THE PUSHTUNS OF THE AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDERLANDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600160010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 1, 1979
• Content Type: RP

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
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The Pushtuns of the
Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands
A Research Paper
October 1979
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Foreign
Assessment
Center
The Pushtuns of the
Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands
A Research Paper
Research for this report was completed
in June 1979.
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Overview
The Pushtuns of the
Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands
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Numbering about 15 million-8 million in Afghanistan and 7 million in
Pakistan?Pushtuns constitute one of the largest remaining tribal societies
in the world. They are an aggressive, martial group of tribes. Although
loosely associated by a common language and an Islamic-based culture, they
lack cohesiveness as an ethnic group. Pushtun cultural patterns reflect their
primary allegiance to small, family-related units, and a tradition of blood
feuds and intertribal warfare. The majority of the Pushtuns lives in primitive
agricultural villages, although a minority still clings to nomadic lifestyles.
Historically independent and militantly defensive of their tribal territories,
the Pushtuns have maintained a semiautonomous status by pitting
succeeding Afghan and Pakistani governments against each other in an
effective form of political blackmail. They have been less successful in
managing the few natural resources of their arid homeland, and herding and
agriculture?the traditional Pushtun pursuits?no longer sustain the tribal
economies. The high population growth rate of the tribes and the
concomitant degradation of tribal lands are increasing Pushtun dependence
on government subsidies and on remittances from outside employment for
survival. Eventually, economic and demographic pressures may accomplish
what Pakistani and Afghan, and earlier British, regiments could not?
pacification and control of the Pushtun tribes.
The Pushtuns are numerically and politically the most important of the
ethnic groups involved in the current insurgency in Afghanistan. The
effectiveness of the tribes, however, is blunted by their preoccupation with
parochial concerns, their internecine bickerings and feuds, and their
reluctance to accept centralized leadership. The tribes may form a coalition
to defeat the Khalqi government?as they have in the past against perceived
outside aggressors such as the British?but the union would most likely
shatter after that objective had been achieved. Similarly, these consider-
ations militate against the formation of a united Pushtunistan?the land of
the Pushtuns?either as an independent unit or as part of Afghanistan or
Pakistan. Divided or united, the Pushtuns of the Afghan-Pakistani
borderlands will continue to be the dominant ethnic group in border politics
for many years to come.
The above information i
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The Pushtuns of the
Afghan-Pakistani Borderland
Introduction
Pushtuns are an aggressive, martial group of tribes
loosely associated by a common language and culture.*
Numbering about 15 million-8 million in Afghani-
stan and 7 million in Pakistan?Pushtuns constitute
one of the largest remaining tribal societies in the
world. They are a dynamic group of people, forceful,
energetic, and quick to take advantage of others for
economic or political gain. Pushtuns dominate the
political structure of Afghanistan, whether monarchy
or Communist regime, and compose a majority of the
officer corps in the Afghan Army. In Pakistan,
Pushtuns are greatly outnumbered by the equally
aggressive Punjabis and consequently have less politi-
cal influence there. They are, however, a major ethnic
component in the Pakistani armed forces.
Pushtuns inhabit the southern and eastern slopes of the
Hindu Kush, a strategic area that commands control of
the Chaman-Quetta Corridor and the fabled Khyber
Pass. Historically, Pushtun control of these routes,
connecting Central Asia and the Middle East with
South Asia, permitted tolls for safe passage to be levied
on the caravans passing through the area. In the
20th century, international transportation routes have
largely bypassed the region and the primary economic
importance of the passes today is for Afghan import
and export of goods via South Asia.
Pushtun country retains a limited value in interna-
tional politics as a buffer to Soviet expansion into
South Asia. In regional politics, the location of the
Pakistani-Afghan border through Pushtun tribal terri-
tory periodically erupts as a divisive issue between the
two countries. For the United States, Pushtun country
is a strategic area of concern on another front: the
* The phonetic spelling of the name of the ethnic group?depending
on tribal dialect differences?is Pushtun or Pukhtun in Pakistan,
and Pashtun or Pakhtun in Afghanistan. Pathan is the Hindu
corruption of the name, which was subsequently picked up by the
British to refer to these hill tribes. Pathan is still common usage in
Pakistan.
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international effort to control the production of opium
and its derivatives?morphine and heroin. Opium
poppies are a cash crop in tribal territory that has few
other sources of income. Tribal lands are arid, lacking
in resources, and overpopulated. Herding and agricul-
ture, the two traditional Pushtun pursuits, no longer
sustain the tribal economies; remittances of tribesmen
employed elsewhere and government subsidies make
up the deficit. Although economically vulnerable, the
Pushtuns will continue to be the dominant ethnic group
in border politics for many years to come. I I 25X1
Tribal Groupings
Pushtun tribal structure is based on descent from
common ancestors and is the source of most present
tribal designations. The ethnic family tree, according
to Pushtun tribal history, contains five main groupings,
each with numerous subdivisions (see appendix). In
reality, three general divisions emerge: the eastern
Pushtuns located in the lower Kabul River Valley; the
southern Pushtuns who live in the region south of
Kabul as far as Quetta and east toward the Indus
Valley; and the western tribes, the Durranis, who
inhabit a broad arc of territory from the lower
Arghandab and Helmand River Valleys eastward
toward the Iranian border.
The Pushtun pecking order reserves top status to the
plains-dwelling eastern Pushtuns near Peshawar and
the Durrani tribes in the vicinity of Kandahar. It is to
these two cities, and Peshawar in particular, that
Pushtuns look for cultural leadership. The former
Afghan royal family are Durranis?Barakzais of the
Mohamadzai clan?with close ties to Peshawar. The
plains Pushtuns in turn view the mountain tribes,
including most of the southern Pushtuns, as less
sophisticated country cousins. Pakistani Pushtuns are
likely to make derisive comments about Afghan
Pushtuns, especially the nomadic groups
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The Pushtuns speak two dialects of the common
language. The linguistic boundary generally follows
the Kurram River Valley. To the north and east, a
more gutteral, harsher version is used, phonetically
spelled Pukhtu (Pakhto in Afghanistan). To the south
and west of the valley, the softer version, Pushtu
(Pashto in Afghanistan), is more common.
The territorial limits of Pushtun tribes are based on
watersheds. Water rights are the measure for family
and clan landholdings, the availability of water deter-
mines the areal extent of a holding and its value. ri
The most important of the borderland Pushtun tribes
by virtue of their location, numbers, or militancy are
the Yusufzai, Mohmand, Shinwari, Afridi, and
Orakzai in the vicinity of the Kabul River and
Peshawar Basin and the Ghilzai (especially the
subtribes of Ahmadzai and Suleiman Khel), Wazir,
Mahsud, Mangal, and Jadran in the region of the
upper Kurram and Gomal Rivers. The Durranis,
although an influential tribal group in Afghanistan,
are not considered borderland tribesT7
Demographic Speculations
Pushtun tribal populations can only be estimated. The
latest Pakistani census (1972) does not tabulate ethnic
background. The first Afghan census was begun on
schedule on 15 June of this year, but is likely to be
inconclusive due to widespread insurgency in the
country. The overall population growth rate is close to
3 percent. The birth rate is high, estimated to be about
47 to 50 per 1,000. Death rates are also high, especially
among the young. One infant out of every 10 dies
before the age of 1 year, and four children in 10 die
before the age of 5, largely from gastrointestinal
ailments associated with poor sanitary conditions.
Those who survive to young adulthood have a better
chance of survival; however, females are prone to death
in childbirth, and males to the hazards of blood feuds.
Population of Major Pushtun Tribes (in thousands)
Major Tribe
Dialect Estimated Total
Population '
Eastern
Afridi
Chakmani
Khugiani
Mohmand
Orakzai
Safi
Shinwari
Turi
Yusufzai
Zaimukht
Pukhtu
Pukhtu
Pakhto
Pukhtu
Pukhtu
Pukhtu
Pakhto
Pukhtu
Pukhtu
Pukhtu
330
210
72
240
114
84
66
48
1,200
120
Southern
Bangash
Bhittani
Ghilzai
Pushtu
Pushtu
Pashto
Jadran Pashto
Jaji Pashto
Kakar Pushtu
Khattak Pushtu
Khostwal Pashto
Mahsud Pushtu
Mangal Pashto
Wazir Pushtu
210
54
3,000
72
35
138
240
84
120
96
240
Western
Durrani Pashto 1,800
' These estimates are based on 1961 data, and although of
questionable accuracy are useful for judging comparative tribal
size.
This table is
Literacy among the Pushtuns averages about 11 to 13
percent, but varies greatly by tribe, sex, rural-urban
status, and country. Educational levels are higher
among settled communities, in Pakistan (compared to
Afghanistan), in urban areas, and proportionately
much higher among males
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Pushtun Lifestyles: Nomadism
Versus Sedentary Agriculture
Pushtun society is primarily rural in character, clus-
tered in primitive agricultural villages with few
amenities. Only the larger villages and towns have
bazaars where supplies and services can be obtained.
More than 80 percent of the tribal population is
directly dependent in some measure upon agriculture.
Arable land is limited to proportionately small parcels
of irrigated land along streambeds, in the wider
expanses of river basins, and in the vicinity of wells or
springs. Wheat is the staple grain, with pulses, lentils,
millet, and maize among the other crops raised;
vegetables?potatoes, cucumbers, onions?are also
grown for family use. There is sometimes a small
surplus of fruit in the more fertile valleys from tree
crops such as the apricot, from vineyards (raisins), and
from vines (melons). Tobacco has been introduced as a
cash crop in some areas. Crop yields are erratic,
however, even under irrigated conditions. Few villages
are self-sufficient in food supplies and in bad years
may produce only 50 percent of their needs. F-1
Variation in house structure provides a regional
identification of sedentary Pushtun settlements in the
tribal territory. The primary unifying characteristic is
the defensive nature of the structure. Each family
occupies its own walled rectangular-shaped compound
with some provision for watchtowers. Villages, which
are usually inhabited by extended family or clan, are
sited for defensive purposes and are usually located on
a knoll or rise of land adjacent to the village fields.
Originally, the larger, older towns were walled, al-
though growth has now expanded beyond the town
walls. The defensive aspect of Pushtun architecture is
an outgrowth of the history of internecine warfare
among the tribes. Intertribal, interclan, and even
interfamily squabbles are common, frequently ending
in bloodshed. All quarters maintained by either the
Afghan or Pakistani Governments in tribal territory
are fortified.
Pushtun nomads, called kuchis or powindahs, are
easily identified by their characteristic black felt tents.
Although fewer in number in comparison to the total
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Pushtun population, their mobility and colorful
lifestyle command an aura of respect and admiration
among their sedentary peers. Nomads cling to their
way of life and resist the concept of permanent
settlement. Tolerated in Pakistan where settlement
effort is stronger, nomadism is more prevalent among
the Afghan Pushtun tribes, particularly the Ghilzais
and to a lesser extent the Durranis. ( 25X1
Nomads migrate between winter quarters in the
valleys and summer pasture grounds in the mountains.
Their flocks of sheep, in particular, are susceptible to
extremes of temperature. The summers in Pushtun
country, though short, are excessively hot, with day-
time temperatures over 37?C. The flocks are moved
from the valleys to higher elevations until the approach
of winter forces them back to lower, warmer eleva-
tions. Nomadic movement develops a seasonal rhythm
with peaks of activity during the months of May and
September-October. The timing of the spring and fall
migrations is closely orchestrated with the activities of
the communities along the route, with which the
nomads develop a symbiotic relationship. Spring mi-
gration precedes crop planting in each of the villages
along the way; the return journey in the fall is timed for
after the harvest. 25X1
Nomads and villagers are interrelated in other ways.
The villagers trade food, mainly wheat and vegetables,
in exchange for the meat, milk, and other animal
products of the nomads. The nomads are also purvey-
ors of news and gossip. One of the important aspects of
the relationship is the nomads' role as itinerant
merchants and moneylenders supplying matches, kero-
sene, cloth, and other small necessities as well as credit
to villages 11 25X1
The economic status of the nomads varies; some are
well off and others are abysmally poor. The more
affluent nomads have gradually acquired land, influ-
ence, and monetary control in many remote areas. For
example, the moneylending Ghilzai nomads are gradu-
ally pauperizing many of the Hazara, a non-Pushtun
ethnic group in the Hindu Kush highlands of Afghani-
stan. The Ghilzais, as practitioners of Islam, do not
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charge interest on a loaned sum, but a sizable "gift"?
the equivalent of 25 to 100 percent short-term inter-
est?is mandatory with repayment of the principal.
Repayment is made more difficult for the hapless
Hazara borrower because the whole sum plus gift is
due in full. Partial payment is unacceptable, and with
the extension of the loan the Hazara and his family,
who are also obligated, sink deeper into bondage to the
Ghilzai. Similar aggrandizing relationships have de-
veloped in areas of the western and northern Hindu
Kush between local villagers of other ethnic groups and
Pushtun nomads, primarily the Durranis.
Culture, Customs, and Traditions
Tribal genealogy and kinship are important to the
Pushtuns. Knowledge of place on the ethnic family tree
and of the relationship to others defines the obligations
of an individual, a family, the extended family, the
clan, and sometimes the tribe. The duties thus derived
merge with Pushtunwali, a code of moral responsibil-
ities that governs most aspects of tribal life. The code
dictates that a Pushtun, his family, and his kinsmen
must exact revenge (badal) for a perceived wrong. The
counterbalancing theme is the obligation for hospital-
ity (melmastia) and the protection of guests. To
transgress the code risks disgrace, and the ostracism
and retribution of fellow tribesmen.
Pushtun society is male dominant and oriented, and
has been characterized as patriarchal, patrilinear, and
patrilocal. The universal Pushtun custom of cousin
marriage?a boy weds the daughter of his father's
brother?perpetuates the inward-looking nature of the
society. Because of the tribal social structure, however,
male cousins almost automatically become rivals. They
vie for inheritance from the common grandfather, for
wives, and for influence within the family group.
Cousin rivalry is the root cause of many Pushtun
family feuds and is an important consideration in tribal
politics. If there are two factions within a tribe, cousins
will usually be in opposite camps. Cousin rivalry may
figure prominently in the most common causes of
breach of peace in the frontier: zar, zan, and zamin
(money, women, and land).
Devout adherents of Islam, Pushtuns are almost all
Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi sect. A few are Shi'ites,
the best known of whom are the Turis and many of the
Bangash in the upper Kurram River Valley in Paki-
stan. Among the tenets of Islam, the concept of jihad
(holy war against unbelievers) blends easily with the
natural Pushtun preoccupation with warfare. The
insurgency in Afghanistan is fanned by the tribesmen's
perception of the Khalqi government as Communist
inspired, and thus atheistic and anti-Islam. The Soviet
advisers and backers of the regime are tarred with the
same brush
Another aspect of the conservative Islamic society is
that women are secluded, protected, and generally
uneducated. Purdah as an institution among Pushtun
women, however, is slowly fading. In rural villages,
traditional conservative ways will linger, particularly
with the current upsurge of Islamic fervor, but the
longer term trend is toward more liberal standards.
The lead in Afghanistan was taken over a decade ago
among the women of the royal family and members of
the ruling elite. Pushtun women in the settled areas of
Pakistan and in the large cities of Kabul and Peshawar
have more liberties due to access to educational
opportunities and acceptance in certain areas of the
work force. Purdah restrictions are relaxed among
nomadic families and in rural villages where the
chadry or burqa, the traditional enveloping shroud,
would interfere with work in the fields. Purdah
traditions are strongest in small towns and provincial
cities.
The Pushtun reputation for democratic action?the
equivalent of one-man-one-vote?is embodied in the
institution of the jirga, the governing council in each
tribal group. A jirga is called to establish a course of
action when dealing with a particular problem. Every
adult male can have a voice in the council. A leader?a
malik or a khan?is only one among equals, who
derives his leadership through adjudicating opposing
views and commanding the respect and allegiance of
the group. The title of khan can also be an honorific for
a large landholder, herder, or anyone with high tribal
standing. Mullahs and maulanas (more highly edu-
cated Islamic scholars), the interpreters of Islam, are
influential but lack the institutional support of an
Islamic hierarchy such as exists in Iran.
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Lacking a written literary tradition, much of the
Pushtuns' cultural heritage is transmitted through
folktales and storytelling. Pushtu is an expressive
language, and among Pushtun classics is the poetry of
the 18th century bard, Khushal Khan Khattak. Music,
predictably martial in tone, is widely popular, as is
male group dancing. ri
Contacts with the world beyond Pushtun country are
inevitably introducing new ideas, growth, and changes
into tribal life. The isolation and inaccessibility of
many villages are ending with the construction of roads
and the introduction of trucks and buses. The nomadic
way of life is slowly but inexorably dissolving under
government pressure to establish permanent settle-
ments, particularly in Pakistan. Population pressures
and the economics of survival contribute to out-
migration, gradual urbanization and the lessening of
tribal ties. Increasing numbers of males are either
working in alien lands, serving in the armed forces in
both Afghanistan and Pakistan or attending colleges
and universities, generally in Kabul and Peshawar. For
those who remain behind in tribal territory, the
transistor radio has become a status symbol as well as a
window on the outside world. 1-1
Economic Realities
Economic survival in Pushtun country is becoming
more difficult. Population pressures have forced
greater numbers of males to migrate outside tribal
territory to seek work. At any given time, as many as
one in six adult males are working outside tribal
territory. Pushtuns work as agricultural laborers on the
Indus Plains, as construction workers in the Persian
Gulf oil countries, or anywhere else opportunity
beckons. They may be absent for a season or for several
years at a time. Remittances are a major source of
income in tribal territory. (El
Some Pushtun tribal groups have adopted new occupa-
tions. Notable examples are the Afridi and Shinwari
tribesmen from the region of the Khyber Pass who, like
the Sikhs in India, have an affinity for motors. They
are now truckers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particu-
larly on the strategic Kabul-Peshawar Road through
the Pass. Some tribes have developed specialities. The
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Andar Ghilzais are renowned for digging and main-
taining karez, the underground channels constructed
to tap a downslope subsurface flow of water. Mahsud
tribesmen, once feared for their treachery in combat,
have taken over a number of former Hindu businesses,
and are now known for their treacherous commercial
practices. 25X1
The Pushtuns have been quick to exploit any demand
for the area's few natural resources. The higher slopes
in the border area that receive more rainfall were
originally covered by forests. The scarcity and the
demand in the villages for charcoal, and in Pakistan for
wood as a building material, have resulted within a
period of several decades in large areas of cleared
slopes to the detriment of the environment. Close
cropping and overgrazing by sheep and goats decimate
the root structure of the remaining grasses and shrubs,
and sheet erosion and gully washers then remove much
of the fragile soil cover, leaving more and more areas
rocky and sterile. Once devastated, these slopes do not 25x1
respond well to reforestation efforts. The incentive
remains: logs and firewood are one of the high-value
commodities in the cross-border smuggling trade.n
Trading in opium is a special problem in tribal
territory. In Pushtun country east and north of
Peshawar opium poppies are cultivated legally under
the aegis of the Pakistani Government. Production
from illicit cultivation in uncontrolled tribal territory
in the borderlands is openly available on the black
market in the bazaars of the Khyber Pass. Total
tonnage of illicit opium produced in tribal territory
increases annually. The estimate for 1979 is 600 to
1,000 tons, up from an estimated 200 to 300 tons in
1970. Attempts to introduce substitute crops have-had
mixed success. No other crops have comparable
monetary returns for the grower, and especially for the
tribal middleman. Afghanistan has no allotment for
legal opium production, although much of the opium
entering the illegal market originates there. With
declining revenues from other sources, the Afghan
Government would undoubtedly like to exploit tribal
expertise and share in the income from the legal sales
generated in Pakistan and India. (T1
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The insurgency in Afghanistan is having widespread
repercussions among the Pushtuns of the borderlands.
Whole villages in dissident frontier areas have fled into
Pakistan. There are now more than 200,000 tribesmen
in refugee camps, most of whom are Pushtuns, and an
unknown number who are taking shelter with local
kinsmen. The summer crops in their deserted villages
have not been planted; moreover, crop yields in the
fields of those villages still inhabited are expected to be
lower because of reduced runoff from last winter's
deficient snow cover in the mountains. Even if the
insurgency abates within the next couple of months,
food supplies in the border areas of Afghanistan are
likely to be low until the summer of 1980.T7
The Borderlands
The boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan was
established in a treaty between Great Britain and
Afghanistan in 1893. Called the Durand Line, it
represented the furthest penetration?but not con-
trol?of the British Empire. The British used various
means to monitor the frontier, including periodic
forays of shows of force into tribal territory, the
establishment of outposts and forts, the building of
roads to connect and supply the military garrisons, and
subsidies to tribal leaders. 11
The methods used by the successor Pakistani govern-
ment to control the Pushtun tribes have differed little
from those initiated by the British. The tribal groups in
the more settled agricultural regions in the valleys of
the Indus River tributaries have gradually been
incorporated into the administrative structure of the
North-West Frontier Province, but the groups along
the border itself remain semiautonomous. Effective
administrative control of the Pakistani Government
extends to the border only beyond Quetta, in the
Khyber Pass, and in the upper Kurram River Valley.
Although the border frequently follows high ridge
lines, it is not impenetrable. Numerous passes provide
ease of movement along the border, which has been
termed a "sieve." Because of the terrain, however, the
border is difficult to police. On the Pakistani side,
natural lines of communication follow the generally
east-west oriented tributaries of the Indus. The
middle-to-lower reaches of these rivers typically flow
through hill-surrounded basins, which are centers for
sedentary agriculturalists, and in which a fair-sized
tribal town is located. Peshawar, Kohat, and Bunnu
are examples of Pushtun centers in "settled districts."
Beyond these basins, toward the border, adjacent
slopes steepen and valleys narrow to become defiles?
excellent country for guerrilla operations. Well
adapted to their land, the Pushtuns are adept at the art
of ambush and are among the best guerrilla fighters in
the worll
The British established military posts such as Wana
and Fort Sandaman in these frontier regions and
constructed a road between Quetta and Peshawar to
connect these outposts. The road, which traverses the
tribal-dominated hill lands between the river valleys,
was built with subsidies to the tribes for construction,
and subsequently for maintenance and protection
(periodically, sections of the road deteriorate over-
night?with tribal help). The construction of roads in
tribal territory is always a contentious issue. The tribes
view a road as facilitating political as well as military
control. As recently as several years ago, tribal
objections halted construction of a road into Mohmand
territory north of Peshawar. Nearby, the Afridis and -
the Shinwaris have never permitted roads to penetrate
their mountain homelands in the Safed Koh where the
border follows the highest ridge lines.
On the Afghan side of the border the transport grid
reverses. The easier natural communications corridor
follows the Logar Valley, traversing a low divide to the
broad Arghandab-Helmand River Plain?the route of
the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat Highway. Connecting
roads that serve the borderlands to the east traverse
more difficult terrain. The present insurgency in
Paktia Province and the siege of the Afghan Army
strongpoint at Khost are based on insurgent control of
the latter easily interdicted routes.
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The location of the border cutting across natural routes
of movement up and down the valleys of the Indus
River tributaries has had a special meaning for the
Ghilzais?one of the largest and most nomadic of the
Pushtun tribes. Their territory lies to the west of the
border in Afghanistan, and the placement bisected
their traditional annual migration routes. Beginning in
the early 1970s, the border passes have been closed
periodically by the Pakistani Government, shutting off
great numbers of the Ghilzai from their customary
winter pastures near the warmer Indus Valley plains,
where many of the men worked as seasonal laborers.
The dislocations caused by the border closings and the
general Pakistani policy of discouraging the annual
migration of the nomads have had wide reverberations
in the Ghilzai economy and lifestyle. Some have
established new winter quarters in the valleys on the
Afghan side of the border; others have continued their
cross-border migrations more surreptitiously, expand-
ing their roles as nomad-merchants (smugglers).F1
The location of the border in tribal territory has been
an important factor in Afghan politics. The Pushtuns
are numerically the largest, and politically the domi-
nant, ethnic group in the country. For them, the
concept of a united Pushtunistan?the land of the
Pushtuns?has been a periodic political battle cry.
They call for self-determination for the Pushtuns?
that is for those in Pakistan?and presumably
relocation of the border from its present location
eastward to the Indus escarpment. The irredentist
approach of succeeding Afghan governments has had
progressively less appeal for Pushtun tribal leaders in
Pakistan, who seem to prefer greater autonomy for
their areas within Pakistan to political union with their
Afghan brothers. The lack of a united front on this?or
any?subject underscores the individualistic nature of
the Pushtuns.
In practical terms, the location of the border in tribal
territory has proved to have both political and eco-
nomic advantages for the Pushtuns. By pitting the
Afghan and Pakistani Governments against each other
in an effective form of political blackmail, the tribes on
both sides of the border have managed to retain a
greater degree of autonomy through the years than
7
1 6 0 0 1 0 - 1
would probably have been possible had they been
under the sole authority of either government. Eco-
nomically, differences in the price structures in the
Afghan and Pakistani economies have permitted a
thriving cross-border flow of trade?regarded by
nonlocals as smuggling.
Outlook
Traditionally, Pushtuns have exploited the location of
their tribal territory as a source of revenue and as a
means of preserving their semiautonomous status.
They have been less successful in managing the few
natural resources of their arid homeland that sustain
agriculture and herding. The Pushtuns' high popula-
tion growth rate will intensify pressures on iribal lands
and will increase their dependency on government
subsidies and outside employment. Thus, economics
and demographic pressures are eventually likely to
accomplish what British, and later Pakistani and
Afghan, regiments could not?pacification and control
of the Pushtuns.
Pushtun institutitnis suess independent action of small,
family-related units. The reluctance of the Pushtun
tribes to accept centralized leadership is limiting the
effectiveness of the Afghan Pushtuns' resistance to the
present Khalqi regime in Afghanistan. The tribes may
form a coalition to defeat the Khalqi government, as
they have in the past united against perceived outside
aggressors such as the British, but that union is likely
to shatter when that objective has been achieved.
Similarly, the historical record of the Pushtuns'
concentration on parochial concerns, with internecine
bickerings and feuds, militates against the formation
of a united Pushtunistan either as an independent unit
or as part of either Afghanistan or Pakistan. The
Afghan Pushtuns' preoccupation with the
Pushtunistan cause, however, is likely to keep that
issue an important factor in border politics for many
years to come. n
Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81600401R000600160010-1
25X1
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25X1
25X1
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?
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Confidential
APPRTUslittitf?1141titdirelititirfgrifibes, Population Density, and Migration Routes
Murgab
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? 9374.
IDASHT-E K SH
Oal'ey-ye Cat
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-.(C)Sargodha
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kh5ns-ur
.3330
DAS 14
Amritsar
hirpan
oLyallpur
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E MARGO .2359
pin Erridak
hairan
Khojak Pass
Major Groups Tribes
Eastern NONE SAFI
Southern GHOLZAO, VrAZOIE JAJI
Western TOKHI
Pak
Muzafi. .arh
Approximate limit of Pushtun tribal
territory
Area of greater population density
in Pushtun territory
Migration and Dispersal Routes
Spring ...?????"10. Fall
Summer pasture ground
Province boundary Asactabad province capital
Lodhr5n
Nushki
MFrilaveh
Broad-gauge railroad
(5' in U.S.S.R., 5'6" in Pakistan)
Narrow-gauge railroad
Road Track or trail
Airfield
Spot elevations in feet
Scale 1:2,690,000
25 50 75 100 Kilometers
50 75 100 Statute Miles
15
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
?
9
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,
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Appendix
Major Genealogical Groupings
11
Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81600401R000600160010-1
Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81600401R000600160010-1
THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS
I. THE WESTERN AFGHANS
SHERANIS
(Sulaiman Mountains)
URMARS
(Kaniguram, Logal, Peshawar)
SPIN TARINS
(Chatiala area south
of Loralai; some
in Baluchistan)
TOR TARINS
(Pishin Valley)
ZIRAK
I
I I
POPALZAIS ACHAKZAIS
I \NURZAIS
I
ALIZAIS
I
ISHAKZAIS1
I
1 ALIKOZAIS
BARAKZAIS
(Branches have
ruled Afghanistan
SADDOZAIS since 1826)
(One branch
ruled Afghanistan I
1747-1818) MOHAMMEDZAIS
DURRANIS
or
ABDALIS
(Afghanistan)
PANJPAI
(Current Afghan Royal
Family styles itself
Yahya Mohammedzais;
Family also called
"Musahibans")
(All in Afghanistan)
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Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81600401R000600160010-1
THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS
II. THE EASTERN AFGHANS
GHORYAKHELS
or
GHORAM
KHAKHAY
KHELS
MASIS
(Quetta)
SHIN WARIS
(Ningrahar
and Khyber)
KHETRANS
(Baluch Border)
YUSUFZAIS
(Dir, Swat, Buner;
extend east of
Indus into Black
Mountain area)
MANDANR
YUSUFZAIS
(Mardan and Swabi)
GIGIANIS TURKLANRIS
(Dorba) (Bajaur)
KHALILS DAUDZAIS MOHMANDS
(Peshawar and adjacent border area)
CHAKMANIS
(Kurram and Peshawar)
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Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81600401R000600160010-1
I
THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS
III. BITAN (BITANI or BHIT)
I
BHITTANIS
(Bannu and Tank, on
east flank of Wazir
and Mahsud areas)
I
I
I
MATIS
I
LODIS
I
NIAZIS SIANIS DOTANIS
1
(Isa Khel and Mirnwalis; (South Waziristan;
many are Powindahs) many are Powindahs)
I I
BILUTS SURS LOHANIS
(Paniala)
I
GHILZAIS
or GHALJI
(Afghanistan; largest
Pushtu-speaking tribe;
generally nomadic)
I
MARWATS, BARBAKS
DAULAT KHEL, etc.
(Bannu, Tank, and vicinity;
many are Powindahs)
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Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81600401R000600160010-1
THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS
IV. GHURCHUSHT
KAKARS
(Zhob, Loralai,
Sibi, and North
Baluchistan)
MANDO KHEL
or
MANDOZAIS
(Zhob)
I I I I
PANNIS SAFIS MUSA KHEL GADUNS
(Sibi, north (Peshawar, (Afghanistan- or
of Quetta) Bajaur border) Baluchistan JADUNS
border) (Mardan and
Hazara districts
of Indus Valley)
Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81600401R000600160010-1
THE PUSHTUN TRIBES
MAJOR GENEALOGICAL GROUPINGS
(PUKHTU SPEAKERS)
V. KARLANRI
(PUSHTU SPEAKERS)
UTMAN KHEL
(Peshawar
border)
ORAKZAIS MANGALS
(South MAQBILS
Tirah) ZADRANS
(JADRANS)
(Khost)
DALAZAKS
(Only small
clusters remain
of once great
tribe; in Indus
Valley)
KHATTAKS
(Kohat,
Peshawar,
Mardan,
South of
Nowshera)
TURIS
JAJIS
KHUGIANIS
(Kurram area)
AFRIDIS
(North Tirah,
Bazar, Khyber,
Kohat Pass)
WAZIRS
BANGASH
(Kohat
Kurram)
AHMEDZAI UTMANZAI
WAZIRS WAZIRS
(South ( North
Waziristan) Waziristan)
DAURS
or
DAWARS
(Bannu,
Tochi)
GURBUZ
(Khost)
MAHSUDS
(Central
Waziristan)
BANNUCHIS
or
SHETAKS
(Bannu,
Tochi)
01
Approved For Release 2006/02/21 : CIA-RDP81600401R000600160010-1