USSR-AFGHANISTAN BREZHNEV SEEKS BORDER GUARANTEE, CONCEDES U.S. OIL CONCERNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600230005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 27, 1980
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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27 FEBRUARY 1980
USSR - AFGHANISTAN
Soviet President Brezhnev's carefully qualified offer in
his election speech to withdraw troops from Afghanistan
once a halt to "outside interference" is guaranteed may
signify interest in working out some face-saving solution
to the USSR's Afghan impasse. Taken in conjunction with
his statement that U.S. concern over the safety of its
oil routes is "understandable," Brezhnev's remarks on
withdrawal could indicate receptiveness to a formula
leading to withdrawal which would recognize Soviet
interests in Afghanistan as well as U.S. concerns in
the Persian Gulf. The impression that Moscow is seek-
ing to signal interest in dialog was accentuated in
subsequent remarks by Brezhnev and by Central Committee
official Leonid Zamyatin, both of whom professed
Soviet readiness to seek political solutions to existing
problems. However, these followup statements, like the
Brezhnev election address, also held the United States
responsible for the deterioration of the international
situation. It cannot be ruled out that Moscow is merely
adopting a calculated pose of reasonableness and
sincerity to counter international condemnation of the
Soviet intervention.
As yet there has been no Soviet comment on press reports
that President Carter, in a 25 February letter to
Yugoslav President Tito, proposed that the United
States and the USSR join other nations in guaranteeing
Afghan neutrality; and Moscow, after its initial negative
reaction, has said nothing further about the EEC foreign
ministers' similar proposal last week.
Moscow promptly blamed the general strike and anti-Soviet
protests in Kabul on Washington and various accomplices,
but recent PRAVDA articles have acknowledged that the
Afghan regime faces complicated religious, ethnic,
communications, and educational problems within the country.
BREZHNEV SPEECH Brezhnev left Soviet options open in his lengthy
discussion of Afghanistan in his republic supreme
soviet election speech on 22 February. While echoing his 13 January
PRAVDA interview in promising that Soviet "troops and military
contingents" will be withdrawn when the reasons for their presence
cease to apply, he added the proviso that the Afghan Government
will also have to confirm that their presence is "no longer necessary."
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27 FEBRUARY 1980
Brezhnev went on to declare emphatically that the USSR will be
ready to "begin" withdrawal as soon as all outside interference
has ceased--again leaving a loophole as to the timing of a total
withdrawal. Calling in his next sentence on the United States
and "Afghanistan's neighbors" to "guarantee" a complete cessation
of such interference, he said the "need" for Soviet military aid
would then end, but he did not specifically pledge that withdrawal
would follow. A speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in
India on 12 February had raised the subject of guarantees without
either mentioning a Soviet withdrawal or specifying the guarantors.*
Brezhnev went on to accuse the United States of seeking to expand
its influence in Asia and the Middle East and to exploit the natural
resources of the region, but he also acknowledged the reasonableness
of some U.S. concerns. Thus, he observed that Washington likes to
talk about the necessity of insuring the safety of U.S. oil supply
routes, and "in a way this is understandable." Brezhnev then
asked rhetorically whether this could be achieved by turning the
region into a powder keg when the result would be the opposite.
That some connection between the Afghan and Gulf situations may have
been intended by Moscow was suggested in the way IZVESTIYA's
authoritative political observer Aleksandr Bovin linked the two
problems. In remarks on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable
program on the 24th, Bovin described the U.S. positions on Afghanistan
and the Gulf as similarly paradoxical because in both cases Washington
by its actions is complicating the situations. In Afghanistan "they
would like us to withdraw our troops," he said, but are doing every-
thing to make this more difficult. And, citing Brezhnev, he added
that the United States seeks stability in the Gulf--"and this is
understandable because it affects their interests connected with
oil"--but through its military presence and political pressure it is
destabilizing the situation.
SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS Two further statements from Moscow in the
week following Brezhnev's election speech
underscored the impression that Moscow is seeking to appear open to a
negotiated solution to the Afghan crisis even as it presses its attack
on the Carter Administration. On 26 February Leonid Zamyatin, the
Central Committee's senior international information official, offered
his first press commentary on the Afghan crisis. In a LITERARY
GAZETTE article, as publicized by TASS, Zamyatin blamed the
Administration for the impasse in relations that has developed but
* Gromyko's remark--which was preceded by an Afghan Government state-
ment linking guarantees with withdrawal--is discussed in the
21 February 1980 TRENDS, page 2.
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27 FEBRUARY 1980
pointedly professed Moscow's "readiness and indeed resolve to achieve
apolitical solution to all problems that exist or may arise." The
next day Moscow reported remarks made by Brezhnev during a meeting
with U.S. industrialist Armand Hammer in the Kremlin which struck
a similar note. According to Moscow radio's domestic service,
Brezhnev asserted that the "only sensible course" is to "search
for mutually acceptable solutions to arising problems on an honest
and just basis." However, Brezhnev was also reported to have said
that the complications in bilateral relations are a "direct
consequence of the current course of the U.S. Administration."
AFGHAN INTERNAL PROBLEMS Soviet reporting on the city-wide
shutdown in Kabul which began on the
21st has focused on the arrest of "one American and 16 Pakistanis"
to make the case that the turmoil was engineered by U.S. and "other
imperialist special services," Pakistan, and China. The reports,
notably vague as to the reason for the disorders, have maintained
that an indignant citizenry, in collaboration with government, party,
and people's organizations, "rendered harmless" assorted terrorists,
bandits, and armed gangs of counterrevolutionaries and that the city
is returning to normal.
A 24 February PRAVDA account from Kabul correspondent Mironov gave
Soviet readers some inkling of the troubles the Afghan regime is
encountering when it referred to government pledges regarding freedom
of religion and assistance for agricultural production. Acknowledging
unspecified "difficulties and current problems," Mironov also admitted
that rebels and reactionary clergy had been able to enlist a
"certain confused section of the population" in the unexplained
"rebellion." Moscow had similarly used the term "rebellion" to
describe the uprising in Herat last March which first prompted major
Soviet press attention to. the problems faced by the year-old
revolutionary government. Some of the internal difficulties were
mentioned in "A. Petrov" articles at that time, but since then the
Soviet press has generally obscured the domestic problems.
Prior to the recent flareup in Kabul, an 18 February dispatch by
PRAVDA's Mironov and Demchenko was atypically explicit in reviewing
Afghan domestic problems and failed to make the usual effort to
attribute all of the country's ills either to foreign interference
or to the regime of the now-disgraced late President Amin. The
correspondents acknowledged that the new regime has to overcome
"flagrant errors" of the "recent past" but only once specifically
referred to Amin. Thus, while they attributed to Amin the mistaken
use of "ultrarevolutionary phraseology," they were imprecise in
describing when and how the "simple people" of Afghanistan became
"frightened away" from the regime and lost their trust in the
leadership. They conceded that there are "deep rifts" among the
people and even within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
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They acknowledged that the task of uniting such an "extraordinarily
complex's country is not simple, and they singled out such problems
as the ethnic and religious composition of the people, the.large
nomad population, the difficulty faced by "central power" in reaching
isolated areas where "the word of the mullah or tribal elder" has
force of law, and the overwhelming difficulty--"how many years will
it take?"-to achieve literacy when 80 to 90 percent of the
population is illiterate. The correspondents warned that the goal
is distant: The Soviet forces are creating "favorable external
conditions" for Afghanistan, they said, but "within it" there is
still much to be done to establish a "peaceful life."
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Moscow's Afghan Problem: New Decisions impending
The major problems the USSR has encountered in Afghanistan
are going to force the USSR in the near future to make serious
decisions about its future course there. Last week's dis-
turbances in Kabul will probably hasten the process.
During the two months the Soviets have been in Afghanistan,
the political and security situation has steadily deteroriated:
-- The Soviet-installed government has proven incom-
petent and is viewed as a Soviet puppet. by the
overwhelming majority of the populace.
Islamic Jimew-r and nationalist opposition to "the
foreign infidel" is fueling broad popular oppo-
sition to the Soviets.
-- The insurgents have continued their resistance
in areas where Soviet forces have been active and
have intensified it elsewhere.
The Afghan army has continued to disintegrate;
there are now only a handful of effective units
and the Soviets cannot count even on their loyalty.
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-- The performance of the Soviet military has
probably disappointed the USSR and casualties may-
have been higher than anticipated.
The disturbances in Kabul have indicated the depth of
opposition to the, USSR and has probably convinced Moscow
that, if security is to be maintained, Soviet forces are going
to have to play a more aggressive role throughout Afghanistan.
When the Soviets entered the country, they undoubtedly were
hoping that the Babrak Karmal government would gain wider
support, and seemed to expect that the Afghan security forces
would continue to police many rural and most urban areas.
The USSR hoped that its direct military role could be
confined to ensuring that the regime was not challenged,
and generally restricted its military and counterinsurgent
operations to controlling the key communications routes and
the Northern provinces bordering the USSR.
The international reaction to
Afghanistan has compounded the Soviet decisionmakerstpro-
blems. International condemnation--particularly from the
US--has been stronger and more persistent than. the Soviets
apparently expected. The Soviets are fearful that their
future actions in Afghanistan could sharply reduce participa-
tion in the Olympics and push the West Europeans toward closer
support of the US.
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There are already some signs of strains and uncertainty
within the Soviet leadership over Afghanistan. Several
reports indicate that some Soviet officials--apparently
including Boris Ponomarev, a candidate member of the Politburo
and a party official with an important role in. formulating
foreign policy--are unhappy with the impact of. the Soviet
invasion on broader Soviet foreign and domestic interests.
Soviet Options
As the Kremlin contemplates Afghanistan, it could weigh
several broad options ranging from outright withdrawal to
a massive, all-out counterinsurgency effort- Some probably
are rejected out of hand while others will involve difficult
policy tradeoffs.
Withdrawal seems extremely unlikely. In. addition to
being a major setback to Soviet prestige and Moscow's self
image as a great power, it would be a humiliating admission
of incompetence by the present Soviet leadership. It would
almost certainly lead to a militantly anti-Soviet, Islamic
influenced government, which Moscow could not. accept.
Interest has been stirred in a possible Negotiated
settlement by Brezhnev's call last week for a "guaranteed"
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end to foreign interference and by Soviet feelers regarding
an international agreement on Afghanistan. It seems unlikely
at this point, however, that the USSR is seriously interested
in pursuing this course.
The Soviets realize that whatever the international context
of their pullout,"a withdrawal would lead to the collapse of
any Soviet installed regime. Despite their hyperbole about
foreign intervention, the Soviets recognize that the insurgents
have derived most of their domestic weapons and supplies from
within Afghanistan, that there is no united insurgent leader-
ship to talk with, and that international guarantees could not
materially change the internal security situation. Even
Brezhnev alluded to this in his speech when he advanced
his one-sided formula that Soviet withdrawal could only
"commence" after Moscow was convinced that foreign interference
had "fully teru,inated"---in other ,acres that the insurgency
had ended.
Furthermore, the Soviets have already rejected some
"neutrality" formulations, saying they would not protect
Soviet vital interests nor perpetuate a revolutionary regime.
In short, Moscow is unlikely to be interested in a political
solution until they are convinced that.a pro-Soviet regime
could survive.
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The Soviets could hope to sit tight, counting on their
present force level to maintain a minimal degree of control,
ensure the survival of a puppet government and allow inter-
national attention to Afghanistan to die away.. But the recent
disturbances in Kabul indicate that this option has probably
already been foreclosed.
If Moscow maintained its present level and form of
military activity, it would permit the insurgents to gather
momentum and determine the time and place of battle. It
would.turn the cities into virtual rebel strongholds. It
would expose Soviet forces to continual insurgent harassment
and a steady drain of casualties.
There were already signs before the Kabul disturbances that
Moscow was moving to improve its position by additional
commitment of troops. Within the last. few weeks, the Soviets
have commited one division they had been holding in reserve
and had begun forming several specially configured heliborne
units for counterinsurgency opposition. In addition, one
division is moving toward Afghanistan from Kiev in the
Western USSR and may be committed.
The Soviets could calculate that the infusion of several
additional divisions and additional tactical aircraft and
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helicopters in Afghanistan--say a doubling of their force
in Afghanistan to around 140;000 men--could check the
deteriorating security situation and administer a severe
blow to the insurgents when the weather turns better this
spring and summer. It is our view that a force this size
could contain the insurgency but not erradicate it aiM A o~-
permanently pacify the countryside.
If the Soviets have made a similar calculation (they may
W1 arC,)
well be more optimistic about their military ospects , they
could inject an even more substantial force, hoping that it
could quickly eliminate the insurgency and even enable them to
put Afghanistan behind them. This would be in keeping with
P ". 4
the Soviet military tendi to employ overwhelming superiority..
But the commitment of say 300,000 men would probably
involve serious.ec,~nomic and military dislocation and
stimulate internal friction and increased international
criticism.
We think the Soviets are likely to conclude that they
need swom more troops in Afghanistan to reduce'insurgent
activity to a more tolerable level, ensure their continued
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control of the cities and maintain a pro-Soviet government
there. Because the Soviets probably do not have a clear
idea of the force levels needed to supress the insurgency
and because of the controversy a deeper' involvement oeallng will
generate both in Moscow and abroad, we think the Soviets
L"0.14 6
will opt for what, it might think e minimum necessary increase.
This might be an increase of several divisions or.so--maybe
40,000 men. If Moscow opts for such an increase, we think it
will be accompanied by a sharply intensified level of Soviet
initiated fighting this spring and summer, as the Soviets try
to break the insurgency.
Such a move would probably be accompanied by a change in
the political leadership in Kabul. There have been many signs
that Moscow is looking for new faces check
the deterioration in the Afghan government and military-at .
t0?Stow m, he- y
rt- rally enough backing to avoid the appearance abroad
of a regime totally dependent on and subservient to the USSR.
We also think the Soviets may accompany this move by
intensified overtures abroad to mitigate, the impact of
increased fighting and to salvage the Olympics and "detente"
in Europe. One element of this program could be stress on
Soviet interest in an international solution to forestall
"foreign interference." Moscow would hope this approach would
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e put the blame on the US for Moscow's continued presence
in Afghanistan, encourage those eager to downplay the
significance of the Soviet invasion and drive an. additional
wedge into US relations with its European allies.
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