KUWAIT REACTION TO EVENTS IN TEHRAN AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R000500130024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: January 10, 1980
• Content Type: CABLE

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FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5193
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRICRITY 5107
RUFHPS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 1067
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3206
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0997
RUGMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5680
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0599
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2607
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1800
RUGMDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0087
RUGMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 2884
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0553
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA'PRIORITY 6657
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTCUM PRIORITY 0705
RUFHUK/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3658
RUGMAM/AMEMEASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4243
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY'2310
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0442
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCI?MOTT PRIORITY 0162
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RAEAT PRIORITY 0646
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2328
RUGMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 1478
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1236
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0785
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0878
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S E C R E T KUWAIT 0168
`E.O. 120651 RDSw1 1/9/90 (DICKMAN.:F.M.) OR-M
TAGS! PEPRs SCULL M.POL. IR: AFs KUs XFs SOPN
SUBJECTS (S) KUWAIT REACTION TO EVENTS IN TEHRAN AND AFGHAN
STAN
REFS MANAMA 0031
1. ?(S - ENTIRE TEXT),
2. SUMMARY. KUWAITI REACTION TO EVENTS IN TEHRAN
AND AFGHANISTAN CONTINUES TO REVEAL A DEPRESSINGLY
PROFLUND DISTRUST OF ThE UNITED STATES. THIS IS
REFLECTEDIN'THE PRESS. THE KUWAITI TENDENCY TO TAKE
CONTINGENCY US DEPLOYMENT IN THE AREA MORE SERIOUSLY
THAN THE ACTUAL SOVIETiINVASION OF AFGHANISTAN.
THE STATE OF.KUWAIT'S DISILLUSIONMENT WITH US POLICY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ANC ATTEMPTS BY YOUNG KUWAITIS
TO FIND NEW SPIRITUAL VALUES NOT TIED TO THE EAST
OR THE WEST. WASHINGTON'S COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF
ISSUES DOES NOT WORK. WITH OUR KUWAITI FRIENDS WHO
SEE?`AFGHANISTAN AS PART OF A BATTLE BETWEEN SUPER-
POWERS AND EVENTS IN TEI-'RAN AS SYMBOLIZING A NEW
ISLAMIC FORCE SEEKING-TO DEFINE A SET OF VALUES
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE WEST. END SUMMARY*
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3. DESPITE OUR INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO REVIEW EVENTS IN
TEHRAN AND AFGHANISTAN WITH WIDE GAMUT OF KUWAITI
OFFICIALDOM AND SOCIETY, KUWAITI REACTION GENERALLY
CONTINUES TO REVEAL A DEPRESSINGLY PROFLUND DISTRUST
OF THE UNITED STATES REFLECTING A DIFFERENCE IN
POLITICAL PRIORITIES ANC A DESIRE TO IDENTIFY WITH
A FORCE THAT IS NEITHER WITH THE WEST NOR THE
EAST. THIS DISTRUST IS MANIFESTED IN DIFFERENT WAYS.
A) THE NEWSPAPERS HERE, THOUGH
HISTORICALLY CHARACTERIZED BY THE EMBASSY AS NOT
REPRESENTATIVE OF RESPONSIBLE KUWAITI OPINION9 ARE
CARRYING EVERY KIND OF SLANDER ABOUT AMERICA. THEY
DO GIVE LIP SERVIC-TO THE IMPROPRIETY OF HOLDING
DIPLOMATS HOSTAGE IN TEHRAN, AND TO THE ILLEGALITY
OF THE SOVIET INVASION CF AFGHANISTAN; BUT THEY
EMPHASIZE, AFTER NODS IN THESE DIRECTIONS, THAT BOTH
EVENTS MAKE GOOD POLITICAL CAPITAL:FOR PRESIDENT
CARTER. THEREFORE THESE EVENTS ""MUST"' HAVE TAKEN
PLACE WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE USG. THESE PAPERS
ALLEGE THAT, SINCE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE WAS AWARE
OF THE MASSING OF SOVIET TROOPS NEAR AFGHANISTAN,
AND AMERICA DID NOTHING ABOUT IT, USG PROTESTS ABOUT
THE SOVIET' INVASION MUST BE ONLY FOR THE RECORD.
IT FOLLOWS, IN THEIR CCNSPIRACY.THECRY ORIENTATION,
THAT THE USG MUST HAVE-AGREED IN ADVANCE WITH THE
RUSSIANS. IF THE RUSSIANS ARE TO HAVE AFGHANISTAN,
THE ARGUMENT GOES, THAT THE USG MUST HAVE RECEIVED
RUSSIAN ASSURANCES EITHER THAT IRAN WOULD FALL TO OUR
SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, OR AT LEAST THAT RUSSIA WOULD NOT
INTERFERE AS WE DEPLOYED SECRETARY BROWN'S
100,000 MAN EMERGENCY FORCE INTO THE GULF 50 AS TO
CONTROL OIL SUPPLIES, UNDER THE EUPHEMISM OF PROTECTING
FRIENDLY STATES.
B) STATEMENTS APPEARING IN US-MEDIA DISCUSSING
HYPOTHETICAL US EMERGENCY DEPLOYMENT IN THE
REGION IS TAKEN MUCH MORE SERIOUSLY BY RESPONSIBLE
KUWAITIS THAN IS THE ACTUAL SOVIET INVASION OF
AFGHANISTAN. THERE-ARE.SEVERAL REASCNS FOR THIS
ATTITUDE. AFTHANISTAN 15 STILL A GOOD WAYS AWAY.
THERE ARE SC MANY ARTICLES THAT RUSSIA IS GOING TO
FIND ITS "VIETNAM", ASINVINCIBLE-AFGHAN MOUNTAIN MEN
DO TO THE SOVIETS WHAT THEY. HAVE.D.ONE TO.INVADERS IN
THE PAST, THAT KUWAITIS RATIONALIZE THAT IT IS A CIA
TRICK. THE US HAS LURED THE RUSSIANS TO A LONG DRAWN
OUT AND DEBILITATING CONFLICT. WHILE HISTORIANS HAVE
WRITTEN ABOUT RUSSIANtASPIRATIONS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN
OR CONTROL OF THE GULF AND ITS OIL, AMERICAN
POLITICIANS CONTINUE TO SPEAK OF THE NEED
TO. DEPLOY FORCES TO PROTECT THE FLOW OF OIL AND THE
REGION GENERALLY, RECENT OFFICIAL AMERICAN STATEMENTS
REGARDING SENDING TEAMS TO DETERMINE AVAILABILITY
OF MILITARY FACILITIES IN THE REGION OR ADMISSION
THAT US MILITARY AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN IN EGYPT FOR TRAINING
EXERCISES ARE SEEN AS CONSTITUTING ALMOST AN OF.FIAICL PROMISE
OF USG INTERFERENCE IN'ARAB AFFAIRS; WHEREAS-SOVIET ACTIONS IN
AFGHANISTAN STILL FALL FAR SHORT OF SUCH A DIRECT THREAT IN
THEIR EYES.
C) THERE IS NOW SUCH A STATE OF DISSILLUSIONMENT
(REFLECTED IN REFTEL) WITH US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
OVER THE ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION THAT MANY OF OUR KUWAITI
INTERLOCUTORS ARE NOT~REALLY WILLING TO.LI.STEN ANYMORE
TO OUR ARGUMENTS, TIME AFTER TIME, . SINCE. THE-EMBASSY
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IN TEHRAN WAS OCCUPIED. FRIENDLY AND RESPONSIBLE KUWAITIS
HAVE (1) COMMISERATED ABOUT THE DIPLOMATS HELD HOSTAGE
ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. BUT (2) ASKED US WHAT WE COULD
EXPECT IN THE WAY OF REAL ARAB SUPPORT IN VIEW OF OUR
CONSISTENT IGNORING OF ARAB AND PALESTINIAN RIGHTS
VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL. THERE ARE SOME WHC AGREE WITH
US WHEN WE POINT OUT THE ESSENTIAL :IRRELEVANCE OF
.PALESTINE TO IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN. SOME ALSO AGREE THAT LIKE
KHOMEINI'S HATRED FOR THE SHAH. KUWAITI UNHAPPINESS WITH US MIDDLE
EAST POLICY BLINDS THEM TO DANGERS OF RUSSIAN ENCROACHMENT. BUT
THEY MAKE THE POINT THAT WHEN USG.HAS MADE ITSELF
UNBELIEVABLE AND UNTRUSTWORTHY ABOUT-AN ISSUE CLOSE
AND VITAL TO ARAB HEARTS. THE US CANNOT BE FULLY
TRUSTED AND BELIEVED ON OTHER ISSUES.
0) THERE IS A RENEWED DESIRE ESPECIALLY AMONG
YOUNG KUWAITIS TO RETURN TO SOME KIND OF SPIRITUAL
VALUES. THE US REMAINS IHE SYMBOL OF MATERIALISM
AND EXPLOITATION AND PLEASURES. KUWAITIS HERE TELL US
THE MOSQUES ARE NOW FULL OF YOUNG PEOPLE, THOSE IN THE
TWENTIES FAR OUTNUMBER ALL OTHER ATTENDEES. WITH
DEPARTURE OF NASSER AND LACK OF ANYONE TO REPLACE HIM
AS POLITICAL LEADER IN THE ARAB WORLD. THEY
ARE LOOKING FOR A NEW SPIRITUAL LEADER. KHOMEINI DOES
NOT EXACTLY FILL THE BILL BUT THERE IS A SEARCH FOR
NEW SENSE OF VALUES WHICH ARE NOT IDENTIFIED EITHER
WITH US OR WITH SOVIET UNION.
4. WE HAVE FOR SOME TIME, IN-PREVIOUS GORM EXERCISES
FOR EXAMPLE. POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE JUDGED OUT HERE
PRIMARILY BY OUR ARAB-ISRAELI POLICY. AND THAT KUWAITI
'PERCEPTIONS OF OUR FAILINGS IN THAT AREA SPILL OVER
AND AFFECT OUR RELATIONS ON UTTERLY DIFFERENT
MATTERS. IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN. TWO DRAMATIC INSTANCES
IN WHICH WE REALLY WANT ACTIVE KUWAITI SUPPORT, ARE
PERFECT ILLUSTRATIONS OF THIS THEME. AS A FOREIGN
MINISTRY DESK OFFICER-TOLD US RECENTLY IN CONTEXT OF 4
DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN. "WE WOULD BE WITH YOU ONE
HUNDRED PERCENT IF IT WERE NOT FOR YOUR BLIND
FAVORTISM_FOR ISRAEL." WHILE TMIS IS AN EASY OUT, IT
REFLECTS. COMMONLY HELD ATTITUDE THAT THE US CANNOT
EXPECT REAL HELP FROM THE ARABS ABSENT PROGRESS ON THE
ARABS' CENTRAL POLITICAL CONCERN w- A STATE
WHICH MEETS BASIC PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS.
5. THE KUWAITIS. AND WE BELIEVE-OTHER ARABS T00,
ALSO SEE US AS COMPARTMENTALIZING ISSUES FAR TOO EASILY.
FROM FOGGY BOTTOM, THE CONTINUED DETENTION OF THE
HOSTAGES STRIKES AT FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR RATIONAL
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGE AND REPRESENTATION IN THE WORLD
AND AFGHANISTAN IS A GLOBAL STRATEGIC MATTER HAVING
NOTHING TO DO WITH=PALESTINE. FROM-THE KUWAITI
PERSPECTIVE, EVENTS IN TEHRAN ARE SEEN AS SYMBOLIZING
ANEW ISLAMIC FORCE SEEKING TO DEFINE A SET OF VALUES
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF-THE WEST. AFGHANISTAN IS SEEN
AS PART OF THE ENDURING BATTLE BETWEEN THE TWO
SUPERPOWERS, WITH THE USG TAINTED BY ITS CONTINUED
LARGE MATERIAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL WHILE
ISRAEL PERMITS THE EXPANSION OF SETTLEMENTS ON THE
WEST BANK IN THE FACEtCF OFFICIAL /AMERICAN STATEMENTS
THAT THEY ARE ILLEGAL.
6. WHILE WE HAVE NO INTENTION CF.CHANGING OUR
APPROACHES ON TEHRAN AND AFGHANISTAN, WE SHOULD
REMAIN-AWARE THAT WAhT AND WE B IEVE OTHER
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ARAE GULF COUNTRIES WHICH ARE AMONG CLOSEST TO
IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN,- CONTINUE TO SEE THEIR
SECURITY AND EXISTENCE AS BEING DETERMINED FIRST BY
WHAT HAPPENS IN PALESTINE AND SECOND BY WHAT
HAPPENS ON THE OTHER SICE OF THE GULF. AT THE SAME
TIME, BEING BUFFETED BY ANTI-ISLAMIC BRUTALITY OF
THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN AND US ATTEMPTS TO
STIR THEM UP ABOUT KHOMEINI?S'INIGUITIES, MANY
KUWAITIS SEE THIS AS A PLOT WHOSE MEANING THEY DO
NOT YET FATHOM. FOR THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF
KUWAITIS, IT TENDS TOAEINFORCE THEIR
DESIRE TO FIND A NEW LEADERSHIP WHICH AT LEAST
WILL EMPHASIZE PIETY AND SELF ABNEGATION AND WHICH
CAN PROVIDE SOME REASSURING EXPLANATION FOP THE
CONFUSION AROUND THEM,
DICKMAN
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