EFFECTS OF THE SOUTHWEST ASIAN CRISES ON KEY GLOBAL ISSUES

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mA proved For Release 2006/11/15: CIA-RDP81 B00401 ROO06002QgOO .
^~- National on 1 ential
Foreign NOFORN
Assessment
Center 25K1
PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING COORDINATOR
ROOM 7E23 HQS.
A
L
Asian Crises on Key
Global Issues
Confidential
PA 80-10243
May 1980
Copy 2 4 8
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 Approved For Release 2006/11/15: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000600200004-3
National Confidential
Foreign NOFORN
Assessment
Center
Effects of the Southwest
Asian Crises on Key
Global Issues (v)
Research for this report was completed
on 18 April 1980.
This assessment was prepared b
Division, Office of Political Analysis)
International Issues Division, Office of Political
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, International Issues
It was coordinated with the Offices of Economic
Research, Geographic and Cartographic Research,
Scientific and Weapons Research, and the
National Intelligence Officer for the Near
East and South Asia. (u)
Confidential
PA 80-10243
May 1980
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Confidential
NOFORN
Effects of the Southwest
Asian Crises on Key
Global Issues (u)
Key Judgments The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have implications for a number of
international issues beyond the future of Southwest Asia and East-West
relations generally. They have embittered world politics and significantly
altered the importance of, and the ways in which nations deal with, such
global issues as the politics of energy, North-South economic conflict, arms
control, nuclear proliferation, and heightened politico social tensions in
many less developed countries. (u)
Many of the consequences of these crises will become clear only with time.
But a preliminary assessment indicates that, at a minimum, these events are
changing many nations' perceptions of the global issues that most seriously
affect their interests. As a result, attention is shifting away from the
economic issues that tended to dominate international forums in the 1970s
and toward military and security-related issues. (c NF)
Developed countries are becoming less sympathetic to developing country
demands for a larger role in world affairs and for a greater transfer of
resources from rich to poor. Energy is still high on the global agenda, but the
focus now is more on seenrity of the energy supply than on the cooperation
necessary to cope with longer term problems of energy scarcity. (C NF)
The crises impinge most directly on security-related issues. Prospects for
controlling the spread of conventional and nuclear weapons have worsened
as many nations perceive what they interpret to be a shift in US priorities, as
US-Soviet negotiations become more difficult, and as other states consider
extending their military commitments. (C NF)
The example set by separatist activity in Southwest Asia is likely to be
contagious. Moreover, the increase in international tensions further
heightens the likelihood of violent resistance to central authorities by ethnic
and religious minorities. One probable result is an increase in terrorism,
which will make it more difficult for many governments to preserve both
internal order and civil liberties. (u)
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Confidential
.NOFORN
Effects of the Southwest
Asian Crises on Key
Global Issues t (u)
The Crises and the Global Political Climate
Many observers have interpreted the recent crises in
Southwest Asia, particularly the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, as a turning point that ended an era of
East-West detente and initiated a new period of rancor
and tension in world politics. Comment on the Soviet
intervention has centered on Moscow's objectives and
strategy in Southwest Asia. Regardless of what Soviet
designs prove to be, however, the recent events in
Southwest Asia are, for several reasons, already
sufficient to make the global political climate signifi-
cantly more inclement during the next several years
than it was during the latter years of the 1970s. (u)
First, the perception of change in superpower policies
has greater impact on the world political climate than
does the actual change. Detente, cold war, and similar
concepts are states of mind-moods with which
opinionmakers infect each other from time to time,
regardless of whether these moods reflect govern-
mental decisions. The recent worldwide change in
mood appears to have gone far enough to assure an
alteration in the global political climate that would be
difficult to reverse even if the USSR were to take
reassuring steps in the coming weeks. (u)
Second, the reactions of some governments, particu-
larly major powers, cause other changes that go
beyond mere states of mind and to which other
governments must respond. A chain reaction continues
even if the first links in the chain are later seen to have
been forged out of false perceptions. US responses to
the events in Iran and Afghanistan have speeded such
a chain reaction by creating new facts: warships are
moved, weapons are exported, embargoes are imposed.
(u)
'This is a preliminary assessment of the ways in which the crises in
Afghanistan and Iran may affect global issues and should thus be
read more for the questions it raises than for specific predictions.
This paper considers only changes triggered by recent events in
Southwest Asia. It does not contain a complete and balanced
assessment of any global issue. (u)
Third, the Southwest Asian crises, even if their
intrinsic importance is played down by future histori-
ans, nevertheless mark a transition to a new era made
possible by two trends of the late 1970s: the augmenta-
tion of Soviet military strength relative to that of the
United States and enhanced US interest in more direct
involvement in Third World security. Afghanistan did
not cause either trend, but provided the occasion for
the implications of each to become clear and for their
broader effects to be set in train. (u)
Fourth, the near simultaneity of several related or
apparently related events has amplified the impact
they could have had on world politics separately. The
takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan caused the United States to
bolster its military presence in the area. The twin crises
subjected other governments to cross pressures but,
nevertheless, made the issues of the superpowers'
rivalry, the projection of their military power, and their
relations with the Islamic world even more salient and
urgent. (u)
Apart from the Iranian crisis, several other events
closely coinciding with the intervention in Afghanistan
have heightened concerns about, and broadened the
political effects of, Soviet military expansionism.
Indira Gandhi's election victory in India has threat-
ened Pakistan with increased Soviet influence on its
southeastern border just as the Soviet Army had
marched up to its northwestern border. Tito's illness
and death have rekindled longstanding fears that
Yugoslavia will become a Soviet target. And the
approach of the summer Olympics in Moscow has
given the West the retaliatory threat of a boycott,
which is forcing other states to decide whether to
follow suit. Meanwhile, several recent moves by the
United States and its allies-modernization of theater
nuclear forces in Europe, a new defense cooperation
agreement with Turkey, and Secretary Brown's visit to
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China-given their coincidence with the retaliatory
steps taken in response to the Soviet intervention, have
reinforced perceptions of increased US militancy and
hostility toward the USSR. (c)
The Crises and Global Issues
Global issues are those that are subjects of debate and
discussion in worldwide forums or that tend to recur in
similar form as international problems in different
parts of the world. The deterioration of US-Soviet
relations and the more general increase in world
tensions affect global issues in several ways. (u)
First, military intervention and superpower confronta-
tion bear directly on security-related questions such as
arms control. Second, some nonmilitary issues receive
increased attention because they are particularly acute
or important in the region where the confrontation
occurs. Third, other issues receive less attention
because the crisis of the moment crowds them off the
global agenda-which is of limited size because
headlines, debating time, and diplomatic resources are
also limited. Fourth, some diplomatic campaigns lose
steam because the states leading them reorder
priorities to meet new security needs. Fifth, new fears
about military security breed new dependencies,
thereby changing the leverage that individual states
can use to win concessions on their favorite issues. (u)
Realignments within and between alliances and re-
gional groups that crises in superpower relations can
entail also affect many global issues. Divisions within
NATO over the Afghan affair are already apparent,
for example, and some members of the Warsaw Pact
evidently view the costs of the downturn in East-West
relations as more substantial than Moscow does. Any
lingering discord within those alliances can, on other
issues, help to weaken old coalitions or to create new
ones. (c NF)
The Impact on 10 Global Issues
The Southwest Asian crises and the change in the
world political climate associated with them will affect
a number of global issues that have been prominent
during the 1970s or are likely to be important items on
the global agenda for the 1980s: energy dependence;
nonalignment and the politics of the nonaligned
movement; demand of less developed countries
(LDCs) for a New International Economic Order
(NIEO); food supply; ethnic separatism and self-
determination for minorities; international narcotics
trafficking; governmental respect for human rights;
international terrorism; arms control; and nuclear
proliferation. The following preliminary observations
are chiefly political in nature, and focus more on the
rhetoric, fears, alignments, and negotiations associated
with these issues than on underlying economic or
technical problems. (u)
Energy. Because of their proximity to the Persian Gulf
oilfields, the crises in Iran and Afghanistan have
intensified worldwide interest in the issue of energy
dependence. US responses to both events-including
the President's declaration that the hostage situation in
Tehran proves the danger of dependence on foreign oil
and the allocation to gasohol production of some of the
grain being denied the USSR-have reinforced the
more obvious links between physical security in
Southwest Asia and the availability of energy in the
industrial nations. Because of these links, energy
differs from other economic issues in that it will not
receive less attention merely because military security
is receiving more. (u)
More specifically, however, the Southwest Asian crises
have heightened immediate concerns over security of
energy supplies-that is, the danger that military
action, civil unrest, or occupation of the oil-producing
areas by a hostile power will interrupt the production
or shipment of oil. To the extent that the consuming
nations focus their attention narrowly on this problem,
they have less time and inclination to develop long-
term solutions to the more fundamental problem of an
overall scarcity of energy resources. For example, the
European Community's attempts to establish a dia-
logue with the Persian Gulf Arab states are intended
primarily to secure delivery of oil and only secondarily
to discuss longer term issues. (c NF)
The crises also have made cooperation among the
industrial countries more difficult because they have
placed in sharper focus the greater West European and
Japanese reliance, relative to the dependence of the
United States, on Persian Gulf oil. The discrepancy in
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Confidential
energy imports, which could divide the United States
from its allies on questions of military security in this
region, may now divide them more sharply than before
on the energy issue itself. Dependence on the Middle
East for energy and on the United States for security
were already competing priorities in Western Europe
and Japan. The more complex relationship between the
two issues that the Southwest Asian crises have
spawned makes the dilemma more acute. (c NF)
The recent events in this region will also influence the
oil producers' decisions in complex ways. For one
thing, Iran's experiences demonstrate the potential
hazards of generating far more revenue than a
government needs merely to maintain itself. Some
attributed the Shah's downfall partly to the rapidity
with which he spent his oil income to modernize Iran's
society, industrial base, and military establishment.
The only place to invest excess revenues, however, is in
the West, and the blocking of Iranian assets by the
United States makes this appear riskier than it once
did. To the extent that both domestic development and
foreign investment thus appear less attractive, other oil
exporters will be more inclined to restrict production
and retain more of their wealth in the ground as
untapped reserves. (u)
The oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf now fear
armed attack from a major power more than they did
several months ago. This also is apt to influence their
decisions on oil exports but in a less predictable
manner. Some officials in these states, including Saudi
Arabian Oil Minister Yamani, have interpreted
Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan as the first step in a
march to the oilfields-part of a military strategy to
cope with the USSR's coming energy shortfall. Corre-
sponding fears of US military action have been
heightened by both the confrontation with Iran over
the hostages and the possibility that Washington will
feel compelled to preempt or respond to Soviet
advances in the region. (c)
The net effect of this melange of security concerns on
individual decisions regarding the pricing and produc-
tion of petroleum will largely depend on how the
producing states perceive the leverage they have over
the major powers and vice versa. On the one hand, an
increased probability of invasion by a major power or
increased dependence on that power to deter or defeat
an attack by someone else tend to weaken the
bargaining position of militarily weak oil-producing
countries. On the other hand, the West's increased
dependence on some of these countries, not only as
sources of oil but as frontline states in an effort to
contain Soviet military expansion, implies that they
can drive harder bargains in future negotiations with
the West. The backdrop to all these perceptions is the
prospect of an energy-hungry USSR becoming a
significant importer of Middle East oil. The oil
exporters will be dealing in the future with both camps
that are competing militarily in their backyard, and
the deals they are willing to make with each will reflect
their judgment of the outcome of that competition. (c)
Nonalignment. An extension of superpower security
commitments and a renewed cold war unquestionably
pose a major challenge to the tenets and cohesion of the
nonaligned movement (NAM). East-West conflict is
making a deepening imprint on world politics in
general. The prospect of an unbridgeable split pre-
vented the NAM from convening a formal meeting to
discuss either Iran or Afghanistan. The creation of the
NAM, however, was a response to the challenges of an
earlier cold war and to the desires of its founders to
resist subjugation by the superpowers. Now, Third
World diplomats are talking of the need to "reinvent"
nonalignment. Many of their governments will make
renewed efforts to map paths that avoid a close
relationship with either camp, not just to preserve
bargaining positions from which to pursue their
individual interests but to preserve nonalignment and
the nonaligned movement. (u)
The embarrassment that the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan has caused the NAM's current chair,
Cuba, should ease these efforts. Havana's withdrawal
from the race for a seat on the UN Security Council
was the first concrete indication that its patron's
aggression was a blow to its own prestige and influence
among the nonaligned. The Cuban-led elements that
have attempted to steer the NAM toward a more pro-
Soviet course in recent years may become less assertive
for the time being, particularly on the more divisive
political questions. The more conservative members of
the movement will not, however, attempt a similar
subversion of nonalignment from the right. Instead,
the greater reticence of pro-Soviet forces in the NAM
will make discourse in the movement sound less
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factionalized than it was before, or at least less than it
had been threatening to become since Cuba's assump-
tion of the chair. (u)
Whether reinvention of nonalignment is accomplished
will depend in large part on the leadership of Iraq,
which will succeed Cuba as the chair of the NAM in
1982. The events in Southwest Asia have enhanced
Baghdad's already excellent qualifications for filling
this role. Iraq has sharply denounced the Soviet action
in Afghanistan while remaining untainted by close
association with the West. It is located on the newest
frontline of superpower confrontation and hence is on
the frontline of the NAM's efforts to avoid being
engulfed by this confrontation. The chaos in Iran's
armed forces makes Iraq militarily the strongest
Persian Gulf state, giving it a greater role in regional
security to complement the important economic role it
fills by virtue of its oil. (u)
Meanwhile, the NAM will alter its treatment of
specific issues as required to avoid a pattern of
consistent support for either superpower. It will change
the tone of its pronouncements on some longstanding
issues to balance positions it takes on more recent
controversies. For example, the stridency of its denun-
ciations of Egypt and the US-sponsored peace diplo-
macy in the Middle East will be governed in part by the
need to appear evenhanded despite its criticism of the
Soviet move against Afghanistan. (u)
LDC Demands for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO). Because most of the membership of
the Group of 77 (G-77)-the caucus that formulates
LDC economic demands-duplicates that of the
NAM, any factionalism that reduces the cohesion of
the latter will have similar effects on the former. The
effectiveness of LDC demands for an NIEO could
decline because of resulting frictions within the G-77,
and are likely to decline a little anyway because of a
shift of worldwide attention to security questions and
away from economic development. As with nonalign-
ment, however, LDC leaders may make special efforts
to counteract these tendencies and to assure that the
sense of urgency for establishment of an NIEO does
not get lost in the crisis-driven political shuffles in the
1980s. And as with energy, national policies toward the
NIEO will partly reflect changing perceptions of who
depends more on whom. (u)
Worries about security in Asia or Africa may make
industrial nations more generous in providing eco-
nomic assistance to selected LDCs, either in return for
military access rights or as part of broader efforts to
nurture relations with critical areas of the Third
World. Some West European governments already are
responding to the recent crises by reemphasizing such
efforts. Increased Western defense spending, however,
implies fewer total resources for development assist-
ance, and this could mean less aid to LDCs deemed to
be strategically less important. (C NF)
In any case, more generous Western economic aid
would not necessarily mute the NIEO issue, for the
LDCs' collective posture is shaped less by what they
have achieved already than by what they want to attain
in the future. Furthermore, additional development
assistance would leave unanswered other demands in
the NIEO, such as those concerning control over
foreign investment. Any appearance of division among
Western nations over how to respond to LDC economic
demands, even if such divisions stem more from
different assessments of Third World needs than from
different interests, is likely to stimulate the G-77 to
sustain or even strengthen its push for the NIEO. (u)
Changes in relations between the oil exporters and
other G-77 members resulting from military develop-
ments in Southwest Asia are also likely to affect the
NIEO issue. The increased vulnerability of some of the
exporting states probably has enhanced the value to
them of diplomatic support from other LDCs, and the
latter may see this as an opportunity to wrest from
OPEC members some of the economic concessions,
including greater development assistance, that so far
they have been unable to obtain. Even if the oil
exporters grant such concessions, however, they may
restrain their rhetorical support for the NIEO to avoid
needless damage to their relations with the major
powers, whose military support has become even more
critical. (c)
Food. Any effects that change in the global political
climate will have on the issue of supply and distribution
of food will parallel to some extent the effects that the
global political climate has on discussions of the
NIEO. It is unlikely, however, that the LDCs will
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Confidential
make special collective efforts to counter the distract-
ing effect of new military concerns and to keep the
world's attention focused on food. There is legs of a
sense of urgency in the. global arena concerning food
than there was at the time of the 1974 World Food
Conference. (c NF)
Although security of food supply is at least a latent
concern for many LDCs, their interests in the world
food trade are divergent. Some are net exporters, for
example, and the degree of dependence on imported
food varies widely among the others. This issue is thus
less suitable than some aspects of the NIEO as a device
for cultivating unity among the nonaligned or
spotlighting economic inequality between North and
South. Furthermore, the Western countries that are
most in favor of responding to the current security
crises with economic concessions to LDCs are not those
with the most food to export. In sum, although the
supply of food will be one of the subjects of coming
negotiations between industrial and developing coun-
tries, the new focus on security questions will tend to
divert attention from food as a global issue. (c NF)
The highly publicized grain embargo by the United
States as a retaliatory act against the USSR's invasion
into Afghanistan had the potential for increasing
worldwide attention to food and its relation to other
aspects of foreign policy. Third World reaction to the
embargo, however, has been mild-surprisingly so in
view of the overwhelming LDC support for past
assertions that the acquisition of food is a basic human
right. Mexico has been the only developing country to
reiterate publicly its opposition to the use of food as a
foreign policy tool, and it did not link its position
directly to US actions. (u)
One reason for the low-key reaction among other
LDCs is that several of them, such as India, have built
substantial reserves and are less dependent on im-
ported food now than they were during the food crisis
in 1974. Another reason is that importing countries
welcomed the increase in supply of grain that the
embargo caused. Mexico contracted to purchase at
least 1 million metric tons of the grain that was to have
gone to the USSR, other LDCs took advantage of the
situation to increase purchases, and still others ex-
pressed interest in increased food aid or PL480 credits.
Finally, most LDCs seem confident that use of the
embargo will be confined to the current dispute
between the superpowers. The fact that the United
States never officially interrupted food shipments to
Iran evidently has reassured them that the present
embargo does not presage future ones directed against
LDCs. (c)
Ethnic Separatism. National self-determination, al-
though affirmed as a right by the UN General
Assembly and repeatedly invoked on behalf of a few
fashionable causes like black resistance movements in
southern Africa, has not been debated in global forums
nearly as extensively as the numerous discrepancies
between ethnic geography and political boundaries
would warrant. The principal reason for this is the
unwillingness of many regimes to champion separatist
movements in foreign countries for fear that others
would foment unrest among minorities in their own
territories. This widely held belief, true or not, implies
that a kindling of ethnic separatism anywhere on the
globe can spread rapidly and widely; not only does the
activity of one separatist group have a demonstration
effect on others, but the tacit agreement among many
governments not to rock each other's boat breaks
down. (u)
The ethnic geography of Southwest Asia is such that
crisis and confrontation in the region are particularly
prone to stir up separatist activity and the self-
determination issue, both of which can then spread to
other regions. The area is a patchwork of minorities
whose homelands straddle international boundaries
and who lack political autonomy. Some of them (for
example, the Kurds and the Baluchis) have recent
histories of violent resistance. As external threats
increase the vulnerability of governments in the
regions, some of these groups are afforded the opportu-
nity to assert their claims more forcefully. Military
assistance to established regimes may also provoke
more violent resistance by minorities fearful that the
new arms will be used against them (currently a
Baluchi suspicion regarding military assistance to
Pakistan). (u)
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Because Islam is identified with neither the predomi-
nantly Christian West nor atheistic Soviet Marxism,
religion overlays and reinforces nationalism as a basis
for resisting the influence of major powers in South-
west Asia. Khomeini's revolution in Iran has made
separatism within the region even more complex by
increasing the probability of serious Shia resistance in
nearby Sunni-ruled countries. Islam as a whole can be
a vehicle to spread separatist unrest to other regions-
that is, to Muslim groups elsewhere in Asia or Africa
inspired by the efforts of their coreligionists in Iran and
Afghanistan. The Sahel in Africa, where a Muslim-
Christian split complicates the problems of ethnic
diversity in several countries, is a particularly fertile
ground for such unrest. (u)
The more that Third World politics fractionate and
local tensions between ideologically incompatible
neighbors develop as byproducts of tension between the
superpowers, the less inhibited some governments will
become in supporting separatist activity in other
countries. The 1975 agreement between Iraq and
imperial Iran that squelched Kurdish resistance illus-
trated how useful such agreements can be to the
regions making them and how devastating they are to
the separatists. Similar agreements, tacit or explicit,
will be less feasible or viable in a more tension-laden
political climate. Support for separatist movements in
neighboring states may become an increasingly
attractive tactic for governments wishing to counteract
perceived threats along their borders. (u)
Third World governments may contribute to separatist
activity less wittingly by making greater use of
nationalist symbols and rhetoric to assert their inde-
pendence in the face of the more extensive activity of
major powers. Nationalist fervor would draw attention
to the aspirations of minorities who have their own
symbols and slogans that they would invoke in
preference to those promoted by their rulers. (u)
Narcotics. Turmoil in Southwest Asia impinges di-
rectly on international narcotics trafficking because
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran presently constitute
the world's leading opium-producing region. Produc-
tion in these countries determines in large measure the
economics of the worldwide illicit narcotics traffic and
specifically the supply of heroin reaching Western
Europe and North America. (u)
A severe drought in the Golden Triangle of Southeast
Asia and the breakdown of internal order in Iran have
contributed to Southwest Asia's current preeminence
in opium production. Licensed opium production took
place in Iran under the Shah, but early in 1979
illicit production began increasing substantially as
Khomeini's revolution disrupted the country and
immobilized its law enforcement agencies. Increased
activity by separatist groups makes conditions particu-
larly favorable for illicit opium production by further
curtailing the central government's control over many
producing areas. (c)
Since the Tehran hostage crisis began, the Iranian
Government has been not only less able but less willing
to cooperate with the United States in controlling the
illicit narcotics trade. Discussions on mutual control
programs took place as late as September of last year,
but that effort is now dead. (c)
The increase in Iranian opium production will prob-
ably be offset to some extent by decreased poppy
plantings in Pakistan and Afghanistan during 1980.
Production in Pakistan is down in part because of
market disruptions and consequent lower prices and
because of an effective control program by the
government. In Afghanistan, the fighting has dis-
persed field labor that otherwise would be harvesting
poppies. Furthermore, shipment of the crop within
Afghanistan is often more difficult because combat
has disrupted established transportation routes and
increased the chance that security forces will find and
seize opium shipments while performing other mis-
sions. (c)
Despite these difficulties, however, the turmoil in
Afghanistan may increase the amount of opium
leaving the country in the near term. The opium
inventory within Afghanistan was probably high at the
start of this year, and many refugees fleeing the
country are taking narcotics with them as an easily
carried form of wealth. Drug traffickers faced with
interdicted transportation networks will seek alterna-
tive routes to their markets, whether by sea or through
Iran-where the disorder is due to a breakdown of
central authority, not a foreign military presence, and
the transport of illegal drugs thus has become even
safer than before. (c)
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Human Rights. A rise in separatist unrest, if it occurs,
also could degrade the human rights performance of
many of the states concerned because their govern-
ments will feel compelled to curtail liberties and
tighten internal security in an effort to meet this threat
to order, territorial integrity, and their own power. The
deterioration in US-Soviet relations also is damaging
the cause of human rights in other ways. Moscow
apparently has concluded that it now must be more
vigilant even if this involves highly visible abridg-
ments of its citizens' liberties, such as the internal exile
of Andrei Sakharov and a reduction in Jewish emigra-
tion. (c)
At the same time, the United States, which for at least
the last three years has been the most vocal govern-
mental proponent of human rights, is seen as having
lowered the priority of the issue relative to military
matters. US nurturing of a security relationship with
Argentina to obtain cooperation with the grain em-
bargo would be interpreted similarly. The impact on
human rights performance will not be confined to the
countries directly involved, because US actions suggest
to other regimes relying on US support that a poor
human rights record, although it can sour relations
with Washington during calmer times, will tend to be
disregarded when serious security concerns material-
ize. (c)
Less observance of human rights in many parts of the
world does not imply, however, less attention to the
issue. Well-publicized violations of human rights-
even those of a lone individual, as in Sakharov's case-
will tend to keep the issue on the global agenda. West
European governments may henceforth attack Soviet
human rights practices more strongly in order to
support the United States and demonstrate their
displeasure with Moscow without jeopardizing that
aspect of detente most important to them-arms
control in Europe. The Sakharov affair already ap-
pears to have given them a rationale for moving in this
direction. (c NF)
International Terrorism. A rise in nationalist unrest
and in harsh security practices intended to cope with
this unrest or with external threats is likely to increase
political violence. Much of this will take the form of
localized terrorism, but violence-prone groups that
perceive their homelands to be targets of major power
expansionism would be more likely to attack the
citizens or property of these powers. (u)
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will have little
direct effect on patterns of international terrorism,
apart from the recent upsurge in terrorist attacks
against Soviet targets by groups other than the
traditionally anti-Soviet ones like Cuban exiles and the
Jewish Defense League. The prospects for greater
East-West cooperation on combating terrorism, like
the prospects for other forms of East-West cooper-
ation, have become dimmer for the short term.
Experience suggests, however, that counterterrorist
measures are one of the last forms of cooperation to be
discarded because of bilateral frictions. The USSR's
concern over threats to its own personnel and installa-
tions should induce it, over the longer term, to continue
such cooperation despite differences with the United
States and the Western alliance. Cuban-US cooper-
ation against aerial hijacking could serve as a model.
(c)
The other Southwest Asian crisis that has dominated
the headlines of the last several months-the occupa-
tion of the US Embassy in Tehran-bears more
directly on international terrorism. The Embassy
affair is most important as a chilling new chapter in the
story of state support to terrorists. Most patron states
have kept their support discreet, but the Iranian
regime openly condoned an outrage committed against
foreign diplomats on its own territory and became in
effect the terrorists' agent in subsequent negotiations.
If this action were to inspire other governments to
extend new assistance to terrorist groups, it would
reverse a hopeful trend over the past few years toward
less patron state support. Whether it does will depend
in part on how the Tehran crisis is resolved and more
specifically on how independent of the Iranian regime's
influence the terrorists prove to be. If the regime is
shown to be unable to control the Embassy militants-
and, therefore, unable to control the costs that it
necessarily incurs as the militants' agent-this could
discourage other would-be patron states. (u)
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The Embassy takeover and another recent and dra-
matic terrorist action in Southwest Asia-the capture
of the Great Mosque in Mecca-have altered pros-
pects in the Islamic world for both international
terrorism and counterterrorist cooperation. In the
short term, the US confrontation with the theocratic
regime in Iran has made the United States more likely
to be attacked by Muslim extremists elsewhere, as
indicated by the ease with which rumors of US
complicity in the Mecca incident spread and touched
off attacks on US installations in Islamabad and
elsewhere. (u)
Over the longer term, Muslim governments may
become increasingly willing to cooperate with Western
states in counterterrorist efforts because they now see
themselves as more likely terrorist targets. This would
be particularly so if the Sunni-Shia split took a more
violent turn-The willingness of some Muslim govern-
ments to cooperate openly, however, will still be limited
by their fear of alienating religious extremists in their
own countries. (u)
Arms Control. Because arms control is closely related
to military force deployments, projection of power, and
similar security questions, the Southwest Asian crises
are having more direct and immediate effects on it
than on any other global issue. In addition to deferring
US Senate consideration of SALT II, the superpower
confrontation has removed any chance for reinvig-
orating certain other bilateral arms control negotia-
tions in the foreseeable future. (c)
Early resumption of the Indian Ocean naval arms
limitation talks seems highly unlikely in view of the
reinforcements that both superpowers have sent to the
region. Negotiations to restrain conventional arms
transfers (CAT) probably also will remain moribund
for the time being, not just because of the general
deterioration of East-West relations but because the
United States-the chief advocate of this arms control
effort for the last three years-has signalled a decision
to lower the priority it gives to CAT restraint. This
signal has taken the form of efforts to resume or
initiate military assistance relationships with Pakistan
and Somalia and to offer more advanced weapons to
current clients like Egypt. The impact of these moves is
enhanced by coming so soon after the US decision to
reverse its earlier prohibition on development of a
fighter aircraft solely for export. (c)
The United States guided or stimulated most of the
steps that the USSR, Western arms suppliers, and
some LDC arms recipients have taken toward CAT
restraint. None of these states wants to get too far out
in front on this issue, and they will take the US actions
as cues to adjust their own priorities in a like manner.
(c)
A more bitter global political climate is also damaging
the near-term prospects for arms control in less direct
ways. The more fearful that LDCs become of hostile
action by either a neighbor or an outside power, the
more they will welcome or solicit countermeasures in
the form of increased imports of weapons or of military
deployments by friendly countries. Outside powers will
respond positively to most such solicitations, either to
protect countries in which they have traditionally
maintained interests or to fill vacuums that adversaries
might otherwise fill. The United Kingdom might
restore some of its lost military presence east of Suez,
and several West European states may increase their
export of arms to the Third World, a step that also
supports domestic economic interests. All of these
developments will further degrade the climate for arms
control. (c NF)
A retardation of arms control negotiations between the
superpowers will produce more hand wringing, re-
criminations, and exhortations in the larger arms
control forums such as the First Committee of the
General Assembly and the Committee on Disarma-
ment in Geneva. There will be more talk in the latter
forum about fulfilling the Committee's charter as a
genuine multilateral negotiating body so that progress
toward global arms control accords need not be held
hostage to bilateral relations between the superpowers.
Actual steps in this direction, however, will be discour-
aged by the continued recognition that such accords
would be either meaningless or impracticable without
the superpowers' cooperation. Greater fractionation of
Third World politics will discourage independent
nonaligned initiatives in arms control even more than
in other global issues on which united action is less
impeded by divisions over security questions. In short,
 Approved For Release 2006/11/15: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000600200004-3
Confidential
the ability of many states to hasten progress in arms
control will decline just as their frustration over the
lack of progress is rising. (u)
Over the longer term, the souring of East-West
relations could encourage arms control in certain ways.
A serious military confrontation between the super-
powers in the Indian Ocean or elsewhere, for example,
might increase support in both countries for agree-
ments designed to reduce the chance of stumbling into
war, similar to the way the 1962 Cuban missile crisis
built constituencies for earlier efforts at detente and
arms control. More probable would be an effort by
West European (and conceivably East European)
governments to counteract the injuries to East-West
relations by placing greater stress on arms control,
particularly those aspects of most immediate concern
to them-that is, the control of both conventional and
theater nuclear forces in Europe. West European
leaders are coming to the view that with the Afghani-
stan affair having already inflicted so much damage to
detente, special efforts to sustain the arms control
dialogue are more important than ever. (c NF)
In this perspective, arms control is less a consequence
of detente than a means for maintaining a relationship
that is threatened on other fronts-a perspective
consistent with the superpowers' use of SALT in the
1970s. To extricate European arms control from US-
Soviet antagonism, the West Europeans are increas-
ingly supporting the French approach of addressing
arms control in forums other than East-West, bloc-to-
bloc negotiations. The meeting scheduled for Madrid
in November 1980 to review the results of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) will provide an opportunity to pursue this
approach, with a probable outcome being a decision to
convene a later conference limited to disarmament
questions but linked to CSCE. (C NF)
Another possible long-term effect not entirely deleteri-
ous to arms control is the faster development of
regional security organizations and arrangements.
LDCs in several regions are likely to find such
arrangements increasingly attractive both as a re-
sponse to the threatened intrusion of a hostile power
and as an alternative to the suffocating embrace of a
friendly state. In other words, they are means for
coping with the dangers of a more unstable and
insecure world without drawing conflicts into one's
own area or sacrificing claims to independence and
nonalignment. Regional arrangements initially would
be instruments more of self-defense than of arms
control. The more that LDCs base their defense
strategies on them, however, the more meaningful it
would be to base arms control efforts on them as well,
to prevent arms races not just within a regional group
but also between such groups. Lacking direct super-
power involvement, regional groups in the Third
World-although they would have many problems of
their own-would probably be freer to pursue arms
control despite US-Soviet hostility than would the
European alliances. (u)
Nuclear Proliferation. Like human rights and CAT
restraint, the United States has championed nuclear
nonproliferation but now is downgrading it in response
to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The pro-
posed lifting of the aid embargo that had been imposed
on Pakistan because of its nuclear weapons programs
and the favorable decision on nuclear fuel shipments to
India, despite New Delhi's refusal of full-scope safe-
guards-no matter how explicable these actions are in
terms of the need to cope with the Soviet advance-
will lower the credibility of much of what the United
States has been saying about proliferation. Both
suppliers and recipients of nuclear materials and
equipment as a result could become less willing to
cooperate in future US-led nonproliferation efforts.
(c)
The recent crises will affect the incentives of would-be
proliferators in a variety of ways, with an uncertain net
effect on their decisions. On the one hand, a greater
fear of becoming a target of great power aggression
could strengthen the inclination of some states to
acquire a nuclear deterrent. Others might be more
likely to develop nuclear weapons because of a hostile
neighbor's buildup of conventional military forces or of
generally increased tension and instability in its region.
Some pro-Western states might conclude from Paki-
stan's experience that they can disregard US warnings
about the consequences of a nuclear weapons program
because the United States will still come to their aid
 Approved For Release 2006/11/15: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R000600200004-3
when that aid is needed the most. An interruption in
the East-West arms control dialogue also would
undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by
inviting the contention that the nuclear powers were
not fulfilling their obligations under Article VI to
pursue negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarma-
ment. This issue surely will be debated at the NPT
Review Conference that convenes in August (u)
The demonstrated willingness of a power like the
United States to aid a threatened state like Pakistan
makes the development of nuclear weapons by such a
state appear less costly. It also makes nuclear weapons
development less necessary because confidence in the
security guarantees of powerful friends who are
increasingly willing to make overseas military commit-
ments reduces one possible incentive to acquire nuclear
weapons. Strengthening indigenous conventional
forces through accelerated military assistance pro-
grams might have a similar effect on some nonnuclear
weapons states. (u)
The alteration of the global climate is also likely to
affect the attitudes of nuclear suppliers. West Euro-
pean governments, in an effort to cement relations with
key LDCs in troubled regions (for example, Iraq),
could fill the requests of these states for nuclear fuel or
equipment without requiring stringent safeguards. The
near-term prospects for Soviet cooperation in nonpro-
liferation efforts are diminishing along with prospects
for many other types of East-West cooperation. The
pro-Western orientation of most potential prolif-
erators, however, implies that Moscow should be at
least as concerned as the United States about preserv-
ing an effective nonproliferation regime in a climate
favoring the further spread of nuclear weapons. (c NF)