US SANCTIONS OVER SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN - SOVIET, POLISH AND ROMANIAN REACTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600200023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 11, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release'
11 April 1980
US SANCTIONS OVER SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN
SOVIET, POLISH AND ROMANIAN REACTIONS
Soviet Union
1. Moscow's decision to invade Afghanistan was probably taken in
full awareness that the US would react strongly, that bilateral relations would
significantly suffer, but that hostile world public opinion would prove to be
transitory. The Soviet leaders probably also assumed that the effectiveness of
the US response would be tempered by Washington's distraction with its problems
with Iran and a Western inability to pursue a unified policy. Moscow may be con-
fident it can frustrate such a coordinated response, Its tactics will focus on
trying to exploit differences between Western countries over policy, and the dif-
fering objectives, as between industry and government, within individual countries.
2, Current US actions will not force a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanis-
tan because that situation has not been resolved according to Soviet criteria and
because it would be politically impossible to appear to have capitulated under US
pressure. Nevertheless, the US sanctions have had a general impact in that the
Soviet leaders now recognize that they cannot receive the benefits of detente if
the mutual understandings that underlie that accord are violated. This has prob-
ably lead to some difference of views within the leadership over future policy
toward the US and the West, as well as toward Afghanistan. If Moscow is unable to
drive a wedge between the US and its allies, the Soviets would be reminded that the
price for future similar aggressions may be higher than they would be willing to pay.
3. The most damaging measures have probably been the US proposal to
boycott the Olympics and the US denial of certain technology. Moscow has a real
concern over the potential Olympics failure in that it would represent a serious
blow to its domestic and internet Tonal prestige. The technology boycott will have
I w-
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its greatest impact on oil and gas exploration and in computer-related branches
of industry; the equipment is not available from any other supplier. Moscow pre-
sumably hopes to obtain the remaining embargoed goods from other industrialized
democracies. Although the grain embargo will have only minimal impact this year,
its continuation--especially if coupled with poor harvests--will impact on domestic
consumption.
4. On the propaganda front, the Soviets will try to counteract Western
criticism of its presence'in Afghanistan by giving heavy, probably distorted media
coverage of US actions in response to situations in such countries as El Salvador.
In general, the emphasis is shifting away from a defense of their Afghanistan
policy to attacking the US affirmation that it has vital interests in the Persian
Gulf and the Southwest Asia sea. In so doing,. Moscow hopes to diminish international
attention to Afghanistan by stimulating concern over "increased" US military activitges.
Poland -
Polish policymbkers probably do not believe that the US response will force
the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistn and, short of a threatened armed confrontation
with the West, they will remain for as long as they deem necessary. Some doubt that
the US will maintain a high level of pressure. The leadership's concerns are paro-
chial in that they view the confrontation basically in terms of its potential impact
on national interests. Moreover, they do not accept the US assurances that it will
differentiate between the USSR and East Europe with regard to the grain and technology
embargoes. They are also concerned that the US would retaliate should Warsaw be
forced by Moscow to divert such goods or even should the US suspect it is doing so.
Romania -
Bucharest is especially apprehensive over Moscow's intervention, believing
it could foreshadow a similar move against Romania. It is also concerned that the
consequent deterioration of detente will curtail its ability to pursue independent
policies within the Bloc. Nevertheless, Bucharest must have felt that the US was
 Approved For Release 2005M M : CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000600200023-2
correct in its response, and probably was relieved that the measures in themselves
did not appear to destroy the detente process. Although pessimistic that sanctions
will be effective, Bucharest may also feel that the show of determination itself
will help deter further Soviet aggression. Romania is the only country in East
Europe that has not publicly commented on the Western sanctions.