GROWTH AND PROSPECTS OF LEFTIST EXTREMISTS IN EL SALVADOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R001400030011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence
Growth and Prospects
of Leftist Extremists
in El Salvador
Secret
Secret
NI IIM 80-10002
January 1980
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GROWTH AND PROSPECTS
OF LEFTIST EXTREMISTS
IN EL SALVADOR
Information available as of 21 January 1980 was
used in the preparation of this memorandum.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The continued rapid growth of leftist extremists in El Salvador
signals a sharply increasing threat to political stability and portends the
outbreak of large-scale revolutionary warfare over the next year-
possibly over the next several months.
The extreme left appears determined to seize power in El Salvador,
although its timetable and tactics may not yet be fixed. It has been
expanding its numbers of trained, armed guerrillas and of political
activists and organizers. At the same time, it has made significant strides
in unification and coordination on both the military and political fronts.
D
The extreme left is very well funded (through ransoms). It has
expanded its military capabilities through training in El Salvador and in
Nicaragua and Cuba and through increasingly sophisticated hit-and-run
raids both on government security posts and on rural and urban "soft"
targets. On the political front, it seems to be well led, and its
propaganda and other activities are winning support from educated and
unsophisticated Salvadorans alike.
Leftist extremists are increasing the size and sophistication of their
armaments and, with Cuban assistance, are laying the logistic
groundwork for resupply, especially through the porous Honduran
border.
The extreme left has not yet demonstrated a capacity for extended
combat against government forces, and the firmness of support for its
cause among the masses is open to question. Nonetheless, in view of the
lack of unity and indecisiveness of the government and of the forces in
the political center and on the right generally, the potential of the
extreme left to control the course of events in El Salvador is formidable.
Note: This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was requested by the Department of State. It was
prepared by the Office of Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center, under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. It was coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency
and with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. Questions or comments may be
directed to the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
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DISCUSSION
Guerrilla Growth
The rise of the left in El Salvador is reflected in the
growth of membership in militant organizations, in the
size, frequency, and sophistication of operations, and
in the armaments utilized over the last two years.
Hardcore insurgents have grown from 200 to 300 in
1977, to about 700 in late 1978, and to more than
2,000 today. In 1978, a country that had been free of
any sustained guerrilla activity two years earlier faced
three principal insurgent groups whose revenues from
kidnaping in two years' time totaled $26 million;
ransoms in 1979 alone yielded an additional $40
million. We now estimate the terrorist war chest, after
arms and operational expenditures, to total about $20
million
Terrorist-incited violence surged in 1978, and Sep-
tember of that year was one of the most active periods
of insurgency. Of 37 security-related incidents that
month, 19 were clearly terrorist initiated, although
they resulted in a total of only eight dead. September
1979 witnessed more than double the number of such
incidents, however, and left 40 dead and 10 wounded.
Other monthly comparisons between 1978 and 1979
reflect the same trend, paralleling the enormous
growth in terrorist membership since 1977. In 1978,
150 politically related deaths were reported; in the
first six months of 1979, the rate quadrupled, with 300
deaths reported.
Insurgent boldness and the ability to field larger
groups of men reflect similar growth. In September
1978, terrorists carried out coordinated attacks on
three police posts, but the largest group of attackers
numbered only a dozen men and they were lightly
armed. A year later, six National Guard posts-a
somewhat tougher target-were attacked in one week,
with 40 guerrillas involved in the largest firefight.
Significantly, these were combined operations by the
two largest guerrilla groups, who employed automatic
rifles, handgrenades, and in one instance a bazooka.
Today, 50.. and 60-man terrorist units, such as those
that temporarily seized outlying towns in late 1979,
0
Front Group Activities
Membership in El Salvador's extremist-controlled
front groups likely exceeds 60,000. The FPL (Popular
Liberation Forces), the largest guerrilla organization,
has effectively controlled and utilized its front groups,
and, on a smaller scale, the other guerrilla groups have
had similar success. Since 1977, militant group activi-
ties-marches, strikes, and occupations-have caused
monumental problems for the governments in power.
Frequently confronted with extreme demands, the
administrations have alternated between military re-
sponse-and an inevitably bloody aftermath that ac-
celerated leftist recruitment-or drawn-out negotia-
tions that tended to undercut and weaken their
control.
The FPL's gradual takeover of the largest front
organization, the BPR (Popular Revolutionary Bloc)
has intensified the government's problem. The BPR,
with 30,000 to 50,000 members, grew out of a bloody
1975 confrontation between students and security
forces, with university groups, some peasant organiza-
tions, and the militant teachers union forming the
original coalition. Like that of the FPL, the dramatic
growth of the BPR occurred after 1977, although some
early links and dual memberships likely existed be-
tween the FPL and BPR. In 1978, outright takeover of
the BPR became a well-defined and attainable FPL
objective.
By mid-1978, members of the terrorist group had
gained many positions in the Bloc's component organi-
zations and engineered a restructuring of the executive
committee, thereby strengthening FPL influence. Eirly
ross memberships in the two
organizations appeared more common and the Bloc
began serving as the breeding ground for a new
Popular Liberation Army guerrilla force.
The FPL thus has been able to draw on the BPR
and make significant progress in its efforts-first
begun in early 1979
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In short, the distinction between parent guerrilla
groups and their front organizations is beginning to
blur. The assassination campaign under way against
lower-level officials is in part a joint effort by the two
largest front groups. The second largest guerrilla organi-
zation-National Resistance (FARN)-and its front-
United Popular Action (FAPU)-reflect a pattern
similar to the FPL-BPR merger. The front has stock-
piled large quantities of arms in El Salvador and has
increased military training for its members, both at
home and in Cuba. Even the traditionally softline
Communist Party and its front group have turned to
more aggressive tactics.
Moreover, through the BPR, the FPL is stepping up
its involvement in labor and is laying the groundwork
for deeper penetration in this sector. In 1978, it
formed a labor coordinating committee which, despite
limited membership, wielded significant influence in
individual disputes and became a catalyst in the
prolonged labor troubles of 1979. Last December, the
BPR formally established the Revolutionary Labor
Federation to assist in widening its labor influence.
The tactical alliance formed this month by the two
leading terrorist groups and the Communist Party-
paralleled by the merger of their front groups-is the
Salvadoran extremists' most significant effort at coop-
eration. Despite ideological and personal differences,
several of the Salvadoran groups have been inclined
toward tactical cooperation for several years. As early
as 1977, some of the groups developed an informal
liaison; in 1978 and 1979, they jointly engineered
several kidnapings and shared safehouses and arms. By
The uneven history of guerrilla cooperation in
Central America suggests that the new alliance may be
troubled, but the Salvadorans have evidenced more
cooperative tendencies than other Central American
groups. Moreover, they have the added impetus of the
Sandinista success in Nicaragua that followed the
unification of rival factions. Recent Cuban urgings
toward unity and the prospect of additional external
support from Havana are further inducements. On
balance, greater tactical cooperation-and more effec-
tive antigovernment operations-are in the offing in
El Salvador.
Arms and External Support
Just as more sophisticated armament-and a guar-
anteed source of resupply-played a critical role in the
Nicaraguan struggle, so too will these factors be pivotal
in El Salvador. An increased arms flow to Salvadoran
insurgents since mid-1979 has boosted guerrilla confi-
dence and affected strategic planning for 1980. Last
August, the guerrillas assessed their weapons stocks as
inadequate for large-scale or prolonged operations, but
the groups have budgeted more funds and have had
increased success in tapping sources of arms supply
and training, both in Latin America and the Middle
East. By the end of the year, two reports noted that the
second largest group believed it had sufficient arms for
a civil war-a claim perhaps exaggerated but reflec-
tive of the trend.
In December,
I arms-almost certainly of Cuban
origin-were transshipped through Honduras to El
Salvador. Arms, including antitank weapons and sub-
machineguns, have also been received from Sandinista
elements in Nicaragua and from Guatemalan guerrilla
groups.
I Ithe FPL sent
increased in 1979,E
in late 1978,
personnel to Cuba; the tempo
The FARN/FAPU had sent approximately
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jnen to Havana by January 1980 and plans to send
more. The Cubans have also played an important
brokers' role, both in organizing increased cooperation
between Salvadorans and Honduran Communists and
in facilitating Salvadoran contacts with Middle East
sources.
The Salvadorans' need for a guaranteed arms supply
and other support, however, will have to be solved
closer to home-from Cuba via Nicaragua, Honduras,
Panama, and Costa Rica. Governments or leftist
groups in each of these countries hold out the prospect
of greater help for the Salvadoran insurgents.
Fidel Castro's personal intervention and call for
unity at a Havana meeting with Salvadoran leftist
leaders in December parallels his role in fostering an
alliance among rival Nicaraguan Sandinista factions
last year and underscores his belief that El Salvador is
the most promising revolutionary target in Latin
America. Castro, more concerned than the Salvador-
ans themselves with the danger of provoking a rightist
countercoup, argued against precipitate armed action
and in favor of a political strategy. His tactics, how-
ever, are also focused on a seizure of power by leftists
this year. Castro admitted that a number of his
advisers had argued for an even more aggressive
sponsorship of Salvadoran insurgency. Following the
collapse of the Salvadoran military-civilian coalition in
early January amid charges that the military continues
to block any real reform, the arguments of the more
aggressive elements in Castro's circle may gain
strength.
estimated 500,000 tons of arms funneled to the San-
dinistas during the final offensive against the Somoza
regime.
Although Nicaragua's Sandinista leaders remain of
two minds-committed to their revolutionary breth-
ren but concerned that their involvement might jeop-
ardize the badly needed flow of economic assistance
from the United States and other Western sources-we
believe they are willing to lend some assistance now
and to give more extensive aid if the situation should
become critical. The Nicaraguans provided some
training for Salvadoran insurgents after the overthrow
of Somoza, and the Salvadorans have received arms
from Nicaraguan sources. The December arms deliv-
ery is believed to have 25X1
transited Nicaragua. in a yearend meeting in Mana-
gua, Salvadoran leftists reportedly reached agreement
with both the Cubans and Nicaraguans for further
delivery of war materiel.
Panama is keeping its options open, fostering con-
tacts with both Salvadoran Government authorities
and insurgent groups, and offering advice to both
sides. But, while General Torrijos claims to he a
mediator with no brief for either side, he views the rise
of "progressive" forces in Central America as both
desirable and inevitable, and he is most likely to
support the side he believes ultimately will prevail.
Drawing on the success of the regional strategy that
channeled support to the Sandinistas, Castro hopes to
use neighboring leftist organizations-principally the
Honduran Communist Party-as a support apparatus.
The transshipment in mid-December 1979
of arms was apparently the first
major Hon uran operation on behalf of the Salvador-
ans. The Hondurans also have agreed,
Ito establish sa a avens in
Honduras for a va oran groups. In addition, the
Cubans last year arranged for indirect purchase of a
small Costa Rican airline that they are planning to use
for covert arms shipments to the Salvadorans, in a
manner similar to that which they used to ship some of
The Costa Rican Communist Party could also play a
minor supportive role. In the wake of the Sandinista
takeover in Nicaragua, the Costa Rican party decided
to adopt a more activist stance.
e
5aivraps also reportedly have a communications
post in San Jose with a radio network linked with
stations in El Salvador.
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Strategy and Prospects
In the final quarter of 1979, the strategy of the
Salvadoran insurgents began to reflect a pattern of
plans for a total offensive within the next month or
so-the outgrowth of their increasing strength and
perception of a weak divided government. This pat-
tern of predicted "final offensives" is likely to persist
in 1980 and translates into gradually increasing terror-
ist and front-group activities aimed at a flashpoint
when the combination of violence, economic disrup-
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If the Salvadoran left can remain tactically united,
it will decrease the chances for success of any moder-
ate civilian-military junta, because it would frustrate
dialogue with elements of the extreme left and in-
crease civilian-military frictions over repressive tactics.
Through intimidation and political pressure, it could
prevent much of the center left from cooperating in
any government initiatives.
The extreme left, increasingly better equipped and
engaging in larger scale actions, has developed the
capability to directly challenge the Salvadoran estab-
lishment, although much still depends on outside
actors. In the absence of external aid that substantially
strengthens the military-government structure, the ex-
treme left-if its own external support grows at the
pace it has over the last six months-will be strong
enough in 1980 to topple the government formed in
January. * If external support for the insurgents is half
of what it was in Nicaragua, the extremists in El
Salvador have a better-than-even chance to seize and
hold power after the anarchy and violence they will
I
*A second Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, scheduled for
publication in the next few weeks, will provide a fuller discussion of
the other factors that impinge on this judgment. The Memorandum
will deal with military-civilian frictions and other political factors
and will provide an evaluation of the military as a fighting force.
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