KAMPUCHEA: FAMINE FIGHTING AND REFUGEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R001400080006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Secret
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Assessment
Center
Fighting, and Refugees
Kampuchea: Famine,
Secret
NI 79-10007
September 1979
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 National
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Assessment
Center
Kampuchea: Famine,
Fighting, and Refugees
Information available as of 31 August 1979 has been used
in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared in the office of the
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the
Pacific and was based on reports submitted by
analysts of the Office of Geographic and Cartographic
Research and the Office of Political Analysis,
National Foreign Assessment Center, and of the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State. Contributions were also received from
analysts in the National Security Agency. The
assessment was requested by the United States
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Ambassador-at-
Large Dick Clark. It was coordinated with the Office
of Economic Research, National Foreign Assess-
ment Center, and the National Intelligence Officers
for USSR-Eastern Europe and China.
Secret
NI 79-10007
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0s
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KEY JUDGMENTS V
DISCUSSION I
Status of Population
Population Size 1
Conditions in First Half of 1979 1
Population Distribution 2
Food Situation 2
Rice Production 2
Current Conditions 3
Prospects 3
Soviet Aid 3
Potential Refugee Trends 4
Political and Economic Trends 4
Heng Samrin/ Vietnamese Infrastructure 4
Heng Samrin/Vietnamese Reactions to Relief Efforts 4
The Vietnamese Military Presence: Fighting and Insecurity 5
The Military Situation 5
Prospects for Peace 6
Thai Attitudes and Policy 6
APPENDIX: Demographic Methodology
The Long Nol Regime, July 1970-April 1975 10
The Pol Pot Regime, April 1975-January 1979 10
Estimated Population Distribution 11
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National Foreign Assessment Center
THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE SITUATION: AN UPDATE
An Intelligence Assessment
This assessment was prepared in the office of the
National Intelligence Officer for China - East Asia and the
Pacific. Contributions were received from the Office of
Political Analysis and the Office of Geographic and Carto-
graphic Research, National Foreign Assessment Center. The
assessment was prepared at the request of the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, and was
coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and the
Office of Strategic Research in the National Foreign
Assessment Center and with the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research in the Department of State.
Secret
NI 79-10009
November 1979
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Vietnam has shown it can regulate the refugee flow
essentially according to its own dictates. The exodus of
boat refugees from Vietnam decreased dramatically following
strict governmental measures taken to moderate the outflow
after the Geneva refugee meetings in July.
Hanoi does not seem to be preparing to resume the
exodus. On the other hand, there is no evidence that Hanoi
has abandoned its basic decision to rid itself of unwanted
citizens, especially Chinese, and the flow of assisted
departures could resume at any time.
0
Vietnam's dry-season campaign and widespread food
shortages in Kampuchea have caused another mammoth refugee
influx into Thailand, the worst effects of which are probably
yet to come. As many as a half million potential refugees
may already be in western Kampuchean provinces within reach
The strong possibility that anti-Vietnamese resistance
in Kampuchea will become a protracted guerrilla war means
that the Kampuchean refugee problem--for Thailand in par-
ticular--will also be a long-term one.
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The number of refugees from Laos has decreased
considerably since Thailand and Laos agreed in August to
cooperate in preventing border crossings. Reported Chinese
plans to put pressure on Vietnam by supporting resistance
in Laos, however, along with other factors, could result,
in future in another large refugee exodus.
Thailand has said it will grant temporary sanctuary
to all persons fleeing to its territory. Bangkok might
reverse this policy, however, if it decided permanent
resettlement to other countries was too slow or international
funding of holding centers was inadequate, or if domestic
pressures became too strong.
The attitudes of other ASEAN countries toward
first asylum will depend on the rate of new arrivals vis-a-vis
departures to countries of permanent resettlement. A
resumption of the large-scale refugee exodus from Vietnam
might result in increased attempts to prevent refugees from
landing,
The flow of boat refugees from Vietnam to Hong Kong
has decreased. Hong Kong and China are cooperating in
preventing the entry into Hong Kong of persons posing as
refugees from Vietnam.
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Present Vietnamese Policies: Boat Refugees
1. The mammoth outflow of boat refugees* from Vietnam
in the period January-June 1979, which totaled almost 60,000
during May, has slowed dramatically. The refugee total was
less than 9,000 in both August and September, clearly demon-
strating that Hanoi can reduce the flow as and when it sees
fit. Since mid-June, the government has implemented effective
measures to diminish the exodus, particularly of Chinese, by
turning off its "refugee machine" and by publicizing the
harsh punishment meted out to offenders, including the death
penalty for organizers and the shooting of escapees on
sight. Increased land and sea patrols, and restrictions on
boat building, also help prevent departures. Adverse weather
may have been a factor at first but is so no longer. Several
reports even indicate the government is refunding exit
permit fees previously paid by Chinese. Refugees report
increasing difficulty in bribing officials to facilitate
departure. Recent escapees typically have been ethnic
Vietnamese in small groups of friends and relatives using
* See NFAC Intelligence Assessment NI 79-10004 of July 1979,
entitled "Indochina Refugee Situation," and PA M 79-10292
of June 1979, entitled "Vietnam's Refugee Machine," for
background on the current situation. Appendix 2 contains
monthly statistics on Indochina refugee arrivals in 1979.
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D
small boats, avoiding contact with the authorities, and
departing clandestinely from southern locations.
2. Vietnam does not, however, appear to have changed
its basic policy of intending to expel most of its Chinese,
and there are reports of continued registration of Chinese
for departure and of assertions by Vietnamese officials that
the moratorium is temporary. Hanoi fears the Chinese represent
a Fifth Column in the conflict with China and, furthermore,
comprise an economic class that does not fit in with sociali-
zation plans. Desire to emigrate by ethnic Vietnamese
unhappy with the government's policies, especially deteriorat-
ing economic conditions, is expected to remain high for
years to come. At present, the weight of international
opprobrium, spearheaded by complaints from the ASEAN countries,
keeps Vietnam from once again opening up the floodgates.
Its future actions, however, will depend upon its own perceived
interests, especially in the field of internal security,
and will not necessarily be responsive to external pressure.
3. Vietnam is loudly publicizing, for propaganda
purposes, a legal immigration program of orderly departures
run in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). The numbers involved so far are
small--about 100 people a week fly out of Ho Chi Minh City
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on charter flights--and Hanoi has dragged its feet on im-
plementation. There is no evidence that Hanoi has established
new refugee processing centers, although the government
could use the large number of existing military camps as,
holding centers if necessary. At the moment, most of the
paperwork needed to acquire an exit permit is completed
well before the departure date, the immediate predeparture
steps take little time, and those permitted to leave apparently
stay in their homes until shortly before departure. Some
would-be refugees may be trying to leave under the orderly
departure program rather than risk a hazardous and clandestine
boat voyage.
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Thailand's Refugee Problem: Disaster in Kampuchea, Less
Urgency in Laos
Kampuchea
5. Vietnam's dry-season campaign, coupled with widespread
and severe food shortages, has created yet another potentially
disastrous refugee situation in Thailand. Actual numbers
are confused, but possibly as many as 200,000 refugees in
various stages of malnutrition and ill health have fled to
Thailand in recent weeks. Perhaps 200,000 others in various
locations just across the border in Kampuchea may soon flee
to Thailand; upwards of 100,000, for instance, are reportedly
gathered inside Kampuchea across from Aranyaprathet. We
estimate that several hundred thousand more Kampucheans in
the western and southwestern regions contiguous to Thailand
may be facing famine and military pressure and thus also
represent a pool of potential refugees. In sum, up to 10
percent of Kampuchea's current population, estimated at 5.7
million, could seek refuge in Thailand.
Pol Pot
6. The refugees fall into the three groups:
forces and their supporters; Khmer Liberation Movement
forces (non-Communist resistance groups) and their supporters;
and Kampuchean civilians with no ties to either group.
Large numbers of Kampucheans also cross back and forth
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into Thailand to barter for food in a flourishing Thai trade
or to obtain relief supplies. Volunteer agencies based in
Thailand have access to these enclaves. Refugees report
severe food shortages in western Kampuchea; they say it is
no longer possible to find edible vegetation along the
border area and that many will be unable to survive without
relief assistance.
7. Current Vietnamese/Heng Samrin policy is apparently
designed to deny food and medical supplies to Kampucheans,
except civilians under their direct control, who live in
contested areas, not only in areas close to the Thai border
but also in the central and northeast regions. Vietnamese
troops have reportedly seized food and medicines from
Kampuchean civilians. Vietnamese military strategy seems
aimed in part at driving Pal Pot guerrillas and their
supporters over the border into Thailand. Over the long
haul, these guerrillas may be able to form the nucleus for
an anti-Vietnamese protracted struggle, which means that the
problem of refugees from Kampuchea will also be a long-
term one.
8. The influx of refugees from Laos has decreased
from approximately 6,000 to 3,000 per month since Thailand
and Laos agreed in August to cooperate in preventing border
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crossings. Vientiane's recent decision to suspend forced
agricultural collectivization may also have contributed to
this diminished flow. The Laotian Government reports that
several thousands of refugees have returned from Thailand--a
figure that is probably exaggerated--and has given re- T_
assurances that returnees will not be treated harshly.
9. The basic causes of the refugee exodus have not
been removed. The government may resume forced agricultural
collectivization following the 1979 rice harvest. Further-
more, Vientiane reports a projected 1979 shortfall of between
70,000 and 80,000 tons of foodgrains. These economic
factors, possibly combined with departures caused by political
frustration, could once again increase the rate of departures.
In the future China's apparent plans to put pressure on
Vietnam by supplying resistance groups in Laos could step
up fighting there and result in an increased refugee flow.
Reactions and Policies of ASEAN States
Thailand
10. Earlier in 1979 Thailand took a hard line against
Kampuchean refugees, at one time forcibly repatriating 48,000
to an uncertain fate. On 19 October, Prime Minister Kriangsak
announced a major policy change, stating that, for humanitarian
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reasons, and in view of the high level of international
assistance, Thailand would henceforth accept for temporary
asylum all Kampuchean refugees and would abandon forced
repatriation.
11. Bangkok intends to transfer newly arrived Khmer
refugees away from the immediate border area to temporary
holding centers to be constructed in Prachinburi, Chantaburi,
and Surin Provinces with UNHCR support. Some of these
holding centers have already started operating, but so far
they are little more than open fields surrounded by barbed
wire where conditions are bad. Thousands of refugees reportedly
fled back into Kampuchea to avoid being sent to these rear
camps. After a few weeks in these centers, the refugees
will be transferred to a "national refugee center" to be
created by expanding a small existing camp in Trat Province
at the southern end of the border into a facility capable
of accommodating up to 300,000 persons. However, priority
is being given to the temporary holding centers, and it may
be some months before the "national center" is operational.
Thailand also wants to set up a relief task force, composed
of government and international volunteer relief agencies,
to bring order to emergency relief efforts at present hampered
by lack of central coordination. Thailand has recognized
the need for additional medical assistance, and promised to
permit more foreign medical personnel to operate in refugee
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camps. It has also called for a United Nations factfinding
mission to monitor the Thai-Kampuchean border.
12. Thailand continues to cooperate with international
organizations in sending food and medicines to refugees
inside Thailand and across the border into Kampuchea. It
also permits the use of Bangkok as a stopover for Red Cross
and UNICEF supply planes en route to Phnom Penh. Bangkok
has stipulated that it will retain full control over all
relief efforts in the border area and insists that some
aid must go to Thai villagers displaced by the refugee
influx.
13. Bangkok continues to discourage refugees from
Laos from entering and to try to repatriate those who evade
checkpoints. Thai leaders have stated, however, that they
will not forcibly repatriate Lao refugees, although in June
provincial officials reportedly sent back several hundred
persons. At the Geneva meetings, China offered to accept
up to 10,000 refugees already in Thailand or other ASEAN
countries and in September agreed to resettle 10,000 Lao
and Hmong from Thai refugee camps.
14. The new Thai policy entails considerable political
risk for Kriangsak, although it may also accrue international
praise to him for Thailand's humanitarianism. Thai authorities
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view the large number of Indochina refugees as a potential
security problem and an economic burden that threatens the
government's stability. The Thais in particular are concerned
that the influx of refugees, including Pol Pot's supporters
could provoke incursions by and conflict with Vietnamese
troops; indeed, several small-scale incidents have already
occurred in the border area. The Vietnamese have stated
forcefully and publicly that, despite public Thai denials,
they have evidence of Thailand's cooperation with China
in the training and resupply of Kampuchean resistance forces.
15. Thailand's new, more lenient refugee policy is
undoubtedly contingent on the timely movement of refugees
either to countries of permanent resettlement or back into
Kampuchea (or Laos) when conditions permit. If this does
not proceed as expected, or if the flow of international
assistance to camps inside Thailand diminishes, the policy
may be reversed and forced repatriation again employed.
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Malaysia
16. The refugee presence in Malaysia could cause
domestic repercussions affecting the regime's stability,
although tensions have decreased recently because of a
decrease in arrivals and the increased rate of departures to
countries of permanent resettlement. Malaysia has a long
history of ethnic confrontation between Malays and Chinese
and believes the refugee presence--including many Chinese--
could result in ethnic violence.
17. In 1978, Malaysia granted first asylum to all boat
refugees. In the first few months of 1979, however, when the
sheer weight of arrivals threatened to overwhelm the country's
capacity to absorb the refugees and become a major political
issue, it adopted a hard line. It set up a naval cordon off
its east coast and towed new arrivals out to sea after
providing fuel and food. Malaysia softened its stance
somewhat following a major outflow of refugees from its
camps to permanent resettlement elsewhere. Only seaworthy
boats are now towed back to sea. While publicly reiterating
its policy of refusing first asylum, in practice Malaysia
has permitted some new arrivals to land and be processed.
It has also allowed all of the "limbo" refugees--those
scattered in unorganized small camps along the beach--into
regular camps.
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18. Malaysia, however, as cautious as ever in its
dealings with Vietnam, appears reluctant to return to an
acknowledged first-asylum policy at a time when Vietnam is
critical of Malaysia and its ASEAN partners for their anti-
Vietnamese stance at the nonaligned meetings in Havana and in
the UN General Assembly. Malaysia reportedly feels that
Vietnam might resume the refugee flow so as to put pressure
on ASEAN to soften its collective policy toward Vietnam and
the Heng Samrin regime.
Indonesia
19. The Indonesian Government, despite strong anti-
Chinese and anti-Communist attitudes, has generally been more
lenient in granting first asylum to refugees. It too fears
that the refugee presence may give rise to internal security
problems, but the threat is less urgent because the refugee
camps are scattered on islands far from major propulation
centers. Indonesia's stated policy is to grant first asylum
to refugees who reach an Indonesian island, although there
have been reports of seaworthy boats being provisioned and
20. In May 1979, Indonesia agreed to establish a refugee
processing center on Galang island in the Riau island group
south of Singapore. Construction has since moved slowly,
but Indonesia is transferring refugees from camps scattered
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on other islands, especially the Anambas group, to Galang.
By mid-October, only two camps in the Anambas were still
open, all other refugees having been successfully transferred
to Galang.
The Philippines
21. The Philippines continues to grant first asylum to
all refugees reaching its shores. Furthermore, the Philippine
Government announced at the Geneva meetings in July that it
would establish a refugee processing center for 50,000
people.
22. Imelda Marcos, wife of the President, is responsible
for the establishment of the center in her capacity as
Minister for Human Settlement and is taking a close interest
in the project. The center was originally planned for con-
struction on the island of Palawan, but this site was deemed
unfeasible because of high malaria incidence and construction
and logistic difficulties. The center will now be built
on the Bataan peninsula. Construction has been delayed by
problems of financial accountability and funding. There
is as yet no firm completion date.
Singapore
23. Singapore consistently takes a hard line on refugees
and has never offered first asylum. It cooperates effectively,
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however, in the transit of refugees through its territory
if it receives cast-iron guarantees of acceptance by countries
of permanent resettlement.
Current Chinese Policy
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24. In principle, the Beijing Government continues its
policy of permitting refugees from Vietnam to enter China,
although relatively few appear to be doing so. Beijing
claims to have accepted 250,000 refugees from Vietnam, most
of whom crossed over the border by land. In July and August,
the Chinese claimed that about 10,000 Vietnamese refugees
per month were entering China. After Vietnam reduced the
flow of refugees, however, China became silent on the number
of new refugees and the latest Chinese refugee figure remains
at around 250,000 persons.
0
25. China may have allowed some of these refugees to
"escape" from their resettlement camps and make their way to
Hong Kong, claiming to have come directly from Vietnam; Hong
Kong authorities conclude that as many as 20 percent of the
"boat" people who landed in Hong Kong this year had originally
been resettled in China. In September, however, Beijing
issued directives to the southern provinces to stop assisting
the onward flow of refugees to Hong Kong and has already
taken back some 700 persons.
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26. China has invited the UNHCR to observe the re-
settlement of Vietnamese refugee and has requested UNHCR
funds to help pay for refugee assistance. The Chinese have
not yet presented a firm figure for this support, but it is
expected to run to the tens of millions of dollars. Beijing
has ignored proposals to create a holding area in China
where refugees could wait for processing of their applications
to countries of permanent settlement.
Refugee Populations in Countries of First Asylum as of
30 September 1979
27. The total refugee population in countries of first
asylum almost doubled in the first six months of 1979 and
reached a peak of about 370,000 persons at the end of July.
During August and September, the arrival rate was dramatically
reduced and more than offset by the rate of departures for
permanent resettlement. The total refugee camp population
decreased by 23,000 (6 percent of the peak July population),
leaving 347,000 refugees still to be resettled. Malaysia and
Indonesia experienced the greatest reduction, accounting for
more than 70 percent of the refugees departing for resettle-
ment. Thailand and Hong Kong together provided only a quarter
of the refugees leaving for resettlement, even though their
combined refugee population constituted two-thirds of the
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total. Singapore, the Philippines, Japan, Macao, and Korea
each experienced slight increases in their refugee populations,
but the total increase was less than 3,000 persons.
28. Thailand continues to be the country with the largest
number of refugees. As of 30 September, its camps contained
almost half of all registered refugees, and, as each day goes
by, refugees from Kampuchea swell the numbers. Hong Kong's
camps held almost one-fifth of the refugee population, while
Malaysian and Indonesian camps combined accounted for less
than 30 percent of the total. The share of other countries
amounted to only 4 percent.
Thailand
29. Thailand's registered refugee population of 170,300--
that is, before the current influx from Kampuchea--is
primarily (95 percent) made up of people arriving over land.
Ninety percent of these registered land refugees have come
from Laos and represent lowland Lao and highland Hmong (Meo)
in roughly equal numbers. Registered Khmer refugees as of
30 September amounted to less than 10 percent of land refugees
in camps, and Vietnamese only 1 percent, although the number
of Vietnamese boat refugees increased by 287 persons (20
percent) during the period 31 July to 30 September.
II
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30. More than 5,600 land refugees left Thailand between
31 July and 30 September. Those departing were roughly half
Lao and half Khmer. Thailand's boat refugee population de-
creased by almost 14 percent to 7,300 during the two-month
period ending on 30 September.
Hong Kong
31. Hong Kong's refugee population increased from less
than 5,000 to over 66,000 between 1 January and 31 July 1979.
Since then, it has decreased by around 1,000 persons--a
reduction smaller in both absolute and proportional terms
than that experienced by other major first-asylum countries.
Malaysia
32. Malaysia experienced the largest absolute reduction
in refugee population among the major first asylum countries
during the two-month period ending on 30 September. Almost
85 percent of the decline can be attributed to departures
from the camp at Pulau Bidong, but all camps had refugee
departures except for the transit facility in Kuala Lumpur
and the Kuantan camp. The net reduction amounted to 15 to
20 percent of the 31 July refugee population.
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Indonesia
33. Figures for Indonesia have not been as reliable as
those reported from other countries. This has been due in
part to the arrival of refugees on remote islands and also
to the moving of refugees from island to island. We believe,
however, that the refugee population during the two-month
period ending 30 September decreased by between 9,000 to
12,000 persons.
The Philippines
34. Most of the 6,700 refugees in the Philippines are
concentrated in three camps: 3,000 on Tara Island, 2,100 on
Palawan Island, and 543 at Subic Bay. The remaining refugees
are scattered in the Manila area.
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Appendix 2
Indochinese Refugee Arrivals in Countries of
Temporary Asylum in Southeast Asia
_ -_ S
p - __b r 1 979*
Month
By Land
By Boat
Total
January
7,200
10,500
17,700
February
3,332
8,632
11,964
March
5,668
17,189
22,857
April
5,636
24,886
30,522
May
4,976
59,412
64,388
June
14,936
45,451
60,387
July
9,571
24,3D
j,oao
August .
3,188
8,792
11,980
September
4,569
8,988
13,557
Total
59,076
208,165
267,241
* Includes Hong Kong and Macao but not China.
This table is Unclassified.
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Appendix 1
Refugee Populations in Countries of First Asylum
30 September 1978 - 30 September 1979a
30 Sep 79b
31 Dec 78
Net Change
31 Dec 78 - 30 Sep 79
Net Change
31 Jul 79 - 30 Sep 79
Persons
Percent
Persons
Percent
Country
6
04
3
Thailand
170,300
139,140
31,160
22.39
-5,34
.
-
Land Refugees
(163,000)
(135,532)
(27,468)
( 20.27)
(-4,174)
( -2.50)
Boat Refugees
( 7,300)
( 3,608)
( 3,692)
(102.33)
(-1,172)
(-13.83)
Hong Kong
65,200
4,810
60,390
1,255.51
-1,451
-2.18
Malaysia
51,700
46,286
5,414
11.70
-9,859
-16.02
c
Indonesia
46,000
2,607
43,393
1,664.48
-9,026c
-16.40
Philippines
6,600
2,265
4,335
191.39
806
13.91
Macao
3,500
n.a.d
3,500
--
234
7.16
Singapore
2,200
641
1,559
243.21
1,047
90.81
170
1
597
573
95.98
639
120.34
K
,
140
74
66
89.19
102
268.42
=.~,,,,,,~
Otters
520
7
513
7,328.57
-408
-43.97
347,330
196,427
150,903
76.82
-23,262
-6.28
a Figures in this table may not agree with those in individual country tables because of
disparities in the mode and date of data collection. All figures should be viewed as
reasonably accurate approximations, not as results obtained from precise headcounts.
b Rounded figures.
c The decrease in Indonesian camp populations during the 31 July - 30 September period
may reflect resolution of an uncertainty concerning the 31 July figures, which included
an estimated 9,000 unregistered refugees.
d Data not available.
This table is Unclassified.
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Approved For Release 2006/0313E[1'WDP81 B00401 R001400080006-6
 SECRET
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 Approved For Release 20061$ l` i -RDP81 B00401 R001400080006-6
Appendix 4
Malaysian Refugee Camp Populations, 30 September 1979
30 Sep 1979a
Percent of
Refugee Population
Net Change
31 Jul - 30 Sep 1979
Camp
Persons
Percent
24,700
49.72
-10,029
-28.88
Transit Facility
(Kuala Lumpur)
7,800
15.70
2,313
42.15
Kuantan
7,480
15.06
330
4.62
Pulau Tengah
6,500
13.08
-1,394
-17.66
Kota Baru
1,970
3.96
-1.350
-40.66
Sarawak
800
1.61
-1,168
-59.35
th
Pulau Besar
430
0.87
-105
-19.63
"Limbo jib
-476
-100.00
49,680
100.00
-11,879
-19.30
a Rounded figures.
b Refugees who arrived but may be pushed back out to sea.
This table is Unclassified.
Approved For Release 2006/O3/SF P81 B00401 R001400080006-6
 Approved For Release 2006M/MZ'k-RDP81 B00401 R001 400080006-6
Appendix 5
Indonesian Refugee Camp Populations, 30 September 1979
Si
30 Sep 1979
Percent of
Refugee Population
Net Change
31 Jul - :30 Sep 1979
tes
Persons
Percent
Jemaja Island
(2 camps)
27,713
63.89
927
3.46
Bintan Island
(9 camps)
9,692
22.34
-2,399
-19.84
Galang Island
5,929
13.67
5,119
631.98
Natuna Islands
44
0.10
-857
-95.12
Tarempa Island
--
--
-5,227
-100.00
an
N, #.arta)
-211
-100.00
-9,000*
-100.00
Not Registered
Totals
43,378
100.00
-11,648
-21.17
* Estimated number of refugees present on 31 July, but not registered with the UNRCR.
This table is Unclassified.
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Approved For Release 2006/03/% . bP81 B00401 R001400080006-6
 Approved For Release 2006 ' .'1' -RDP81 B00401 R001 400080006-6
Appendix 6
Hong Kong Refugee Camp Populations, 30 September 1979
Percent of
Net Change
1979
30 S
Refugee Population
31 Jul - 30 Sep l979
Camp
ep
t
P
Persons
ercen
Kai Tak North
14,380
21.88
-22
-0.15
Tuen Mun
13,366
20.33
13,366*
--*
Sham Shui Po
8,582
13.06
1,482
20.87
Jubilee
7,378
11.23
911
14.09
Chi Ma Wan
6,597
10.04
-1,996
-23.23
Kai Tak East
6,231
9.48
-9,772
-61.06
V't. Dockyard
3,197
4.86
-1,286
-28.69
In Prisons
2,807
4.27
1,983
240.66
Argyle IV
1,520
2.31
-1,190
-43.91
Cape Collinson
1,060
1.61
-19
-1.76
Ma Tau Wei
613
0.93
464
311.41
-4,841
-100.00
Not Registered
-920
-1.38
Totals
65,731
100.00
* Data for 31 July not available.
This table is Unclassified.
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Approved For Release 2006/03/1 JJ JlbP81 B00401 R001400080006-6