasion took place.
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C. Zaire 1977:. When interviewed for U.S. television in May of
1977, while the first Shaba invasion was going on, the following
exchange took place:
Question: Did Cuban advisers train troops to fight in Zaire?
Castro's Answer: No, absolutely not. We have had no training
nor weapons. Something else--we did not even know these events were
going to take place.
FACT:
had in fact trained Katangans and helped plan the invasion
the Cubans
III. It is impossible to believe that the Cubans had no part in the plans
or training or foreknowledge of the attack in a country in which:
A. There are 5,000 Cuban civilian advisers filling top
managerial and technical positions;
B. They are developing a national education system, running
the public health service, assisting in the coffee and sugar harvest and
reconstructing roads and bridges destroyed during the civil war;
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