THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS AND PAKISTAN: PROBLEMS FOR ISLAMABAD AND MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000600140008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: IM

ro@tqRM- Release 2
Foreign
Assessment
Center
The Afghan Insurgents and
Pakistan: Problems for
Islamabad and Moscow
Secret
PA 80-10030
January 1980
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Summary
Pakistan: Problems for
Islamabad and Moscow
The Afghan Insurgents and
One of Pakistan's immediate worries in the wake of the invasion of
Afghanistan is that Soviet operations against rebellious tribesmen there
will lead to Soviet incursions into Pakistan.
So far, the Afghan insurgents have not depended heavily on Pakistan for
help or the use of territory. If the Soviets push the insurgents back toward
the border areas, however, Pakistani support could become crucial. Pakistan
might be unable, even if it were willing, to comply with Soviet demands to
curtail insurgent activity. The Soviets would attempt to deny the use of
Pakistan to the insurgents, and Moscow could decide to take military action
on Pakistan's side of the border against the insurgents, or even against the
Pakistanis.
This memorandum was prepared b ear East South Asia Division, Office of 25X1
Political Analysis, an R-EE Division, Office of Political Analysis. It 25X1
was coordinated with A e OJJice Strategic Research and the National Intelligence Officers
for Near East and South Asia and for USSR-Eastern Europe. Research was completed on
21 January 1980. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief
Afghan Task Force, 25X1
i Secret
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Insurgent Strongholds
0 Area of insurgent activity
anal Ka
Pesha
Afghanistan
?+ National capital
0 Province capital
-- Railroad
Road
---- Track or trod
Pass
Terrain too high and/or steep
for airmobile operations
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The Afghan Insurgents and
Pakistan: Problems for
Islamabad and Moscow
Insurgent Use of Facilities in Pakistan have been useful to the Afghan insurgents but not
Pakistan essential to the survival of the rebellion. Almost all insurgent operations
have been launched from within Afghanistan, and much rebel action has
taken place in areas that are not contiguous to Pakistan.
Although the Afghan tribesmen are able to purchase weapons and
ammunition in Pakistan, most of their military supplies were either in their
hands before the insurgency began or have been obtained-through
desertions and capture-from the Afghan military. Some insurgents
probably have been trained in tribal areas in Pakistan and have stockpiled
military supplies and even taken prisoners to Pakistan. The rebels, however,
control enou h territory in Afghanistan to obviate the need for bases in
Pakistan.
Some exile groups maintain headquarters in Pakistan and use it as a base for
directing propaganda at both the Afghan people and the foreign press. The
contribution of these groups to the amorphous, tribal-based insurgency in
Afghanistan, however, has been minimal. 25X1
Despite repeated public denunciations by Kabul and Moscow of Pakistani
aid to the insurgents, there have been no serious border incidents. Cross-
border shellings have been brief and ineffective. Occasional air raids have
been made by single planes, and their penetration has usually been too
shallow to give the Pakistanis time to intercept them.
Moscow and Kabul are aware of the risk of pushing Pakistan into retaliatory
action or greatly stepped-up aid to the rebels.IPakistani leaders 25X1
have limited themselves 25X1
to diplomatic protests to avoid increasing tensions with Afghanistan and the
USSR.
The Refugees The Afghan refugees-who Pakistani officials predict will soon number half
a million-could become a major point of contention. Despite Soviet and
Afghan charges, there is no solid evidence that the refugees have played
more than a marginal role in the insurgency. Most are the very young or are
women and elderly men who are unfit for military action. Although some
undoubtedly have joined the insurgents, and insurgent groups have
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occasionally entered Pakistan under the guise of refugees, most refugees
have fled Afghanistan simply because it became too dangerous. But
Pakistani territory makes an important-contribution to the insurgency by
providing a safe haven for the families of rebels.
The Pakistanis do not have much control over the refugees. Only a small
percentage-less than 2 percent by one estimate-live in government
camps. Most have either been living with related Pakistani tribes (many
tribes live on both sides of the border) or have built numerous encampments
without government permission or assistance.
The refugees are less of a domestic political problem for Islamabad in the
border areas than they would be in heavily settled areas away from the
border. Furthermore, forcible return of the refugees to Afghanistan would
be unpopular with fellow Pathans in Pakistan, would probably be resisted by
the refugees, and might reduce their number only temporarily.
In the past, despite the formation of several short-lived fronts, rivalries
among the various exile groups have limited their effectiveness. Now under
pressure from both the Pakistani Government and events in Afghanistan,
the groups appear to be moving toward a more lasting coalition that could
lead to the formation of an Afghan government-in-exile. Although such a
coalition would have major difficulties in directing insurgent activities in
Afghanistan, it could serve as a more effective channel for foreign assistance
to the insurgents. The establishment of a government-in-exile, moreover,
would inevitably undercut the legitimacy of the Soviet-backed regime in
Kabul.
Establishment of a government-in-exile in Pakistan would annoy the
Soviets. Pakistan is clearly able to prevent the exiles from operating openly
in Peshawar, the major city near the Afghan border. Moscow and Kabul
could hardly view the establishment of a government-in-exile on Pakistani
soil as anything but an indication of increased Pakistani support for the
insurgenc
Problems for Even if it wanted to, Islamabad would have difficulty controlling the supply
Islamabad ... of arms to the insurgents from Pakistan. Although the Pakistani Govern-
ment may have indirectly supplied some weapons to the insurgents through
related Pakistani tribes, most of the military supplies obtained in Pakistan
by the insurgents have been purchased from private dealers.
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Both the manufacture and sale of Pakistani copies of foreign arms take place
in areas where many Pakistani laws do not apply and where enforcement has
always been difficult. Although the Pakistani Government could clamp
down on the arms trade-which operates openly-it would risk a backlash
in tribal areas, and Islamabad could not eliminate manufacturing and
smuggling completely.
Pakistan would also have difficulty restricting the use of Pakistani territory
by insurgent groups. Most of the border is uncontrolled and unmarked. It is
ignored by the tribesmen who seasonally migrate across it. Pakistan could
make cross-border movements more difficult, but only with considerable
effort and by moving more military units to the Afghan border. This could
lead to clashes with the insurgents and with Pakistani Pathans, who are
always sensitive to government control in the North-West Frontier Province.
The government might be criticized more widely in Pakistan for appearing
to knuckle under to the Soviets. 25X1
Any Pakistani effort to crack down on insurgent activity could also bring
foreign criticism. In Islamic countries-including those important to
Pakistan, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran-this action would be seen as
aiding the Communist effort to suppress Islam
... and for Moscow The question of how to deal with insurgent use of Pakistan already seems to
be preoccupying Moscow. The Soviets have publicly charged that the
insurgents are making extensive use of Pakistan and receive substantial
foreign support there. Moscow may have an exaggerated notion of the
support the insurgents are receiving. In any event, Moscow is undoubtedly
concerned that the United States and China -will use Pakistan to funnel
supplies to the rebels. 25X1
At least in the short term, while Soviet forces are involved in consolidating
their hold in Afghanistan, border raids by the Soviets are unlikely. At an
official level, Moscow-anxious to avoid pushing Islamabad further toward
the United States-is now seeking cooperation from Pakistan on the
insurgent issue and saying that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan poses no
threat to Pakistan. The Soviets, however, have coupled this approach with
pressure to close the border and move Afghan refugee camps away from the
frontier. Soviet officials also are spreading the word that Moscow reserves
the right to take military action against the rebels in Pakistan. It is possible,
that if Moscow thought President Zia was about to decide to increase
support for the rebels, the Soviets might undertake a military action against
Afghan targets in Pakistan to indicate the danger of such a course.
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Over the longer term, it seems likely that Moscow will become involved in
protracted efforts to quell the insurgency in Afghanistan. In such
circumstances, the Soviet interest in curtailing insurgent use of Pakistan is
likely to mount. If Soviet counterinsurgency efforts are fairly successful,
they probably will force many rebels along Afghanistan's eastern frontier to
flee and make them more dependent on facilities in Pakistan. On the other
hand, the more difficult and costly the anti-insurgent campaign becomes for
the Soviets, the more pressure there will be on Soviet political leaders to
authorize military action into Pakistan. In either case, the Soviets may
conclude that an effective end to the rebellion would depend on the
elimination of a safe haven in Pakistan for the insurgents.
Initially, Moscow would intensify pressure on Pakistan to deny its territory
to the insurgents. If Pakistan were to defy Soviet demands or become more
extensively involved in supporting the insurgents, the Soviets might take
more aggressive action. Given the damage to the Soviets' international
position that has resulted from the Afghan invasion, Moscow is unlikely to
be significantly constrained from such action by anything short of the threat
of military counteraction.
Soviet Military Options Moscow's first military response might be to try to seal the Pakistani-
Afghan border. This would be a very difficult task since the long border is
crossed by trails at thousands of points. The high altitude and difficult
terrain-particularly north of the Khyber Pass-and the prospect of
nighttime movement by the rebels limits the effectiveness of Soviet airpower
and mobility. The Soviets, however, could control movement through the
main passes. The Soviets probably would also be able to disrupt the
movement of large groups and substantial amounts of supplies, but so far the
insurgents have not had to depend on an extensive logistics system.
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If the Soviets moved against the insurgents in Pakistan, they would have
several options:
? Moscow could use Afghan forces against Pakistan in the hope of
forestalling sharp international reaction. In view of the growing ineffec-
tiveness of the Afghan military, such a course would seem to offer little
hope of disrupting the insurgents.
? The Soviets could relax restrictions on their forces aimed at preventing
violations of the border. Under such a policy some border violations would
be inevitable but probably not serious enough to lead to a confrontation
with Pakistan. This most likely would do no more than make it marginally
easier for the Soviets to deal with insurgents on the Afghan side of the
border.
? The USSR could allow hot pursuit of rebel bands. More serious border
violations would result, and the chances of clashes with Pakistani troops
would increase. Nevertheless, depending on the size and depth of Soviet
penetrations, Islamabad might try to avoid a response as long as possible,
perhaps until it was clear that the penetrations were deliberate policy and
became widely known in Pakistan.
? Moscow could raid rebel camps in Pakistan, either on the ground or by air.
Because the camps are small and dispersed, such raids would have little
effect on rebel capabilities, but they would increase the risk of a response
from Pakistan. Pakistan would almost certainly appeal to the United
States and China for assistance.
? Soviet forces could attack Pakistani facilities-for example, tribal gun
factories or even Pakistani military installations. Islamabad would have
difficulty regarding raids of this type as anything but an act of war. Any
government that failed to react strongly would face severe domestic
criticism and might fall. Moscow would be unlikely to risk such action
unless it was confident Pakistan could not count on outside help. In such
circumstances, Pakistan might have no choice but to give in to Soviet
pressure.
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