WORLDWIDE REACTION TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600190013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

tioFnoar Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP81 B00401 R0006001 0113g
ecret 25X1
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Worldwide Reaction to the
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Top Secret
PA 80-10051 C
e ruary
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Worldwide Reaction to the
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan=
Summary International public reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been
overwhelmingly negative, although in varying shades of intensity
In the case of several states, negative private reaction among government
leaders has been masked by silence or in some cases lukewarm public
support for the invasion. Some public backing for Moscow, particularly by
radica~.Ar states, has hidden private apprehensions over future Soviet
goals. lul
As expected, outright approval has come only from those states having well-
established relations with or dependent on the USSR, such as the hardline
Warsaw Pact states, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Angola. And Hungary, Poland,
and Bulgaria, while providing official support, have expressed private fears
to US diplomats that the-.nwasion will hurt their growing economic relations
with the United States.) 25X1
The author of this paper i Near East South Asia Division, Office of
Political Analysis. It has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near
East and South Asia and with the Office of Economic Research. Research was completed on
23 January 1980. Questions and comments are welcome and should be directed to the Chief
Afghan Task Force,F- -1 25X1
i Top Secret
The nature of the reactions and the motives behind them have varied with
each country's geopolitical, economic, military, and religious concerns:
? Most of the 18 votes against the UN General Assembly resolution calling
for the removal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan came from
Communist or Marxist countries or from states heavily dependent on
Moscow for economic and military support.
? Many Near East and South Asian nations see the Afghan situation as a
problem between the superpowers in which they should not become involved.
? Many other developing countries view the crisis in superpower versus
Third World terms.
? Islamic religious political parties and groups worldwide have been hostile
to the Soviet intervention. ^ 25X1
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On the issue of sanctions and reprisals against the Soviet Union, few states
are taking action on their own. Those that are can generally afford to, both
sally and militarily, because of solid relations with the United States.
Some states, such as Egypt and China, have publicly promised aid to the
Afghan guerrillas. Most small, developing nations, however, probably prefer
collective action, if any, and may go no further than their vote on the UN
resolution.II
Some of the smaller African nations appear to have abstained from the vote
to avoid endangering their access to aid from either the West or the
Communist bloc. Yet, some who have sought Soviet aid, such as Jama'
voted in favor of the UN resolution, possibly at some cost to themselvelI
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Worldwide Reaction to the
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan F]
Arab States Moderate Arab states have generally condemned the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Of the radical Arabs, only Iraq has criticized the Soviets. The
other radical states and the Palestinians have offered varying degrees of
public support to Moscow, although some are rivately critical and 25X1
apprehensive about Soviet goals in the region.
Within the moderate ranks, only Egypt has taken concrete steps to penalize
the USSR. The recent tentative improvement in Egyptian/Soviet relations
has all but collapsed. Cairo has canceled plans to send an ambassador to
Moscow and has ordered a sharp reduction in the Soviet diplomatic presence
in Egypt. Cairo has repeated its offer of military facilities for US use in
dealing with crises in the Middle East and has appealed to other Islamic
states to join a united anti-Soviet campaign. High-ranking Egyptian
officials have met with-and promised military assistance to-exiled
Afghan leaders.
7
Saudi Arabia and Morocco, which do not suffer from Egypt's diplomatic
isolation within the Arab world, worked with Pakistan to convene a meeting
of Islamic Foreign Ministers. This gathering has resulted in a call for
increased assistance to Pakistan, Iran, and the insurgents in Aghanistan,
further condemnation of the Soviets, and suspension of Afghan membership
in the Islamic conference. The sole Arab member of the UN Security
Council, Tunisia, joined with non-Arab Islamic members in sponsoring the
Soviet-vetoed resolution calling for an end to foreign military involvement in
Afghanistan. All of the moderate Arabs voted in favor of the General 25X1
Assembly resolution. F-1
Of the radical Arab states, South Yemen has defended the Soviets
vigorously because of its arms supply relationship with the USSR and
because the two countries recently signed a friendship treaty. Syria and the
Palestine Liberation Organization also have backed the Soviets publicly, but
with notably less enthusiasm. Members of the Arab "Steadfastness
Front"-Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO-met in
Damascus on 16 January in an attempt to marshal renewed Arab backing
for their anti-Egypt and anti-US campaign. All references in their
concluding joint statement that pertained to the USSR were positive, and
they praised the policies and orientation of the new government in
Afghanistan. Algeria, Libya and the PLO nonetheless decided to participate
in the Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting on Afghanistan. Iraqi President
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Saddam Husayn has personally condemned the Soviets, fueling speculation
that Baghdad's apprehensions about Soviet goals in the region might
ultimately lead Iraq to abrogate its friendship treaty with the USSR.
Arab media comment on the Afghan situation has made clear that many
Arabs, even the moderate small states of the Persian Gulf, see the crisis
primarily as a problem between the superpowers that the Arabs would be
wise to avoid. This attitude reduces the likelihood that the Arabs will
cooperate with the United States in any anti-Soviet action that carries risks
or costs for them. Some Arab spokesmen have coupled their attacks on the
USSR w, arnings against possible US military action in the Persian Gulf
region. u
Some of the Arabs have defended their mild responses to the Soviet invasion
as being in line with their policies concerning the occupation of Arab land by
a US proxy-Israel. The Arabs clearly believe that the unresolved
Palestinian question, not Soviet expansionism, is the most serious threat to
political stability in the Middle East
The Israelis predictably interpret recent events in Iran and Afghanistan as
support for their longstanding contention that the central destabilizing
factor in the region is not the Arab-Israeli conflict but a combination of
Soviet expansionism, growing domestic instability in the Muslim states, and
the Islamic revival. Given its perception of rapidly worsening regional
instability, the Begin government will be even less willing to consider major
concessions on Palestinian autonomy. Instead, Begin will increasingly
emphasize the critical "larger" need for cooperation on regional security
among the United States, Egypt, and Israel. ^
Iran has officially condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and many
Iranian officials, both secular and clerical, have strongly criticized the
Soviets. The Soviet Embassy in Tehran has been attacked twice by Afghan
and Iranian crowds. Already strained relations between Tehran and Kabul
have deteriorated further. By recent Iranian standards, however, the
reaction has been restrained. Ayatollah Khomeini has not publicly
commented directly on the Soviet move, and Iran has taken a low profile in
the UN. In part this has reflected Iran's preoccupation with the hostage
crisis and its need for Soviet support in the UN Security Council. In
addition, the Iranians are well aware of SQj t military power and do not
want to provoke their northern neighbor.
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South Asia Among the South Asian countries, India's reaction to the events in
Afghanistan has been the mildest. The responses of the other four countries
have been far more negative, and all have been tempered by regional and
domestic considerations. Only one state, Pakistan, is directly affected by the
Soviet invasion, but it tends to view the situation as both an opportunity and
a long-term threat. 225
25X1
Strongly critical of the Soviet intervention, Pakistan organized a conference
of Islamic Foreign Ministers, which began in Islamabad on 27 January.
condemn the Soviet Union, call for the immediate withdrawal of its troops
from Afghanistan, refuse recognition of the puppet regime in Kabul, pledge
support to the Afghan resistence movement, and study the possibility of
imposing economic sanctions on the USSR. These actions would be
consistent with Pakistan's vehement public denunciation of the Soviet
action, based on real fears about Soviet intentions concerning Pakistan,
particularly Baluchistan province, as well as the long-term effect of a ft
M ft
'
military presence on Pakistan
s
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The convening of the Islamic Foreign Ministers, however, is only one of
Islamabad's tactics for lining up support for its position. Negotiations with
the United States and China will lead to other possibilities.
military ai
India, whose foreign and defense policies are decided by Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi_ has accented the Soviet invasinn Thnnah she does not
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Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have all strongly condemned the Soviet
invasion. In late December and early January, Bangladesh was active in
promoting Security Council action on Afghanistan and was an early
supporter of the calling of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference.
Demonstrations by Islamic groups took place in front of the Soviet Embassy
in Dacca, and there were reports that some Soviet cultural and trade centers
would be burned and de y with the tacit approval of the
Bangladesh Government
Bangladesh leaders still condemn the invasion privately, but they have
begun to mute their public criticism under increasing Soviet pressure and to
minimize their role in advocating the Islamic conference. President Ziaur
Rahman reportedly has stated that faced with the choice of alienating the
United States or the USSR, he would not hesitate to alienate the United
States first. Bangladesh is inclined to follow other Islamic states, particu-
larly Saudi Arabia, rather than pursue its own initiative on the invasion issue
to avoid exposing itself to further pressure from the Soviets.
Nepal supported the UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign
troops from Afghanistan, but probably will not take an active role in any
efforts to implement it. Ultimately, Nepal's reaction will be largely dictated
25X1 by its geographical location between two giants, India and China, who have
adopted significantly different responses to the crisis. Sri Lanka also
supported the UN resolution, but subsequently has adopted a quieter "wait-
and-see" attitude^
East and Southeast Beijing's public reaction to the Soviet invasion has combined a drumbeat of
Asia criticism with calls for an unspecified action by antihegemonists to thwart
the Soviet move
Japan's denunciation of the Soviet invasion was quickly backed by clear and
public measures, such as deciding to support any COCOM decision to
restrict high-technology exports to the USSR, postponing a visit by a Soviet
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parliamentary delegation, putting a brake on cultural and political relations
with Moscow, cutting off future aid to Afghanistan, and increasing aid to
Pakistan by 50 percent. While Prime Minister Ohira is inclined to accept
stiffer economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, he has had to move
cautiously. Politically, he needs business support and is under substantial
pressure from the business sector not to disrupt commercial relations with
the USSR. Ohira thus is looking for strong West European-particulnrlv
West German-support for sanctions before making a final decision] I
25X1
South Korea is deeply concerned about the Afghan situation and wants a
firm US response. Editorial comment has termed the Soviet move "an
outright act of aggression." Commentaries also note that the US reputation
as a "credible protector" of its allies is at stake and support President
Carter's retaliatory measures. On 7 January, South Korean President Choe
Kyu-ha warned that South Korea should not regard the Afghan situation as
"a fire on the other side of the river," because it would affect Korean
economic and security matters. North Korea, in keeping with its practice of
not taking sides i Sino-Soviet rivalry, has not commented publin
the Soviet move. r
In general, Southeast Asian reaction to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan
has been highly condemnatory, particularly in Muslim states such as
Indonesia. All levels of Indonesian society have expressed strong public
disapproval, and on 6 January President Suharto, in a televised budget
message, called for the "withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan's
territory," saying also that the military intervention "shakes the foundations
of world peace." Indonesian students have staged several peaceful demon-
strations in Jakarta and three other major cities. They also have demanded
the recall of the Soviet Ambassador because of remarks he made to a student
delegation on 4 January and have called for the severance of Soviet-25X1
7
The Malaysian Government issued a statement on 3 January calling for the
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and political and religious
organizations have backed the government with protest statements of their
own. In Singapore, a Foreign Ministry statement on 31 December called the
Soviet action a "clear signal to Asia that in the 1980s it will be the target of
Soviet ambitions" and "a clear warning that Western imperialism, n1
largely defunct, is not without a successor.'=
The predominantly government-influenced media in the Philippines have
registered strong disapproval of the Soviet invasion. Although official
statements have been scarce, largely due to preoccupation with local
elections set for 30 January, the Philippines cosponsored the "Uniting for
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Peace" resolution in the UN Security Council, which moved the Afghani-
stan question into the General Assembly. Moreover, President Marcos has
privately confided his concern over Soviet actions, adding that, despite
political differences with the United States, continu cess to
Philippine bases is essential to stability in the region
Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan publicly denounced the Soviet
invasion as interference in the internal affairs of a nation and as a threat to
regional and world peace. The Thai Government supports US sanctions
against the USSR and has privately expressed its willingness not to sell the
USSR any grain products in the near future. Thai Muslims have
demonstrated in front of the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok. The Burmese
Government has not spoken out officially-in keeping with its customary
low posture-but Burmese officials have expressed dismay. I I
Australia and New Zealand have backed their strong condemnations of the
Soviet Union with several concrete actions. Australia has announced that it
will not make up any of the shortfall in US grain sales to the USSR; has
suspended talks on Soviet fishing in Australian waters, plus all other talks,
visits, and exchanges; has suspended port calls by Soviet scientific vessels;
and has dropped consideration of Aeroflot flights through Australia
New Zealand is reviewing its relations with Moscow. On 22 January
Wellington cut the Soviet fishing quota in New Zealand waters for the
license year beginning 1 April. Official visits to the USSR have been
canceled and trade talks left in abeyance. A Soviet correspondent also has
been expelled. New Zealand stopped short, however, of cutting its
agricultural exports to the Soviet Union on the grounds that an embargo
would further damage the depressed New Zealand economy and would hurt
New Zealand more than the Soviet Union.
Twenty-three of the 104 UN members that voted in favor the of UN
General Assembly resolution calling for the removal of foreign troops from
Afghanistan were Sub-Saharan African states. These countries are either
pro-Western or genuinely nonaligned. Some of them-mainly small, weak
states that may have felt protected by the UN umbrella-took the
opportunity to make additional public statements condemning superpower
interference in the Third World. Liberian President Tolbert, in his capacity
as chairman of the Organization of African Unity, appealed to Fidel Castro,
chairman of the nonaligned movement, to condemn Soviet actions in
Afghanistan. The three African countries that voted against the resolu-
tion-Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique-all have close ties with and are
to some degree dependent upon the USSR_They could be expected to
support the Soviets on almost any issue.
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I
Of the remaining 17 states 11 abstained and six were absent or did not
vote-all for a variety of reasons. Some of the abstainers were left-leaning
states and some were special cases. Most probably abstained in order to
avoid jeopardizing their access to aid from either the West or the
Communists. For example, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, which recently
installed new pro-Western regimes, abstained either because of disorganiza-
tion or a desire to keep their options open. Zambia's abstention and lack of
any official statement probably represents an attempt to protect its bilateral
ties with the USSR. But it did vote with the United States on the moti Ci
referring the Soviet-Afghan issue to the General Assembly, its Foreign
Minister has privately reprimanded the Soviet Ambassador, and its
government-influenced press later denounced the Soviet intervention.r-
7
The six nonvoting states included some, like South Africa, which seldom
participate in UN votes. The Central African Republic probably believed it
could not vote on this issue in view of the recent French operations in its
territory. The new government of Chad is strongly opposed to foreign
intervention, but probably believed its own situation was too fragile for it to
criticize anyone.I
Latin America Latin American reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been
almost universally critical. The Caribbean and Central American coun-
tries-with the exceptions of Cuba and, surprisingly, Grenada-voted in
favor of the UN General Assembly resolution calling for the removal of
foreign troops from Afghanistan. Nicaragua abstained, and only Dominica,
whose pro-US government has no representative accredited to the UN,
failed to vote. On balance, the voting confirmed other evidence that the
Soviet action has boosted the US position and has seriously hurt the USSR
in the region. rl
The USSR has done specific harm to its relations with Costa Rica-and
possibly with Jamaica and Panama as well. Costa Rican leaders have made
a direct link between the invasion and the threat posed by domestic labor
strife-allegedly abetted by Communist involvement. Action against Soviet
and Cuban diplomats is quite possible. Jamaica, which has tried long and
hard to cultivate the Soviets, supported the resolution first in the Security
Council and later in the General Assembly. Prime Minister Michael Manley
attempted privately to reassure pro-Soviet leftists among his supporters, but
adopted a public position strongly critical of the USSR. Panamanian
officials have made no comment on whether the Soviet move might cause a
delay in plans-previously set for midyear-to establish relations with the
Soviets.
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Jamaica's socialist ally, Guyana, voted in favor of the UN resolution, but
issued a very mild public statement-attributable in part to its current
desperate search for&t~rnal aid and its apparent desire to present the least
offense to any party I
Mexico cosponsored and voted for the Security Council resolution calling for
the emergency session of the General Assembly and voted for the resulting
resolution. Mexico's Security Council representative, Foreign Minister
Castaneda, characterized Soviet actions as "invasion, armed intervention."
The Mexicans also attempted to encourage the Nicaraguan representative
to speak against the Soviet action. In Mexico, however, government and
ruling party officials have made no comment and are trying to remain low-
key. Nicaragua, despite some reported internal disagreement, chose
abstention as the best way to demonstrate its nonalignment. Apparently the
Nicaraguans were surprised that the majority of nonaligned nations voted to
condemn the invasion.
Grenada's surprising decision to join the 18 largely Communist countries
opposing the resolution probably reflects Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's
infatuation with Cuban President Fidel Castro. II
In South America, all governments have criticized the Soviet invasion. The
two grain exporting nations, Argentina and Brazil, however, have made
clear that they intend to let market forces control their grain sales to the
USSR. The Soviet Union has become a key market for Argentine
agricultural products, and the Argentines, for economic reasons alone,
welcome an opportunity to expand that market. A wide variety of reporting
indicates that Argentina will ignore US appeals to reduce grain sales to the
USSR. US policies on human rights, nuclear proliferation, and military
cooperation have exasperated the Argentine leaders, who apparently see the
current grain situation as an opportunity to retaliate
The Brazilians also will continue to sell soybeans and derivatives to the
Soviets for many of the same reasons. In the past, however, the Soviets
reportedly have been reluctant to buy Brazilian soybean meal-which is the
bulk of what Brazil has to sell-fearing that it might be contaminated with
swine fever. The prospects of any significant increases in Brazilian exports to
the USSR, therefore, may be limited.
The Peruvian Government apparently has decided to forgo Soviet financing
of the economically important Olmos hydroelectric and irrigation project.
The Soviets, who had given the impression they were willing to finance the
first stage of Olmos, had been pleased about the Peruvian Foreign
Ministry's "prudent" communique of 3 January on the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, and they believed that Peru's "positive view of their conduct"
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indicated a Peruvian desire for good relations with the USSR. The Soviets
also apparently had counted on using their leverage on the Olmos project as
a means of keeping the Peruvian Government in line. The Minister of
Finance, however, with the President's concurrence, suddenly canceled a
long-planned trip to Moscow to negotiate the financing-thus effectively
scrubbing the deal-because a visit at this time would not have been in
accord with the principles of Peruvian foreign policy. The decision appears
to have been heavily influenced by the growing world consensus against the
invasion. II
The Soviet invasion has posed a dilemma for the Cuban Government.
Castro, as nominal leader of the nonaligned movement, undoubtedly felt
some obligation to take a stand against the Soviet action, but Cuba's
overwhelming dependence on the USSR brought strong pressure from
Moscow. Cuba's difficulty was reflected in Havana's reluctance to offer
immediate, unequivocal support for the Soviet position. The vital nature of
Cuba's economic and military links, however, decisively determined
Havana's position. The Cuban media eventually came out on the side of the
Soviets, and Cuba voted against the UN resolution condemning the
intervention. A lengthy Soviet military action could undermine Cuba's
efforts to woo wealthy Arab states as well as Castro's pretensions to world
leadership via the nonaligned movement. The Soviet action may place some
temporary strains on Cuba's relationship with Moscow, but it is unlikely-
by itself-to produce serious tensions 25X1
Western Europe The West European countries predictably have condemned the Soviet
invasion, and the European press, for the most part, has been more critical of
the Soviets than individual governments. Many articles compare the
situation to the 1930s and chide Europeans for not responding to Soviet
aggression in practical ways. While individual governments are united on
broad policy concepts, they are divided on what specific actions to take
against the Soviets. Most countries welcome the stronger US reaction to the
Afghanistan situation, but their own concrete steps in curtailing relations
with the Soviet Union will be carefully measured to each country's
individual requirements and will be cloaked as much as possible by the UN
and other international means 25X1
All NATO members have condemned the Soviet intervention, but divergent
national positions and domestic constraints are preventing them from
forging a strong Alliance reaction to the invasion. The British have been the
strongest supporters of US sanctions and have called for a special North
Atlantic Council meeting to endorse specific sanctions of their own. French
policy toward the Soviets has hardened, but the French still see Afghanistan
as an East-South rather than an East-West issue. The French Government
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issued a statement on 23 January that termed the Soviet invasion
"unacceptable." But France would like to preserve its special relationship
with Moscow and probably will insist that the allies respond individually to
the Soviet actions. The West Germans see the invasion primarily as a
challenge to Third World countries around Afghanistan and believe that
those states should take the lead in condemning the Soviet invasion. All
allies agree that arms control talks with the USSR should proceed. Few
West Europeans of any political persuasion believe that the crisis should
mark the end of detente. The West Germans, especially with their emphasis
on Ostpolitik, wish to keep East-West lines of communication open. 4I
0
The European Community member states clearly want the EC, not NATO,
to lead the West European response to the Soviet intervention. The EC
countries believe that an EC response might be more palatable to non-
Western countries than NATO or other US-led actions. The West
Europeans want to act together on issues with potential implications for
their own security and are more comfortable supporting US policy in a
forum like the EC, which is not dominated by the United States. At the EC
Foreign Ministers meeting on 15 January, the ministers voted to divert aid
from Afghanistan to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and to prevent West
European suppliers from undercutting US curtailment of agricultural
exports to the USSR. Divergent national interests, however, will make
support on other specific economic measures difficult to obtain. The Soviets'
detention of dissident Andrei Sakharov, however, may lead to greater West
European support for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics
West European Communist reaction has been harsh. The West European
Communists are now less restrained than initially in their criticism of
Moscow. In particular, the Italian Communist Party has hardened its
criticism of Soviet actions, while cautioning against US overreaction. The
Spanish Communist Party, as well as smaller parties, also consider Soviet
actions to be violations of national sovereignty, although they place their
comments in the context of such Western "provocations" as the December
decision to deploy new theater nuclear weapons in Europe. The French
Communist Party not unexpectedly stands out as the most supportive of the
Soviet action, as reflected in the recent conversations-highly publicized by
the Soviets-between party bosses Marchais and Brezhnev in Moscow. The
smaller Portuguese Communist Party, in keeping with its strong pro-
Moscow bent, also has completely backed the Soviet invasion.
Eastern Europe The Warsaw Pact countries varied in their press coverage of the Afghan
crisis during the first days of the invasion. Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and
East German commentary was the firmest in support of the invasion, while
Hungary_and Poland remained relatively restrained. Subsequently, with the
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exception of Romania, media coverage has assumed a uniformly militant
tone, defending the Soviet action and condemning alleged support of the
Afghan rebels by "external forces," usually identified as the United States
and China. Underneath the predictable public attitudes, however, private
feelings are varied. It appears that all of the East European regimes are
deeply disturbed by the implications of the Soviet move and concerned that
any long-term setback in East-West relations ma worsen their economic
difficulties and reduce their political latitude. 25X1
Hungary, where popular reaction is reported to be overwhelmingly negative,
has expressed the hope that bilateral relations with the United States will be
as little affected as possible. Bulgarian officials have stated privately that
they hope bilateral relations can be kept separate from propaganda matters
and will continue to improve. The Czechoslovak press has adhered to its
customary pro-Soviet, anti-US line; perhaps out of concern for popular
reaction, however, official commentary has been sparse. ( 5X1
Although East Germany's public support for the USSR remains unquali-
fied, the leadership apparently was surprised by the vehemence of the
Western reaction. Recent speeches and press reporting have played down
the Afghan situation and devoted more space to the need for detente, arms
control negotiations, and business as usual. The Poles probably fear that the
cooling of US-Soviet relations will affect US-Polish relations or, even more
importantly, overall East-West relations. More than any other East
European country, Poland has benefited from detente and needs economic
assistance from the West. According to US diplomats in Warsaw, Polish
officials are embarrassed at defending the Soviets and have expressed
pessimism about the future course of US-Polish relations despite American
assurances that the United States will seek to pursue a "differentiated"
policy toward Eastern Europe. F-1 25X1
Romania, predictably, has parted company with its East European allies; it
has refrained from recognizing the new Afghan Government, and President
Ceausescu has implicitly condemned the Soviet invasion. Privately, Roma-
nian officials have made clear their alarm over the implications of the Soviet
act and have solicited US support. At the same time, however, they have
avoided direct public criticism of Moscow and have linked the withdrawal of
foreign troops from Afghanistan with the cessation of external assistance to
Afghan rebels. In a recent speech, Ceausescu pessimistically described the
current international situation as the most tense since World War II,
warned that "wide-scale military confrontation" threatened, and exhorted
his countrymen to be prepared to defend Romania. Ceausescu also appears
fearful that a chill in East-West relations will sharply reduce Romania's
latitude to pursue its autonomous foreign policy and apprehensive that the
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Soviets may be inclined to meddle in neighboring Yugoslavia after President
Tito dies.
The Yugoslav Government has officially condemned the Soviet intervention
and expressed "astonishment" and "deep concern" about developments in
Afghanistan. Yugoslav media have challenged the Soviet assertion that the
USSR moved at the invitation of authorities in Kabul, and the press
reported with unprecedented speed the fact that President Carter sent a
letter to Tito. The Soviet intervention has heightened Yugoslav anxiety
about Soviet intentions in the post-Tito period. One senior Yugoslav official
reportedly told a group of associates that he views the Soviet action in
Afghanistan as a "blueprint" of what could happen in Yugoslavia after Tito
dies.