PRC MEETING ON THE INDIAN OCEAN, 18 JULY 1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R001900120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 17, 1979
• Content Type: AG

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Table of Contents
PRC Meeting on the Indian Ocean, 18 July 1979
MEMORANDUM: PRC Meeting on the Indian Ocean
18 July 1979
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
74,9L#'A,, cam.
Jam., 19,9
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5 75 101 ED TIONES IOUS
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Officers
NFAC #3750-79
17 July 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence,,
THROUGH Robert R. Bowie
Deputy Director, National Fore `'Assessment
National intelligence icer or Conventional Forces
SUBJECT : PRC Meeting on Indian Ocean, 18 July 1979 (S)
1. The purpose of the PRC meeting is to determine how the US should
proceed in the Indian Ocean arms limitations talks with the USSR in light
of recent Soviet and local activities in the area. In addition, the
meeting will address the question of how to deal with Soviet Ambassador
Mendelevich who will be in Washington this week. (S)
2. You will be asked for a 'rundown on the situation in the Indian
Ocean area. Your briefin book includes a short Talking Paper, as well
as several backup papers (Tabs A through 0), which review a number of
intelligence questions that may arise during the PRC meeting. (S)
3. Your briefing book has been prepared by OSR analyst
who is available to accompany you to the meeting. (U)
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Soviet-Saudi Diplomatic Relations
There have been no further developments concerning the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two
countries that was rumored in the press some months ago.
-- The Soviets are eager, and the Saudis talk about it
now and then, but nothing more than that.
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Soviet Activity in South Yemen
I. The Soviets have been committed to the Marxist
regime in South Yemen since 1967, and during this
period, they have tried to enhance their access to
Aden's naval and air facilities and attempted to
establish closer political relations.
-- Soviet ships have called at the
port of Aden regularly since 1968.
They use the port for replenishment,
crew rest, some minor repair, and
to obtain water which is either
scarce or more expensive elsewhere
-- Moscow's interest in these facilities
increased substantially after the
Soviet expulsion from Berbera, Somalia,
but the South Yemenis have been reluctant
to formalize the Soviet presence. I
II. During the past two years, the Soviets have received
increased access to port facilities,
transport aircraft there.
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III. In return for access to Aden, the Soviets have
been very supportive of the Aden regime, providing it
with considerable military, economic, and technical
assistance.
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-- During the past two years, the Soviets
have introduced a broad spectrum of
military equipment into South Yemen.
$133(nd approximately $40 million in
equipment has been delivered so far
this year. Items include BTR-60 and
BMP armored personnel carriers, T-55
tanks, ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft guns,
OSA missile patrol boats, a T-58
minesweeper, MI-8 helicopters, and
MIG-21 and SU-20/22 aircraft. Only
small quantities of new equipment
have been introduced--less than a
dozen of most types--perhaps reflect-
ing South Yemen's limited ability to
absorb new equipment.
-- There are at least 500 Soviet military
advisers in South Yemen and probably
a like number of Cuban advisers.
IV. The USSR has long been aware of South Yemen's
intention to topple the regime in North Yemen and has
not indicated that it has any problem in principle
with that objective. It has expressed reservations
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at times about South Yemen's taking precipitate
-- There is no firm evidence that the
Soviets were directly involved in
this spring's border fighting between
the two Yemens, but there is some
evidence that they advised--from
within South Yemen-
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-- The Soviets almost certainly continued
to provide the maintenance support
necessary to keep much of South Yemen's
equipment operational.
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Saudi Arabia
South Yemen
~' 'eaple s Democratic Republic of Ye e
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___-North Yemen
Yemen Arab Republic
South Yemen
i .--, peoples Democratic Republic o.
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Soviet Presence in Countries Bordering the Indian Ocean
Ethiopia
1200 Military Advisers
600 Civilian Advisers
Kenya
Tanzania
Mozambique
Malagasy Republic
North Yemen
South Yemen
India
Iran
10 Civilian Advisers
120 Military Advisers
250 Military Advisers
10 Military Advisers
150 Military Advisers
500 Military Advisers
150 Military Advisers
120 Military Advisers
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Sudan
Nakfa, led Sea
Eritrea
South
Yemen
V .Uardere
ct d e n
-North
Yemen
0 200
Kilometers
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Ethiopia: Political Developments
I. Five years after the revolution, signs of dis-
content are developing among various groups in
Ethiopia over the government's continuing inability
to overcome a number of military, economic, financial
and political problems.
-- Ethiopian military forces have
grown increasingly dispirited and
war-weary as the guerrilla wars
in Eritrea and the Ogaden have
shown no signs of abating, and the
possibility of renewed guerrilla
activity in other areas has grown.
-- The government's much-heralded economic
development campaign has dismally
failed to live up to expectations,
and there are unconfirmed reports
of armed resistance by peasant
farmers to the campaign's center-
piece--agricultural collectivization.
-- The economy is still suffering from
the drain on Ethiopia's cash reserves
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caused by the 1977-78 war with Somalia
as well as the cost of maintaining a
215,000-man army.
-- New disposable foreign exchange
reserves have declined to less than
US $10 million and imports have
virtually ceased.
-- On the internal political front,
serious conflict has developed over
the formation of a single Marxist-
Lenist workers party, with military
hardliners unwilling to cede any
degree of significant power to
II. Although Chairman Mengistu's position is not in
immediate danger,
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III. Mengistu's growing troubles have increased his
dependency on the Soviet Union.
-- The Soviet-Ethiopian relationship
was cemented by the Friendship
Treaty of November 1978, and
Moscow appears determined to
support Mengistu over the long
run.
-- The USSR recently offered Ethiopia
a $600 million military assistance
package, which, if implemented, would
raise the total value of Soviet
military aid to Ethiopia since 1977
to $2.66 billion.
-- The Soviets have apparently not carried
through on promises of significant
economic development assistance, however,
and this failing could eventually cause
serious frictions in bilateral relations.
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Turkey
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British Indian Ocean Territory
(BLOT)
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NEW DELHI
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Somalia: The Political Situation
I. Somali President Siad has managed to maintain an
apparently firm grip on the levers of power in Mogadiscio,
despite persistent internal political and economic problems,
stresses arising from support of an apparently stalemated
guerrilla war in the Ogaden, and growing anxiety over a
Soviet-Cuban supported Ethiopian invasion of his country.
-- Siad has taken steps to consolidate his position by
fashioning a new constitution--scheduled to be
promulgated over the next few months--which
establishes the dgmminance of the presidency and the
primacy of the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party
which he controls.
II. Despite his military break with the USSR in November
1977, Siad has kept his Soviet option open, but we see no
prospect for any significant rapprochement between the two
sides over the near term.
-- Anti-Soviet sentiment remains strong in Somalia,
particularly within the military--the mainstay of
Siad's support.
-- The Soviets, for their part, are reluctant to
jeopardize their considerable investment in
Ethiopia by once again courting a
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leader--Siad--they intensely distrust and dislike.
In any case, Moscow's pre-conditions for
reconciliation, i.e. renunciation by Somalia of all
claims to the Ogaden, would be totally unpalatable
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Kenya: Political and Military Developments
I. During the past year Kenya has accomplished--without
incident--the transition successor government to the
Kenyatta regime that led it to independence.
-- President Moi has become a popular and
self-confident leader and is virtually certain to
be reelected to a full term later this year.
-- A reasonable level of popular satisfaction with
economic conditions--currently in a period of
decline--will be the key to continued political
stability.
II. Kenya is pro-Western and allows the United States
limited military access to its airfields and the port of
Mombassa.
It views the present level of US naval activity in
the region as a useful counter to Soviet, Cuban,
and radical Arab maneuverings.
Nairobi probably would not oppose an increase in
such activity, as long as the expansion did not
create a threat of war in the area.
III. Despite its moderate stance, Kenya maintains a military
pact with radical Ethiopia based on mutual fear of Somali
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The Situation in Djibouti
I. The situation in Djibouti is inherently unstable because
-- Longstanding tensions between the country's
generally pro-Somalia Issas and the
Ethiopian-oriented Afars.
-- The unwillingness of President Gouled, an Issa, to
delegate real authority to his Afar Prime Minister.
-- The alienation and militancy of the Afar community.
-- The potential for Ethiopian and Somali meddling and
subversion in Djibouti.
II. The French role and military presence in Djibouti is a
major factor promoting stability, particularly as a
deterrent to direct attack by Ethiopia or Somalia. In
addition to the strategic importance of Djibouti for their
naval operations in the Indian ocean, the French view their
presence as:
-- An obstacle to Soviet expansion in the Horn of
Africa.
-- A beachhead for safeguarding Western interests in
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III. Djibouti's deepwater port and protected anchorage make
it one of the best harbors on the east coast of Africa.
-- It is homeport for French naval forces in the area,
normally the largest Western naval force in the
Indian Ocean.
-- The French generally have helped to facilitate US
access to Djibouti's port and aviation
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE US MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS
IN PERSIAN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN
Introduction and Summary
This paper examines the attitude of selected
countries toward four levels of US military presence
in the Persian GuZf region, beginning with the exist-
ing ZeveZ and progressing to a substantially larger
and continuous US military presence. Our aim is to
identify the extent to which additional presence
would be welcomed by and useful to regional states
and the point at which additional US military presence
would be politically counterproductive. At what point
would we do our friends in the area a disservice and
elicit their opposition rather than their support?
We conclude that the political break-even point is much
closer to the current level of US forces than to the large
and continuous presence posited in Option IV. A significant
number of area governments would support a "modest" increase
in the US military presence (Option II) if the augmentation
were not highly visible, carried no sense of permanence, and
were not centered in the Persian Gulf itself. An additional
condition that makes even this support suspect is that the
buildup should, in most cases, occur in someone else's country.
We believe that, barring a Soviet-provoked crisis, there is
virtually no support for a major increase in US military
presence (Option III) that includes a large naval presence,
bases in the area, or prepositioning of materiel. A continuous
presence as outlined in Option IV would simply draw a more in-
tensely hostile reaction from friend and foe alike.
T is memorandum was prepared by the Near East South Asia
Division of the Office of Political Analysis. Questions and
comments may be addressed to
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What are the basic considerations that govern local
attitudes? Ideally, most area governments want no big power
military presence in the Gulf or on the Arab Peninsula.
It continues to be a contentious issue at Arab gatherings,
and in Arab eyes ensures future big power meddling in local
affairs. Oil, however, acts as a magnet and makes the ideal
unobtainable. The question for most, therefore, becomes
what level of US military presence increases security and what
level detracts? The answer is not static; it depends to a
great extent on the nature and seriousness of security threats
perceived by local leaders at any given moment. A US show
of force is welcome when South Yemen is attacking North Yemen,
but not when the Arab League is arranging a cease-fire.
Gulf leaders see three sources of danger to their regimes:
--Domestic political upheaval fueled by socio-religious
and in some cases economic issues.
--Radical or Palestinian subversion, externally supported
but using local sympathizers.
--Soviet-Cuban aggression, either direct, through local
client states, or through Soviet sponsored insurgencies.
The lesson of Iran to area leaders is that the US will not
intervene directly to save a regime threatened with internal
unrest, and that a strong US presence, in certain circumstances,
might actually weaken a regime's ability to manage internal
threats. The preferred US role in such situations might be
to provide the means to enable individual leaders to protect
themselves.
A significant US military presence is seen as useful only
as a deterrent to Soviet/Cuban aggression. Even then, it is
not the presence per se that is important to Gulf leaders,
but the symbolism. A US military presence presumably conveys
to Moscow US preparedness to react strongly to Soviet adven-
turism in the area. Persian Gulf leaders would have no objec-
tion if such a message could be effectively conveyed to Moscow
by means other than the stationing of US forces in the region.
They would, in fact, prefer that course because it would relieve
radical Arab pressures on US friends in the area and avoid the
risk of stimulating a military response from the USSR.
-2-
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;;t~sr,ntcnt
'nter
Indian Ocean Arms Control:
Attitudes of Littoral States
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Center
Indian Ocean Arms Control:
Attitudes of Littoral States (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 29 May 1979.
directed to the authors,
the Office of Strategic Research and the National
Intelligence Officer for Conventional Forces.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be
nternational Issues Division, Office of
Political Analysis. The paper was coordinated with
Secret
PA 79-10268
June 1979
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0
Indian Ocean Arms Control:
Attitudes of Littoral States (u)
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Key Judgments The littoral states that are pro-Western welcome a continued US military
presence in the Indian Ocean to the extent necessary to balance Soviet
forces. Some of them might view with concern a US decision to resume the
US-Soviet bilateral talks on the Indian Ocean that have been suspended
since February 1978 as a sign of Washington's unwillingness to play a role in
the region, but few would desire a major or conspicuous buildup of US forces
Although the radical regimes all oppose a US military presence, some of
them (for example, Ethiopia and South Yemen) are more sanguine about
Soviet military activity in the region than others (for example, Madagas-
Because the littoral states resent their exclusion from the US-Soviet
negotiations, they will probably continue to criticize the talks even if they
Most littoral states would publicly applaud a US-Soviet agreement only if it
committed the superpowers to a significant reduction and eventual exclusion
of their forces from the Indian Ocean and accepted the littoral states'
participation in regional arms control. Their private reactions would depend
on whether they felt the pace and balance of any reductions posed security
problems vis-a-vis either one of the superpowers or some potential regional
adversary (for example, Pakistan's concerns about India). Although virtually all littoral states voice support for an Indian Ocean "zone
of peace," they differ over its meaning:
? They agree that the military presence of great powers should eventually be
excluded from the Indian Ocean but disagree on the definition of military
activity, the limits of the zone, and the timing of great power withdrawal.
? There is more serious disagreement over the extent to which the littoral
states should restrict their own military activity-in particular, whether to
maintain local balances of forces and whether to establish a regional
collective security system and code of conduct.
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? The littoral states agree that the great powers' nuclear weapons should be
excluded from the, Indian Ocean but disagree on whether a zone of peace
should include a renunciation of nuclear weapons by the littoral states
themselves.
more specific than previous documents on the subject.
Harmonization of the views of littoral states at the first formal United
Nations meeting of littoral and hinterland states on this subject on 2-13 July
will be difficult. The meeting, in New York, is expected to produce a
program of action to implement a zone of peace, but it will probably be little
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The Strategic Setting
The Diplomatic Setting 2
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Diplomacy of the Zone of Peace Concept 11
The Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States 13
Aftlh~
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Secret
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For several reasons, the Indian Ocean littoral states
will probably express their views on arms control in
their region more forcefully during the coming months
than before. Already discontented with the lack of
progress in the US-Soviet negotiations on the Indian
Ocean, their interest in the superpowers' intentions in
the area has been heightened by the Iranian revolution,
conflict in the Yemens, and the recent deployment of
US and Soviet carrier task forces. Meanwhile, multi-
lateral diplomacy aimed at establishing an Indian
Ocean zone of peace is accelerating. Preparations are
now under way for the meeting of littoral and
hinterland states on this subject in July.
This assessment examines the littoral states' positions,
both public and private, on Indian Ocean arms control,
as well as the diplomatic and strategic factors that
underlie them. It discusses how these states would
respond to possible future developments in the US-
Soviet negotiations and how they view key issues in
those talks. It also analyzes the different ways the
littoral states define a zone of peace and the extent to
which they will be able to agree on a common program
for security in the Indian Ocean.
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 The Issues
Arms control in the Indian Ocean presently involves
two general objectives:
Indian Ocean Arms Control:
Attitudes of Littoral States (u)
? A negotiated limitation of the US and Soviet
military presence.
? Establishment by the regional states of a zone of
peace. (u)
The US-Soviet negotiations on the Indian Ocean have
addressed such specific issues as the level of naval
forces, the admissibility of strategic forces and land
based strike aircraft, base construction, port calls, and
transits. The zone of peace is an umbrella concept to
which different states have attached different mean-
ings, including not just removal of the superpower
presence but also exclusion of nuclear weapons from
the Indian Ocean or an assurance that they will not be
used there, stabilization of military balances among
states within the region, and "collective security" or
other cooperative arrangements.
1 -1
A variety of motivations shape the attitudes of littoral
states toward Indian Ocean arms control because the
subject involves so many specific issues and because,
for most of these states, it is secondary to other security
concerns.' Their views reflect their interests in local
conflicts and rivalries around the rim of the ocean
more than it does any thinking about the region as a
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The Strategic Setting
Over the last decade or so, there has been a gradual
buildup of the Soviet and US military presence in the
Indian Ocean. The levels and patterns of these
deployments reflect the different interests of each
superpower. The United States seeks to secure West-
' Throughout this assessment, the term "littoral states" includes all
states, whether island or mainland, bordering the Indian Ocean and
its gulfs. (u)
0
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ern access to Middle Eastern oil supplies, to maintain
economic and political stability, and to counter Soviet
activities in the area. It maintains a permanent naval
presence in the Indian Ocean composed of three ships
based in Bahrain and a naval support base on Diego
Garcia, from which a detachment of maritime patrol
aircraft operates. In addition, the United States has
deployed task forces of four or five ships each to the
Indian Ocean about three times a year. Normally, one
of these task forces has been headed by a carrier and
the other two by cruisers, with each one remaining in
the area for six to eight weeks. Since November 1978,
the US task force presence has been continuous, with
six to 14 ships on station.
The Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean is designed to
enhance the USSR's image as a global power, to
ensure a Soviet voice in regional political affairs, and to
provide support to friendly regional states. While this
presence has increased substantially during local
crises, it has now stabilized at about 18 to 21 ships,
two-thirds of these being auxiliaries. Since they first
became active in the Indian Ocean in 1968, the Soviets
have sought access to naval facilities in several littoral
states. They currently have some access in Ethiopia
and South Yemen, and they call periodically for
replenishments in Mozambique, Iraq, the Seychelles,
Mauritius, and other regional states. However, the
Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron continues to rely
primarily on its own auxiliaries for logistic support,
and much of the squadron's time is spent in sheltered
anchorages in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
France, India, Australia, and South Africa maintain
the other significant naval forces in the area. France
usually has the largest military presence of any
nonregional power and has the use of naval and air
facilities in Djibouti as well as in its own territory of
Reunion. Although the United Kingdom does not
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maintain a permanent naval force in the Indian Ocean,
it does occasionally make modest deployments. Iran,
since the Islamic revolution and subsequent reduction
of Iranian military capabilities, can no longer be
considered as even a potentially significant Indian
25X1 Ocean power for the immediate future.
The Diplomatic Setting
Efforts to exclude the military forces of major powers
from the Indian Ocean are rooted in the anticolonialist
sentiment among states of the region and the belief of
nonaligned nations generally that "when elephants
fight, the grass suffers." The earliest formal declara-
tions concerning an Indian Ocean zone of peace
emanated from the nonaligned movement, particularly
its 1970 Lusaka summit. In 1971, the General
Assembly of the United Nations passed the first of
several resolutions endorsing the concept and the
Soviets first showed interest in making a joint declara-
tion on arms restraint in the region, although they did
not pursue it. US-Soviet negotiations, proposed by the
United States, began in July 1977, and in December of
the same year the General Assembly decided to
convene a meeting of littoral and hinterland states as
the next step toward an eventual conference on the
Indian Ocean. Preparations for the meeting have
already begun in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian
Ocean.
The littoral states and other nonaligned governments
have become increasingly critical of the bilateral talks
on two counts. First, the talks seemed too limited in
scope to meet the objective of a zone of peace. Second,
even with the modest objectives of the talks, there was
an apparent lack of progress. The declaration of the
nonaligned foreign ministers' meeting in July 1978
sounded both of these themes, and the Indian Ocean
has been placed on the agenda for the nonaligned
summit meeting to be held in Havana this September.
In the face of this criticism, the USSR has increasingly
distanced itself from the United States on this issue,
publicly blaming Washington for the lack of progress
and voting in favor of the last two Indian Ocean zone of
peace resolutions in the General Assembly, while the
United States continued to abstain.
Recent events, some of which were spawned by the
Iranian revolution, have bolstered the commitment of
many of the littoral states to a zone of peace. The
deployment of a US carrier task force to the region
heightened anticolonialist sensitivities, and the disinte-
gration of CENTO was interpreted by some as demon-
strating the ineffectiveness of military ties to a
Western power. The USSR's sending of its first carrier
task force to the Indian Ocean, its logistical support for
South Yemen, and its continued involvement in the
Horn of Africa reinforce concerns over Moscow's
intentions in the area.
Responses to US-Soviet Negotiations
The littoral states generally applaud the objective of
the US-Soviet bilateral talks on the Indian Ocean.
Nonetheless, because of the limited scope of, and
participation in, the talks, the littoral states'
criticism-and agitation on Indian Ocean arms control
generally-will probably continue even if the talks
resume and begin to show results.
The public attitudes of many littoral states toward the
bilateral talks differ from their privately held views.
Consequently, a state might change its public posture
not because it had reevaluated the necessity for certain
arms control measures but rather because it found the
posture difficult to maintain as the overall tone of the
debate on the Indian Ocean shifted. The degree and
direction of any such change in public positions in
response to developments in the bilaterals are, how-
ever, highly dependent on other events.
Some littoral states would take a termination of the
talks by the United States as a cue to stiffen their
demands against the superpowers. Others would see
formal termination as little different from the present
suspension of the talks, while still others might become
more discouraged about arms control in the Indian
Ocean and hence less inclined to push for it. On
balance, the rhetoric of the littoral states on the subject
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C0
would probably become somewhat more critical of the
United States but otherwise would undergo little
change. Private views, particularly those held by
moderate governments, would depend on the circum-
stances accompanying termination of the talks. These
governments would be displeased by the setback to
arms control in the region and by the prospect that it
would become more difficult to keep the radical
regimes in the area from taking even more extreme
positions. If US termination of the talks followed a
further buildup of Soviet forces in the region, however,
most of them might view termination as justified. F_
Similar considerations would govern littoral state
responses to a resumption of negotiations. Resumption
would dampen criticism of the superpowers only
slightly and would not derail efforts to involve the
regional states more directly in Indian Ocean arms
control. The moderate littoral states would welcome
resumption per se, but they would look for signs-
particularly in the naval activity of the two super-
powers-that the United States was becoming unwill-
ing to counter the Soviet presence in the region.
Although virtually all littoral states would acknowl-
edge a US-Soviet agreement as a positive step, the
extent of public enthusiasm would chiefly depend on
whether the agreement:
? Committed the superpowers to future reduction and
eventual elimination of their military presence in the
Indian Ocean, rather than merely a freeze in the level
of forces.
? Accepted the littoral states' participation in regional
arms control, preferably by accepting the concept of a
zone of peace and the need for an Indian Ocean
conference in the near future.
Private opinion on a US-Soviet bilateral accord would
depend more heavily on the balance of forces that
would remain under the agreement. Pro-Western
states like Kenya, Saudi Arabia, or the countries
belonging to the Association of South-East Asian
Nations z (ASEAN) want to see a US presence at least
sufficient to offset Soviet forces, while pro-Soviet
states like Mozambique, Iraq, or South Yemen take
the opposite view. The littoral states would interpret
the settlement of such currently outstanding, issues as
the definition of military presence and the status of
naval auxiliaries in this context.
There are several other outstanding issues in the
bilateral talks in which littoral states would have a
special interest, either because the issues involve
possible military activity on the territories of the
littoral states or because they have been specifically
mentioned in multilateral diplomacy on the Indian
Ocean:
? Utilization offacilities. The US position on this
issue-that utilization of a port beyond routine port
calls should be defined and limited-would probably
enjoy broad support. Many littoral states permit port
calls by foreign warships, garnering revenue in the
process, but deny base rights. These states would
welcome a restriction on permanent or exclusive use of
facilities because it would restrict the options of hostile
neighbors and make it easier for themselves to resist
pressures from major powers to grant base rights.
? Diego Garcia. Although some littoral states have
approved of the US base, at least privately, it has
become such a familiar symbol of the superpower
presence in the Indian Ocean that continued construc-
tion there would likely draw strong criticism.
? Land-based strike aircraft. Littoral states have
divided interests on this issue, which has not been
extensively discussed in the bilateral talks. Some pro-
Western countries, particularly Australia and Saudi
Arabia, would oppose restrictions that would prevent
US aircraft from defending their territories. They
would view any limit on deployment of the super-
powers' strike aircraft as working to the disadvantage
of the West, since the Soviets would be more apt to
circumvent the restrictions by using Cubans or other
surrogates. Conversely, left-leaning states that see US
aircraft as a potential threat would tend to support
restrictions.
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? Ballistic missile submarines. As evidenced by the
1971 UN zone of peace resolution, littoral states
generally agree that the superpowers' nuclear weapons
should be excluded from the Indian Ocean. This
implies their support for an explicit ban-favored by
the USSR and opposed by the United States-on
missile-carrying submarines. Because they probably
believe that the missiles' targets lie outside the Indian
Ocean region, however, a ban on submarines might not
be of major concern to them. These weapons, which are
out of sight, could be kept largely out of mind.C
Security Concerns of Littoral States
0
Southeast Asia
The security concerns of the ASEAN countries center on
Indochina and on Vietnamese intentions in the wake of
the invasion of Kampuchea. They certainly support the
idea of zones of peace, but they are less interested in
the entire Indian Ocean than in their own proposal for
a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in
Southeast Asia. They have supported the US-Soviet
talks and criticized the military deployments of both
superpowers. They privately admit, however, their
concern over any US retrenchment that would give the
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USSR a freer hand in the region. A resumption of the
talks and conclusion of a bilateral agreement might
worry the ASEAN countries, not so much because of the
specific naval limitations involved but because it would
seem to signal a decreased US willingness to act in the
region.
Indonesia likes to call attention to its archipelagic
geography as a reason for having a special interest in
naval arms control. Indeed, it has been quite active in
the Ad Hoc Committee, calling for an international
conference on a zone of peace and suggesting that the
committee draft a treaty on the subject. Despite this
activity, however, its maritime and security interests
lie more to the north and east, and it would be
relatively unperturbed if an Indian Ocean zone of
peace were not established. Although Indonesia has
publicly criticized the US base at Diego Garcia, it is
more concerned about Soviet military activity. It feels
reassured by a nearby US presence and has quietly
facilitated transit through its waters of US warships
while rejecting Soviet requests for naval port calls.
Malaysia has also been active in the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee and may enjoy playing the same kind of leading
role in establishing an Indian Ocean zone of peace that
it did in writing the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration
on ZOPFAN. It criticized the US construction at Diego
Garcia, but mainly because it feared that the base
would stimulate additional Soviet deployments to the
Indian Ocean. Malaysia recently denied landing clear-
ance for flights of KC-135 air tankers on their way to
Diego Garcia, citing pressures from within the
nonaligned and Islamic movements as the reason.
Nevertheless, with the increased Soviet presence in
Vietnam having heightened what was already a strong
Malaysian concern over Moscow's intentions, Kuala
Lumpur should continue to welcome privately an
offsetting US presence in the Indian Ocean.
Of all the ASEAN states, Singapore has been the most
accommodating to visits by foreign warships and
aircraft. US military operations in the Indian Ocean-
including flights by P-3 reconnaissance aircraft, supply
flights to Diego Garcia, and naval patrols-make use
of Singaporean airspace or port facilities. The Soviet
Navy has also used Singapore for repair and replenish-
ment. As a militarily vulnerable but economically
robust city-state, Singapore is, in comparison with its
neighbors, less interested in excluding outside powers
from the region and more interested in controlling
arms races among the states within it. Accordingly,
Singapore is less partial toward an Indian Ocean zone
of peace, and more openly supportive of a US military
presence, than the other ASEAN countries. It will not,
however, allow its diplomatic posture to diverge much
from those of Indonesia and Malaysia.
Thailand has historically bent with the changing winds
in its region in order to protect itself from stronger
states, and it has been doing so during the past decade
on Indian Ocean issues. In 1971,
1-1 Bangkok
abstained on the irst UN General Assembly resolu-
tion concerning an Indian Ocean zone of peace.
hailand became
less willing to support American activity in the region
Jublicly, although most Thai officials were still pri-
vately supportive. Bangkok continues to share its
ASEAN colleagues' desire to keep the Soviets at bay. It
thus welcomes a US military presence in the region
and, like Indonesia, has rejected Soviet port call
requests.
The other Southeast Asian littoral state, besides the
ASEAN countries, is obsessively neutral Burma, which
will support any measure designed to rid the area of the
superpowers' presence. Its principal concern in zone of
peace diplomacy is to avoid antagonizing either India
or China. The issue of denuclearization of South
Asia-an element in some conceptions of a zone of
peace-has already given Burma difficulty in this
regard, since support for denuclearization would be a
slap at India while failure to support it could be seen as
an indirect slight of China. Such dilemmas will
reinforce the Burmese tendency toward diplomatic
passivity when the zone of peace is discussed in detail.
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South Asia
The security concerns of South Asian littoral states-
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh-are
exceedingly complex, reflecting not only the Indo-
Pakistani dispute but also the influence of great power
rivalries. The South Asian littoral states-especially
India and Sri Lanka-were the leading proponents of
an Indian Ocean zone of peace, but from the outset
there were differences-reflecting intraregional con-
flict-in interpretation of, and support for, the
concept. All of the littoral states have supported the
US-Soviet Indian Ocean naval arms limitation talks
and have criticized the military presence of both
superpowers in the area, including the US facility at
Diego Garcia. Nonetheless, because of their limited
military capabilities relative to India, the other states
look to the outside powers, including the United States
and China, to check what they regard as India's
hegemonial aspirations
India perceives itself as a regional power, whose proper
role in the region has been stinted by the presence of
outside forces. As a result, it has traditionally been the
most active advocate of an Indian Ocean zone of peace
and has vociferously supported efforts by the super-
powers to negotiate a reduction of their military
presence in the Indian Ocean. Although India's armed
forces are by far the largest in the area and it enjoys
basic military security, New Delhi regards the naval
presence of the outside powers as a continuing chal-
lenge to its regional leadership.
absence of a US-Soviet agreement on arms restraint in
the region. Since Mararji Desai took office in March
1977, however, New Delhi has taken a more balanced
view on the relative merits of the Soviet and US
positions, and no longer exempts the USSR from its
criticism. Its policy now is to encourage the Soviets and
the United States to resume their negotiations as a first
step toward the complete neutralization of the area.
India is likely to support, at least for the near term,
force stabilization measures proposed by the super-
powers, but its long-term goal is still the complete
elimination of outside military forces from the region.
Indian Ocean and to blame the United States for the negotiations.
Pakistan's views toward an Indian Ocean zone of
peace and toward the presence of the outside powers in
the area are shaped by its relations with India. It
believes that militarily dominant India will be the main
beneficiary if naval forces of outside powers are
excluded from the region. Consequently, Islamabad
has consistently advocated a zone of peace formula
that requires not only the elimination or reduction of
the military presence of outside powers but also the
establishment of "reasonable ratios" between the
military and naval forces of the major littoral states.
Pakistan will urge that the July meeting's final
document incorporate this security formula.
Pakistan believes that the radical coup in Afghanistan
in April 1978, the continuing turmoil in Iran, and the
recent fighting between North and South Yemen are
the result of either direct or indirect machinations by
India's Soviet ally. This conviction has heightened
Islamabad's insecurity and reinforced its sense of
encirclement. Pakistani officials are convinced that
these developments have increased their political and
military vulnerability and reflect growing Soviet and,
by association, Indian influence in the area. In view of
these circumstances, Pakistan would obviously prefer
that the Soviets reduce their presence in the region.
Just as clearly, however, it does not wish the United
States unilaterally to reduce its presence. Moreover,
Pakistan's own tendencies are to some extent rein-
forced by the views of its longtime supporter, China.
For these reasons, Pakistan has not actively encour-
aged the bilateral talks either publicly or privately
The pro-Soviet tilt of former Prime Minister Indira since mid-1978, although, like other Indian Ocean
Gandhi led New Delhi to accept at face value the littoral states, it nominally continues to support both a
Soviets' claim that they had no military bases in the zone of peace proposal and the US-Soviet bilateral
5X1
In recent years, Bangladesh's position on an Indian
Ocean zone of peace has become ambivalent. The
current leadership in Dacca came to power in 1975
following a series of coups with some anti-Indian and
anti-Soviet overtones. Although relations have im-
proved considerably since 1975, Bangladesh continues
to be concerned about India's regional intentions and
has moved closer to the Pakistani position on a zone of
peace formula, a shift that has been evident in several
multilateral forums. Bangladesh's improving relations
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with China and its recent moves to acquire arms from
the West, China, and Saudi Arabia is another sign of
Dacca's desire to reduce its political and military
reliance on India and the Soviet Union and to expand
its relations with outside powers.
Sri Lanka was more responsible than any other state
for generating early support among the nonaligned
countries for an Indian Ocean zone of peace. But
President Junius R. Jayewardene, who took office in
July 1977, has been less active in the nonaligned
movement and more concerned over India's intentions
in the region than was his predecessor, and members of
Sri Lanka's foreign policymaking elite apparently
share this concern. While they publicly continue to
support an Indian Ocean zone of peace and to favor
demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, they are equally
concerned over the political-military vacuum, favoring
India, that they believe would be created by a total US-
Soviet naval withdrawal. Over the past year, therefore,
Sri Lanka's officials have been privately expressing
their hope that the US-Soviet Indian Ocean negotia-
tions, if resumed, will not lead to such a withdrawal.
Middle East
Most of the Middle Eastern countries have consistently
supported the Indian Ocean zone of peace proposal in
the United Nations but have not taken a stand on the
US-Soviet naval arms limitations talks. Even those
most concerned with the presence of foreign powers in
the region have only a general familiarity with the
issues involved in the US-Soviet bilateral negotiations
and consequently have yet to assess the potential
impact on their security. Nevertheless, the recent
unsettling events in the region have heightened their
security concerns and probably will cause them, in the
coming months, to focus more attention on the
superpower military presence in the area and on arms
control initiatives in the Indian Ocean.
Iran's revolutionary regime is scrapping the pro-
Western approach of the Shah's government toward
most regional and international issues and has dis-
avowed any intention to serve as policeman of the
Persian Gulf. In any case, the revolution has drasti-
cally eroded the country's military capabilities. Iran's
current anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric and
its withdrawal from the Central Treaty Organization
(cENTO) demonstrate its shift toward nonalignment in
foreign policy. Tehran has made it apparent that it will
deny the use of its naval and air facilities to both
superpowers for military or related purposes. Although
it is difficult to forecast Iran's future positions on
regional security issues, its emerging nationalism and
fears of foreign manipulation suggest that Iran will
actively support initiatives favoring reduction and
elimination of both US and Soviet military presence in
the region.
Saudi Arabia, with its huge petroleum reserves, is
strategically the most important state on the Arabian
Peninsula. In the past, Riyadh has had a close
relationship with the United States and has counted on
US support to help guarantee its security. Saudi views
on regional security issues, with the exception of the
Arab-Israeli dispute, have generally been similar to
those of the United States. Saudi Arabia is concerned
over Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of
Africa and South Yemen. It views recent developments
in Afghanistan and Iran and the border war between
North and South Yemen as the result of Soviet
machinations and as threats to its security.
The smaller states on the Persian Gulf-Kuwait,
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab
Emirates-have essentially pro-Western foreign poli-
cies and have never been active participants in the
Indian Ocean zone of peace diplomacy. The Iranian
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revolution and its unsettling effects on the region have
exposed the vulnerabilities of these states to foreign-
inspired subversion and have spurred increased coordi-
nation among them. They share the Saudi concern over
what they view as Soviet encirclement of the Arabian
Peninsula. Similarly, they privately encourage greater
US efforts to counter Soviet advances in the region but
generally oppose any enlargement of the US presence
that could stimulate additional great power rivalry.
These states-except for Oman-publicly support
nonaligned themes to escape criticism from Arab
leftists. They probably will remain passive on naval
arms control issues while voicing support for the Indian
Ocean zone of peace in multilateral forums. Oman,
however, may support the United States more openly;
it welcomed the recent US naval deployments in the
Indian Ocean because it feels severely threatened by
25X1 Soviet-backed South Yemen.
Since 1971, Egypt, Sudan, and North Yemen have
steered their foreign policies more toward the West.
They are wary of Soviet and Cuban activities in the
Horn of Africa and South Yemen and are apprehen-
sive about a possible Soviet foothold in the Arabian
Peninsula. All three countries have encouraged US
efforts to counter Soviet-supported subversion in
North Yemen. At the same time, however, these states
are leery of the establishment of a conspicuous US
military presence in the area. So far, they have
refrained from commenting on the US-Soviet
bilaterals, although both Egypt and North Yemen
have been active in zone of peace diplomacy. Given
their heightened distrust of the Soviet Union, they may
not welcome the resumption of the US-Soviet talks if
this were seen as possibly leading toward significant
constraints on the ability of the United States to act
decisively in the Indian Ocean.
Israel favors an increased US military presence in the
Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area and is thus likely to
offer the United States the use of its own naval
facilities, including Eilat as a frequent port of call.
While the Israelis did not openly oppose the US arms
shipments to North Yemen during the recent fighting
with the South, they are apprehensive about the
possibility of these weapons being used against them in
the future. Nevertheless, they probably welcomed the
move, if only as a sign of renewed US determination to
check Soviet-backed aggression in the area. Israel
wishes to be more active in the Indian Ocean zone of
peace diplomacy and has shown an interest in attend-
ing the meeting of littoral and hinterland states in July.
The frigid attitudes toward Israel in the United
Nations have, however, resulted in its exclusion from
the meeting.
Iraq is profoundly suspicious of the United States and,
within the UN framework, led the opposition to the
recent US naval deployments to the Indian Ocean. At
the March session of the Ad Hoc Committee, Iraq
unsuccessfully sought to convene a ministerial-level
emergency meeting of regional states to discuss the
"deteriorating situation" in the Indian Ocean area.
Iraq tolerates a Soviet military presence in the Persian
Gulf-Indian Ocean region as a balance to US support
of Israel and conservative Arab states. It has permitted
the Soviet Navy to use the Iraqi naval base at Umm
Qasr, which was constructed with Soviet assistance.
Despite its leaning toward Moscow, which furnishes
the bulk of its weapons, Iraq remains intensely
nationalistic and is sensitive to being labeled a Soviet
client. At the July meeting, it probably will take the
lead in pushing for a program of action that empha-
sizes the elimination of all great power military
presence from the Indian Ocean.
South Yemen's relations with the West in general and
the United States in particular are poor. Since 1969,
South Yemen-strategically located at the exit of the
Red Sea-has been closely aligned with the Soviet
Union and has actively opposed US military presence
in the area. Since they were expelled from Somalia in
late 1977, the Soviets have shown greater interest in
South Yemen, apparently hoping to acquire a secure
base of operations for their Indian Ocean fleet as a
replacement for the facilities in Berbera, Somalia. This
increased interest was underscored by a visit to Aden,
in August 1978, of the commander of the Soviet Indian
Ocean Squadron. Soviet maritime reconnaissance
flights operate out of the Aden airfield, and the Soviets
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0
4
have installed a naval communication station nearby.
Moscow reportedly has exerted considerable pressure
on South Yemen formally to grant unlimited access to
its air and naval facilities. Despite Aden's Marxist bent
and desire to accommodate most Soviet requests,
however, it does not appear to have done so in this
regard.
At the July meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, Aden's
position probably will resemble Iraq's. Because of its
arrangements with the Soviet Union, however, it will
be less likely to endorse specific measures for imple-
menting the zone of peace concept. Outside the UN
framework, South Yemen will continue to back the
Soviet line in criticizing the US naval facility at Diego
Garcia and blaming the United States for lack of
progress in the US-Soviet bilateral negotiations.
Ethiopia on the defensive in discussions of a zone of
peace, but it is unlikely to deter it from joining in
denunciations of foreign bases in the Indian Ocean
region. It will probably deny it has granted exclusive
base rights to anybody, just as Somalia denied there
was a Soviet base at Berbera.
Somalia's dispute with Ethiopia has already spilled
over into deliberations on the Indian Ocean in the form
of a fierce contest for one of the vice-chairmanships of
the Ad Hoc Committee. The conflict over the Ogaden
will continue to shape Mogadiscio's views on the
subject. As long as the USSR remains the friend and
backer of its chief enemy, Somalia will oppose an
extension, or even a continuation, of the Soviet military
presence in the area. It welcomes port calls by US
arships and would be reassured by a nearby US naval
presence. Somalia, however, does not seek a permanent
Africa
The security concerns of East African states have
focused on the armed conflicts in the Horn, Uganda,
and southern Africa. Their opinions on arms control in
the Indian Ocean, and on superpower military activity
there, are strongly influenced by their special interests
in these disputes. At the same time, these states include
some of the most vocal members of the nonaligned
movement, whose rhetoric in support of a zone of peace
will partially mask specific differences growing out of
the conflicts on the African continent.
Ethiopia's preoccupation with warfare in the Ogaden
and Eritrea overshadows any interest it has in Indian
Ocean arms control. The Mengistu regime's heavy
dependence on Soviet and Cuban assistance to combat
the separatist movements in those regions, coupled
with its own Marxist persuasion, will lead it to adhere
to the Soviet line in criticizing US military activity in
the region and blaming Washington alone for lack of
progress in the US-Soviet bilateral talks. This
dependence also implies its continued acceptance of
the largest foreign military presence in East Africa,
which includes Soviet advisers and Cuban ground
troops as well as increasing Soviet naval activity along
the coast. Despite reports that Ethiopia has granted the
USSR exclusive rights to a naval facility to be built
north of Assab, Moscow probably intends to rely
instead on the limited facilities now under construction
on Dahlak Island. The Soviet presence could put
Western military presence on its territory, only weap-
ons and diplomatic support. Having received no lasting
return from the earlier Soviet presence, Somalia now
firmly supports the dismantling of foreign bases and
the withdrawal of foreign troops from the entire Indian
Ocean region.
Sandwiched between feuding neighbors, subject to
ethnic division, and a target of Soviet desires to gain a
foothold on the western shore of the strait of Bab al
Mandab, Djibouti sees the French forces on its
territory as crucial to its continued independence.
France now has 4,500 troops and a naval force based
there. Djibouti will probably maintain a low profile in
discussions of a zone of peace and will consider any
embarrassment caused by the French presence as a
small price to pay for its security.
Kenya takes several seemingly disparate approaches
toward its security and toward arms control in the
Indian Ocean. Its foreign ministry, which frequently
appears to be out of step with the rest of the
government, strongly espouses an Indian Ocean zone
of peace in the United Nations and opposes foreign
military bases in the area. At the same time, the
Kenyan leadership welcomes a continued US presence
in the Indian Ocean to balance Soviet naval activity. It
also permits ships of the US Navy to use Mombasa
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113ecause it
perceives Somalia to have designs on the Somali-
inhabited portions of Kenya, Nairobi is allied with
radical Ethiopia in joint efforts to contain Somali
expansionism. Nevertheless, Kenya will probably con-
tinue to look to the United States for its overall
security, especially since Tanzania's successful opera-
tion in Uganda intensified Kenya's fear of encircle-
ment by various self-styled socialist regimes. F___1
Tanzania is the most vocal African supporter of an
Indian Ocean zone of peace and will probably continue
to be so despite its preoccupation with the armed
conflicts in southern Africa and, more recently,
Uganda. This activism reflects both President
Nyerere's leadership in Third World diplomacy and
his genuine desire to see the military forces of both
superpowers vacate the region. Related to this desire
has been an increase in Tanzania's own military
activity in the region, such as the Uganda operation
and the dispatch of a small contingent of troops to the
Seychelles in April of this year.
Tanzania's perception of where the superpowers stand
on issues in southern Africa colors its statements on
US and Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean.
In the past, Dar es Salaam has privately justified its
one-sided criticism of US activity in the Indian Ocean
by observing that the Soviets have a more favorable
southern Africa policy and seem to be less resistant to
the concept of a zone of peace in the area. Such
perceptions will continue to influence Tanzania's
posture, but are unlikely to result in logistical support
to the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet.
Like Tanzania, Mozambique is a "Frontline State" in
the southern Africa conflict and voices strong support
for an Indian Ocean zone of peace (an objective
mentioned in the Mozambican constitution). It is
much more closely aligned with the USSR, however
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It has also opened the port of
Maputo to Soviet warships, although evidently without
granting base rights. The Machel government prefers a
Soviet naval predominance in the area, but its desire to
expand economic ties with the West may induce it to
restrain its criticism of US activity.[
South Africa will be excluded from the July meeting of
littoral and hinterland states, as it has been from the
Ad Hoc Committee. Despite its isolation, however, its
current emphasis on regional interdependence in
southern Africa could lead it to endorse an Indian
Ocean zone of peace. Because of reevaluations of the
threat it faces, Pretoria has oriented its navy toward
coastal defense and gives priority to the army and air
force. Moreover, there is little prospect-or desire on
South Africa's part-for reintroduction of a Western
military base like the formerly British naval facility at
Simonstown, Since South Africa needs the cooperation
of other states in order to make its regionally-oriented
foreign policy work, it is likely to support a zone of
peace even if the formula for such a zone is written in
its absence. Nevertheless, it still perceives the USSR as
the greatest threat and will tacitly favor a US naval
presence as long as Soviet forces are also in the area.
The Island States
Of all the littoral states, the island republics are the
most interested in Indian Ocean arms control. They
are not distracted by conflicts with adjacent states,
while they feel particularly vulnerable to hostile naval
activity, including seaborne mercenary attacks. All of
them ardently voice support for the concept of a zone of
peace, but their political persuasions vary widely, as
does their willingness to receive visits of foreign
warships.
So far, agitation in the island states in support of a
demilitarized Indian Ocean has mostly been the work
of the political leftwing. A "Conference of Progressive
Parties and Forces of the Southwest Indian Ocean,"
promoted by the opposition Mauritian Militant Move-
ment and held in the Seychelles in April 1978, issued a
zone of peace declaration that contained several anti-
Western demands, including the dismantlement of the
US-British base at Diego Garcia, the withdrawal of
French troops from Reunion, and the dissolution of
CENTO. The declaration gave general approval to the
US-Soviet bilateral negotiations but criticized any
effort to link the talks to other military problems-an
apparent reference to the US decision to suspend the
talks partly because of events in the Horn of Africa.
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Madagascar, the largest and most left-leaning of the
island states, has recently sharply criticized US naval
activity in the Indian Ocean. President Didier
Ratsiraka is suspicious of both superpowers, however,
and he has generally practiced what he has preached
regarding the exclusion of all military forces from the
region. He uses a Soviet transport aircraft with Soviet
pilots, and he welcomes, as a deterrent to foreign
overflights, the four North Korean MIG-17s with their
crews that were "loaned" to Madagascar last year and
are still there. There has, however, been no other
permanent foreign military presence on the island
since France vacated Diego Suarez in 1975. Even port
calls by foreign warships are no longer welcome.
Despite the attractiveness of Diego Suarez to foreign
navies, Ratsiraka is unlikely to depart from his policy
of denying base rights. He will try to persuade the
other island and littoral states to support his concep-
tion of a zone of peace, which includes a system of
"collective security" without military alliances. This
system is not clearly defined, but one apparent
manifestation of it was the recent participation of a
Malagasy detachment in a joint military
"exercise"with the Seychelles.
The Government of the Seychelles is almost as critical
of US naval activity in the Indian Ocean as Madagas-
car and also publicly opposes the permanent stationing
of foreign forces on its territory. Socialist President
Albert Rene recently wrote to President Carter to
protest the possible establishment of a new US naval
force based at Diego Garcia.
Western-oriented Mauritius favors an Indian Ocean
zone of peace as a long-term goal, but considers it
unrealistic for the time being. It is suspicious of Soviet
intentions in the region and would like the United
States to stay there as long as the Soviets do. Mauritius
has indicated its desire for more visits by US warships
to Port Louis-which it has kept open to all-to
balance the frequent Soviet port calls. The status of
Diego Garcia, which was detached from Mauritius
prior to the latter's independence, might cause friction
with the West. Agitation on this issue, however, has
been largely confined to the opposition, which has little
prospect of supplanting the Labor government of
Prime Minister Ramgoolam in the near future.
Strategically, the Comoros are the least significant of
the island states. The regime of President Ahmed
Abdallah is economically dependent on the West and is
unlikely to be active in zone of peace diplomacy.
However, because of its dubious birthright-having
come to power through a white mercenary coup-
Abdallah's government may join in criticism of the US
use of Diego Garcia in an effort to establish its
legitimacy with African and other nearby states.
President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom of the Maldives
strongly supports demilitarization of the Indian Ocean.
He is unlikely, despite Soviet overtures, to lease the
naval and air facilities on Gan Island that were vacated
by the British in 1976. To do so would be inconsistent
with his view of nonalignment. He will take his cues on
Indian Ocean issues from the moderate Islamic states,
with which he has tried to align his foreign policy.
0
Union delivered a small shipment of arms to ene s
government last December, but no Soviet advisers
were sent. The Seychelles allows visits by the ships and
aircraft of both superpowers, with American ships
being more popular among the Seychellois because
their crews spend more money. Although Rene has
threatened to deny the use of Victoria port to any
power that increases its forces in the Indian Ocean, the
economic motive will probably deter him from closing
the port.
Diplomacy of the Zone of Peace Concept
Zones of Peace as a Multilateral Issue
The concept of an Indian Ocean zone of peace is not
only an approach to arms control in one region, but also
an element in the general demand for greater progress
in disarmament that the less developed countries have
collectively made on the developed world. Proposals for
zones of peace are favorite vehicles for pressing this
demand because they also assert the independence of
the developing countries from powers that have stron-
ger and farther-reaching military forces than their
own.
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Of all the regions for which such zones have been
proposed, the Indian Ocean currently appears to be the
strongest candidate. Malta's idea of a Mediterranean
zone of peace seems unrealistic because the sea adjoins
both NATO's territory and critical areas of the Middle
East. A Southeast Asian zone of peace is a less remote
goal, but the distrust between ASEAN and Vietnam-
heightened by the latter's invasion of Kampuchea-
will make it difficult for them to reconcile their
competing formulas for such a zone. The Indian Ocean
is also the only area of the Third World where the
superpowers have attempted to negotiate limits to their
military activity. The resentment of most countries in
the region over being excluded from this effort has
made them particularly anxious to establish their
claim to participation by promoting a zone of peace.
This wider, symbolic role of an Indian Ocean zone of
peace has several implications:
? The Indian Ocean zone of peace concept has broad
support among many developing countries, not just
those in the Indian Ocean region.
? The Indian Ocean littoral states, almost all of which
are developing countries, will try hard to show progress
toward a zone of peace-and hence progress in their
overall debate with the developed world-even if they
realize that an agreed formula for a zone of peace
would do little or nothing to strengthen their security
in the short term, and even if the US-Soviet negotia-
tions make headway.
? To show such progress, the littoral states will tend to
paper over the more specific security issues that divide
them.
? Confrontation, rather than cooperation, with the
superpowers will continue to be the dominant tone of
Indian Ocean zone of peace diplomacy.
There is general agreement about the responsibilities
of the great powers. The resolution establishes the
objectives of halting the expansion of their military
presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from it
all bases, military installations, logistical supply facili-
ties, and any other "manifestation of great power
military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the
context of great power rivalry." Nevertheless, there
are several unresolved issues.
A more serious issue concerns the geographical limits
of a zone of peace, which the 1971 resolution states are
"to be determined." Disagreement over the zone's
limits concerns chiefly the territories of littoral and
hinterland states. Somalia has called for the with-
drawal of all foreign troops from all states in the
region, but littoral states that play host to Soviet,
Cuban, or French military personnel naturally prefer a
more restrictive definition of the zone of peace. There
is also the question of islands under foreign control,
such as the French territory of Reunion. The "progres-
sive" parties' conference called for the withdrawal of
forces from Reunion, but others have raised the
possibility of omitting such islands from a zone of
Different Conceptions of a
Zone of Peace
The 1971 General Assembly resolution is the basis for
efforts to define an Indian Ocean zone of peace. This
document is only a framework, however; it does not
resolve several sharp differences among the littoral
states over what a zone of peace should mean.
peace.
A further issue concerning the responsibilities of the
great powers is timing. The 1971 resolution gives the
goal of withdrawing the great power military presence
but does not establish a timetable. Some states have
demanded immediate withdrawal, but the more mod-
erate and more common demand is for a freeze on
deployments followed by some sort of graduated
reduction of forces.
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There is even stronger disagreement over the extent to
which the littoral states should restrict their own
military activities. The disagreement is manifested in
the Pakistani proposal-and Indian rejection-of a
"reasonable ratio" of forces and in the issue of whether
to establish an Indian Ocean collective security system
and a regional code of conduct. The disagreement
stems from differences in military strength and the
concern of some littoral states about the military
intentions of countries excluded from the zone of peace
or deliberations on it (for example, the concerns of
ASEAN with Vietnam, India with China, the Arab
states with Israel, and the Frontline States with South
Africa).
Exclusion of nuclear weapons from the region could be
made a responsibility of either the great powers alone
or jointly with the littoral states. The littoral states
generally agree that the great powers' nuclear weapons
should be excluded from the Indian Ocean as part of
the withdrawal of their overall military presence,
which is the context in which the 1971 resolution
mentions nuclear weapons. Pakistan, however, has
argued that a zone of peace should also include a
binding renunciation of nuclear weapons by the littoral
states. Most other littoral states believe that nuclear
proliferation should be examined in a broader context
that includes the "vertical proliferation" of the super-
powers' weapons. These states would, therefore, prob-
ably oppose a formulation that placed a special
nonproliferation obligation on themselves.
Finally, there is the issue of a mechanism for monitor-
ing, review, or enforcement of a zone of peace. A
common view has not yet evolved on whether such a
mechanism is necessary and, if so, whether its creation
should await the great powers' full acceptance of an
Indian Ocean zone of peace.
The Meeting of Littoral
and Hinterland States
The states whose concerns were reviewed above will
dominate the July meeting in New York.' Most great
powers and major maritime users will be invited only
as speakers at the opening session of the meeting and as
observers thereafter. The decision to restrict their
participation reflects the opinion-espoused most
strongly by Madagascar and Tanzania-that the
Indian Ocean states should use the meeting to harmo-
nize their own views to enable them to bargain with the
great powers more effectively. Given the differences in
those views, harmonization will be difficult. The
document currently being prepared for the meeting is a
declaration that on many points-particularly those
pertaining to obligations of littoral states-will prob-
ably be little more specific than was the 1971 General
Assembly resolution. Some of these states, especially
Australia and India, would find such a result satisfac-
tory anyway, believing that the negotiation of specific
formulations should be deferred to an Indian Ocean
conference or to a time when all great powers are ready
to accept a zone of peace in the area. There may be
some pressure to set a date for such a conference,
perhaps as early as 1980, but both the disagreements
among the littoral states and the reservations of great
powers will encourage further delay
' The 48 participants will include 33 littoral states (Australia,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burma, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, North Yemen, Oman, Pakistan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Yemen,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, and the United Arab
Emirates), 11 most minor "hinterland" states (Afghanistan, Bhu-
tan, Botswana, Burundi, Lesotho, Malawi, Napal, Rwanda,
Swaziland, Uganda, and Zambia), and four other countries that are
members of the Ad Hoc Committee (China, Greece, Japan, and
Panama). China has no significant interest in using the Indian
Ocean itself, has denounced the US-Soviet talks as a "fraud," and
strongly supports the concept of a zone of peace in the area. Japan
supports both bilateral and multilateral approaches toward arms
control in the region. It would not want the US position in the area to
weaken appreciably relative to the USSR's, but given its dependence
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