CUBA S RECORD OF DECEIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100020007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Begin Text: "Cuba's Record of Deceit"
Summary
Fidel Castro recently made public acknowledgement of the
key role played by thousands of Cuban combat troops in the
Ogaden campaign -- after months of official Cuban denials
that they were even there. The Castro Government has a
long history of similar deceits in the past, ranging from
the Guevara's secret intervention in the Congo and Bolivia
in the 1960's to Cuba's dispatch. of a 20,000-man expedi-
tionary force to Angola in 1975-1976. Cuba denied its
presence in Angola for nine months.
Havana's subterfuge
is so practiced that Cuba even accused British Foreign
Secretary David Owen of the "grossest deceit" in April for
warning that total Cuban-Soviet military forces in Africa
now exceed 37,000; the total is more than that and most are
from, Cuba. This study, recalling other instances of Cuban
deception, raises serious questions concerning the reliability
of Cuban current disavowals of involvement in training and
equiping Katangan rebels who recently invaded Zaire.
Fidel Castro, speaking on television in Havana March 15,
finally acknowledged that Cuban soldiers played a decisive
combat role in the Ogaden campaign. He praised the "magni-
ficent combat qualities" of Cuba's "internationalist fighters.
The same day that Castro spoke the Havana newspaper, Granma,
printed details of the Ogaden combat roles of Cuban pilots,
tank crews, artillery units and infantry brigades. Prior
to these public acknowledgements the Cuban Government in
step with Moscow, steadfastly denied foreign reports of a
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them as "imperialist fabrications." Zarly contingents of
Cuban military personnel were described initially by Havana
as "medical personnel," and only later as "military advisers
on training missions."
The record speaks for itself, despite the flow of denials.
Even after hundreds of Cubans had assumed training and
advisory roles and begun organizing Ethiopia's armed forces
for the Ogaden counter-offensive, the Cuban Foreign Ministry,
cited by TASS last November 5, asserted: "There is not
a single Cuban unit, a single Cuban soldier, in Ethiopia."
Cuban diplomats, acting under instructions from Havana, assured
concerned foreign governments that published reports about a
Cuban military buildup there were untrue. Unable, however,
to conceal new call-ups of military reservists and the dispatch
of additional military personnel to Ethiopia in mid-November,
Cuba modified its story slightly. It said it was providing
"some" additional instructors and advisers "requested" by
Ethiopia. Cuba continued to deny the presence of combat
troops, however.
Even after actual deployment of Cuban combat units to the
Ogaden front in January 1978 for the counter-offensive which
began in late January, the Cuban press in Havana published
statements by Ethiopian officials that no foreign military
personnel were fighting alongside their own forces. Cuban
and other Soviet Bloc diplomats, it is now known, were under
official orders during this period to deny Cuban military
involvement in the fighting.
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On February 26, Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez told the London Observer there were only "Cuban
specialists" in Ethiopia. At that time Cubans in Soviet
tanks and jet fighters were spearheading the final drive on
the key Ogaden city of Jijiga.
This propaganda line was shattered March 2, when
Colonel Mengistu, the Ethiopian leader, revealed on national
radio that "Cubans ... are standing alongside the Ethiopian
people's defense forces on the front lines." Even so, it
took Havana until March 15 to acknowledge their involvement.
Throughout this period Cuba, along with the Soviet
Union and other partners, attempted to project a reversal of
roles. That is, they systematically issued propaganda charging
a NATO and Western buildup in Somalia directed against Ethiopia.
The propaganda even borrowed words from foreign press reports
concerning Soviet supplies of war materiel to Ethiopia, by
claiming a "massive airlift" of military supplies to Somalia
from neighboring and western countries, which were charged
with plotting violence against the revolutionary regime in
Addis Ababa.
HISTORIC PATTERN OF DECEPTION
This Cuban deception in Ethiopia follows a pattern
of deception discernible in past Cuban foreign military
adventures -- including the Cuban role in Angola. After a
campaign of subterfuge and half truths, Castro finally
admitted the presence of an expeditionary force in Angola
only in January 1976 -- nine months after the first contingents
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arrived. By then Cuba had placed 9,500 combat troops in
Angola, with 1,000 more enroute.
Just as in Ethiopia, Cuba attempted to conceal its
military intervention in Angola. Some of the first Cuban
arrivals posed as Portuguese; others termed themselves
"volunteers," in mid-1976, Castro promised the Prime
Minister of Sweden he would withdraw Cuban troops on a
systematic basis, a pledge which has proven to be only a
propaganda maneuver. Some troop rotation ensued, but there
are thousands more Cubans in Angola today -- a total of about
25,000. Including over 20,000 troops -- than there were
during the Civil War.
There are other earlier examples of Cuba's manipulation
of the truth. Not until after his death did Cuba admit that
the Guevara had attempted to incite region-wide revolution
from a guerrilla front in Bolivia. And only then did Havana
also admit that Geuvara had earlier tried to do likewise in the
Congo (now Zaire), despite Cuba's intensive training programs
and other assistance over the years for rural and urban
guerrilla fighters and terrorists, Havana denies any connections
with terrorist groups, yet the international terrorist, Carlos,
was trained in Cuba and three Cuban intelligence officers were
ordered out of France after two French security agents were
killed in a shootout with Carlos.
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TALKING POINTS - The Cuban Presence in Angola
I. The President has been fully briefed concerning Cuban
involvement in training and planning the recent incursion by
Katangan elements into Shaba. The evidence is persuasive and
the President is satisfied that Cubans bear a responsibility for
what occurred.
II. In view of his past record, Castro's statements should
not be accepted as credible. For example, Castro repeatedly
falsified about his support for guerrillas in Latin America.
Regarding Angola, he concealed the deployment of Cuban combat
troops in October 1975. In 1977, Castro denied training
Katangans to fight in Zaire, when in fact he had been doing so
for months previously. Additionally, Castro is motivated today
to conceal his responsibility for supporting the violation of an
existing national boundary.
III. It is impossible to believe that the Cubans had no part
in the plans or training or foreknowledge of the attack in a
country in which they play a major role in civilian administration
and a dominant role in internal security. There are some 5,000
Cuban civilians and at least 19,000 Cuban military -- advisors and
combat troops in the country as a whole. The Cubans have a
major headquarters and facilities at Saurimo, Angola, which is the
center of the area where the Katangans have been billeted and
trained.
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